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Abstract 
Despite modernisation and legal intervention, the practice of dowry in India today continues, 
although prohibited by state law. Traditional academic discourse tended to link dowry practices to 
Sanskritisation, denying the validity of dowry as a normative marital custom, strengthening calls 
for a legal ban. While India’s Dowry Prohibition Act (1961) appears to outlaw dowry, in reality it 
continues to respect the practice as custom and even makes room for it. Initially the statute 
allowed Rs 2000 as a token dowry, post the 1980s amendments this amount was rasied to Rs 
5000, in keeping with the rate of inflation at the time. Overlooking this aspect of the statute, 
current academic discourses fail to adequately address what causes the persistence of dowry. This 
thesis considers how and why dowry has long defied legal prohibition and continues today as a 
major determinant in ‘ideal’ marriage alliances. Thereby this thesis aims to fill a gap in the 
current understanding of dowry as a normative marital custom. 
In this thesis I interprete the giving and taking of dowry as sadācāra (good collective custom), 
in spite of legal, and public agitation and moral bans. Methodologically based on legal and textual 
anthropology, this inquiry explores the triangular interaction of traditional cultural texts, modern 
statutory law as another form of text, and social customs old and new. In such complex ancient 
textual roots lie the murky but discernible workings of dowry as sadācāra, or dharma with a very 
small ‘d’. Relying specifically on an academic appraisal of the role that anthropology and history 
continue to play in the construction of South Asian worldviews, the thesis demonstrates that 
within textual tradition lie the notions of an uncomfortable and intensely plural legal modernity, 
which continues to use medieval and more ancient customs while striving for a progressive 
future. This thesis argues that the ancient Brahma form of Hindu marriage remains the idealised 
kanyadān model for modern Hindu marriages. I argue that kanyadān veritably imbues dowry 
within it.This analysis confirms that text has always had a limited influence over the development 
and maintenance of socio-legal norms in Indian society. Traditional cultural texts tend to assert 
certain ideals rather than reflect social reality. However, the modern social practise of dowry as 
‘good custom’ even the right thing to do in the form of ‘living law’ harmonises the various 
contradictions in the light of marital expectations, old and new. The three theories of 
Samskritisation, Orientalism and Feminism overlay the central argument of the thesis, which is 
that the custom of dowry is and has been and continues to be a socially sanctioned necessary part 
of Hindu marriage. Let us set a working hypothesis, then. Dowry as a cog of culture works. It has 
a proven life of its own; it has successfully operated for a minimum of three thousand years, give 
or take a century. It refuses to go away. This confirms that the statutory abolition of dowry in 
Indian law is merely a textual fiction that serves a variety of agenda. Then perhaps, it is fair to 
stake an assumption that dowry is necessary to Hindu or Indian marriage in some way. This thesis 
therefore suggests that dowry law reform must consider alternative methods to protect women. 
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Warli etching: Circle of Solidarity in ancient pictorial terms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Seen here in an ancient wall painting, represents the cosmic harvest dance of a universe 
in harmony. Every cog in place, each member playing their part, therefore the circle of 
solidarity as I see it is harmonising society through connectivity with nature.This is 
clearly visible as a means to balance and stabilise human relations to each other. This 
ancient cave-painting style etching, practised today as a modern art form, by the 
Maharashtrian Warli community harks back to a period before recorded literature to 
demonstrate social belief in linking with nature and each other to reinforce harmony. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction  
 
India in 2012 is sustaining economic growth in spite of a global financial crisis (Ninan, 
2010). For the past five decades India has seen consistent consumerist growth, mirrored 
also in dowry-related practices (Saavala, 2010), and the death by homicide or suicides of 
some 25,000 women in India each year is still linked by the media to dowry.1 Defining 
dowry in general terms remains problematic. The Oxford English Dictionary defines 
dowry in general terms as “property or money brought by a bride to her husband on their 
marriage”. As a marriage-related practice, dowry in different forms exists almost 
universally and is not unique to the specific cultures of Indian communities. To set the 
current social context; questions have been raised over decades about why dowry as 
practised in the South Asian, even Indian, context apparently leads to conflict, and to the 
deaths of  many young women. The establishment has stopped seeking answers. This 
thesis asks, why? 
In discussing the role of dowry in tradition and text this thesis takes up three 
issues. One, the dowry expectations found in the cultural texts, collectively called śāstra 
in this study. Two, it questions the position of the Indian Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961 
(DPA),2 a legal statute regarding the practise of dowry giving and taking in Indian social 
reality. And finally, it considers the curious nature of dowry behaviour as it appears in 
usage across Indian communities, both at home and abroad, presenting itself almost as a 
‘living law’ (Ehrlich, 1936). One of the core concepts this thesis deals with is that of 
sadācāra, which has variously been translated. It is a compound term comprising the two 
Sanskrit words sad or good and ācāra behaviour. But here this core concept, present in 
classical Hindu law (Menski, 2003: 31), is considered the collective conscience 
represented by the good behaviour of good people.3 This brief explanation should clarify 
the notations of the various ancient and classical Hindu law terms in the title of this work. 
‘The Circle of Solidarity’ as presented in photo plate 1 and the diagrammatic 
                                               
1 See “1 dowry death every 4 hrs in India”, an article on the Zee News channel’s dedicated website, 
updated on Monday, December 2007, http://www.zeenews.com/news414869.html. See also Dowry Today: 
An overview, a documentary on perceptions of dowry in India today (2003). 
2 Throughout this thesis, the abbreviation DPA includes the original statute of 1961 and its subsequent 
amendments made in the 1980s. 
3 Menski (2003: 31) for instance translates it as ‘model behaviour’ because of the implication within this 
judicial and moral orbit of the term as an official source of Hindu dharma. 
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representation of the whorls of harmony as widely perceived by Indian communities is 
necessary to ground this thesis in its cultural context. Everything is linked: typically   a 
is considered the widest whorl, or encircling boundary that guides all right behaviour. In 
a Hindu law sense, this would be further guided by the cosmological guidance of   a 
macrocosmic harmony (Miller, 1985), while the inner whorl of dharma4 relates to 
microcosmic harmony. Additionally, both are linked by belief to a set of texts, originally 
oral. In the case of   a this co-relates to  r     or the received wisdom contained in the 
Vedic mandala or collections, while dharma is seen to relate to what is considered s     
or the remembered wisdom of a people, as contained in a copious collection of dharma 
texts, also collectively called śāstra. These are fluid terms, and do not always have 
defined rigid boundaries as one might expect of usual sociological categories. 5   a is 
linguistically very close to the Hindi word riti in common usage today, which represents 
a harmonic repetition with particular reference to ritual.6 The thesis employs these terms 
here as such, in a manner similar to their social usage. However the presence of a 
glossary will guide the reader by assigning broad meanings for the purpose of clarity. 
Both the Warli (an ancient tribal art form of Maharashtra) photo plate and the diagram 
construct a view of Hindu social life as being cyclical, constantly linked, constantly 
renewing, and somehow constantly aware that history is an ongoing ritual of peeling and 
unpeeling whorls of culture. 
Do dowry expectations appear to be (Chapter 5) woven into the very fabric of the 
most highly emulated of all ancient marriage forms Brahma as described by the cultural 
texts? Further, how does this apparently idealised and pure marriage form relate to what 
has been encoded as the official modern Hindu marriage enshrined by the positivist state 
law into the HMA (1955). This after all is the expected type or form of marriage that will 
be followed by all those marrying officially under Hindu rites. A burgeoning middle class 
in India today have had a specific impact on this as well. The only academic study on 
dowry linking traditional and modern India was released eight years ago (Oldenburg, 
2002). This claimed that dowry did not originate in ancient Indian customary practice. I, 
                                               
4Dharma is a concept, indeed a category, that cannot be satisfactorily translated, see Doniger and Derrett’s 
(1978: xiv-xv) incisive discussion on its relationship with the concept of duty in ancient and contemporary 
India. See also Kunst (1978: 3-18). 
5 The terms tradition and custom are used inter-changeably in this study, reflecting similar usage at ground 
level. It seems meaningless to assign fixed sociological definitions to these terms, since sociological 
terminology finds no representation in the minds of those who dynamically act out these terms in life.  
6 For example in India the modern Hindi term rit-riwaj, incorporating riti (tradition) and riwaj (custom), is 
used widely to refer to both concepts. 
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and others, find otherwise. This thesis suggests, that dowry is very much part of the 
cultural textual tradition of India (and indeed South Asia), and has been so from its 
earliest inception. Further, the research evidence produced here confirms that while the 
modern legal tradition appears to outlaw dowry as a custom, in reality it makes room for 
it. Initially a token sum of Rs 2000 was considered acceptable by law, this was amended 
to Rs 5000 in the 1980s, accounting for the rate of inflation at the time. It appears 
therefore that the prohibitive dowry statute of 1961, with its various amendments during 
the 1980s is some kind of symbolic, even myopic legislation, and therefore this thesis 
argues that the whole strategy of tackling the ‘dowry problem’ must be urgently re-
assessed. The intervention of normative positioning creates a conflict where none existed 
before. The DPA does not in fact decree that no dowry whatsoever should be given or 
taken, but it seeks to curtail exploitative practices. 
My thesis is concerned with the inscription in society and law of a particularistic 
notion and set of practices comprising of dowry, deemed ‘right’ or desirable ‘good 
custom’, as probably contained within the idealised form of the ancient Brahma marriage 
type. This social approval seeking is what according to ancient Hindu legal terminology 
has been called sadācāra or simply, ‘good custom’ which may be explained further as a 
good social norm. As clarified this thesis casts the concept further to include the wider 
collective community conscience. However, in modern India, dowry is considered 
negative, and yet it appears integral to the Indian wedding ceremony.7 The main aim of 
my thesis is to examine, analyse and explain this somewhat contradictory articulation.  
 
1.1 Thesis focus: The persistence of dowry as a problem 
Why does dowry persist in Indian communities if it is so problematic a custom? After all 
there is the Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961 in Indian law. Does the presence of this 
prohibitive statute, instituted almost fifty years ago, not curtail the performance of dowry 
as a customary practice? Latest recorded reports highlight that there are 19 dowry-related 
deaths a day, or one death every 75 minutes, according to the National Crimes Bureau All 
                                               
7 India Today of 31st January 2004, in a Special Issue on Youth Power, reported that a representative survey 
across India found that 25% of respondents thought it was ok to receive dowry, but 79% did not believe in 
extravagant weddings. Though dowry as a custom is practised variously by different communities, the 
defining principle appears to be similar in most cases. Some communities for social or political reasons 
shun dowry, like the Gandhians who consider dowry the consumerist aspect of marriage. It is therefore not 
a uniformly followed practice. 
 
 
14 
India statistics.8 Governmental intervention, by instituting a statute in law, clearly has not 
worked in this field. This thesis questions why, in spite of a prohibitive statute law 
(DPA), dowry exists as a strong marriage practise across Indian communities, at home 
and abroad?  
The primary focus in this thesis is to build the foundation for my argument that 
text is a form of tradition9 itself. As noted in the very title, in terms of Hindu legal 
terminology: śāstra is sadācāra, śāstra as represented by authoritative cultural text, and 
sadācāra as represented by custom or tradition as the case might be in the form of a 
collective community conscience. One flows from the other, but may not seem to do so. 
Although I argue that texts are compilations of idealised traditions, in the case of dowry 
we have the initial difficulty that this is a custom never clearly mentioned by name in the 
traditional cultural texts. It appears therefore to have no clear ontological origin. 
However, there are copious expectations noted in various layers within the literature, 
which lend themselves to examination. This thesis questions whether dowry is somehow 
entrenched within the notion of a ‘model marriage’, as represented by the most ancient 
verses. And that this ‘model’ is upheld as the most exemplary of sacred unions, in the   a 
sense; always to be replicated by the human unions being sought in the dharma sense. 
The marriage hymns of  gveda X.85 and Atharvaveda Book 14 may hold clues to this. 
Of particular concern to the present study therefore is the notion of dowry rooted 
in the traditional  rah an  a ca  patriarchy that has taken precedence across India as a 
tradition that is adhered to, believed in, and has been carried forth through generations, 
reinforcing patriarchal norms despite legal bans. As a matter of fact the very emulation of 
the Brahma marriage form associated very closely to various dowry marriages today as 
the norm attests this historical process. Is there, therefore, a conceivable link between the 
three: (i) the ancient model of marriage found in the old verses of  gveda X.85 and 
Atharvaveda Book 14, (ii) binding it by practise to the model marriage in medieval times 
as perpetuated by the Brahma form attested in the Mahābhāra a and (iii) finally linked by 
definition and auspiciousness to the model contained in the legally defined Hindu 
marriage as contained in the Hindu Marriages Act (1955)? What evidence exists to 
clarify these connections?  
                                               
8 The National Crimes Bureau refreshes its website with monthly updates of these figures, for detailed 
statistics see www.ncrb.org. Also, see Table 3: All India Dowry Death Index (1991-2000).   
9 See chapter 2 for a discussion of the correlation between tradition and religio. 
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Although, this is not yet another legal dissertation, focusing on the tired old topic 
of “dowry in India”, it sets out an examination of law in terms of law making, seeing this 
as a social process in the anthropological field of human society. Further, this thesis 
focuses on the question of whether law is governed by social behaviour, or by textual 
tradition. Therefore, the topic of dowry, in text and tradition, is examined in terms of 
social reality governed by notions of ‘living law’. The manner in which this thesis 
examines law as a social process is by clearly casting dowry behaviour as a legally 
controllable phenomenon in the past and present. Rather, it examines text and custom in 
order to distinguish the old established practice of dowry as separate from dowry-related 
deaths and murder, both in the past and in the present. In seeking evidence to understand 
how dowry functions this thesis scrutinises expectations from two specific layers of texts: 
broadly the modern legal texts and the traditional cultural texts. A specific delineation of 
the various types of text this thesis tackles is dealt with in section 1.3 below.  
Dowry represents a traditional marriage custom and is therefore uncomfortable to 
admit in an up surging global modernity. In the past decade there has been little 
movement on any front dealing with dowry. On the academic front, the last dedicated 
publication appeared a decade ago (Oldenburg, 2002). On the social reform agenda, 
tackling dowry-related issues meaningfully seems to have been shuffled down to the last 
row, as though it were no longer important. Recent efforts at reform, by government-led 
agencies, have removed dowry from the immediate public agenda, filing these away as a 
mere aspect of domestic violence and the wider issue of gendered violence. It would 
appear that dowry per se has lost its priority with policy makers. In spite of the high 
officially recorded rates of death linked to the practice of dowry, the social reform agenda 
is seeking to protect women in other ways. It also seems as though dowry as an issue has 
been forgotten for almost a decade. Social work groups, initially funded by the 
government have been disbanded as pointless. Therefore, the urgency for this study arises 
from a desire to set in motion a fresh approach to understand the wider framework of 
dowry practice, to better inform meaningful policy making for women.  
The practice of dowry persists. Dowry as a customary marriage practice thus 
needs re-examination through tradition and in the form of text. Due to the persistence of 
dowry practice in real life this thesis examines specifically the historical articulation and 
interaction between traditional cultural texts and modern statutory law indicating the 
relevance and importance of dowry to Indian marriages. As all things Indian, there are as 
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many types of Indian marriage as there are communities in India. Indian marriages are in 
no way bound in a code of cultural behaviour that is uniform, in spite of the presence of 
the HMA. The emphasis is always on plurality. We must recognise that local variations 
of every specific community set the standard of marriage for that specific community. 
However, while taking note of these local variations this study seeks to understand the 
conceptualisation and practice of dowry in traditional and modern Indian marital 
expectations and arrangements, in an attempt to understand the persistence of this 
custom. The primary analytical aim is to examine, analyse and explain the co-relation 
between social practice and the ancient and modern textual tradition in determining a 
seeming agreement that dowry must be practised as a form of ‘living law’,10 equated here 
for Hindu purposes as sadācāra.11 Briefly, the notion of social approval seeking is what 
according to ancient classical Hindu legal terminology is called sadācāra in the past. This 
thesis stretches this definition to include collective community conscience, even the right 
thing to do. The ‘good’ of this conscience is taken as being inherent in its essential form. 
How can one therefore, outlaw what is conceived to be ‘the right thing to do’? 
Traditional academic writing has linked dowry to the process of Sanskritisation;12 
which is the gradual acquisition of higher caste symbols by members of lower castes and 
classes seeking upward social mobility (Srinivas, 1984: 7-14). In the past dowry as a 
‘custom’13 has been cast in various roles: as a construct created by the over-zealous 
taxation system of the East India Company (Oldenburg, 2002) in order to encourage 
“conspicuous consumption” (Thakur, 1998: xvi), or as an invention of the patriarchal 
system to rob daughters of their inheritance (Kishwar, 1999: 20-23). This also ties in with 
the hypergamous ethos of Indian marriage culture, (see section 4.3 below). The dominant 
trend in Indian academic research and among nationalist writers has been, as Jamison 
(1996: 3-4) rightly asserts to glorify the past position of Indian women.14 This thesis 
                                               
10 For a further explanation of the term ‘living law’ see Ehrlich (1936) and also iin more detail below. The 
contributions of several forerunners of this concept have highlighted the “cultural nature of law”: Wundt, 
Savigny, Hegel, Maine, Post, and Kohler (Chiba, 1986: 4). 
11 See section 2.5 below for an in-depth discussion. 
12 For a specific examination of Sanskritisation to religiosity in the modern middle classes in India see 
Saavala (2010: 156-169). In a connected discussion also see a much earlier work Velben (1911) 
13 When highlighted by single quotation marks the term ‘custom’ denotes the implications of the popular 
understanding of custom as traditional family and community practices sanctioned by society at large and 
not the academic sociological phenomenon of a precise vehicle of culture.  
14 However, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century women writers developed a critique of 
the traditional,  rah an  a ca  cultural practices. These writers sought to clarify that the “golden age” might 
not have been so golden after all. See in particular Pandita Ramabai’s The High Caste Hindu woman 
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takes the view that traditional texts assert certain ideals rather than reflecting social 
reality. Dowry appears to be underwritten as integral to marriage transactions and is 
perceived as good customary practice. It is not prescribed, but it is suggested that – 
sensibly used – it is actually part of dharma. This thesis therefore examines the futility of 
banning dowry in the light of marital expectations old and new. Despite modernisation 
and legal intervention, the practice of dowry in India continues today outside the scope of 
formal law. This demonstrates that modern statutes, as text, have limited influence on 
social practises. Further, that deeper cultural concepts, which are found in the older texts, 
other than legal statutes, and of course within socio-cultural processes themselves, remain 
an important influence of current socio-cultural practices. 
Accordingly, my research tracks a two-pronged path: First, after discussions of 
textual anthropology in chapter 2 and legal anthropology in chapter 3, it outlines a 
conceptual model for traditional dowry expectations as an accepted custom in terms of 
economic interaction between families in society (chapter 4). Second, it highlights the 
fact that dowry as a custom might not be as problematic as it has been made out to be by 
rather myopic attempts at lawmaking. I therefore emphasise that modernist law making 
on dowry has introduced a conflict of expectations which cannot be resolved as originally 
planned by those who wish to use law as a method of social engineering. In fact the 
formal modern law demands one ideal and society continues to conform to another. In a 
post-modern world we therefore have come to the realisation that there is a new conflict 
between text and custom. This thesis deals mainly with two types of texts: firstly, the 
traditional cultural texts comprising the early Hindu ritual texts and secondly the modern 
texts, comprising the modern law books and statutes. In my opinion, as indicated, the 
whole DPA of 1961 is some kind of symbolic legislation even myopic, which gives this 
statute as text a rather different status than lawyers and a wider public have been led to 
believe (section 2.2). The emphasis to continue things as they have been practised for 
generations gives a sense of harmony and propriety to society. Dowry, this suggests, has 
the force and influence of such a harmonising custom.  
My assertion is that dowry and dowry-related practices, both during and after the 
marriage, are governed by these fluid rules operating within the jurisdiction of custom. 
This gives them the force of tradition and links them with unwritten sanctions, should 
                                                                                                                                            
(1888), Tarabai Shinde’s Sri Purusa Tulana (1882). For further detail see O’Hanlon (1994) on Tarabai 
Shinde; Chakravarti (1998); and Ramabai (1984) [1888]. 
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there be any abrogation.15 Therefore we cannot start at the point of the inefficacy of the 
law; rather we need to question and examine the efficacy of custom or sadācāra. Dowry, 
I argue, is clearly representative of sadācāra as defined above, and since this concept is 
interlinked with custom we must examine how ‘custom’ itself functions in the Indian 
context and is made to work, though of course there will be abuses, as in any social 
context. I argue therefore that from the earliest verses what has been preserved is a 
complex combination of custom and idealisation, which seeks to influence ‘right’ 
behaviour and to thereby become a norm, although it is imperative to consider that these 
norms still remain fluid, flexible and also subject to selfish exploitation  
Methodologically the concept of ‘legal pluralism’ is important to this thesis as a 
conceptual back-bone. Briefly, this approach highlights law as just one feature in a social 
field, stressing also that law may take many forms (Moore, 1978). This is the starting 
point, then, for a social understanding of the literature of ancient India and its 
anthropological relevance to legal analysis today, and it highlights the particular 
methodological approach employed in this study. Geertz (1973) espoused the idea that 
culture is a semiotic concept and equated ethnography with interpretation, or the reading 
of text. He explained that the purpose of cultural analysis should be a quest for 
interpretation and meanings, not a search for the truth, in his words: cultural analysis 
should “not be an experimental science in search of law but an interpretative one in 
search of meaning” (Geertz, 1973: 5). Importantly, it is unsatisfactory to study law in 
isolation from its social context. The thesis therefore combines these two aspects, guided 
by comparative law scholarship that is influenced by recognition of the cultural 
dimensions of law (Chiba, 1986: 1; Menski, 2000: 69). Dowry expectations here are 
examined as a part of marriage arrangements. The ancient Hindu texts are re-read in 
order for an adequate picture to be unearthed and drawn of the economic expectations at 
play before and during marriage negotiations. 
Tradition, as highlighted in the title of this thesis, has again received renewed 
attention recently. In legal theory, it seems tradition manifests itself with fresh emphasis 
on the critical role of social forces acting within legal analysis (Menski, 2000). This also 
                                               
15 It is uncomfortable for grooms who refuse dowry. The girl’s family may believe their capability is being 
doubted, this ties in with Raheja (1996) and Marriot’s (1955) findings that there exists a hierarchical 
asymmetry between wife-givers and wife-takers. This has been borne out by discussions with friends in 
India, particularly in the case of  ayesh, who admitted being deeply troubled with his bride’s family 
insisting on expensive functions and several gifts, even after the wedding.  
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appears to be brought on by a set of internal circumstances, which were examined using 
an international social science survey of western society in the early 1990s (Inglehart, 
1995: 47).16 Most notably, this survey highlighted a “post-modern shift” over the last 
twenty-five years or so of the twentieth century, characterised by a gradual move away 
from “rational-legal authority” toward “self-expression”. In order to meaningfully situate 
the argument in the wider context of the universality of law making and legal sources it 
becomes imperative to note H. Patrick Glenn’s (2004) perspectives in this area. Glenn 
(2004: xxiv) holds that both political and social theory have begun to recognise, once 
more, the validity of ‘tradition’ as a possible means of “maintaining social coherence”. 
This concept underlies the discussion here, whether tackling modern or ancient law 
making agenda, and will be taken up further at some length (see, chapter 3). 
 
1.1.2 Thesis scope: The misguided dowry debate 
Why does dowry persist? In order to establish the wider scope of this thesis it is crucial to 
discover how dowry has long defied legal prohibition and why it continues as a major 
determinant in marriage alliances today, good and bad, notwithstanding the legal ban. 
Further, it becomes pertinent to examine what constitutes the so-called ‘dowry debate’.17 
This raises questions about the nature of contemporary dowry discourses and why they 
seem to have failed in the real search for solutions. Journalists and activists have pursued 
the issue of the gruesome suicides and homicide related to dowry demands, while lawyers 
and academics examine another aspect of solving the ‘dowry problem’ (Menski, 1998). 
Many activists are abandoning their previous commitment to the anti-dowry campaign 
because answers have been so hard to come by (Kishwar, 1988: 10-13; Agnes, 2001). 
While modern attitudes and texts in the form of the DPA of 1961 sum up dowry as 
negative, traditional Hindu texts set in the context of a patriarchal society seem to 
endorse dowry. The dowry statute law was deliberated over for a decade (see chapters 2 
                                               
16 This is a report on a 43 nation World Values Survey, carried out in 1990-1. 
17 The phrase ‘dowry debate’ must be distinguished from ‘dowry problem’. In this thesis the former refers 
to the media’s construct of dowry as a social evil, carrying implicit dimensions, while the latter refers to the 
academic construct on research issues surrounding dowry. See Menski (1998), discussing South Asian 
dowry problems faced by South Asian communities in Britain, India and South Africa. 
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and 6) before the passing of the DPA, categorically criminalising the practice of dowry, 
but to little effect.18 
My research directly addresses long-standing assertions that, dowry giving did not 
originate in Indian traditional custom (Srinivas, 1984; Witzel, 1995; Thakur, 1998). 
Additionally more recent academic assertions (Oldenburg, 2002) confirmed this claim. 
Such efforts to dissociate dowry from Indian history continue. Such a stance is deeply 
problematic, seeking once more the mistaken golden age ideaologue now associated with 
the politically motivated Hindu Right. This study clearly finds that dowry as a ‘custom’ 
was neither the construct of an over-zealous East India Company to encourage 
“conspicuous consumption” (Thakur, 1998: xvi), nor the construct of a patriarchal system 
to rob daughters of their inheritance (Kishwar, 1999: 20-23). Rather, my research finds 
there are indeed underwritten expectations that influence normative behaviour to uphold 
the practice of dowry as part of an appropriate, even ideal marriage, as the findings here 
affirm. The normative behaviour I speak of here takes the form of the customary 
collective social conscience or sadācāra. How this is achieved will be here examined. 
More specifically, as briefly seen above, this thesis argues that the ancient 
Brahma form of Hindu marriage, typified by the kanyadān (gift of the girl),19 which 
remains the idealised model for modern Hindu marriages in India, despite various 
reforms, which have also sought to outlaw the phenomenon of dowry.  My thesis is 
concerned with the inscription in Indian society and law of the particularistic notion and 
set of practices comprising of dowry behaviour, deemed ‘right’ or desirable ‘good 
custom’ or sadācāra contained within this idealised form of Brahma marriage. In these 
complex ancient textual roots lie the murky but discernible workings of dowry as an 
intricate and fail-safe system using the notion of sadācāra, or model behaviour of the 
peer group, to perpetuate itself.  
This thesis begins the discussion (chapter 2) by focussing on the conflict between 
the subaltern views of India and the need to recognise itself as a powerful democratic 
nation state, with an elevated position on the world stage after years of struggle against a 
colonial reality. Just laws, civil society and a formal legal system are of course the 
                                               
18 Numerous dowry convictions continue to be made under section 498 A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) 
of 1860, often referred to as the dowry section of the IPC, since it deals with cruelty in marriage and is 
applied to apprehend perpetrators of dowry-related violence (Palkar, 2003: 181-4). 
19 Whether appearing as one word or two the concept of kanyadan remains the same: kanya-unmarried girl 
and dān-gift. 
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fundamental provision of such an entity. Dowry, seen as restrictive to modernity is also 
seen as representative of the old traditional marriage and the mention of it must be 
dispensed with at least by paying lip-service to it being rooted out. The modern 
establishment will time and again quote the existence of the statute as proof that dowry is 
indeed gone. Therefore in the contemporary context, particularly in India, it seems that 
people are aware of the legal ban on dowry (Jaising, 2000). It is hard to ignore the 
spiralling statistics of dowry-related deaths, so dowry is publicly condemned as a social 
evil. An estimated 25000 women are killed or severely maimed every year (Thakur, 
1998; Menski, 2003: 307).20 There is little doubt that the increased incidence of dowry 
deaths in India and in ex-patriate Indian communities is a problem of considerable 
magnitude. However, to put the number of deaths in perspective: many millions of 
marriages are contracted in India every year with some form of dowry changing hands. 
Not all end in the killing or suicide of the bride as a direct result of dowry. Dowry itself 
cannot be the sole reason for the dowry problem. Indeed, more recent research, as yet to 
be published (Wyatt, 2010) suggests that the so-called ‘dowry problem’ has much more 
to do with relationship problems and conflicts than with the financial arrangements in 
marriages. If that is so, then, what is ‘the dowry problem’? 
In a post post-modern world, it seems that we therefore have a new conflict 
between text and custom, because law today claims to defy or at least attempts to defy 
patriarchal principles and upholds individual rights instead.21 There is renewed focus on 
the importance and validity of ‘tradition’ as a “fruitful field” and thus a valuable source 
for legal concepts, both in the west (Glenn, 2004) and the east, (Chiba, 1986; Menski, 
2002). Therefore, bearing this renewed broad research agenda in mind the focus here is to 
build the foundation for my argument that text is tradition itself. In Hindu legal 
terminology, this would mean śāstra is sadācāra. Tradition, I argue, in turn is text itself, 
maybe an oral text or a non-textual text, but a form of script nevertheless. One flows from 
the other, but may not seem to. To be clear: I argue in the main that texts are compilations 
of idealised traditions. When dealing with dowry we have the initial difficulty that this is 
                                               
20 In the last couple of decades deaths of young brides have been variously named: ‘bride-burning’ and 
‘dowry death’ are two terms coined to categorise this phenomenon linked to marriage customs. More 
recently ‘dowry murder’ has been added to the terminology. For a detailed study of the cultural 
ramifications of this crime see Oldenburg (2002: 3-18). 
21 This raises the question whether the custom of dowry is blameworthy in essence. The intent is not to seek 
“golden beginnings” but to examine the nature of custom as separate from the practice, to sift the ideal 
from the actual. (See Nietzsche: Rabinbow, 1984). 
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a custom never clearly mentioned by name in the traditional cultural texts. I search 
therefore for expectations within the literature and for the possibility of locating 
traditional terms that give away the socio-cultural reality of dowry at much earlier stages 
than most of the literature suggests. 
This study examines dowry as a complex conglomerate of culture and attempts to 
disentangle the array of issues around it by focusing on the following aims: 
1]  To formulate a meaningful conceptual model to analyse the meaning and 
perpetuation of dowry; 
2] To emphasise the dynamic relationship of custom with differing types of textual ideals; 
3] To argue that dowry has always existed as part of the Indian Hindu tradition as a 
major determinant in suitable marriage selections as the Brahma marriage form;  
4] To assess the role of the dowry statute as a well-intentioned, but misguided legal 
strategy, ultimately defeated by social norms. 
Through this historically based analysis, the impossibility for a third world 
postcolonial nation to disentangle itself completely from constructions of the older 
European imperial ideologies and its own longitudinal discourse is demonstrated. Such 
nations, with an uncomfortable colonial past and their legal systems need to find their 
own culture-specific path and place in the world. There is pressure always to conform, to 
do the right thing, to have an egalitarian society, based on certain images, old and new, of 
a ‘golden age’. Governments today function to enforce the law through legal regulation 
and a judiciary to therefore conform to the models set out by agencies that recognise 
difference as divisive. The media continues to highlight the tussle of the state with 
society. 
Unsurprisingly, thus, dowry problems and dowry-related death and murder have 
received intensive media attention. It is clearly condemned by Indian society at large and 
the image of dowry is used as a measure of India’s lack of development and, more 
recently, failure to comply with international legal standards. And yet something exerts 
an influence on parents when negotiating marriages, so that despite moral and legal 
discomfort a dowry is often transacted.22 There is little consensus on whether or not 
dowry as a custom is the main problem. As noted, recent reforms by government-led 
                                               
22 Menski (2003: 33) discusses the large scale “legal disobedience” being formatted, to some extent, as part 
of the formal legal framework. The recent fieldwork-based study of Saavala (2010) has many references to 
expectations that dowries will be given and taken. 
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agencies removed dowry from the immediate public agenda. Notably, Sakhya, a 
Bombay-based vigilance cell set up in collaboration with the State Department of 
Welfare for Women and the Maharashtra State Police, was disbanded after fifteen years 
of conducting anti-dowry research and campaigning.23 The Maharashtra State 
Government was in search of a solution to the dowry problem; since none was found, the 
project was abandoned. The government prefers to plough resources into more tangibly 
solvable problems like the rehabilitation for women rag-pickers and child prostitution. 
Not that these are not areas that require urgent attention, but is it responsible to abandon 
one project for another? Further, can one completely abandon the search for solutions to 
the dowry problem after years of tangible research? A visit to the Greater Bombay Police 
Statistics Department in May 2003 showed a recorded rise of 5% from 2002 in dowry-
related death figures for the state of Maharashtra.24 This cannot be solely due to a higher 
rate of incident reporting, as has been suggested in the past. Some socially motivated 
factor surely continues to function despite the intervention of the judiciary and activist 
groups.25 What is this forceful factor? This is what must be researched here. 
Despite modernisation and legal intervention therefore, the practice of dowry in 
India continues today outside the scope of formal law. This shows that when dealing with 
dowry as an abhorrent custom, the modern statutes are bound to have limited influence. 
The fact that modern lawmaking is unable to influence custom challenges the legalistic 
assumption that social practices can today (or could ever) directly and effectively be 
influenced by text in the form of statutes. This becomes a “limits of law” issue, then 
(Allott, 1980). Taking the example of dowry, the present thesis examines and compares 
how the early Hindu texts and modern Indian statutory law influence social behaviour 
and socially embedded practices like dowry.  
                                               
23 Dr Kalindi Muzumdar, Former Dean of the Nirmala Niketan College of Social Work and  Former 
Director of Sakhya in an interview, in April 2002, Bombay, documented as part of the present thesis in a 
documentary series entitled ‘Dowry Today: An Overview’.  
24 Unpublished data, from the Greater Bombay Police Statistics Department, given in a personal interview 
with Manjeet Singh, Deputy Director of the Statistics Department, Mumbai Police, May 2003. See also 
Table 3. 
25 See also accusations against then Women and Child Development Minister Renuka Chowdhury for 
doctoring actual dowry death statistics by Save Indian Family Foundation spokesperson Swarup Sarkar, 
who objected to the “false” cases being included in the overall statistics. Also see “More than 6,000 dowry-
related cases registered yearly: Govt” March 10, 2008 
(http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/More_than_6000_dowry-related_cases_registered_yearly_Govt/article 
show). 
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Why, despite knowing the law, do people act in contravention of it? This 
observation demands that the perception of custom and law be examined in order to raise 
the question whether the DPA has been a misguided strategy. This study suggests that we 
may be looking through the wrong end of the lens in searching for a solution to the dowry 
problem. Important to note here is that this inquiry does not claim to offer an effective 
solution to the current dowry problem, though it sets itself the task of exploring 
expectations, possible solutions and reassessing the current legal position.  
The research in this thesis is conducted using the methodology of textual and 
legal anthropology. Two processes influencing the conceptualisation and practice of 
dowry today are analysed here. First, there is the interaction of tradition, traditional text 
and custom in shaping the perception of dowry and its practice. The ideal of dharma in 
the text and the reality of custom or riti on the ground and their interaction are therefore 
crucial to consider. Second, the interaction between law and society in India today is 
analysed as another extremely complex tension between textual ideal and social reality. 
This tenuous relationship that appears to maintain order and harmony through written 
rules is examined in terms of the ideal and the actual; here the ban on dowry co-existing 
with the persistent practice of dowry itself. As we will see in more detail further on, the 
existing text of the relevant statute, the DPA, has actually anticipated that dowry would 
continue to be given. Different from the earlier manifestation of ideals in the older textual 
material, what becomes a new focus of research is how today we have a new conflict 
created by the social engineering agenda of the law. The context demonstrates that in 
order to meaningfully understand dowry in the ancient and modern context it is necessary 
to chart a course of study which accounts for this hydra-headed research issue. 
My research must therefore take an approach which accounts for the several 
aspects of the ‘dowry problem’. The two-pronged path specified above is worth 
reiterating and explaining in a little more detail.  
First, it is essential to outline a concrete conceptual model for traditional dowry 
expectations as an accepted custom in terms of economic interaction between families in 
society (chapter 4). Therefore one must consider how in the traditional context this may 
have meant that the expectations reflected in text and in social reality did not necessarily 
conflict. In a modern context, this of course has changed, this must be accounted for. 
Both the traditional texts and traditional society, as the research here will demonstrate 
(chapter 2 and 3) were based on the same patriarchal concepts, according to which 
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women moved from their natal family to the husband’s home and brought some form of 
property with them. In an early agrarian context, this implied that the bride normally 
moved without any immovable property rights to her natal home, since the family she 
married into must now take on the responsibility for her upkeep. It seems so simple and 
commonsensical. In an ancient society dominated by concepts of patriarchal joint family 
property, individual rights may not feature at all, it was the harmony of the wider group, 
in this case the joint family, which is all important. There is therefore little conflict. What 
this simplified picture does not account for is the presence of matrilineal communities 
within Indian culture as well as the fact that in real life, death and disaster may wipe out 
many family members and then leave women in positions of responsibility and of 
property ownership that the classical ideals may not have accounted for. Surely, female-
headed households are not a consequence of modern industrial society, they are an 
ancient phenomenon. Simplistic perceptions of male and female patterns of property 
ownership are, thus, going to be a potential stumbling block for understanding the 
complex pluralities within ‘traditional’ Indian societies.  
Second, highlighting the fact that dowry as a custom might not be as problematic 
as it has been made out to be by confused attempts at lawmaking, I emphasise that 
modernist law making on dowry has introduced a conflict of expectations which cannot 
be resolved as originally planned. In fact law demands one ideal and society continues to 
conform to another.  
 
1.2            Context: Problematising dowry in text and tradition 
The context of this thesis is primarily a textual context, which links ancient and modern 
concepts and practices. One of the four primary aims of the thesis, as stated above, is to 
trace the conceptual development of dowry as a custom from its earliest to its current 
forms. 
This thesis asserts the view that traditional texts assert certain ideals rather than 
simply reflecting a type of social reality. Dowry appears to be underwritten as integral to 
marriage transactions and is perceived as good customary practice, as expressed in the 
expectation of sadācāra. Given the superior status accorded to ‘custom’ by the early 
traditional texts (Derrett, 1968; 1970; Lingat, 1973; Lariviere, 1984), this means probably 
that little conflict existed between text and practice, because both were aware of the need 
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to adjust individual action to situation-specific solutions in terms of marriage making and 
giving dowries (Menski, 2003).  
In modern society, the legal text of the DPA exists in conflict with practice or the 
custom of dowry. To clarify the problem, these two layers of texts are examined here: the 
traditional and the modern, creating a combination of legal and textual anthropology. 
Further, the present analysis offers an exploration of the relationship between custom and 
modern statutory law (as another form of text), both influencing the conceptualisation 
and persistent practice of dowry in India today. It examines the ‘living law’ of dowry in 
terms of sadācāra (good custom), though it is more often simply referred to as dharma. 
The analysis thus further examines the futility of banning dowry in the light of marital 
expectations old and new.  
Academic writing has traditionally linked dowry to the process of Sanskritisation; 
which is the gradual acquisition of higher caste symbols by members of lower castes and 
classes seeking upward social mobility (Srinivas, 1984: 7-14), emphasising that this 
perpetuates patriarchal structures. This writing remains incomplete in its assessment of 
dowry as a problem in the historic past. Though existing research (Witzel, 1995) has been 
hazy about the extent to which dowry was part of ancient Indian society, the academic 
discourse positions its approach to dowry as a bad custom. It assumes that in an early 
egalitarian society “dowry in a mild form” existed (Witzel, 1995: 7). However, there is a 
serious gap in our understanding of how and why dowry exists as a persistent player in 
modern marriages. This lacuna is also addressed in this thesis. There has been additional 
controversy about whether or not dowry may be linked to traditional marriage practices at 
all. These arguments have failed to adequately address the causes for the persistence of 
dowry. My thesis aims to redress this loophole in an academic analysis of the ‘dowry 
problem’ by making the necessary conceptual link between modern, medieval and 
ancient marriage practices that formulate and embed dowry within Indian society. 
As noted above, one of the reasons for the urgent need for a thesis of this nature is 
that recent research has denied the link of modern dowry to traditional and ancient 
marriage practices, which confuses the background and context to the further study of 
dowry in the historic past (Thakur, 1998; Oldenburg, 2002).26 My research therefore must 
                                               
26 Dr Mahesh Mehta and Dr Bal Ram Singh, University of Massachusetts categorically claimed that dowry 
had no roots in Indian tradition (Friday, 3rd January 2003: 6th International Conference on dowry, bride 
burning and son preference). 
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also address claims that, “there is a widespread view that Hindu scriptural traditions 
underwrite dowry transactions. Our research so far shows that this is not correct” 
(Thakur, 1998: 212; Witzel, 1995: 1), sustained efforts of this nature continue to try and 
dissociate dowry from Indian history, implying it originated during British rule; as a by-
product of asymmetric land revenue taxation (Oldenburg, 2002: 12), arguing that by 
creating a new economic policy during the British Administration, land rights took on a 
different character, alien to the indigenous understanding of the ownership of the village 
(Oldenburg, 2002: 132).  
In response to these recent academic assertions this thesis clearly argues that 
within the ancient textual tradition, found in what can be called the ancient cultural or 
ritual texts or śāstra, there are indeed underwritten expectations that influence normative 
behaviour to uphold the practice of dowry as part of a good marriage. Part of the problem 
may well be that research to date has focussed too much on the gruesome consequences 
of the dowry problem, and not enough on the factors responsible for it. Even among 
research on the causes of the dowry problem, too little importance has been given to 
questions of pre-marital arrangements over property and expectations of dowry inherent 
in marriage negotiations. In order to reveal the various causes that perpetuate dowry, the 
analysis here focuses on traditional expectations before marriage, contained in the ancient 
texts, as well as their interpretations in recent academic writing, before examining the 
text of the modern anti-dowry law and the resulting case-law. A study performing this 
function is clearly and urgently required. 
Although dowry is an economic practice, it has rarely so far been studied or been 
defined with an economic model in mind.27 It is the intent of this thesis to provide a 
backbone to future research in this area, to motivate research and future policy guidance 
to better understand the functioning of dowry as a necessary determinant in modern 
marriages in Indian and South Asian communities. It is hoped that this intensive 
background work into the traditional normative content of dowry as a custom, with 
specific reference to law making and social practice will lead to a better understanding of 
the inter-linked issue of dowry-related deaths. Mine is neither a legal nor an economic 
                                               
27 However, see Bisakha Sen’s (1998: 75-96) analysis of dowry in economic terms, in an attempt to answer 
just this question: “Why does dowry still persist in India? An economic analysis using human capital”, 
which makes an attempt to raise and answer pertinent economically charged research issues, which must be 
further addressed by new research. 
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thesis, but it operates within the area of law making, to understand an economically 
charged custom. 
 
1.3 Methodology 
The methodology employed in this thesis follows a two-pronged approach already noted 
but further stated as below; the nature of the texts themselves will be reflected in their 
examination. Due to the multi-layered evidence which comprises the field of this study, 
the analysis follows a non-linear, inter-disciplinary path to better suit the sources. It is 
also important to briefly outline how this approach will incorporate analytical tools from 
varying disciplines in order to examine the tension between text and custom. Therefore, 
from the discussion in section 1.1 and 1.2 above, the following research questions are 
raised: 
1. How important is the textual tradition of India to the conceptualisation of a living 
law of dowry as compared to statutory law? 
2. What is the role of ‘custom’ in dowry practices? 
Exploring these questions may inform current dowry-related legal and social debates 
surrounding practices related to dowry, or more specifically the giving and receiving of 
dowry. In order to tackle the answers to these two broad research questions several 
methodological tools are used. Two relevant areas influencing the conceptualisation and 
practice of modern dowry are analysed here in particular: 
[1] The interaction of tradition, traditional cultural text and custom in shaping the 
perception of dowry and its practice. The ideal of dharma in the text and the reality of 
custom on the ground and their interaction are therefore crucial to consider. This is 
carried out through chapters 2, 3 and 5. 
[2] The interaction between law and society in India today is analysed as another 
tension between textual ideal and social reality. This is charted through the evidence in 
chapters 4 and 6. 
This tenuous relationship that appears to maintain order and harmony through 
written rules is examined in terms of the ideal and the actual; the ban on dowry co-
existing with the persistent practice of dowry itself. Different from the earlier 
manifestation of ideals in the older textual material, today we have a new conflict created 
by the social engineering agenda of the law. In an ancient society influenced by concepts 
of joint family property, individual rights may not feature as important at all.  It appears 
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that the harmony of the wider group, particularly the Hindu joint family, which is all 
important. There is therefore little conflict. The fact that dowry as a custom might not be 
as problematic as it has been made out to be by confused attempts at lawmaking, is 
important to note as I emphasise that modernist law making on dowry has introduced a 
conflict of expectations which cannot be resolved as originally planned. In fact, as stated 
above, it is important to explain why and how in the specifically Indian socio-legal 
context law demands one ideal and society continues to conform to another in the matter 
of practising dowry.  
A brief note on the sources employed in the research of this thesis is vital to set 
the methodological tone here. The primary sources record in extraordinary detail the 
concerns of a small-scale mobile, non-sedentary society. In the search for dowry through 
this vast material the research needs to remain focussed on expectations rather than 
linguistic clues linked directly with the custom alone. It is worthwhile to further identify 
what this thesis means by the term ‘text’ in the discussion that follows. All our texts from 
the ancient period have a religious leaning in some or other sense of the word. For want 
of a better term this thesis regards these as cultural texts, thereby widening their purview 
from a purely religious one. Each type of text deals with a different aspect of religious, 
cultural and sometimes domestic or even secular life. Further, the towering collection of 
translations which accompany these tomes must also be made to count. Because both 
secondary and primary sources can uncover the conceptualisation of dowry over time, the 
views of writers records the preoccupations of their time in footnotes to history. 
In this thesis I deal with two layers of texts, which for convenience I have 
delineated into two broad categories: traditional cultural texts and modern legal texts. 
First to describe what is presumed to be immediately accessible and known in the modern 
context; the modern legal texts encompass the juridical literature of modern India, the 
Constitution, the Hindu Marriage Act (1955), but far more specifically the Dowry 
Prohibition Act (1961), the Dowry Prohibition (Maintenance of List of Presents to Bride 
& Bridegroom) Rules, 1985, and all the various amendments of the dowry law during the 
1980s (see Menski, 1998). Further, the latest layer of these modern legal texts is the 
Protection of Women From Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and Protection of Women 
From Domestic Violence Rules, 2006.  
Second, the traditional cultural texts are further sub-divided into three categories 
in order to access them more easily, into ritual, legal, and literary. It is worthwhile to note 
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the classification of the ancient texts, which form the primary sources for this thesis, 
within these three categories for non-specialists. Broadly categorised for convenience as 
ritual, legal and literary, here is a brief description of each category:  
Ritual: 
What are considered the very oldest texts in the vast collection of this ancient 
culture are the four Vedas; the  g, the Sāma, the Yajur, and the Atharva. These 
four collections comprise verses dedicated to ritual formulae for pronunciation 
and recitation during ritual ceremonial practices both private and public. While 
the majority of Vedic hymns were to be used in public rituals designed to promote 
order in the macrocosmic sphere   a, certain later layers of Vedic text seem to 
focus more on the microcosmic dimension and leads towards a focus on dharma 
and thus private ordering. This is found especially in the marriage hymns of 
 gveda X.85 and Atharvaveda 14, which are examined here in some depth 
(chapter 5). 
Legal: 
What has been classified for at least a hundred years now within the wider 
academic community and considered as law codes are not just judicial or 
legislative codes in the ordinary sense (Jamison, 1996; Menski, 2003). Here we 
deal with dharma texts that are collected under the categories of śāstra and sūtra: 
the dharmaśāstra and dharmasū ra literature. 
Literary: 
The Sanskrit epics, in particular the Mahābhāra a (MBh), qualify traditionally as 
dharma texts, though ordinarily considered the realm of folklore and myth. But 
we also consider the Ramayana briefly. Both sets of texts serve as illustrations of 
dharma and thus as manifestations of sadācāra (Davis, 2004). 
Under these three broad categories I have classified the literature from the ancient period, 
for the purpose of this introduction and further for a more detailed analysis in chapter 5. 
This examination will aid the understanding of what this thesis aims to achieve in terms 
of reviewing the primary textual sources for the purpose of this research.  
 In this thesis I refer to Professor Ronald Inden’s extensive research of 
commentarial sources on medieval cultural categories maintained into contemporary 
times by Bengali society. These textual sources are relevant here as they specifically 
outline the transactory nature of marriage and the mobility of caste and clan rank through 
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marriage in medieval and modern society. The substantial sources from this medieval 
period make it possible to relate similarities to the old Vedic material with which most of 
these commentarial texts claim allegiance. Pertinently, these texts continue to be used for 
modern day marriage ceremonies, and are therefore vital clues to the nature of the 
mindsets at play. These genealogical records or books of clan rank of the Brahmans and 
Kayasthas, which form the bulk of the evidence for attitudes to marriage in medieval 
Bengal, are contained in what have been called kulaji, kula-panjika, and kula-karika. 
Written in Sanskrit, and sometimes also in Bengali these texts are considered the 
corporate property of the sub-castes. They are still recited, usually from memory, at 
marriages and kept updated by professional genealogists known as ghataka, who are a 
sub-caste in themselves. 
A caution on these primary sources is worth noting before we proceed. There is 
no iconography or visual imagery available for the people we are putting under the 
microscope in the earliest period of our study. Therefore there is an accepted paucity of 
direct testimonies,28 and of observations,29 of the men and women about whom we are 
concerned. Our primary sources are completely oral or verbal, committed to textual form 
in arbitrary fashion across millennia.30 The character of these texts is nearly always 
assumed to be religious,31 and their preservation and propagation is owed to diligent 
transmission, at first orally and then through writing, by an elite socio-economic class. In 
an attempt to transmit the verses we see today that unaltered and unadulterated extreme 
mnemonic devices were utilised so as to preserve every syllable. These have functioned 
as self-checks, it is assumed. But as has been noted (Jamison, 1996: 7), these devices are 
only as good as the next generation. We must take note of how this transmission was 
orchestrated through quasi-official organisations, the gurukuls or schools, passing from 
                                               
28 As we will see in chapter 6, the compelling nature of a woman’s dying declaration, either recorded by a 
social worker, police officer or in some poignant cases scrawled on the victim’s own body in a desperate 
attempt to have their version heard. During the early period of our study we sadly have no such records. 
29 In modern day cases we have the verdict of judges, which guide and track the overall nature of society’s 
abhorrence of this custom, but its absolute frustration at being able to sensibly be rid of it. Again, we have 
no such accounts available to us from the ancient period.  
30 In fact Jamison alerts our attention to the fact that this nature of the ancient texts, particularly of concern 
when accessing gender studies in non-Western cultures is “more often an anthropological than an historical 
enterprise.” (1996: 7) This assertion is relevant to the methodology of this thesis as well. 
31 Historically, it seems, the ancient Hindu textual material is continually referred to as primarily 
‘religious’, but Menski (2002) has warned that this may be an inappropriate and entirely misleading 
strategy, since the religious and the secular co-existed in Hindu thought and were also expressed in 
different words for Truth, namely rta for the invisible side of things, and satya for the tangible and visible 
aspects.  
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male teacher to mostly male students every generation, with a specifically patriarchal 
focus. What was the role of women in this preservation, if any? And, as is often assumed 
with oral traditions that they tend to operate in the inner sphere, informal and “non-
institutional” under the sculpting hands of the womenfolk, this particular society was 
notably different. This domain of words and stories and of transmission and 
dissemination was the mainstay of the men in this oral tradition. In fact the Aryan oral 
tradition is quite the contrary of other oral traditions,32 in being “regimented, 
institutionalised, and purposeful” ( amison, 1996: 7-8). In fact it may even be said that a 
text required the stamp of orthodoxy in order to survive, as we evidence in the case of 
the Māna a Dhar a - ā stra (MDS) in particular.  The likelihood of the intervention of 
influence of women in this sphere, therefore, given the patriarchal nature of the work, 
seems highly unlikely.  
Universally the phenomenon of marriage is marked by numerous related financial 
arrangements (Westermarck, 1921).33 In the South Asian context modern dowry has been 
vigorously discussed and virtually demonised, more recently as a form of human rights 
abuse. In its ‘good’ form dowry represents and is conceptualised as property brought into 
the new marriage by the woman, not only for her own benefit and status, but also for her 
new family. In such scenarios there is a high likelihood that a marriage will conform to 
the ideal popularised by modern Indian society, today prominently through media such as 
television and film.  
In its ‘bad’ form, dowry takes the much-criticised and rightly criminalised 
practice of property extorted and demanded by the groom’s family on the occasion of 
marriage, with the expectation that such property then becomes owned by the husband’s 
family and, in extreme cases, the woman herself becomes a form of property. In such 
scenarios a marriage may still appear to be successful, however new research shows that 
so-called dowry problems may not be related to property and financial matters (Wyatt, 
2008). If they continue to exploit the ‘bad’ form of dowry by continuous demands and 
                                               
32 See Pinkola (1987) Women who run with the wolves for accounts of folklore and its function in other oral 
societies. 
33 Dowry given at marriage to either one of the bridal couple or both, and features as an almost universal 
customary tradition in various societies. The thesis argues that this set of marital expectations practice, in 
the form of dowry does not appear to be a problematic social custom in any other society to the extent that 
it does in Indian communities at home and abroad. Dowry deaths and dowry-related problems are not 
confined to Indian communities; Pakistan and Bangladesh have reported similar problems in their 
communities at home and abroad, which are collectively called the dowry problem in this thesis.  
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extortion there is the danger of a breakdown in marriage. The main accusation against 
dowry is that it commodifies daughters, and it is held directly responsible for the death of 
thousands of brides, young and old. These two disparate forms of dowry, ‘good’ and 
‘bad’, are in social reality represented by a whole host of variations in form and practice. 
For instance the under- researched topic of marriage presents relating to HMA, section 27 
(Rose, 2003) indicates that important insecurities exist in terms of the ownership of such 
presents made at, and following marriage. Linked to this, the wording of section 6 of the 
DPA of 1961 and its amendments demonstrates that presents made in keeping with 
tradition, and to both bride and groom, are legally not defined as dowry at all. In fact 
various forms of presents are construed as expected human behaviour at the time of 
marriage, to strengthen human connections and interlinkages. If dowry is indeed 
portrayed as such an evil custom, then why do Indian communities continue to practise it 
in some form or another to date, in spite of a legal ban?  
This thesis is not a legal analysis of the dowry problem, but seeks to understand 
how apparently presumed textual and value contradictions in different sets of texts, 
ancient and modern, cultural and legal, are combined into a ‘living law’ that continues to 
enjoin the practice of dowry as sadācāra. For clarity, sadācāra may be understood as the 
social norms crystallized in the concept of ‘good or model behaviour’ which is tested in 
constant consideration of situational relativity against the yardstick of dharma; in fact 
sadācāra virtually embodies dharma (Menski, 2003: 31). 
This thesis adheres to a law-based methodological approach taking forward 
Derrett’s (1976: 47) assertion that a much-needed collaboration between anthropologists 
and lawyers has been lacking. He observed in keeping with his earlier belief that the 
“anthropologist is not concerned with what was the law, nor with lawyers’ versions of 
what law is ideally (as the courts see it), but with what actually goes on in people’s 
minds” (ibid.: 5). This ties in directly with the need to understand what people perceive 
as being bad and good, and how they act in accordance with this, as represented in Fig 1, 
(below). Derrett brings to the fore a major problem faced by research attempting to 
employ both anthropological and legal data: the chasm between the people’s and lawyer’s 
conceptualisations of law.34 
 
                                               
34 See also Holden (2003, 33-9) for an enlightening discussion on methodological miasma of issues when 
tackling these very research issues in fieldwork application. 
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1.3.1 Theories 
In terms of a specific theoretical approach this thesis examines a range of ideas. For 
instance, traditionally, history has concentrated on the study of past societies, while 
sociology and ethnology examined those of the present; respectively treating modern and 
traditional societies. These partitions still exist, but they are gradually becoming less 
exclusive (Rouland, 1994: 1). To uncover the links in an ancient context our only 
evidence is the literature preserved from a historic period that has long passed. Part of the 
responsibility of this thesis is to understand the role of this literature in its historical and 
legal significance without engaging in the construction of fiction. Therefore in chapter 2  
along with the discussion centred on the invention of tradition (Hobsbawm, 1983: 1), one 
section is devoted to examining the nature and character of the texts in question: What do 
they represent, social reality or ideals, or an admixture? Do they encapsulate custom? 
How explicit are they and are they designed to be in terms of telling us about social 
realities? I argue that from the earliest verses what has been preserved is a complex 
combination of custom and idealisation which seeks to influence ‘right’ behaviour and to 
thereby become a norm, although it is imperative to consider that these norms still remain 
fluid and flexible.  
The top end of the triangle examines what exerts a stronger influence on the 
actions of people in the performance of marriages and the practice of dowry: The State 
(as an enforcing body) or custom or law; the other two forces acting on the current role of 
dowry in Indian society are marriage and domestic violence. People negotiate constantly. 
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Fig. 1 The tussle of texts 
In setting the ‘good’ dowry next to the ‘bad’ dowry I suggest that, at the simplest level, 
there is a disjuncture between the governmental/policy view that all dowry must be bad, 
or potentially so, and the “customary” view that, in any given community, “our” dowries 
are good.  It appears possible that this kind of contrast then repeats itself in other parts of 
the social whole; where one set of people believe that it is only some dreadful “other” 
people who engage in the ‘bad’ dowry, while their own practice of it is perfectly 
acceptable.  Thus, distinction attaches itself not just to the giving of dowry, but to the 
giving of dowry in an authentic, ethical fashion, in fact in terms of specific sadācāra 
which is virtually ethnicised. The notion of ‘goodness’ is then not simply a feature of the 
act but of the actors themselves, and of their subjective perceptions.  Is this perhaps a way 
in which families simultaneously support anti-dowry laws in principle (because of these 
other “bad” dowry givers/takers) while continuing to give “good” dowry themselves?
 These two forms of text have been widely presumed to be contradicting each 
other in essence, with regard to the practice of dowry as collective conscience or 
sadācāra. However, this thesis examines to what extent these presumed textual and value 
contradictions are in socio-religious and cultural reality amalgamated into forms of 
‘living law’ that are part of custom, within a patriarchal context, but do not necessarily 
disadvantage women. This has however been misunderstood so far. Also, due to a vast 
number of the ancient texts remaining un-translated they continue to remain inaccessible 
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to the non-specialist. Unfortunately this wealth of material has not been ploughed for the 
information it can provide on and about women in the worldview of ancient India.   
 In terms of sociological theory this thesis touches upon several key authors. First 
and most importantly in chapters 2 and 3 I consider the validity of Emile Durkheim’s 
(1979: 39) sui generis approach to religion, and further his notion of the ‘collective 
conscience’ of a society as the totality of the beliefs and sentiments common to the 
average members of that society, which forms a determinate system, almost with a life of 
its own (Fields, 1995: 5).35 Further, another of Durkheim’s ideas about social 
organisation; that of “collective conscience” overlays the notion of a common idea of 
good behaviour within a community, and is relevant to our discussion here because of its 
co-relation to our core concept here of sadācāra. Durkheim (1979: 79-80) in his 
explanation of a social mechanism of what holds the group together arrived at an 
understanding of “collective conscience”.36 He uses this term to identify a body of 
beliefs, practices and customary arrangements and enactments which tend to be held as 
common knowledge by all members of society. This set of beliefs, in his view, are 
diffused throughout the society, they not only define social purposes, but further imbue 
actions with meaning and generally go toward structuring a pattern of life. In Durkheim’s 
own view, this common conscience develops according to its own laws and is not an 
expression of individual conscience, or in our Hindu sense ātmana  u    i, and is therefore 
in an analytical sense separable from it. Therefore, collective conscience may be seen as 
global reflection of the Hindu concept of appropriate group behaviour. This corresponds 
almost entirely with the ancient Hindu category of sadācāra.  
In chapter 4, the research is informed by Tylor’s (1873) analysis of religion and 
Leach’s (1938) transmission of myth theory.37 Levi-Strauss’s (1969) approach to the 
fraught nature of gift-giving in pre-literate societies is also considered here. Further, this 
thesis through the analysis in chapter 5, considers Mauss’s (1925) original insight on the 
socially sanctioned distribution of gifts and other tokens of relationship, fraught with 
historical and structural significance as these things are, may be an irreducible element in 
                                               
35 Durkheim’s first edition of The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (Paris: Alcan) appeared in 1912 and 
is notably a seminal work on sociologically informed philosophy of society, which fits the discussion in 
this thesis in terms of an underlying, guiding methodology. See Karen Fields’s (1995: xv-xxiii) entire 
Introduction for a qualitative analysis of Durkheim’s position in sociological thought. 
36 This is a central concept within Durkheim’s (1979) thesis on the division of labour in global society, for a 
further discussion and extended examination of common conscience see Lukes (1971: 183-209). 
37 Both Tylor and Leach are the original publication dates, however, the bibliographical references here are 
more recent editions. 
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human culture. The pot-latch and caste system are perhaps instances of general principle, 
which underlie behaviour sanctioned and governed by these albeit fluid rules. The 
universal relevance of these systems is clearly defined in this thesis in chapter 5. In this 
analysis, on the basis of the textual evidence, both primary and secondary I argue that the 
dowry system coincides with the pot-latch system of gift-giving in several ways. 
Bronislaw Malinowski’s (1929) “participant-observer” methodology,38 must be noted as 
a mode of understanding my own culture, from the anthropologist’s desk in chapter 6.  
 As the following conceptual model highlights, three broad theoretical approaches 
present the lens through which to study the evidence of a) Sanskritsation, b) Orientalism 
and c) Feminism on the concept and phenomenon of dowry. These broad theories are 
used throughout the text of the thesis, inlaid within the analysis. The conceptual model 
below, maps the three main theoretical thrusts of the thesis, explaining the approach of a 
three-way tug of war similar to that between custom, law and society, as shown above 
(Fig. 1). 
Fig. 2 Conceptual Model: The theories guiding this thesis as a framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These three approaches allow the theoretical framework to be meaningfully incorporated 
into the text of the thesis, rather than to form separate literature review sections. The six 
chapters and the conclusion fit around these larger theoretical issues. These theories 
                                               
38 Malinowski’s “participant-observation” methodologically refers to the principle of internal observation 
by the anthropologist or social scientists, by being completely “immersed” in the culture they are studying 
(see Malinowski, 1922). 
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overlay the central argument of the thesis, which is that the custom of dowry is and has 
been and continues to be a socially sanctioned necessary part of Hindu marriage. There 
will be a considerable overlap between theories, much like the historical-anthropological 
process of law-making.  
 
1.3.2 Concepts 
Though it is customary for academic research to follow words as a smoke trail, I will 
examine expectations and patterns of behaviour involved in the negotiations for marriage, 
which precede the actual ceremony. I can therefore study how and why the dominant 
dowry model has come to occupy centre stage and is held as exemplary. The question is: 
“What is the role of the law in this context? In fact, is there a role for law?” has in the 
past been expressed (Menski, 1997: 68). In order to tackle this tussle meaningfully (see 
fig 1, above) one must note the need for a dialogue between anthropologists and lawyers, 
as chapter 2 discusses. 
At this stage it is important to briefly examine the concept of ‘legal pluralism’ and 
its significance to the present discussion. The basic underlying notion of this approach, 
meaning that law is just one feature in a social field, and law takes therefore many forms, 
was previously expounded by the American legal anthropologist Sally Falk Moore 
(1978), whose field-based theoretical study is a major source for several writers on legal 
pluralism. An important article “Law and anthropology”39 highlights the inter-textuality 
of the two, “every good ethnographic description contains a great deal of legal material, 
whether or not it is explicitly called ‘law’…”.  This is the starting point, then, for a social 
understanding of the literature of ancient India and its anthropological relevance to legal 
analysis today and it highlights the particular approach employed in this study.  
Additionally, I consider how families negotiate between official laws of the state 
and custom in how they practise dowry. It is necessary at this point to briefly examine the 
concept of ‘living law’. Ehrlich (1936: 486-506) early in the twentieth century 
established this concept as prevalent in every human group. It signifies a tendency to 
include in law a certain type of conventional norm; Weber (1967: 233) characterised 
ideally “the particular principles underlying the religious ethics” that limit the structure 
and function of secular law. Notable for the present purpose is Malinowski’s (1926: 46-9) 
                                               
39 Originally published in 1970, it appears in reprint form in Moore (1978: 214-56). 
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discovery of the social mechanisms of “publicity” and “reciprocity” as the essence of law 
in a society without government and formal law.40 This inclusion and its negotiation is a 
gradual process, India is an excellent example of a country where colonial legislation has 
laid the roots for a fascinating specimen of ‘living law’. 
 To add a reflexive note here, however un-politically correct or sexist it may seem 
today, in the late 1980s eminent Indian social theorist Srinivas (1984:7-8) highlighted the 
advantages of dowry being analysed by women social scientists, since the segregation of 
sexes continues to be a marked feature of Indian society, particularly its more traditional 
sections. His assertion is that “women social scientists might have better insight into the 
kind of mental world in which the daughter-in-law or mother-in-law lives…”. In my case 
I refer also to the issues centred on being a desk-based anthropologist immersed as 
participant observation demands in the culture I address (Malinowski, 1922: 10). 
Malinowski’s “participant-observation” methodologically refers to the principle of 
internal observation by the anthropologist or social scientists, by being completely 
“immersed” in the culture they are studying. This implies participating as wholly as 
possible in all everyday activities while observing the interactions of the informants.41  
Particularly relevant are Srinivas’ observations on the social scientist’s dilemma while 
addressing dowry: 
“Dowry is in many ways an archetypal institution, for it illustrates the kind of problems 
which the social anthropologist/sociologist studying his own society faces 
frequently…The first and most obvious problem is the ambivalence which dowry rouses 
in the sociologist studying it. On the one hand, there is the feeling that the institution is an 
unmitigated evil and that it needs to be destroyed root and branch, and at the earliest 
opportunity, and on the other hand, the institution demands to be understood, its many 
ramification [Sic.] traced, and its regional, caste and other variations recorded. The 
sociologist studying dowry cannot help being fascinated by it, and being impressed with 
its strength and resilience. But this very fascination with the institution and his awareness 
of its strength might result in his being accused of being a reactionary who wants the 
institution to remain.” (Srinivas, 1984: 7)   
                                               
40 Hoebel’s (1954: 97-126) contribution of data on the function of “jural postulates” among primitive 
groups is noteworthy here. 
41 Malinowski’s most significant contribution to the science of anthropology remains his study of the 
Trobriand islanders (most notably the kula ring exchange pattern) as presented in his first publication The 
Argonauts of the Western Pacific (1922). With R. Radcliffe-Brown Malinowski founded the modern 
approach to British anthropology. His specific theoretical contribution is functionalism, as opposed to 
Radcliffe-Brown’s structural functionalism. 
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Noting these worthy pointers as ear-marks in my research notes I now delve further into 
how these theoretical issues may be addressed in the course of this thesis, by outlining the 
layout of this work.   
 Within the wider context of Indian marriage laws, the thesis accounts for the 
phantom of dowry, which neither has a clear-cut definition nor an ontology within textual 
representations, yet has remained a powerful player in the discourse of marriage laws 
(chapter 4).  While engaging in a discourse of what dowry is and how it has formulated 
itself to become an entrenched partner to most Hindu, even Indian marriages, the thesis 
explores particularly the role of tradition and text as agents in shaping the notion of 
dowry, and its indisputable position in Indian society today as an uncomfortable 
sadācāra. The canvas against which this custom is set illustrates the rather important role 
‘tradition’ continues to play in shaping India’s legal modernity, which apparently is not 
just dominated, as we assume for ‘Western’ legal systems, by state-centric and top-down 
formal legal regulation. 
 
1.4 Thesis structure 
Each individual chapter carries a review of the literature relevant to its content and 
context, thereby negating the need for a comprehensive stand-alone literature review. In 
this way it is possible to outline the particular theoretical issues of each segment before 
highlighting the additions to knowledge being made through this study. Further, by 
concentrating on individual reviews of academic material and sources, the thrust of each 
chapter is defined clearly, focussing on subjective analysis as this study poses an inter-
disciplinary approach. What follows is a brief expalantion of the main thesis structure. 
Chapter 2 deals in some detail with the traditional, ritual textual material 
highlighting the tension between cultural texts and social tradition in relation to defining 
legal precepts. It examines legal pluralism as well as the effect of tradition and text on 
each other. Here I also highlight the importance of sadācāra and the fact that its hold on 
society is almost as strong as, if not stronger than, the rule of law. Crucially this chapter 
also acts as the methodological hinge for my thesis. I begin by placing my research 
within the Orientalist debate and its subsequent critique. Positioned at the centre of the 
thesis Chapter 3 functions as a guide to provide the legal background for the research 
questions in this thesis. Further, it examines the backdrop against which dowry works. 
The theoretical relevance of legal anthropology is considered here to place the discussion 
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in its academic context. The wider research question is whether one can root out a custom 
by applying the force of law? This leads directly into the discussion on the nature of law 
in India, and an understanding of what is legal. The analysis in Chapter 4 examines the 
problems of defining dowry adequately, both in terms of legal application and for 
academic argument. The current legal definition of dowry does not take cognisance of the 
ongoing payments incumbent on the wife-givers for the duration of their daughters’ life. 
The conceptualisation of dowry as sadācāra is dealt with in detail in this chapter. This 
involves a deeper investigation of the influence of custom in India, as compared to that of 
official law, on the collective conscience of the people. The hypergamous ethos is more 
fully described withrefernce to the excellent anthropological ethnographies that have 
gone before. 
In Chapter 5 dowry expectations are examined as a part of marriage 
arrangements. The ancient Hindu text form the field, as it were: in particular verses 
contained in the Vedic marriage hymns,     da (RV) hymn 85 in mandala 10 and the 
Atharvaveda (AV) book 14. The analysis of the textual evidence follows a chronological 
path, carefully dusting older interpretations and looking afresh at the original material 
itself. Interestingly, it is the fullness of the minutiae and the detail these texts provide 
which makes their relevance to this thesis invaluable. By ploughing this material 
extensively it is possible to delineate and take note of the things that these texts 
themselves do not know that they are saying. As Jamison, (1996: 10) notes,  
“The women acting in the ritual are not the point of the texts; as we will see, they 
are fairly marginal at least in terms of the composers’ focus. They are neither 
demonized nor divinized as fictional exemplars so often are. They simply sit in 
the background, waiting to perform their little tasks – carry the little pot of water 
or exchange glances with a priest. But when we assemble the little tasks, they 
produce a remarkably telling conceptual portrait.”[emphasis added] 
It is this conceptual portrait that we seek to align alongside the emergent conceptual 
framework for the functioning of dowry as a custom within the context of Hindu 
marriage, because it helps a little way to understanding what we are dealing with in the 
bigger picture of answering the main aim of this thesis.  
In Chapter 6 the process of analysis begins with the anti-dowry law, examining 
to what extent it proves to be a misguided strategy to tackle dowry. This chapter takes 
into account not only the stated intentions of the legislators but also the major argument 
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which women activists have been fighting for: seeking to secure separate property rights 
for women. It may well become evident that the causes of the ‘dowry problem’ have not 
been sufficiently researched and have become intertwined with other gendered 
discourses. This chapter also contains examinations of current dowry cases, which have 
helped bring to light problems of application at the ground level. An in-depth analysis of 
the anti-dowry statute will aid the hypothesis of it being an outmoded strategy. The 
concluding analysis in Chapter 7 binds the various threads of the argument together, 
reiterating the customary nature of dowry as an institution. This thesis demonstrates that 
traditional cultural texts reflect and assert ideals rather than reflecting social reality, and 
suggests that modern legislative texts possibly have the same effect. Therefore the 
acceptance of dowry in defiance of the modern legal system is not interpreted as blatant 
lawlessness, but rather as an example of a varied perception of law.  
Having sought to understand the functioning of the dowry law and its problems in 
the current Indian context, with the aid of messages from the past, this thesis ends by 
exploring the idea that modern law reform must consider alternative methods of seeking 
to protect women, not just against abuses of the dowry system but against other forms of 
gendered violence. According to the findings in this thesis therefore, the climate that 
allows dowry murder to occur as a by-product of the custom of ‘bad’ dowry, is also a 
product of Indian society, created by a similar malignant mindset, which must be 
understood if we are to tackle it meaningfully. In Sharma’s view (1984: 71) as the girl is 
merely the carrier, in a modern context, is is no longer seen to be as valuable as the 
wealth she brings. Menski (1998: 51) observes how this view underlines a significant 
characteristic of modern dowry. He highlights in particular the procreative potential, so 
valued in the past, is no longer inherently perceived in the highly prized terms of the past. 
But this remains unspoken because it is so “obvious to the insider”. Here he succinctly 
clinches a crucial point, of extreme value to the crucial question of ontology raised by 
this thesis, why is dowry a phantom: When a custom, a tradition is of such import, and is 
so common a behaviour, it is rarely underlined in ideal terms within textual content: 
therefore no clear terminology exists for the practice; text or terminology has become 
practice. Instead the opposite behaviour is ostracised and black-listed, so as to enjoin the 
preferred behaviour, which within the society everyone is aware of and practises.  
 To begin the process of examination of the vast material before us, where the 
expectations lie embedded then one must proceed with the process of unpeeling. Firstly, 
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let us return to the notion raised at the opening of this chapter, where the core concepts of 
Hindu law were briefly mentioned.   a as the cosmic blueprint for Order, followed by 
dharma as the macrocosmic blueprint setting out guidelines for human behaviour, how 
are these linked to textual ideals? (See 2.4 for further detail). If we examine the 
pictographic representation of an ancient society without iconography, the various forces 
acting on it, juxtaposing it with the artistic expression as seen in Plate 1: Circle of 
Solidarity,42 we arrive at the diagram linking the various layers of text to spheres of social 
and legal influence (below). In Hindu terminology we may explain this as the conceptual 
model that guides life in terms of the influence of   a and Dharma on reality. For a 
fundamental understanding we may recognise   a as the harmonising force ruling cosmic 
reality as Order. In similar terms dharma guides the order within the microcosmic 
universe applicable to human behaviour, thereby dowry behaviour. While sadācāra is the 
expression of a group’s collective customary social conscience, ātmana  u    i is the self-
regulatory essence of an individual who aims to live in harmony with the wider 
aspirations of her/his group. This last aspect of ātmana  u    i or individual conscience is 
managed by the self, but is acted upon by all the other forces in the field of law. It is 
therefore self-regulatory, mostly in consultation with the customary social collective 
conscience but at times individually, as the situation requires. In this sense, texts do not 
mimic reality they constitute reality anew; therefore tradition become interchangeable 
with text.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
42 Historians believe that the Warli tradition can be traced back to as far as the Neolithic period between 
2,500 BC and 3,000 BC. It has since travelled across borders and territories. Home décor products with 
Warli paintings have an international appeal and demand too. The Warli paintings essentially depict the 
basic principals of life which are main themes or the basis for any tribes’ expression. Their major designs 
include the harvest season, celebration, wedding, rituals and births. 
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Figure 3  Circle of Solidarity in terms of   a and Dharma 
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Chapter 2:  Methodology: Texts, traditions and custom   
 
This chapter focuses on methodology and charts the course of textual anthropology to 
inform the wider argument and seat my research comfortably as a religious studies thesis 
exploring the legal dimension of a social practice: dowry. Textual anthropology refers to 
a means of overstepping the anxieties of ethnography and historiography to date by 
highlighting the anthropological validity of literary and ethnographic sources (Whitehead, 
1995: 53). While the thesis examines the negotiation between custom and text in the 
understanding of legality in the context of India, this chapter principally focuses on the 
traditional cultural texts themselves, because it is crucial to understand the role of the 
Hindu traditional cultural texts within society as epitomised by the Vedic and later s     
literature. ‘Texts’ are collections of tradition.43  
The English word ‘text’ appears to derive from a root, meaning “to weave”, 
which corresponds interestingly with the Sanskrit term sū ra or thread (King, 1999: 63). 
It is in this sense that I use the word ‘text’ when so highlighted, to represent the basic 
thread of, what we might speculate to be intended as, thinkings and teachings. The legal 
aspects of this literature are analysed in the discussion in chapter 3. Here, it is important 
to note the anti-positivist stance of this thesis (Maine, 1986, 2-7; Inden, 2006: 29) at the 
outset. This thesis, as discussed in chapter 1 above, calls for a better understanding of the 
continuing tussle between Indian tradition and the historical effects of western-led 
administration. It is surely time for this tussle to be better guided by research efforts, 
maybe even to help resolve a ‘problem’ such as the dowry problem. The following 
arguments set the stage for a beginning to this resolution, at least in the analysis of 
dowry. 
Crucially this chapter also acts as the methodological hinge for my thesis.  44 In 
examining the place of texts it is crucial to note the varying agenda of much of the 
research conducted on and around Indian traditional texts. Therefore I begin by placing 
                                               
43 When highlighted in this way ‘text’ implies the position of the early Indian literature being equated with 
the texts of other religious traditions, like the Qur’an and the Bible as irreducible containers of religion as 
opposed to fluid and complex oral systems, of which these are a product. Therefore when alluding to ‘text’, 
I do not necessarily mean a written text alone. 
44 Methodology implies a system of methods, rules, paradigms and principles used to organise an inquiry 
guiding the practitioner toward an appropriate approach to an analysis, evaluation, investigation and so 
forth. ‘Methodology’ does not inherently denote any particular sort of approach in criticism; however it is 
important to note here that some scholars find the connotation of ‘scientificity’ in relation to ‘cultural’ 
studies disagreeable.  
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my research within the Orientalist debate and its subsequent critique. The discussion here 
takes cognisance of the impact of Orientalism,45 and of post-modernist debates prevalent 
in academic analysis centred on India. Further, Richard King’s (1999) analysis of religio 
as representative of the practice of traditions and customs of one’s ancestors informs the 
investigation of the concept of Hinduism as a religion, within which the customary notion 
of dowry is formulated and then embedded.  
 
2.1 Textual anthropology: The Orientalist impact 
My thesis focuses first of all on Brahma  ca  Sanskrit texts, characterised here as 
traditional cultural texts, which have been historically regarded as religious texts by early 
scholars. This is the first layer of text to be examined, the modern, legal texts are 
analysed in chapter 6 below. Propelled by a strong literary bias, western scholars 
interpreted ancient Indian data as religious “texts”. Menski (2002: 112) comments and 
cautions that too often “we undervalue the elements of orality and traditional internal 
plurality and seek to indulge our Western fixations with scriptures, certainty and 
uniformity”.46 Indeed, it is noteworthy that a clear “literary bias exists within modern 
Western conceptions of religion” (King, 1999: 62), and this emphasis on written texts has 
had wide reaching repercussions on approaches to the study of traditional Indian cultural 
texts and Indology by both insiders and outsiders over the last hundred years, and 
continues to cloud the methodologies of analysis used to understand both ancient and 
modern Indian phenomena. With reference to the current debates within the fields of 
anthropology and history, in providing newer analysis of ethnographic texts and 
historiographical material it is worth noting cautions like Neil L. Whitehead’s (1995: 53-
54) that the tendency has been so far “for the limited historiographical scholarship that 
                                               
45 Orientalism as coined by Edward Said in his 1978 book of the same name refers to an entire discourse 
through which ‘the Orient’ is represented in specific terms by ‘the West’. Said refers particularly to 
scholarship that, primarily during the nineteenth century, set about studying other cultures to describe, 
assess, categorise and label them. He defines the term thus: “Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as 
the corporate institution of dealing with the Orient—dealing with it making statements about it, authorizing 
views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style 
for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient. …My contention is that without 
examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline 
by which European culture was able to manage –even produce—the Orient politically, sociologically, 
militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period” (Said, 
1978: 10).  
46 See Bennett (2004: 2), discussing a similar predisposition of writers on South African customary law 
being biased with the European mindset “to give a privileged status to the written as opposed to the spoken 
word”. 
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has generally underpinned literary analysis of ethnographic texts to lead to an inadequate 
anthropological appreciation of what such sources may tell us”.47 This thesis treats the 
traditional cultural texts as ethnographic record for the purpose of analysis in the absence 
of any iconographic or testamentary evidence of the period under survey, aware of the 
subjectivities of assumed or actual authors of such texts, and conscious of the fact that 
what the text is actually stating may be read in a variety of ways. An examination of the 
widespread ideology that dowry is ‘good custom’ or sadācāra, and therefore right to 
practice seems to have emerged from the spread of Sanskritisation. This process accounts 
for how and why a particular interpretation of the Brahma  c  textual tradition has come 
to shape ‘tradition’ more broadly, particularly in light of the hoary dichotomy of the great 
and little traditions in India.48 I argue here that texts do not represent historic or 
prehistoric reality but instead ideals. This thesis essentially states that texts are 
ideological constructs. 
The discussion here unfurls the layers of research devoted to the traditional 
cultural texts, while at the same time placing them in the chronology available to date as 
devised earlier by Kane (1961: xi-xii) and presented here as the Tentative Chronological 
Table (Table 2). Such tables run the risk of fixing fluid entities, providing an impression 
of firm dates, when in fact we do not know precise dates for the earlier layers of 
literature. Much time and effort has been spent working on such tables and chronologies. 
The present research is less concerned with the reliability of certain entries or assumed 
dates and data, but is critically interested in their virtually liquid or fluid characteristics, 
leaving almost everything open to interpretation, because texts are time-sensitive and 
context-specific, and in the Sanskrit context, as we shall see, the same word in one 
sentence can often mean something quite different in another place.  
The efforts to ‘fix’ things are aided to some degree by the diagrammatic 
representation of the texts and their estimated period of composition/production based on 
                                               
47 Whitehead argues that to date anthropology seems to have inadequately understood and addressed the 
ideas of representation and textuality. Literary and historical theorists have remained unaware of the 
relevance of ethnological record as valid anthropological data within ethnographic writing (Whitehead, 
1995: 53-74). 
48 See, Miller (1966) for an illuminating discussion on the great and little traditions in India, with specific 
reference to the oral traditions contained in the poetry of the “untouchable” Mahar community, who contest 
the Great tradition of dominant Hinduism by creating their own unique “little” tradition. This is not the 
place for a deeper discussion of these aspects of the great and little traditions in the context of Indian 
communities, other than noting the idea of a plurality of pluralities (Menski, 2011). 
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a chronological analysis suggested by Menski (1998/99) (Table 1).49 Relying on either 
one still presents an incomplete picture, particularly as this thesis relies on a number of 
specific texts, not the wide corpus of literature as a whole. Taking these two sets of dates 
together, however, makes it possible to arrive at an understanding about why dating and 
incorporating the many layers of texts into any one cohesive chronology has been so far 
challenging, and remains so. Further, brief historical and geographical clarification of the 
vast period under survey makes it possible for the background to be set for this thesis. 
Finally, the construction of the position of Indian women within the debate is woven into 
the discussion as opposed to being presented in a stand alone section. After all the social 
reality this thesis seeks is one within which women appear woven into the backdrop. 
The analysis here follows an ideological path set out by Prof. Inden in his 
conceptualisation of Indology and the Indological discourse as essentially idealistic (i.e.  
apolitical) and therefore limiting.50 As he highlights the strength and power of these 
limits, “despite India’s acquisition of formal political independence, it has still not 
regained the power to know its own past and present apart from that discourse” (Inden, 
2006: 15). This is where our problem lies. Not in definitions of the past but in recognising 
the present as a clue to what has been ongoing. As Daud Ali (2006: 10) reiterates, while 
reintroducing Inden’s early essays, Inden’s unique analytical approach in marrying 
anthropological and historical tools and methodology has enabled the possibility of 
evolving “both empirically and theoretically”, a more nuanced and complex historical 
account of ancient and medieval India. With this view in mind we may deconstruct the 
Orientalist debate with reference to Indology. Additionally, it is vital to bear in mind that 
the study of Indology was a contradictory combination of societalism, inherited from its 
largely British empiricist and utilitarianist past. This recognised and attributed Indian 
actions to social groups, i.e. the village, a linguistic region, religion, the joint family and  
                                               
49 This Hindu law time chart has been used as part of teaching materials for an undergraduate Society and 
Law class covering the Legal Systems of Asia and Africa, taught by Prof. Werner Menski, and also for an 
Area Studies Masters programme at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. I am 
grateful for permission to use it here. 
50 This remains the case some thirty years on and is therefore relevant to the research here, although Inden’s 
paper “Orientalist Constructions of India” was written originally in 1986 (401-446). For a feminist 
perspective specifically on the potency and politics in the power of women’s expression and the local 
traditions of this contained in North Indian women’s songs, more specifically Rajasthan, see Raheja and 
Gold (1994: 182-85). See also more recently, Declan Quigley’s work on similar ideas of a segmentary state 
(1996; 2005). See also Menski, (2003: 42, 50). Most recently see Kaviraj, (2010: 12; 41; 80) on an 
excellent analysis of the evolution and perceptions of self-regulatory segments of statehood, in the colonial 
and post-colonial context with specific reference to India.  
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even caste. The importance of the group was referred to as superior to the individual, as 
individualism in Indian thinking was considered a “bad” motive (Inden, 2006: 15). 
Briefly, during the ‘discovery’ stage in the early nineteenth century the early 
writings of India were seen as an exotic echo from the past. The religion and philosophy 
of India excited colonial administrators who stumbled upon these ancient writings, and 
likened this to a Renaissance of the East. Today academics view much of this research as 
romanticised and tinged with Orientalist fervour. However, it has its place in my research 
as it sets the stage for the reactionary beliefs of the nationalist and Orientalist critique that 
resultantly evolved and remain widely prevalent to date. Specifically what I am arguing is 
that Brahma  c  discourse is the source of notions of the “good” acknowledged in dowry.  
What is evident is that there are other discourses (in tradition) that parallel it, to begin 
with in terms of bride-price giving customs, which become incorporated into the wider 
view of Sanskritised Hinduism (Glenn, 2004: 289). It is therefore my argument that 
Brahma  c  ideals have infected everyone else, not that there is a genuinely shared 
commitment to dowry as honourable/auspicious/moral that transcends Brahma ic  
prescriptions. 
 Orientalism is important to my thesis because it positions this debate within the 
ongoing academic and historical dialectic. Radical denunciations of the very concept of 
Hinduism are associated with the critique of Orientalism and academic discourses of 
domination. This critique and associate deconstruction tries to expose links between the 
intellectual exploration and the political and material subjugation of India individually as 
a nation, and as part of the wider super-structure of the Orient. It further attempts to 
disentangle and eliminate western constructs and superimpositions, and to provide a 
comprehensive revision of the conceptual machinery of Oriental and Indian academia.  
Edward Said is particularly influenced by Michel Foucault –his notions of 
discourse and power/knowledge –and also by Jacques Derrida and his deconstruction of 
binary oppositions. For Said, the West sets about inventing ‘the Orient’. He therefore 
argues that prior to it being labelled as such, this labelling process being dignified by the 
authority of western scholarship, the entity we recognize as the Orient did not in reality 
exist. For example, the racial science that ‘proved’ that ‘other races’ were different (i.e. 
inferior) to white western Europeans is a representation that served to define the West as 
superior, enlightened, civilised among other things, in contrast to the Orient as inferior, 
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dark and barbarous. And, for Said, the impact of this discourse is to provide an 
intellectual foundation for material domination: for imperial, even economic exploitation. 
  Critics state that these Western Orientalist representations objectified and 
categorised the Orient in accordance with the European agenda of domination. This has 
weakened the possibility that this region has of a genuine self-understanding and further 
created a sphere of “otherness”. More specifically Indologists have categorised, redefined 
and even “invented” much of India’s ancient past (Washbroook, 1988: 83). In a more 
explicit alliance with the British colonial administration, and in consonance with such 
measures as the census reports, they created the caste system in its currently accepted 
sense, and Hinduism as a clearly definable religious category. If there is a connection 
with pre-modern India, it is through the conceptualisations and theoretical norms of the 
Brahman  as, whose writings and observations provided the source material for the 
scholars as well as the colonial administrators. Through this “unholy alliance” (Halbfass, 
1992: 9) colonialism “elevated Brahma  c  formulations to the level of hegemonic text” 
(Raheja, 1988: 497-523), while Indological discourse continued to project “the essence of 
Indian civilization” as opposite to that of the West; that is as “the caste system and the 
religion that accompanies it, Hinduism” (Inden, 1986: 401-446). In the hands of the 
colonialists, caste became an administrative tool to “arrange and register” Indian society 
into a cohesive sum of parts. This further helped to transform Brahma  ca  hypocrisy into 
social fact. Said’s views on the treatment of the Orient have been critiqued as inadequate 
for non-Islamic parts of the world where a tussle between coloniser and colonised is at 
play. Since the contemporary context defines the conception of dowry practices with 
relation to the legal framework, it is crucial to outline the Oriental school of thought that 
developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century and influenced law making 
in colonial India.51 
Max Müller (2002: 81-82) was possibly the first to reprimand students of 
anthropology hesitant to explore the relevance of early Vedic material, which he 
considered a “miracle”. This initial hesitation was compounded by the work of  ames 
Mill (1818)52 and his thesis that this material was not worthy of anthropological attention, 
                                               
51 This aspect of lawmaking in the colonial period is discussed in detail in chapter 3 below. 
52 See particularly James Mill, (1858: 141) on the mental habits of the Hindus, also quoted at length in 
Inden (2006: 24) discussing the Orientalist constructions of India. 
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which set the tone for future researchers.53 For centrist or left-leaning research scholars or 
intellectuals looking at this material it is clearly romanticised and out-dated, the only 
relevance of the past of traditional or medieval India is that it was feudal, even nasty and 
therefore irrational.54 The leftist dismissal of such a ‘reactionary’ cultural past has 
virtually handed the reins of this area to the Hindu Right. This was until Menski (2003) 
appeared.55   
It is essential to briefly highlight the research of previous scholars, not only to 
learn from them but also to avoid some of the methodological problems associated with 
reconstructing customs relating to the position of women within ancient and medieval 
Indian history. Juxtaposing my contribution to these past efforts poses an opportunity to 
clarify my own methodological perspective further.56 By focussing on the British colonial 
perspective, formulated primarily by William Jones and H.T. Colebrooke, both legal 
practitioners,57 it is possible to demonstrate how this colonial administrative context 
shaped the consequent Indian nationalist scholarship on women in ancient India.58 
Equally essential is an analysis of A. S. Altekar’s work, as it continues to exert much 
influence on most post-Independence scholarship, which itself remains ensconced in the 
archaic nationalist academic paradigm.  
          An important ideological tool used to rationalise the continuation of British rule 
and to highlight the superiority of the rulers, were the “twin evils” of the caste system and 
the oppression of India’s women (Chakravarti, 1990: 32-4). This became the underlying 
colonial critique of the degenerate social customs of the colonised people. This view is 
                                               
53 Max Müller (2002: 32-35) records his disdain for such scholars, particularly Mill (1818) based on his 
History of British India, who were unwilling to be open to the nature of Hinduism, and classified Hindus, 
“a Brahman  a is an ant’s nest of lies and impostures”. Mill also charges Hindus as highly litigious, cited by 
Max Muller (2002: 33). James Mill is to be distinguished from his father John Stuart Mill. 
54 The repercussions of such attitudes is plainly evident in India today, as Ali (2006: 8-9) also points out, 
where this has allowed the dominant public discourse to be captured by the Hindu Right; with particular 
reference to the importance of public processions or rathayatras as an example of hijacking political 
history. 
55 See “In defence of Hindu law” the review of this book for further detail on its relevance to a new reading 
of a pluralistic Indian cultural context in terms of Hindu law past and present, (Pratap Bhanu Mehta, The 
Hindu 2003). 
56 Keeping in mind Dumont’s caution that “writers too often do not take the trouble to relate their work to 
that of their predecessors or contemporaries, disregard precise description, underestimate the difficulties 
inherent in the definition of the subject, and finally push on to their conclusions, all this as if the work 
could stand by itself while, in such conditions it can be but ephemeral.” (1961: 75-76)  
57 See Colebrook (1805) for an enlightening view of Vedic studies in this first phase of discovery. 
58 See in detail John Keay’s (1981) India Discovered and the influence personalities like Jones and Twining 
had in formulating perceptions of the Raj and its Vedic past. See also, Mukherjee’s excellent account of 
 ones’ part in setting up the Asiatic Society and further elaborations on British attitudes to India in the 
eighteenth century (1968: 80-90). 
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echoed in many Utilitarian and Evangelical writings.59 Several early writers on India 
believed Hinduism to, in effect, sanction these evil practices. For instance, John Stuart 
Mill held that the most telling index of the level of civilisation reached by any society 
was the position it accorded its women; the Hindus had never treated their women well 
(Tharu, 1990: 46).60 As Indian women were seen to be oppressed and fettered, by 
implication Indian culture was deemed illogical and sexually perverse, requiring the 
civilising intervention of the British continually. Chatterjee writes that the “colonial 
mind” had transformed the Indian woman into a symbol of the oppressive nature of 
Indian culture as a whole (1989, 622-3). It is particularly noteworthy that in this context 
the colonial critique extended to the political condition of the colony, which was 
characterised as anarchical prior to British rule. In fact the British colonial administration 
was deemed necessary to institute “good government”. Clearly the preoccupation of the 
colonial discourse was the “civilising” of the Indian people. This created significant 
repercussions, which are examined here.61 As Chakravarti (1990: 34) explains, the 
superior “morality” of the colonisers was effectively established by highlighting the low 
status of women within the subject population: “the women’s question thus became a 
crucial tool in colonial ideology”. Repercussions of this ideology continued to be at play 
in following years, with an enormous pressure to identify and tackle the status of women 
with the foundation of the nation.62  
       To counter this critique of Hindu tradition nationalists sought to prove that 
women, specifically in Vedic India, had been accorded a high position. The dominant 
trend among nationalist writers was to glorify the past position of Indian women. 
However, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century’s women writers 
developed a critique of the traditional, Brahma i cal cultural practices, in particular those 
relating to widowhood. These writers sought to clarify that the “golden age” might not 
have been so golden after all.63 However, the colonial critique continued and in order to 
emphasise the validity of the “golden age”, further evidence was cited: absence of child 
marriage, access to public spaces, women’s right to education and upanayana, the right to 
                                               
59 See Stokes (1959: 2-47) for a description of a battle between the two philosophies; Eastern and Western. 
60 For an exploration of Mill’s brand of evolutionism see Burrow, (1970: 27-29, 42-49). 
61 For a fuller analysis of the “dead legislative of British India” see Stokes (1959: 243-287).  
62 The framing of the Dowry Prohibition Act (1961) and the build up to it are reflections of this 
preoccupation, a virtual hangover of the colonial past. See Nehru’s concerns in chapter 1, above. 
63 See in particular Pandita Ramabai’s The High-caste Hindu woman (1888), Tarabai Shinde’s Stri Purusa 
Tulana (1882). For further detail see O’Hanlon (1994) on Tarabai Shinde; Chakravarti (1998); and 
Ramabai (1984) [1888]. 
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participate in sacrifices, including Suttee and Purdah. These were of course the 
counterpoints to each of the evils the British administration of the day had identified. The 
nationalists argued that this high status had suffered a gradual decline, caused not by the 
inherent nature of Hinduism itself but by external factors or ‘the other’. This ‘other’ was 
highlighted as the corrupting force of the emerging heterodox sects of Buddhism and 
Jainism, which brought in the general influence of ascetism, and more commonly the 
Muslim invasions of the eleventh century. Therefore the nationalists succeeded in 
identifying Vedic India as the golden historical period for Indian women. Particularly 
noteworthy is the fact that the patriarchal subordination of women, as defined by the 
feminist movement, was not considered important, rather it was the position of tradition 
in Indian history that was paramount. As Lata Mani perceptively points out, the 
extraordinary attention lavished to the women’s question from the nineteenth century was 
clearly indicative of the debate over Indian tradition: “…tradition was thus not the ground 
on which the status of women was being contested. Rather the reverse was true… what 
was at stake was not women but tradition.” 64   
Before it became an established academic tradition, several factors influenced the 
nationalist discourse on women.  
First, the glorification of the cultural achievements of ancient India, following the 
Orientalist re-discovery of India’s past, was reinforced by the indigenous retrieval and 
study of early Sanskrit texts. This repeated re-statement of the cultural glory of ancient 
Hindu India roused the growing historical consciousness of the emergent indigenous 
literati providing them with knowledge of, and pride in, the past. Colonial administrators 
were responsible for introducing certain widely prevalent trends:  
a) Discounting the prescriptive nature of the Sanskrit texts, and accepting them 
instead as reflective of social reality, 
b) It was believed that the older the text the greater its authenticity regarding 
women and; 
c) Being confused by any contradictions on the same subject within the texts. 
These trends became permanent legacies for future historians (Chakravarti, 1990: 30-31).  
Second, Max Müller popularised the theory that Indo-European languages had a 
common origin, and he was therefore responsible for imbuing the term ‘Aryan’ with new 
                                               
64 As cited in Nair (1994: 86). 
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meaning. His research indicated that Europeans and Indians, coloniser and colonised, 
were of similar racial origin. This strengthened cultural nationalism and Vedic India was 
equated with Aryan India.  
As Chakravarti (1990: 42) points out: “Max Müller vastly popularized a racist 
Aryan version of the Orientalist Hindu golden age and it was this that became so 
influential in later Hindu thought”. In the hands of the nationalists, the intellectual and 
moral superiority conferred on the Aryans by Max Müller were transferred to Aryan 
womanhood. Once the mainstay of Aryan civilisation had been established as the Aryan 
man, “…his newly minted, archaic, upper caste image that the entire scope of Indian 
history and culture was reconstructed. Indian history became the history of the Aryan 
man…[and the] Aryan woman, a perfect adjunct to the Aryan man, shadow of that 
shadow character, haunted almost all writings on women in pre-colonial India which had 
in effect become Vedic India” (Tharu, 1990: 51).65  
Third and finally, the emergence of social reform movements with Rammohun 
Roy in the nineteenth century, their subsequent ‘Hindu revivalist’ element, as well as the 
gradual communalisation of Indian politics played a crucial role in the development of an 
exclusive Hindu identity. This increasing identification of Hindu with Aryan resulted in 
the creation of a ‘Hindu Aryan’ national identity. Therefore ancient India became 
synonymous with Hindu/Vedic/Aryan India and the main category in the nationalist 
discourse on women became the high-caste Hindu Aryan woman of Vedic India. 
Continuing this trend in India today the preoccupation with the high-caste woman as the 
ideal for all womankind is equated with her role in perpetuating the traditional 
Brahma i cal patriarchy. 
 Indian scholars adopted the nationalist rhetoric of a “golden age” as a historical 
paradigm to study the status of women in ancient India. The most representative work of 
this school is Altekar’s The Position of Women in Hindu Civilisation from Prehistoric 
Times to the Present Day (1938). Altekar underlined the golden age rhetoric as an 
academic paradigm, thereby providing an authoritative validation of nationalist 
convictions. The conclusion to his detailed survey is telling: “The position that Hindu 
women occupied at the dawn of civilization during the Vedic age is much better than 
what we would ordinarily expect it to have been” (1938: 407). There was a considerable 
                                               
65 See also Chakravarti (1990: 46). Interestingly the first traces of this glorification of the Aryan Hindu 
woman are to be found in the works of early women scholars like Clarisse Bader (1863). 
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decline in women’s status during the age of the sū ras, and s    s. This decline from 
what Altekar believes to have been a satisfactory status in the Vedic age, continued till 
1800 CE, notwithstanding minor improvements in property rights. This work appears 
methodologically lacking in the context of today’s post-feminist and post-nationalist 
climate. Altekar’s recommendation for the emancipation of modern Indian women is not 
only limited but patronising. In particular his uncritical acceptance of the written word as 
‘truth’ is problematic and underlines his positivist inclinations, which reveals further 
methodological lacunae. His explanation for the deterioration of the status of women 
lacks a wider contextual underpinning, since he makes no reference to the broader 
economic and social context. Finally, he appears unaware of the intricate functioning of 
patriarchy, patriarchal institutions and gender relations. 
 In the context of the Indian academic world striving to remain secular in the face 
of ‘Hindu revivalist’ forces, Altekar’s statements on medieval India and the effects of 
Muslim rule on Hindu women are severely problematic particularly in the current 
contemporary context.66 The need to respond to the colonial critique of Indian culture and 
society meant that historians like Altekar tended to focus on specific religious, social and 
legal issues that were important in the context of the colonial discourse. Accordingly, 
Altekar remains preoccupied with the absence or presence of certain factors in the past: 
dowry, Suttee, child marriage (Menski, 2003: 322), education, Purdah, property rights, 
niyoga, tonsure, religious rights, access to public areas and female infanticide. These 
issues were taken up for debate and considered indices to the status of women in ancient 
India. Altekar painstakingly researches the origin and development of each of these 
indices. Chakravarti and Roy (1988a: 3) criticise as unhistorical such attempts to trace the 
development of individual traits over time detached from their wider social and cultural 
context. In his defence however, considering that Altekar was himself a high-caste man 
and a product of a male-dominated academic world untouched by notions of feminism, 
particularly at a time when colonialism was losing ground and nationalism was at its 
peak, it is not surprising that he held the views he did. It is apparent that Altekar was 
                                               
66 Today we have a new area of conflict perhaps due to these early reactionary writings, Menski (2002: 
112) points out any attempt to explain Hinduism, to Indians or outsiders, from within is “stereotyped as 
Hindu revivalist” particularly in the wake of Hindutva fanaticism and its BJP era. 
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deeply influenced by biological determinism and thus accepted women as the weaker sex. 
He therefore unquestioningly accepts patriarchal paradigms.67 
 Altekar’s bias towards certain sources may be held responsible for his 
methodological shortfall. The bulk of his evidence is drawn from Vedic literature, the 
dharmaśās ras, the epics and classical Sanskrit literature. Of course the use of these texts 
is inevitable considering the subject matter and the scarcity of alternate sources for 
ancient India. However, the nature of these texts dictates that the relationship between the 
normative and the historical be thoroughly examined before they are unquestioningly 
accepted. Unfortunately, Altekar does not consider the primarily scriptural, prescriptive 
and normative nature of these texts. Perrot (1992: 4) explains, for instance, that through 
history women have been the targets of exhortations and normative sermons by religious 
leaders, who, by emphasising what women ought to be, have helped to obscure what their 
position might really have been. For Altekar the Hindu woman is the high-caste high 
class one, although he does mention in passing the “lower sections of society”, but it is to 
castigate them for the perpetuation of certain evils and thereby to hold them to account 
for lowering the status of women overall. Interestingly, Altekar sets himself the task of 
writing the history of all Hindu women, however partly perhaps due to his personal 
background as a high-caste man steeped in Sanskritic traditions, and partly due to the 
social context of the Hindu reform movement and struggle against colonialism, he 
represents instead the high-caste high class Hindu woman. For example he talks about the 
fact that the practice of bride-price prevailed in the lower sections of society and that it 
was a by-product of the lowering of the age of marriage (1938: 49). Altekar also justifies 
the existence of the dowry system as it is connected to the conception of marriage as a 
gift. He says, “A religious gift in kind is usually accompanied by a formal gift in cash or 
gold. So the gift of the bride also was accompanied by a formal and small gift in cash or 
ornaments” (1995: 71). While prominent historians continue to validate this view, this 
reading has severely damaged any attempt to re-examine their role and validity 
meaningfully. My study evaluates this historical quagmire in the sections below, since 
this will highlight the problems of understanding the true, but still contested, nature of 
these ancient writings. 
 
                                               
67 For more detailed references to Altekar’s patriarchal bias see 1938 (112, 322-3, 409). 
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2.2 The role of tradition in shaping text 
When determining the role of early Indian literature in shaping tradition, keeping in mind 
the multi-disciplinary approach of my thesis, the views of numerous scholars, literary 
historians, legal theorists, and anthropologists is considered. Further, while examining the 
place of texts and their relevance to this study it is crucial to understand the varying 
agenda of much of the research conducted on and around Indian traditional texts. My 
study focuses on the Brahma  ca  Sanskrit texts, regarded as religious texts by early 
scholars. It is noteworthy that there has been a clear “literary bias within modern Western 
conceptions of religion” (King, 1999: 62), and this emphasis on written texts has had 
wide reaching repercussions on approaches to the study of Indian cultural texts by both 
insiders and outsiders.  
 The most ancient layers of Sanskrit text are clearly ritually focused, and as such 
are centred on male concerns, though they address matters of the macrocosmic Order 
(rta), for which the ancient Vedic rituals appear to have been an important support 
system. Unsurprisingly, thus, most historians argue that almost all religious texts tend to 
be andocentric and patriarchal.68 For instance, Fiorenza (1993: 7, 11) highlights the 
androcentric nature of the Bible, which she argues has been successfully employed to 
legitimise societal and ecclesiastical patriarchy and women’s “divinely ordained place” in 
it. According to this historical view, such texts are male-centred because they are male-
authored and operate with a generic masculine reference point implying men are speaking 
for and about women. Importantly, these texts are characterised as prescriptive and 
reflective of the world-view of the class that composed them. Similarly, the texts that 
form the main source material for my study, as noted have a strong male, Brahma  north 
Indian bias and appear primarily religious in nature.  
                                               
68 Patriarchy literally implies the rule of the father. In the Indian environment specifically, as in the global 
context, this refers to a social organisation where men are the heads of their families and descent and 
inheritance is reckoned through the male line. Feminism, in characterising patriarchy more generically as 
officially sanctioned male dominance, characterises it symbolically as the root of all evil. According to Lisa 
Tuttle’s Encyclopaedia of Feminism (1986) definition of the term “the universal political structure which 
privileges men at the expense of women”, which proponents of new masculinity contest? They concur with 
the feminist view that patriarchy is oppressive, but argue that it does not necessarily imply men are 
universally privileged. In the Indian context the term patriarchy is impossible to ignore. The discussion in 
chapter three below will devote some excursus to the relevance and prevalence of patriarchy in Indian 
society and its role in conceptions of dowry. At present it is sufficient to preface the term in its current 
cultural and critical usage. Further, see Reiter’s (1975) edited volume in its entirety, and the introduction 
(Reiter, 1975: 11-19) and Lila Liebowitz’s “Evolution of Sex Differences” (1975: 20-35) in particular, on 
the application of these ‘gendered’ categories to the modern academic study of women as a sub-species. 
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Further, I am aware of the dangers of applying the gender lens to ancient Indian 
literature as Jamison (1996: 5) cautioned.69 I have located these texts in their specific 
socio-political and textual contexts and am aware of their function in society past and 
present. I do not at any stage claim that the information concerning women relates to 
social reality; in fact the intention is quite the reverse. The Brahma  ca  discourse within 
these writings represents an influential construct of the male elite, the Brahma s. We do 
not have women composing teachings or observations during the ancient period or even 
expressing their views on women’s role in society. What we have is the male elite, 
possibly senior citizens, expressing their view of the world. Clearly, it is not always 
possible to gather accurate or historically sound data of the lives of women from the 
texts; however, it is all that remains of a distant period. Nevertheless, they encapsulate 
the dominant ideology of the period, an analysis of which is necessary if the processes of 
legitimisation of patriarchal institutions like dowry are to be better understood. We will 
see from the argument below that these texts are a product of the Brahma  ca  discourse 
designed to indicate how the world should be, and not what it was.  
Over a century ago, when Max Muller edited the fifty-volume set of world 
scriptures he perhaps did not hesitate to entitle the series “books”. The term Bible 
originally implied books, 70 while the word ‘scripture’ designates that which is written 
down. On closer inspection it is evident that being a sacred text or ‘scripture’ is not a 
quality inherent in any given text, rather it is the interactive, inconstant relationship 
between the text and the community of people to whom it is symbolic. Cantwell-Smith 
(1993: 18) highlights the human “propensity to scripturalize”, which he believes is a 
widespread tendency in most cultures. Most relevant to the discussion that follows is the 
assertion that there has been and is a human activity of treating a work or works as 
scripture, common to most societies. It is a surprising thing to do, according to Cantwell-
Smith (1993: 19), to take a piece of literature and evidently elevate it to very special 
status. And to further live one’s life, individual and corporate, in accordance with its 
guidance. 
                                               
69 For further detail for  amison’s caution and a discussion on the textual material under survey here see the 
introduction to chapter 5, below. 
70 During the middle ages there was a gradual movement from ta Biblia, a plural in Greek towards Biblia a 
singular in Latin. Therefore perception moved from “the Books” to “The Book”. This extended from the 
purely grammatical sense to the gentle development away from a “collection of writings” to a single 
volume bound between two covers This was strengthened further by progress in printing following the 
Guttenberg era. See Cantwell-Smith (1993: 10-13). Similar positivist perceptions have developed from 
previously transcendent meanings in relation to the material under consideration here as discussed below. 
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The word Qur’an, on the other hand clearly implies what is recited, not written, 
and of course the dogma in this case is that a Muslim has to believe that the Qur’an is 
god’s word. The trouble is, of course, that God did not give detailed enough instructions 
for humans to lead their everyday life –humans still have to make their own decisions 
seeking to be compliant with God’s wishes. No such pressures exist for Hindus, but that 
is often forgotten in the so-called comparative debates about ‘religious law’. Whether to 
give dowry or not could for Hindus never be a matter of falling in line with divine will, it 
is a social issue.  
There is thus at least a dual involvement evident in all early collections of 
religious thought. The approach that regards the written word above the spoken word is 
the positivist Western influenced approach, reinforced by Islamic concepts, it would 
appear. Similarly, what the term Veda implies is a complex web, and what precisely the 
Veda comprises is tangled in this web.71 This web has further to do with humans being 
part of the cosmic web, but the day-to-day actions for common people are not prescribed 
in detail by such texts. However, this may be a different matter for ritual specialists 
engaged in Vedic rituals. Here, absolute precision and total compliance seems to be 
expected, every single word, every syllable of the text, counts and has a role.  The fact 
that only a small minority of Indians ever had an opportunity to study or use the Veda is a 
crucial fact not to be ignored here. It is necessary to highlight the prominence of these 
texts here to foreground the argument because of the status given to this collection by 
outsiders, and insiders alike. Although the Veda is rarely consulted, it is called supreme. 
The observation that “Veda is whatever pertains to religion; Veda is not books” may be 
seen as the guiding principle for much of the early scholarly writing on these 
collections.72 
                                               
71 Whilst regarding even the early texts an outside observer might deduce that there are sixteen, considering 
that there are traditionally four classes of text for each of the four orders of the Veda Rg, Yajur, Sama, 
Atharva:  a h  ā, Brahman  aa, Aranyaka and Upanishad. As Cantwell-Smith (1993: 133-34)  highlights, 
when the term Veda is spoken by modern Westerners, there is a tendency for its meaning to fluctuate 
between one, or three, or four, or all sixteen elements  of this formal collection. Interestingly the four 
distinct threads of thought represented by four separate collections are now often, even among academics, 
referred to as the Veda, as singular, no longer plural. Similarly the Bible, in the Latin is so called as one 
book, not many books so, Ta Biblia. This nomenclature in some way signifies a sense of single authorship, 
a sense of monotheistic imposition of rules, casually cutting out the options and the realities of plurality. 
72 Vedam est, quidquid ad religionem pertinet, Vedam non sunt libri this quote is from the response made 
by a Brahman  a and reported by a Carmelite missionary Paulinus recording his experience of studying with 
Brahman  as in 1792 (Cited in Cantwell-Smith, 1993: 305). 
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Following from this observation one can examine the position that has argued that 
the philosophy and ideology contained in the four Vedas represents religion rather than 
tradition. It is useful to digress here to compare and discuss the terms ‘r     o’  and 
‘ rad   o’ (King, 1999: 35-40).  King (1999: 35) points out that the term religion derives 
from the Latin ‘r     o’ , which has been related to the root re-ligare meaning to re-trace 
or re-read. It follows therefore that religio involves the retracing of “the lore of the ritual” 
of one’s ancestors. This implication of the term appears to have gained credence in the 
“pagan” Roman Empire and rendered religio synonymous with traditio. King (1999: 36) 
argues that as such religio represented the “teachings” of one’s ancestors and was 
essentially not open to debate. This attempt to elevate ritual to a sanctified status is 
evidenced in the post-Vedic period by the Brahma i cal discourse, as explained below. 
Primarily religio involved the performance of ancient ritual practices and paying homage 
to the gods. However, this also implies an inherent plurality, pertinent particularly in the 
Indian context, that there can never be one religio because there are a vast variety of 
different social and ethnic groups with traditions and histories of their own. As 
Balagangadhara (1994: 241) notes: 
When you look at religion as traditio, that is, as a set of practices transmitted over 
generations, then the term appears as a minor variation of our intuitive notion of culture: 
to have religion is to have culture. 
Modern discussions on the meaning of the term religio tend to focus on the Christianised 
model of religion, strongly emphasising theistic belief.73 Interestingly, however, there is 
an implicit pluralism evident in the Ciceronian understanding of both terms religio and 
traditio (King, 1999: 37).74  
Before proceeding to examine the relevance of the traditional texts and their 
practice it is useful to briefly discuss the classification best suited for the complete 
content of the early Indian literature. It has been variously called early Vedic religion or 
Vedism. Ray (1999: 43) argues that Vedism underwent fundamental changes and virtually 
“re-invented” itself as Brahma  s   during the period 500BCE to 300BCE. Ray’s 
assertion is adequately attested in post-Vedic literature; however before we go further, 
the term Brahma  s   requires explanation; since this study is concerned with the nature 
of the religion implied by it. Describing the historical setting of the ancient period of the 
                                               
73 Whether, mono-, poly-, or pan-theistic in nature, these represent theistic traditions all the same (King, 
1999: 37). 
74 See King (1999: 35-36) for greater detail of Cicero’s pre-Christian etymology of the term ‘r     o’ which 
allows the connection to re-ligare, meaning to bind together or to link, to be constructed. 
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traditional texts aids a contextualised view of these religious texts and the version of 
religion they carry. I agree with Richard King (1995: 1) when he observes that there is a 
close connection between religion, culture and power. He highlights the layering of these 
categories, “…awareness of the mutual imbrication of religion, culture and power as 
categories. This is not to say religion, and culture can be reduced to a set of power 
relations but rather that religion and culture are the field in which power relations 
operate” [emphasis added].  
In terms of sociological theory this thesis touches upon several. First and most 
importantly Emile Durkheim’s (1979: 39) sui generis approach to religion, and further 
his notion of the ‘collective conscience’ of a society as the totality of the beliefs and 
sentiments common to the average members of that society, which forms a determinate 
system, almost with a life of its own (Fields, 1995: 5)75. This corresponds almost entirely 
with the ancient Hindu category of sadācāra. Levi-Strauss’s approach to the fraught 
nature of gift-giving in pre-literate societies is also considered here. Bronislaw 
Malionwski’s participant-observer methodology must be noted as a mode of 
understanding my own culture, from the anthropologist’s desk. However, previous 
research centred on the history of religion has risked the danger of taking the sui generis 
“in and of itself” approach to an extreme.76 
It is essential to note that the central explanatory category of religious studies, 
meaning the notion of “religion” itself, is a Christian theological category (King, 1999: 
40), how easily this has sat with previous and current research on Indian religion in 
particular is discussed here. The concept of ‘religion’ is the product of the culturally 
specific discursive processes of Christian history in the West and has been “forged in the 
crucible of inter-religious conflict and interaction” (King, 1999: 40). As Shaw (1995: 65-
76) argues, like Eliade (1982), most studies on the history of religion examine and project 
a view from above, thereby rendering them socially de-contextualised and un-gendered. 
Fiorenza (1993: 29) makes a similar statement when she argues that it is not possible to 
take androcentric texts, like the Bible, as reliable sources for human religion, history and 
culture: 
                                               
75 Durkheim’s first edition of The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (Paris: Alcan) appeared in 1912 and 
is notably a seminal work on sociologically informed philosophy of society. See Karen Fields’s (1995) 
entire Introduction for a qualitative analysis of Durkheim’s position in sociological thought. 
76 See in particular McCutcheon’s Manufacturing Religion (1997) based on his doctoral thesis of 1995, 
examining the discourse on sui generis religion and the politics of nostalgia. 
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“The text may be the message, but the message is not coterminous with human reality and history. 
A feminist critical hermeneutics must therefore, move from androcentric texts to their social 
historical contexts. It not only has to claim the contemporary community of women struggling for 
liberation as its locus of revelation, it also must claim its fore-sisters as victims and subjects 
participating in patriarchal culture.” 77   
Any approach that allows religious texts and religion to be treated as an irreducible 
phenomenon leads quite simply to the representation of religion as scriptural, thereby 
limiting any anthropological analysis. Subsequently both religions with religious texts 
and some sort of scholarly elite who claim interpretative authority are privileged. Shaw 
(1995: 65-76) concludes that this approach is underwritten with inadequacy, since it fails 
to examine the concept of power in the context of the nature of religion. Any analysis on 
the nature of religion, its origins and the context of religious texts allows these texts to be 
demythologised. In the process the androcentric nature of the texts as codes of patriarchy 
and patriarchal power, its ideology and the underwritten sanctions are challenged and 
therefore revealed. 
The precise theoretical framework guiding the present thesis involves an approach 
pioneered by Clifford Geertz (1973), the concept of “thick descriptions” as a way of 
cultural description, to generate interpretive insights into the practice of dowry. In The 
Interpretation of Cultures, Geertz espoused the idea that culture is a semiotic concept and 
equated ethnography with interpretation, or the reading of text. He explained that the 
purpose of cultural analysis should “not be an experimental science in search of law but 
an interpretative one in search of meaning” (1973: 5). Recalling the researcher-
ethnographer, he accorded greater importance to interpretative insights, thickly described, 
than to ‘thin’ scientific conclusions, as the product of ethnographic endeavour. I stress his 
emphasis on being aware of the critical elements of cultural specificity in attempting to 
draw generalisations about how dowry as a custom functions.  
James Clifford (1986) contributed to the conceptual development of 
hermeneutics. Famously referring to cultural descriptions as “partial truths”, he develops 
Geertz’s notion of ‘thin’ with this assertion that “[e]ven the best ethnographic writing is 
fictional or constructed in the sense that cultural and historical ‘truths’ are partial” 
(Clifford, 1986: 6). Accepting this hermeneutic insight that cultural descriptions may be 
likened to stories (implying autobiographical or fictive content? to a degree), this further 
                                               
77 Emphasis in the original.  
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implies that ethnographic accounts do not reflect a pre-existing reality, much less one that 
is uniformly or universally shared. Texts do not mimic reality. Instead, they constitute 
reality anew. This reading may be applied to the role of texts across the historical period 
under survey here, and additionally augment and embellish the researcher’s position in 
the process. This becomes relevant in examining my own position as a researcher 
involved in the study of my own culture, including the fact that I am a woman 
researching an issue that affects Indian women.  
However politically incorrect or sexist it may seem today, in the late 1980s 
eminent Indian social theorist Srinivas (1984:7-8) highlighted the advantages of dowry 
being analysed by women social scientists, since the segregation of sexes continues to be 
a marked feature of Indian society, particularly its more traditional sections. His assertion 
is that “women social scientists might have better insight into the kind of mental world in 
which the daughter-in-law or mother-in-law lives…”. Relevant in particular are Srinivas’ 
observations on the social scientist’s dilemma while addressing dowry in particular: 
“Dowry is in many ways an archetypal institution, for it illustrates the kind of 
problems which the social anthropologist/sociologist studying his own society faces 
frequently…The first and most obvious problem is the ambivalence which dowry rouses 
in the sociologist studying it. On the one hand, there is the feeling that the institution is an 
unmitigated evil and that it needs to be destroyed root and branch, and at the earliest 
opportunity, and on the other hand, the institution demands to be understood, its many 
ramification [Sic.] traced, and its regional, caste and other variations recorded. The 
sociologist studying dowry cannot help being fascinated by it, and being impressed with 
its strength and resilience. But this very fascination with the institution and his awareness 
of its strength might result in his being accused of being a reactionary who wants the 
institution to remain.” (Srinivas, 1984: 7)   
Noting these worthy pointers as ear-marks in my research notes I now delve 
further into how these theoretical issues are to be addressed in the course of this thesis, by 
outlining the lay out of this work.  Notably, this thesis considers Mauss’s (1925) original 
insight on the socially sanctioned distribution of gifts and other tokens of relationship, 
fraught with historical and structural significance as these things are, may be an 
irreducible element in human culture. The pot-latch and caste system are perhaps 
instances of general principle, which underlie behaviour sanctioned and governed by 
these albeit fluid rules. The universal relevance of these systems is clearly defined in this 
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thesis in chapter 5. I argue here that the dowry system coincides with the pot-latch system 
of gift-giving in several ways. 
 Within the wider context of Indian marriage laws, the thesis accounts for the 
phantom of dowry, which neither has a clear-cut definition, nor an ontology within 
textual representations, yet has remained a powerful player in the discourse of marriage 
laws (see for detailed discussion chapter 4).  While engaging in a discourse of what 
dowry is and how it has formulated itself to become an entrenched partner to most Hindu, 
even Indian marriages, the thesis explores particularly the role of tradition and text as 
agents in shaping the notion of dowry, and its indisputable position in Indian society 
today as an uncomfortable sadācāra. The canvas against which this custom is set 
illustrates the rather important role ‘tradition’ continues to play in shaping India’s legal 
modernity, which apparently is not just dominated, as we assume for ‘Western’ legal 
systems, by state-centric and top-down formally led legal regulation. 
It is usual to employ the term Hinduism when dealing with these ‘texts’ and the 
religion or beliefs they embody. However, Hinduism as a term is rife with academic 
controversy. It has been categorically called a “western concept” attempting to indicate a 
cognizable entity (Cantwell-Smith, 1993: 137). For the ancient period in question it 
appears archaic; particularly since its early connotation, devised by the British 
administration, was a geographical-cum-cultural one. Von Stietencron’s (1989: 11-27) 
statement that Hinduism is just a “collective label” or Sammelbezeichnung is noteworthy. 
He argues that it is a construct produced by Western scholars of religion in order to have 
a common designation for the “innumerable, partly cognate, partly divergent religious 
phenomena of one geographical and historical region” (Von Stietencron, 1989: 12-13). 
Hinduism is therefore a term used to describe a collection of belief systems by outsiders, 
which insiders have adopted for reasons of brevity. This view is echoed by several 
scholars who argue without consensus that Hinduism represents an amalgamation of 
sects. 
From the insider perspective it is argued that Hinduism should not be compared to 
religions like Islam and Christianity, because it represents rather a kind of “meta-
religion”. This view argues that the sects or sectarian religions like Saivism and 
Vaisnavism which operate within Hinduism might be suitable for such comparison 
instead. Various Indian authors have rejected the characterisation of Hinduism as a 
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religion at all and have critiqued the very concept.78 Others have put forward what 
appears to be a more characteristic approach that is to define its “essence”: not in terms of 
specific religion, but a more comprehensive and inclusive constellation of religious 
thought and life and as a potentially universal framework for religious plurality.79 As 
Cantwell Smith (1962: 65) summarised “there are Hindus, but no Hinduism”. In his view 
it is a foreign, possibly Islamic and European superimposition upon the “luxuriant 
welter” of a tradition that “is not a unity and does not aspire to be” and a misplaced 
attempt to systematise and “congeal the spontaneous” (1962: 66).80 
It is broadly agreed among the scholarly community of Indologists that there is no 
“one” Hinduism (Menski, 2002: 112). Further it is crucial to recognise that this tendency 
of early western scholars to homogenise has obscured the very substantial diversities in 
religious outlook in India during successive millennia and even centuries. Cantwell 
Smith (1993: 137) recognises as “characteristic” of Indian culture the ability to not 
repudiate earlier phases but to continually innovate and enrich its heritage rendering it 
more complex throughout history. By history I mean an ongoing process, not just the 
past. It is a growth process, then, a continuum, which is ongoing. The present is just as 
historical as the past, as is the future. They are interconnected. Human history is a 
continuing dialectic, being re-modelled and recast by new contributors to its richness and 
complexity. Bearing this in mind it is possible to continue the outlined discussion here.  
For the present purpose the broad definition of Hinduism as a conglomerate of 
belief systems with two primary features in common for most Hindus should suffice: the 
acceptance of the Vedas and the importance assigned to the caste or  ar a  system. 
Beyond that, there ought to be at least a general cultural recognition of being interlinked 
with the cosmos, and thus with all others, in a culture-specific way.  Thus put, Hinduism 
turns out to be a chthonic religion (Glenn, 2000, 56-85) and is quite akin to African 
                                               
78 Halbfaas’s (1988) India and Europe, chapter 18 in particular, has an enlightened discussion on Bankim 
Chandra and S.V. Ketkar. Also see L. S. Joshi A Critique of Hinduism, translated from the Marathi original 
1940 edition by G. D. Parikh 1948 Bombay.    
79 See S. Radhakrishnan The Hindu View of Life 1968 London (first edition 1927). In Hacker’s (Halbfaas, 
1995) view questions concerning the “essence” are more representative of  Neo-Hinduism, a preoccupation 
with an idea of unity and essence is motivated by and in effect inseparable from the modern Indian quest 
for a national identity. Also for further detail on Hacker’s thesis on Neo-Hindusim, and its place in the 
study of religions see Smith (1998, 313- 339), and for an able deconstruction of versions of Hinduism. 
80 Cantwell Smith rejects any attempt to “reify” or “essentialize” the personal faiths of human beings. Apart 
from this specific critique of the concept of Hinduism he categorically considers the very notion of 
“religions” and “religion” as inadequate. See also R.D. Baird (1971). 
 
 
67 
religions and other Asian forms of “chthonic culture”.81 But Hindus are proud about 
having an ancient literature and think they are thus very different from these other, 
virtually ‘primitive’ religions without proper texts. We see here that ‘text’ also has an 
important function as an ethnic identifier, maybe even if one is illiterate. After all, the 
ancient Indian texts started out as oral texts! 
Returning to the explanation about Brahma  s  : although pivotal to an 
understanding of Brahma  s  , in isolation the categories of varn  a and an acceptance of 
the Vedas as central, does not comprehensively represent what this term  rah a  s   
expresses in totality (Smith, 1994: 5-19). Academics, like Robinson (1985: 182), have 
further attempted to differentiate the Brahma  c  and non-Brahma  c  strains within 
Hinduism by identifying the former as a Sanskrit-based, priestly tradition emphasising 
ritual and the latter being expressed through regional languages concentrating on 
devotional worship without any defined role for a priestly class. Lipner’s (1994:9) 
definition of Brahma i c culture marginally suits the discussion here;  rah a  s   is a 
collection of beliefs and practices that are not homogenous, but propagated and ratified 
by Brahma  authority. This proves true in two aspects.  rah a  s   created, implied and 
accepted the supreme authority of the Brahma   ar a and was assimilative in nature. It 
was  rah a  s   in fact that paved the way for further assimilation under   r ā  c  
Hinduism. The verses, conglomerates of older ideas about marriage and dowry contained 
in the ‘texts’, are products of this historic period. Therefore, to adequately examine the 
sources of evidence laid out in the following chapters,  rah a  s   requires a far more 
comprehensive definition. 
Here I am concerned with the glorified status the Brahma s  as custodians and 
traditional interpreters of the Vedas gained and their role in elevating these ritual manuals 
to prescriptive teachings. Crucially the Brahma s claimed to be and were recognized as 
religious authorities because of an intimate relationship to the Vedas; the authoritative 
and in that sense canonical texts of Hinduism. The authority of the Brahma  was 
dependent on the Veda and the Veda existed only because of the traditional function the 
Brahma  assumed for its preservation. However, Brahma  s   cannot be defined as 
                                               
81 The term “chthonic” here refers to primarily oral traditions, including those found in parts of Latin 
America and the South Pacific also believed to have common elements, see Glenn (2004: 32) for further 
detail. In this, Glenn’s second edition to his original (2000), apart from the title losing the phrase “a 
sustainable diversity”, he further develops his theory of tradition. Some reviewers have called Glenn an 
unlikely “Oppenheim”, see Peter Norman’s review at www.globallawbooks.org/reviews/File.asp.id=246 
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merely a “Sanskrit-based priestly tradition emphasising formal ritual” (Smith, 1987a: 
39), because although it emphasised the role of the priests as the traditional interpreters, 
purveyors, bearers and protectors of texts and traditions Brahma  s   also developed 
simple forms of domestic ritual rites. In other words, Brahma i sm also comprised ‘living 
laws’ and internally plural awareness of sadācāra, it was from early on a plurality of 
pluralities (Menski, 2010)82. 
Selvanayagam (1992: 65) observes that it was as a result of the decline of grand 
rituals following the rise of the heterodox sects that the Brahma s  were forced to develop 
simpler forms of domestic rituals. Brahma i sm undoubtedly privileged grandiose formal 
ritual. But Vedic sacrifices continued to be central and were revived during the medieval 
Sunga period.83 Essentially, Brahma  s   represented an integrated socio-politico-
religious ideology which developed in this period pressured by the social and political 
transformations which transpired. Contained in this ideology was the worldview of the 
elite Brahma s , which found expression in their vast literature. These texts reflected the 
changing circumstances of the times as perceived by the Brahma s . The basic tenets of 
this tradition were: the belief in and the propagation of the four-tiered caste/ ar a   
system with the Brahma as  at the top; complete acceptance of the notional authority of 
the Vedas; the belief in  ta cosmic, social, moral and political order and connectedness;84 
hence the performance of formal ritual and also of domestic rites, which over time 
became more central to ‘living’ Hinduism than the Vedic rituals of Brahma  s  ; the 
constant assimilation of new cults and traditions as exemplified in the incorporation of 
the principles of samnyasa and aśrama; the belief in ancestor worship and the theory of 
the three debts, r as ; the establishment of four goals or primary imperatives in a man’s 
life, puruśarthas and of four modes or stages of living; an emphasis on centralised 
monarchy as the predominant political system, on territoriality, on patrilineal bonds 
within the family and society, and on private property.  
These tenets of Brahma  s   were expressed in what we might call the ‘texts’ of 
this period. Sanskritists have traditionally held that the Vedas and a large part of the post-
Vedic literature including the śāstras were orally composed and orally transmitted for a 
                                               
82 See http://ssrn.com/abstract=1621384 
83 There is documentary evidence, for instance, that Pusyamitra Sunga performed the aśvamedha sacrifice. 
84 For a detailed analysis of  ta as the cosmic scaffolding of Order and harmony see Jeanine Miller (1985), 
further for a law related understanding of the  ta-dharma complex see Menski (2003: 32, 90-91). 
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considerable period of time before being committed to writing.85 The first to mildly 
refute this hypothesis was Walter Ong (1982: 66), who wrote that there is some degree of 
difficulty in accepting that works of such length could have been orally composed and 
retained efficiently in memory. Goody (1987: 110-22) argues a stronger point claiming 
that this entire corpus could not have been the product of an oral society; purely because 
of its length, he argues it could not have been transmitted over generations in invariant 
form and been confined to a so-called oral tradition by a class of literate specialists. This 
critique was firmly rejected by Falk (1990),86 cited by Lopez (1996: 35-36) and 
Halverson (1992: 301-317). Staal (1986) had earlier admitted the role of written text at 
some point in the history of the Indian epics, and clearly rejected the notion that the 
Vedas originally had written texts.87 It is necessary to consider that in the midst of this 
controversy no final conclusion has been reached, further stressing the amorphous 
timeframe of undocumented periods of history.  It is possible, thus, that these texts 
contain traditions that have remained fluid for a time, and were eventually written 
down.88 In the course of their composition, compilation and final commitment to writing, 
these tenets became further clarified, even crystallised and reformulated. 
 The śāstras and epics composed/compiled by the Brahma as  during this period 
therefore represent the ‘texts’ of Brahma  s   par excellence. They not only reflect 
Brahma i cal values but serve as receptacles where Brahma  ca  doctrine is recorded and 
explained. But as doctrine, this is not text as binding authority, but as authoritative 
guidance, with room for variations in specific circumstances, as the sū ras, in particular, 
richly document by saying that a particular ritual should be done like this, or like that, or 
in this or that other way. The texts themselves thus tell us that they are conscious of 
plurality and of ‘living law’ adjustments.  
  amison (1996: 7) comments that the texts “are entirely religious chronicling an 
elaborate institutional religion requiring significant material resources and social 
organization privileged in its socio economic class”. When perceived as expressions of 
Brahma i cal thought, the very nature of these ‘texts’ emphasises the reasons for their 
being, their composition/compilation and commitment to writing. The major question in 
                                               
85 See Coward (1988: 116-118) on the nature of the oral composition of what he has called Hindu scripture. 
86 However see also Falk’s (1989) in-depth analysis of language and women’s positionality in religious life 
elsewhere. 
87 As cited in Lopez (1996: 36) 
88 For a discussion on the writing down of the orally transmitted texts see Coward (1988: 120-122). 
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this thesis is whether and to what extent text can represent sadācāra. According to 
Menski (2005)89 it is these old men stating something or writing it, but what are they 
writing? Are the expressions in the layers of traditional cultural texts, based on their own 
opinions of the social norms even customs that they continually observe? Or are they 
ideals that one should observe? In either case, is that not sadācāra? When Derrett (1984: 
192-193) notes that “as long as the joint-family system survives as a sociological fact 
(irrespective of what happens to it at law)…” he clearly recognizes the disparity between 
legality and reality. Texts claim one thing, society quite another. 
 Further, as Smith (1987a: 46-51) observes, if “by representing new texts and 
practices as in some way connected to the Vedas, change is both legitimized and denied 
and continuity is both affirmed and unrestrained”, and this process transforms sm ti, 
technically “non-canonical” into “canonical” and thereby authoritative; undertaken by the 
Brahman  s and by implication if the brah an  s are creating an ideal model for all society, 
then these patterns of behaviour are gently over a period recommended for all, in a 
certain way. This explanation fits the remit of the preferred form of marriage being 
instituted for all, as we will see in chapter 4 and 5 below. However, there is also room for 
the argument that Brahma s  would not assume that everyone followed their model, for 
example the frequently listed eight forms of marriage assume certain ideal forms for 
Brahma s , but other forms for different castes. Again, the existing interpretations of 
these kinds of texts are not helpful enough to clarify the issue debated here. 
According to Vansina (1965: 77-78, 84, and 154), a text or a tradition does not 
exist by itself or even for itself. Every testimony and tradition has a purpose and fulfils a 
function. Usually this function is to serve the interests of the society in which it is 
preserved by being put into practice. He further observes that normally the interests of 
the society are served in two ways: either tradition helps a society to adapt itself to its 
changing environment or it helps in permanently maintaining the social structure. 
Scholars argue severally, offering numerous explanations. However they appear to miss 
the structural link between texts and the socio-politico-religious tradition that gave birth 
to them. According to some, the sū ras were composed for the guidance of the advanced 
sections of society in its early stages (Banerji, 1962: 9). Some believe that the śās ra 
literature was developed in order to justify social organisation increasingly threatened by 
                                               
89 Discussion during supervisory meeting. 
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the growing spread of Buddhist ideology. For instance Derrett (1994: 3) writes: “A 
stimulus for the śās ra seems to have been the need to depict and justify a social 
organisation as against the seemingly insidious message of Buddhism which… 
threatened to undermine the tradition and claims of Brahman  as to monopolise all contact 
with the eternal and the intellectual Hindu society.” It was further held that the śās ras 
were intended to encourage Sanskritisation of the indigenous and tribal community 
without jeopardising the social and political superiority of the upper castes (Srinivas, 
1995: 1-8).90 
Elsewhere Derrett (1975: 10) suggests that the śās ras addressed themselves to 
the intricate task of inspiring the aspiring, without encouraging them to infringe upon the 
property and prestige of their betters, and reassuring the superiors that they are in no way 
threatened. In addition to the above stated assertions, it is not far flung to assume that the 
Brahma as ’ desire to firstly assimilate, compose and compile the śās ras and secondly to 
take over custody of the epics from the bards was rooted in the peculiar socio-historical 
context of this period. See Map 3: Socio-cultural Map of North India (c. 500 BCE).91 
This was further strengthened by the Brahma  ca  perception of a threat to their 
envisioned socio-political order. The primary motivation of this literature was to expand 
the ritualistic, social and political universe of the Brahma as  further to encompass all 
aspects of daily life, so as to counteract the perceived threat posed by the heterodox sects. 
This is the transition from  ta to dharma (see Menski, 2003: 94ff). 
The process of composition/compilation had two important results which 
reinforced Brahma  s   further. Firstly, immense power accrued to the Brahma as  
through the process of compilation, also reinforcing their privileged ritual, literate status 
in society. This was first the case for the huge Vedic rituals and after their decline and 
eventual collapse the sphere of the domestic rituals, a process that is clearly reflected in 
the late textual layers of the marriage hymn of the  gveda (RV X.85) and further 
expanded in the corresponding text of the Atharvaveda (AV 14). Not just as authors but 
also as custodians of s    , or tradition, they appropriated memory and acquired mastery 
over knowledge and the production of knowledge. The unpublished detailed research by 
                                               
90 See also Ghurye’s (1969) analysis of “var a  dharma” in this regard as explored by Srinivas (1995) to 
further explain his theory in terms of Indian notions of societal sub-division.  
91 Source:  oseph E. Schwartzberg’s South Asian Atlas (1992: 15-21), now also available in a digital 
version. 
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Menski (1984: 538-548),92 suggests further that these authors manipulated their esoteric 
knowledge and deliberately concealed certain uncomfortable, i.e. polluting elements of 
their ritual activity.93 As Smith (1994: 58) succinctly states: 
The control of a group’s collective memory, the power to declare what happened in the 
past is a significant means of controlling the here and now. The ability to account for the 
past also entails the power to put it into the service of the present and into the service of 
those who pronounce on what happened in the past. Those who cannot remember the past 
are doomed to repeat others’ versions of it. 
Secondly, Brahma  s   itself assumed its form during this involved process of 
composition and compilation. Their worldview and belief system became re-systematised 
and clarified. It is tempting to conclude that Brahma  s   was created or at least re-
created in the texts of the period. In the centuries that followed the composition and 
compilation, the śās ras and the epics were committed into written form. Interestingly, it 
appears that the act of writing did not substantially alter the discourse or indeed the 
content of the ‘texts’.94 Notably however, in ancient India writing did not freeze or 
fossilise the śās ras, whereas according to some, in Mesopotamia the commitment of 
legal texts to writing soon after writing first appeared apparently froze legal codes 
(Oppenheim, 1964: 232; Ong, 1982: 41).  
It is the position of this thesis that these views appear too positivist. The fluid 
form of the śās ras remained, at least till the end of the nineteenth century, when 
additions and interpolations continued as a matter of form.95 Writing was thus unable to 
establish the Brahma  ca  discourse as an autonomous and authoritative discourse. The 
text was not ‘the law’, but a source of law, and it is significant that Muslim scholarship, 
for example, says the same even about the Qur’an. This, then, suggests further that 
existing scholarship on the authority of Sanskrit texts has been too positivistic. 
It is believed that the act of writing things down is able to establish what has been 
termed “context-free language” (Hirsch, 1977: 21-23, 26). Similarly, Olson (1980a) 
                                               
92 Further, Menski (1984: 530-542) suggests a plausible argument for a creation of the priest as ritual 
scapegoat in the early marriage texts. 
93 However, there are sometimes clues to these attempts to hide these acts, an associated example is to be 
found in AV 14 concerning the disposal of the blood taboo, the soiled bedclothes, even the bridal clothes, 
see Menski in some detail (1984: 532) 
94 See Day (1982) below, and his findings on the conservative tone of the ancient writing. 
95 In a certain sense the śāstric tradition continues to be fluid in contemporary India, where conflicting 
interpretations abound and take the place of the ‘written word’. 
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discusses the creation of an “autonomous discourse” through writing.96 Practically 
speaking this means that a written text is deemed to be more authoritative as it cannot be 
directly questioned or contested. However, texts in Sanskrit would still be open to 
interpretation, and thus would not simply be ‘fixed’. Unlike oral speech, a written 
discourse is detached from the author; therefore a written text assumes greater credibility, 
but that still does not mean it is set in stone and valid forever and in all scenarios. In 
ancient India authority was associated with the speaker and the spoken word rather than 
the written word.97  In fact despite the existence of written records, texts continue to be 
memorised and orally transmitted. Writing however did restrict the access to the corpus 
of literature limiting its perusal to literate Brahma as  and k a r yas, thereby reinforcing 
their privileged status. But it could not be held that a text is simply ‘the law’. It is always 
operative in a context and thus normally has what lawyers would call ‘persuasive 
authority’ or ‘coercive force’ rather than being a strictly binding rule. The text as a form 
of law has to live with other types of law and thus contributes to the genesis and constant 
navigation of ‘living law’, for which ancient Sanskrit devised, inter alia, the term 
sadācāra as a form of dharma and thus an aspect of ‘tradition’. 
 
2.3 The impact of texts on traditions 
We have seen that Hinduism as a historical entity spans a vast period and draws us back 
to the beginnings of human thought. Its very nature of projecting past, future and present 
into a complex continuum, which renews itself periodically, demands that any analysis be 
situation-specific and time-sensitive and take on board Clifford Geertz’s notion of “thick 
description”.98 “Thick description” refers to a description rich in contextuality, a study 
which pays attention to sociocultural and historical circumstances which contribute to the 
significance of the event or period. The second type of “thick description” attempts to 
clarify precisely the operative factors in the interpreter’s approach, which may directly 
influence his or her conception of the subject. As King (1999: 80) summarises, from this 
                                               
96 Both also cited in Ong (1982: 78) within a similar context. Also, for a informative discussion on Hirsch’s 
The Philosophy of Composition and the relevance of “context-free” language see Bizzell and Herzberg’s 
(1980) examination and critique. 
97 See Chitre’s (1991: viii ) introduction to Says Tuka describing the conflict faced by Tukaram the ś dr as 
saint because he dared to compose poetry on religious subjects which were considered solely the domain of 
the Brahman  aas. He also makes an interesting point on how Brahman  aism as a religion at this time 
separated communities (Chitre, 1991: xvi).  
98 The term “thick description” was coined by philosopher Gilbert Ryle but has been elaborated excellently 
by Geertz (1973). See also King (1999: 77-80).  
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perspective the most useful hermeneutical works are those which manifest an awareness 
and appreciation of context of the text and of the interpreter.99 With this approach in mind 
it is possible to name the texts and their interpreters for further analysis. 
The texts that characterize themselves as receptacles of Brahma  ca  tradition and 
thought, wherein Brahma  s   assumed its predominant shape are as follows: the 
dhar as ū ras (specifically Gautama, Vasistha, Apasthamba and Baudhayana), the 
dhar aś ās ra (particularly the śās ra associated with Manu, Yājñavalkya, Narada, 
B haspati and Vi nu), and the two epics, the Rā āy a a  and the Mahābhārata. These 
texts in their various layers form the main corpus of evidence for this thesis. Further, the 
layering of the texts is crucial to our discussion here. There has been frequent argument 
over their hierarchy and the implied order in which these texts are accessed by society. 
 ruti, sm ti, sadācāra and ātmana  u    i are arranged in their order of importance when 
determining solutions to societal problems. However śruti and sm ti represent an entire 
corpus of literature (śās ra) and must be further divided in two categories: what they 
might more precisely represent and in terms of their inherent meaning. The dhar as ū ras 
and the dhar a śās ra, including the two epics are identified as part of sm ti, to be 
distinguished from śruti.100  
 ruti, translated literally, refers to sound, to hear or the sense of hearing, and is 
typically used with reference to the Vedas in particular but might be extended to include 
the writing contained in the Brahma as , Āranyakas and Upanishads. In Brahma  ca  
thought śruti represents the sacred ‘texts’ believed to be apaurusheya or without a human 
author and therefore revealed, eternal and changeless, even timeless. Sm ti ‘texts’ are 
greater in number than the śruti ‘texts’, and are perhaps less clearly defined; these are, in 
a manner of speaking, regarded as interpretative appendixes to śruti. They therefore, 
make room for and even recognise human agency in their authorship and compilation. 
Further, s     may appropriately be defined as the “remembered wisdom of the 
race/people” transmitted from generation to generation (Bühler, 1882: xvi-xvii). This is 
most plainly stated in the Apastambadharmasū ra where the founding author or school 
                                               
99 See, also Whitehead (1995: 53-17) for an incisive discussion on the nature and validity to ‘con’-text to 
textual anthroplogy. 
100 For a clear discussion on differences between the dhar asū ras and the dhar aśās ra see Banerji 
(1962: 2) and Kane (1968: 299-306) 
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makes no claim of divine revelation, but instead views the sū ra as a new systematic 
arrangement of extant precepts on sacrifices and ‘law’.101  
The later śās ras however, frequently attribute the pronouncements they contain 
to either particular deities, for instance the Vi n  s     to the god Vi nu, or fallaciously to 
the primeval man Manu like the Manus    . This represents a clear attempt to grant these 
texts supreme authority and deeper antiquity.       makes the cumulative wisdom and 
tradition of the past available to the Brahma  ca  community. Traditionally śruti is 
considered most authoritative, in comparison to s    , which is accorded a high status as 
well. Smith (1987: 47) argues that virtually all literature wherein actual doctrines and 
practises of Hindu sects are “codified” equal s    . He believes that several strategies 
were employed to invest these texts with deeper authority parallel with the Veda’s 
timelessness. Crucial to my purpose is how through recurrent restatement, reproduction, 
recapitulation, reflection and even reversal, these texts dominated streams of thought. As 
Smith (1987: 46-51) states:  
“…these are some of the ways in which post-Vedic Hindu texts create new traditions and 
transform older ones (i.e. change them, from an outsider’s perspective) while they are 
perpetuating the “Vedic tradition” (i.e. do not change them from the orthodox Hindu 
view). By representing new texts and practices as in some way connected to the Veda, 
change is both legitimized and denied and continuity is both affirmed and unrestrained”.  
This process thus transforms s    , technically “non-canonical”, into “canonical” and 
authoritative; undertaken by the Brahma as  for the Brahma as .  
Most people who claim to be Hindus acknowledge the notional authority of the 
Vedas, however they know their religion not through the apparently revealed śruti, but 
rather they rely on the ritual traditions of s     texts or even remembered versions of 
them.       literature has been labelled the “functional scripture” of and for Hinduism 
(Graham, 1987: 75).102 In its most basic translation s     signifies tradition. Cantwell-
Smith (1993: 129) observes that the śās ras are scriptural in as much as they exert moral 
severity and authoritativeness not as devotional literature. He believes that the śās ras 
comprised of “…a classical exposition of formalized moral—also ritual and other—
conduct, normative and obligatory”. Although Cantwell-Smith writes with reference 
particularly to the Man  s    , this allusion is easily transferred to the śās ras as a whole. 
                                               
101 Highlighted in this manner ‘law’ represents the more fluid notion of what is considered right and not its 
modern state projected positivist definition of a state-centric book law. 
102 See also Cantwell-Smith (1993: 108) and Flood (1994: 72). Again we note the fixation with uniformity.  
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Interestingly, he terms the epics as scriptural since most Hindus discern their worldview 
and their lives in conscious relation to these more than any other texts (1993: 127-8).103 
This is not echoed by academics generally, for instance van Nooten (1978: 66) is 
reluctant to afford sacred status to these texts, highlighting the several additions, 
corrections and interpolations these texts have seen. He therefore specifies that this is 
why they cannot lay claim to any definitive text. I believe that it is this fluid nature, and 
the merging of collective memory and tradition that combined create a powerful opiate 
for public consciousness, which then influences the ‘living law’, which in turn will have 
influenced the texts. 
To examine the role tradition has played in shaping texts is most clear when we 
consider the role expectations of women contained in the Brahma i cal discourse. This 
has informed and continues to inform notions of how women should be treated in society, 
and their appropriate place. This discourse is explicitly expressed in the dhar a śās ra 
and illustrated by the epics; it created a “natural” woman who was fundamentally a 
problematic category. From the start of Sanskrit literature, there is a fascination with the 
fact that only women can give birth, so that men, even though they are the textual 
specialists, are at their wit’s end about one of the major secrets of life. In later layers of 
text, which appear to reflect much misogyny, she had a voracious sexual appetite, was 
elementally unruly and therefore dangerous. A growing body of references in the 
literature characterises women as sexually insatiable. This is not new and may be seen in 
some of the earliest passages from the  gveda which make up the Urvaśi-Pururāvas104 
conversation. However it appears that there was a rapid rise in these references during the 
period of compilation of the dhar aś ās ra and the didactic sections of the epics. The 
Man  s    , which takes a somewhat ambiguous approach to women, to put it mildly, 
clearly assigning women to bed and the seat, jewellery, lust, anger, crookedness, 
malevolence, and reprehensible conduct states at one point: 
 Good looks do not matter to them, nor do they care about youth: ‘A man!’ they say, and  
 enjoy sex with him, whether he is good looking or ugly. 
                                               
103 An interesting phenomenon was recorded by national dailies in the late eighties when the National 
television network serialised both epics. Reportedly people bathed before switching on the television to 
watch these shows and some worshipped the television sets (Kasbekar, 2006: 152). Also several actors who 
played deities went on to have well-mapped political careers. These events underline the relevance these 
epics continue to have on an Indian public. No similar strain has been recorded with reference to other 
religious literature. See for much detail Kasbekar (2006). 
104 This refers to two characters in an ancient poem: Urvaśi is the name of the girl, and Pururāvas the man. 
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 [Therefore] It is the very nature of women to corrupt men here on earth…  
(MS 9.14, 17; 2.213) 
Leslie (1996b: 89) uses the Bhangasvna episode in the Mahābhārata (13.12.47), where 
Bhangasvna has been transformed into a woman by Indra and later when granted a boon 
by him elects to remain a woman,  as illustrative that female sexuality did not always 
constitute such a negative aspect. The reason Bhangasvna gives is that women enjoy 
greater sexual pleasure than men. Leslie (1996b: 89) states: “This story makes a virtue of 
the much-maligned sexuality of women”.105 
 It is apparent that the Brahma  ca  discourse constructed women as unruly, fickle, 
inconsistent, sexually insatiable and cunning, hence by implication wicked. Numerous 
reasons are stated for the increased number of sayings on the essentially sinful and sexual 
nature of women in the literature of this period. Primary among these is the growing 
significance of ascetism in Brahma  s   to which women proved a hindrance. The theme 
of the seductive temptress disrupting the male ascetic’s tapas is common in ancient 
Indian literature. Asceticism popularised the concept of seminal retention as a symbol of 
male power contrasting the fact that women had no control over their bodily fluids. 
Jamison (1996: 15-17) suggests that these statements on women’s sexuality serve to 
define an “area of anxiety”, implying the need to control.106 Asceticism did play a 
colluding role in the construction of women as sexual, therefore sinful. The main concern 
of the Brahma a  ideologues appears to have focussed on the control over women’s 
sexual nature and her procreative potential due to the imperatives of land, lineage and 
family and most importantly  ar a . Before such control could be exerted it was necessary 
to establish that there was a need for control in the first place. Therefore the construction 
of women as dangerous is linked to the ideological structure of Brahma i sm and was not 
a result of a concern with ascetism alone. How was this control achieved? In answering 
this question the influence of tradition over text and thereby of text over tradition 
becomes clearer. 
 Chakravarti (1993: 582-583) believes that one of the primary mechanisms of 
control was the pativrata rhetoric. Despite a preoccupation with pure lineages and the 
                                               
105 For further illustration of strisvabhava, the inherent nature of women see Chakravarti (1993: 582), 
Leslie (1995: 246-272; 1996b 88-89) Jamison (1996: 12-15) For the wicked nature of women in Buddhist 
texts see Law (1927: 38-60), Gross (1993: 40-48), Paul (1985: 3-50) 
106 See Smart (1992b: 7-32) for an elaborate discussion and exploration of similar preoccupations to control 
the unruly nature of women in Victorian England with regard to their reproductive and sexual nature.  
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importance of  ar a, women are not categorised as per any male criteria like  ar a  or 
āśra a . The dhar a śās ras provide minute detail as to the criteria according to which 
men are to be classified however; women do not appear to have required such 
classification. According to Olivelle (1993: 185-189) the options of Vedic study and 
renunciation do not seem to exist for women by the time of the dharmaśās ras. The 
Man s      (2.67) emphatically decrees that for women marriage must be equated with 
the upanayana, which marked the beginning of Vedic study for dvija or twice-born 
men.107 By the time of this text a woman’s potential for intellectual and spiritual 
fulfilment no longer seems necessary. Many historians argue that in the Vedic period 
women could participate in certain religious activities en par with men, they suggest that 
this parity gradually declined after the Vedic age.108  
The dharmaśās ras reflect that the essential var a and āśrama categories of 
Brahma i sm did not apply to women.109 Smith (1994: 4) declares that all knowledge is 
power and knowledge is the product of categorisation. He suggests that usually a 
classification system is the invention of a specific group of people, whose power and 
privileges are in part based on their ability to seize the “enunciative function” and 
expound on how the universe is structured. But those who generate the categorical system 
also place themselves at its forefront. There is, therefore, a social and political dimension 
to a classificatory system which represents itself as pure knowledge. Interestingly, 
women are mostly identified by their physiological and bodily functions. Motherhood is 
held as model and all important. Ray (1999) discusses at some length how women who 
did not attain motherhood were considered deviant. What is important to note is that the 
way women were categorised and represented in the dominant Brahma  ca  discourse in 
turn influenced how women perceived themselves and how they reacted to the dominant 
                                               
107 There appears to be concurrence in the other s    s as well, see   sn  s     2.32, Yajnavalkya s     1.13 
and the Mitaksara on the  a na a kya s     1.15. 
108 These studies are often influenced by Altekar (1938) and the nationalist school who claim the Vedic era 
as the golden age of Indian history. This argument is one-dimensional and therefore insubstantial. 
109 Olivelle (1993: 188) has suggested the existence of a body of evidence for female initiation and study in 
the ancient period. He further disputes the view that the married state could have constituted an āśra a. It 
appears that women technically enjoyed twice-born and caste status only through their paternal kin 
affiliation and not through their ritual rebirth through Vedic initiation. In the didactic texts women are 
rarely referred to by their caste names, and there is virtually no distinction between dvija and non-dvija 
women (Ray, 1999: 62). The only exceptions include specific discussions on marriage and inheritance, and 
the caste status of sons born of mixed caste marriages. Additionally the VasisthaDhar asū ra (20.37-40) 
recommends that the punishment for killing a woman should be determined according to the caste of the 
woman, as also the punishment for adultery (21.1-5). 
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discourse. In this way tradition exerts control and influence over the formulation of ideas 
in these ‘texts’ and also impacts on the ‘living law’ and thus on perceptions of sadācāra. 
 Brahma  s   not only established the dangerous nature of women but it was 
imperative to disseminate this worldview as well. Traditionally the Brahma as  are the 
creators, perpetuators and interpreters of the s     texts, a privilege they guarded 
zealously. How then did these messages permeate the common consciousness of both 
women and society at large? The explanation might lie in the origin and composition of 
the sū ra texts. Although compiled in Sanskrit in the Vedic caranas by Brahma as , they 
may not have been targeted at the entire Aryan community, but meant rather for specific 
groups of Brahma as  (Bühler 1882: xiv). Lipner (1994: 81-82) agrees:  
“The reason for the popularity of the sūtra as a means of storing and passing on lore in 
Hinduism is not difficult to find. The sūtra attests to the fact that Hindu wisdom has 
traditionally been transmitted orally, and it facilities such transmission. The sūtra is a 
memory device. It is far easier to remember a sūtra or collection of sūtras than a normally 
rendered, and far more verbose, text. Further, the sūtra points to the fact that Brahman  aic 
wisdom was more or less safeguarded knowledge and transmitted as such. Its pearls were 
not meant to be cast before swine, namely, those unfit or unprepared to receive it. The 
sūtra form enclosed Establishment wisdom, enabling it to be unlocked only in appropriate 
circumstances. It was a vehicle and symbol of authority”. [emphasis added]  
In fact until the Man  s     a particular sū ra belonged to a particular Vedic school and 
was probably not even shared by all Brahma as . Women and śudras, possibly vaiśya, 
were excluded from this learning. The later dhar aśās ras seem to have enjoyed a wider 
audience; most of these would have been available to Brahma as  and literate k a r yas. 
Despite an expansion in the audiences of the śās ra, women and ś d ras would have 
remained on the outside. 
 Brahma  s  , particularly in response to the burgeoning numbers of the newer 
heterodox sects of Jainism and Buddhism, recognised the importance of these two 
sections of society to securing the Brahma  ca  scheme of the world: ś d ras as the 
producing and serving class; women and specifically upper-caste women as a necessary 
part of the Brahma  ca  worldview on family, caste, land and kingship. They had to find 
a way to address these groups without breaking the norm of privileged access. And the 
greatest clue to how this was achieved is in the Brahma i cal takeover of the epics, and 
later the   r ā a s. The redacted epics both overtly and covertly exemplify dharmic 
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principles and betray a preoccupation with them. As Jamison (1996: 9) points out, there 
was a notable correlation between the idealised rules of conduct in the dharma treatises 
and the idealised narratives in which dharmic principles are applied. The primary 
function of the epic narratives become exemplary and in this manner the dissemination of 
Brahma  c  social values was achieved. In fact women and ś d ras were urged to listen to 
recitations of the epics during important ritual ceremonies and at temples, as the very act 
of listening would endow the listener with religious merit. Remarkably, of course, this 
also reflects to some extent the pattern of the various emerging bhakti traditions, which 
use different forms of text. 
 Winternitz (1991: 311-314) surmises that the beginning of epic poetry may be 
traced to the Vedas, considering that their recital might have constituted a part of early 
religious ceremonies. They may not have been a formal book, he conjectures. Possibly, 
there may have been a tradition of professional story-tellers travelling like the sū as and 
the maghada bards weaving popular folk themes, incorporating elements of local colour 
into the nuclei of the tale they were telling or singing. See Map 1, for a geographical 
representation of the kingdom of Maghada where some of these bards are believed to 
have originated, therefore the name maghadas. By the Buddha’s time there was perhaps a 
vast store of prose and narrative verse constituting a “literary public property”, which was 
then drawn on by the Buddhist and Jaina tradition as much as by the epic poets. The 
ballads of the Ramayana and Mahābhāra a appear to owe their origin to this tradition of 
heroic ballads. They are believed to have been transmitted through recitation by these 
sū as and maghadas spreading them from community to community. It is conjectured 
that the ballads and tales of the bards were similar to the akhyanas of the  gveda and 
more specifically to the gathanarasamsi, itīhāsa and   r ā a  which may have been 
recited as part of Vedic ritual. Brockington (1984: 9; 1998: 4-25) concludes that this fluid 
mass of material must have represented a tradition parallel to that of Vedic literature 
rather than having been a part of it. The Mahābhārata is the longer of the two epics and 
presents itself as a more composite work. Its very structure suggests the possibility that it 
derives in the main from a series of oral narratives. The Ramayana by contrast is 
characterised by a far clearer continuity in its narrative verse. The latter contains fewer 
moral and folk tales and appears structurally more uniform. 
In her analysis, paying every minute detail of structure and story attention, Smith 
(1972: 65) suggests that the core of the Mahābhārata is contained in the gambling match, 
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the embassies for peace and the final battle. The remainder she analyses as encrustations. 
Most of the added material appears didactic in nature. Hopkins (1889: 67) distinguishes 
between the early narrative core and the later didactic incursions identifying the former as 
epic and the latter as pseudo-epic present mainly in the twelfth and thirteenth books. He 
elaborates:  
Upon the original story… have been grafted many ‘secondary tales’ (upokhyana); 
and upon these, have been inserted whole poems of romantic, ethical and 
theological character, having nothing to do with the Epic itself. We must, 
however, remember that our epic has been enlarged in two ways: first by natural 
expansion of matter already extant; secondly by the unnatural addition of new 
material. 
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MAP 1 
Political Map of North India (circa 500BCE) 
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MAP 2 Political Map of North India (circa 1-100CE) 
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MAP 3 A Socio-cultural Map of North India (circa 500BCE) 
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Warder (1972: 169) refers to the present form of the Indian epics as being “artificial” 
rather than true “narrative” ones. Thus we may conclude that aside from the bard’s 
repertoire of myths and legends of Brahma  ca  origin, didactic sections emphasising the 
superiority of the Brahma as , cosmological, genealogical and geographical matter myths 
of Visnu and later Siva, Brahma  ca  fables, parables ascetic poetry and moral stories 
(part or entirely in prose), were included in the redacted Mahābhāra a (Pusalkar, 1955: 
xxi). 
 With reference to dating this epic there has been little or no agreement. Improving 
on previous scholarship, Hopkins developed an intricate schema to clarify that the 
Mahābhārata developed in four stages. First by 400BCE was a collection of Bharata-
Kuru story threads. In its second phase, by 400-200BCE the Pandavas were introduced as 
heroes with Krishna characterised as a demigod. The third stage, around 200BCE-200CE, 
saw the recasting of the entire epic with Krishna now as Godhead with new episodes and 
decisively didactic material being added. In its final phase possibly around 200-400CE, 
the introduction and the later books were added. Winternitz (1991: 454-75) concurs with 
Hopkins (1969: 386-407) adding that by the fifth century CE the epic already constituted 
a religious text and discourse.110 Scholars appear to agree on an approximate date of 
400BCE-400CE. Dahlmann contends that it was the work of a single poet who put 
together pre-existing narratives and didactic elements with the objective of popularising 
the dhar aś ās ra among the populace and therefore could not be any later than the fifth 
century CE.111 Jacobi concluded that the current shape and narrative of the epic in 
circulation today was no later than the second or perhaps third century BCE.112 
 The authorship of the epic is important here as it establishes the authority and 
deep reverence with which it is treated to this day. Scholars conjecture that though it was 
composed in three main stages—Jaya, Bharata, and Mahābhāra a—it is the cohesive 
creation of a single mind, the poet saint Vyasa (Pande, 1990: 123). Some argue the text is 
a compilation of contributions from several sources across generations. And though 
Vyasa himself is regarded as mythical and therefore only symbolically the author, this 
augments the Mahābhāra a being assigned the status and authority of a religious text 
                                               
110 For an updated argument on dating the Mahābhāra a see Brockington (1998: 130-155). 
111 Cited in Sullivan (1990: 16) 
112 According to Lassen the epic was pre-Buddhist, with the second phase of additions taking place around 
400-450BCE, although insertions of a Kr naite nature continued for longer. (See Pusalkar, 1955: xxvi, xxx, 
xxvii-xxviii, xxx-xxxi)  
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(van Buitenen, 1973-78: vol.1, xxiii; Sukthankar, 1933-59: vol. 1, ciii). Sullivan (1994: 
377-401) comments that in the Hindu tradition religious authority is often personal, 
embodied in the figure of the guru. Vyasa in fact is believed to stand at the head of the 
guru parampara or teacher tradition as the originator and authenticator of all important 
teaching. And therefore Vyasa’s authorship serves to validate the Mahābhāra a and its 
claim as the fifth Veda, which in turn reinforces this epic text with supreme religious 
leverage.  
Further, as Lipner (1994: 74-85) argues the form of these made them easier to 
remember and therefore easier to disseminate at a later period through memory and 
recitation. Therefore, the epic has also social leverage, for an elite who intend to 
incorporate, even infect a wider society with their own ideals.113 As we will see this 
ability to transmit ideals in this manner has specific repercussions for the acting out of 
dowry as accepted and appropriate behaviour in the context of marriages past and 
present. This recalls Edward B. Tylor’s (1873) model of the transmission of myth, and 
legends in ancient pre-literate societies. Edmund Leach (2004: 168) characterises the 
transmission of myth, in terms which fit the argument here well. He discusses Levi-
Strauss’s (1949: 39) idea of a “breakthrough from nature to culture”.114 Applying this 
idea in terms of the transmission of custom in a similar pattern Davis (1999: 164) 
recognises dhar aś ās ra literature “in general” as a record of “customs”. Davis (1999: 
166) also notes the reflexive process from custom through capture and “transmission” to 
a more crystalline “revivified custom”. 
 About the Mahābhāra a however, who might we ascribe the authorship to? As 
discussed, originally the epic began as an assortment of heroic ballads and tales, recited 
or sung by bards possibly for public entertainment. There was no cohesive text 
transmitted verbatim, instead it would have consisted of a compilation of loosely related 
stanzas, embellished and improvised with every telling. There would have been room for 
local colour, incorporating happening that were current to illustrate instances which 
might appear out of context or even archaic. However, it seems that gradually interest 
                                               
113 See Lipner (1994: 25-165) for an explanation of how “the Veda” functions as “scripture”  and notably 
for the present purpose for the relevance of caste and narrative (108-145), also a discussion on the part 
folklore plays in the wider social network in India in the context of the growth of intellectual power of an 
entire group (146-164).  
114 As cited by Fox (2004: 167-8) who discusses Levi-Strauss in the light of the Freudian concept of the 
psychological event of the recurring Oedipal myth as a complex in numerous global societies. Fascinating 
though this notion is there is no room for a further analysis here, for further detail see particularly Fox 
(2004: 161-177).  
 
 
87 
dwindled from purely local and dynastic matters and the epic experienced a 
transformation. Mythological and cosmological narratives of Brahma  ca  origin, 
moralizing sections focussed on Brahma  ca  philosophy, law and ethics were added 
converting it virtually into a “whole literature” from its initial shape as a poetic 
production (Winternitz, 1991: 317-319). This transformation seems to have been 
primarily caused by an extensive Brahma  ca  involvement, although some scholars 
disagree. For instance, Grierson maintained that this epic belonged rather to the k a r ya 
tradition (Pulaskar, 1955: 29) and later Smith (1980: 49) notes: 
“As the Vedas and their supporting literature were the ‘property’ of the Brahma s, so the epic was 
the ‘property’ of the   a r yas. The epic dealt with their ‘legendary’ heroes, and put forward 
‘their’ code of conduct it was a statement of ‘their’ mythology”. 
Smith continues that although the Mahābhāra a may have belonged to the k a r yas it 
might not have been composed by them.  
The creators and transmitters of the epic were the sū as, a specific caste group 
who benefited from a symbiotic relationship with the k a r yas.115 The text underwent 
extensive expansion, virtually altering its character. It was Brahma  s  d and 
characterised as the fifth Veda and therefore the property of the Brahma as. The epic 
now represented a “religious” text, its custody having passed to the elite Brahma a 
educators from the bards. Goldman (1977: 3) argues credibly that the Bhargava sect of 
Brahma as is responsible for this process of Brahma  s a  on. “The Bhārata is the 
definitive Bhargava text” he asserts.116 Shende (1943a) surmises that the Bhrgus and the 
Angirases are responsible for this transformation (Brockington, 1998: 156). Some 
scholars, like Sullivan (1990:19), do not agree that the Bhargava Brahma as strategised 
this transformation, while Winternitz (1991: 319-320) argues that the Mahābhāra a was 
reworked by court poets and temple priests and not any particular schools of Veda-
knowing Brahma as.117 
 Possibly because it is shorter and more uniform, telling the tale of one dynasty 
and its virtual destruction, the Ramayana is more popular than the Mahābhāra a. 
Traditionally credited to Valmiki the Ramayana is called the adi kavya or the essential 
                                               
115 This may have been similar to the privileged status enjoyed by the carana court poets, in the medieval 
Rajput court with their kings, for whom they composed praiseworthy heroic ballads. 
116 For a similar argument also see Sukthankar (1936: 67-71). 
117 An enlightening analysis of the process of  rah an  a sa  on of another epic, the contemporaneous oral 
epic of Western India Pabuji is highlighted by Smith (1980: 55, 73) as exemplary of what may similarly 
have transpired with the Mahābhāra a.  
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poem. It is impossible to know whether Valmiki was a historical person or not. It tells the 
story of Rama’s exile and banishment, the abduction of his wife Sita, the consequent 
battle with Ravana, and finally his triumphant return to Ayodhaya, followed by his 
subsequent rejection of Sita. Most scholars agree that the current version dates from 
about the third/fourth century BCE to the second century CE. It began life as an 
anthology of five books, the first and last being later additions.118 There is speculation but 
not complete agreement among scholars that the Ramayana also underwent 
Brahma i sation, possibly by the same sect of Bhargava Brahma as  implicated with the 
metamorphoses of the Mahābhāra a (Brockington, 1984: 15; 1998: 156). This 
incorporation of Brahma  ca  values into what originated as fluid folk ballads is crucial 
evidence to our discussion (Blackburn, 1989). 
 The notions elaborated in these epic poems are finally amalgams of dharmic 
ideals set out as models for non-Brahma i c society to follow. The many myths and 
stories threaded together in both epics contain overriding preferences for dharmic 
behaviour, gently expounding what is right. Ideal marriages between Rāma and Sitā are 
highlighted, notably with  anaka, Sitā’s father, giving an enormous dowry. These stories 
set the precedent and gradually formulate a trend followed by wider society at ground 
level, whether or not they can afford the same kind of pomp and show as a medieval 
Indian king. 
 The problem of translating these epics, composed in the sacerdotal language of 
Sanskrit, was solved if one considers the Indian tradition of priests holding recitations in 
temples for women during which moral and dharmic ideals were meaningfully 
demonstrated using instances from the epics and explaining them for the audience. Leslie 
(1995:22) in the context of the Strīdharmapaddhati, an Indian text on the duties of the 
“perfect wife”, notes: “It is therefore not unreasonable to assume that Tryambaka’s 
Strīdharmapaddhati was written precisely for this purpose: to be read aloud and 
expounded upon for the benefit of women of Thanjavur court during their afternoon 
siesta period. The women themselves need not have been proficient in Sanskrit, or even 
literate. For the court pandit responsible for recitation would no doubt have translated 
                                               
118 Dating the Ramayana has been no mean feat, see Pusalkar (1955: xxxix-x1), Winternitz (1991: 500-
517), Brockington (1984:12). Brockington (1984: 307-317; 1998: 377-397) divides the current version of 
the epic into five comprehensive stages of development and composition. He forwards the theory that the 
first stage was composed in the sixth-fifth centuries BCE, the second around the first century BCE and the 
third possibly between the fist and third centuries CE, the fourth stage at the start of the fourth century. And 
the final fifth stage is hardest to date as it was later than all these stages. 
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freely and expansively into Marathi in order to bring these vital pronouncements 
concerning proper behaviour of women to the attention of those whom they were 
intended”. Whether what people were told to accept as sadācāra was then actually 
followed in practice is of course a rather different matter, further discussed below. 
 
2.4 Tensions between cultural texts and social tradition 
It is essential to consider the peculiar social and political conditions that led to the 
evolution of Brahma  s   and promoted the writing of the texts in order to understand the 
ongoing tensions between cultural texts and social traditions. In particular this section 
highlights the emphatic influence of social traditions on the way cultural texts were 
shaped. For our purpose it is worth noting, the development of a monetised economy 
influenced the manner in which these texts functioned in society.  
From about the sixth century BCE to the fourth century CE the establishment of 
centralised monarchy took place; coupled with the consequent problems of its 
consolidation and continuation. There was an emergence of private property, a monetised 
economy and the strengthening of the  ar a  system, as mentioned earlier, with its 
associated challenges, all of which had crucial implications on the emerging Brahma  ca  
discourse and its related traditions. In this regard it is useful to highlight Eli Sagan’s 
(1986: 291-4) theory, which identifies three major stages of socio-political development, 
since this captures the nature of the changes occurring during this historical period.119  
The growth of territorial kingdoms and private property necessitated the transfer 
of land and kingdoms through lineage, transacted for women, and not only in India, 
primarily through dowry.120 Therefore, purity of the patriline became essential; it was 
considered corrupting if the lineage was not continued by off-spring from the same line. 
Additionally, a large number of women became attracted to the simplicity of Buddhism 
in contrast with the Brahma  ca  principles of land, family and ancestor worship. This 
                                               
119 See in particular Sagan’s incisive introduction (1986). 
120 Dowries have strengthened fiefdoms and kingdoms throughout history. One noteworthy example is the 
transfer of the islands of Bombay from the Portuguese to the British in 1661, when Catherine of Braganza 
married King Charles II. See the chronology of a city and its acquisition as a dowry in Bombay: The cities 
within (Dwivedi, 1995: 342). Also, the Vikings remained in the Scottish Isles for longer than in any other 
part of Great Britain and Ireland. The Hebrides were part of the Viking kingdom on the Isle of Man until 
the 13th century, when they were lost at the Battle of Largs. Shetland and Orkney were part of Norway and 
then Denmark until they too were given to Scotland, as part of a dowry payment, in the 15th century. From 
the Vikings in the British Isles by Nicola Cook and may be found at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/programmes/bloodofthevikings/british_isles_03.shtml. 
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resulted in strengthening the preoccupation with controlling the sexuality of individuals, 
particularly women. It was the recognition that Brahma  s   was dependent on its women 
to perpetuate its envisioned moral and social order that possibly made the ideologues of 
Brahma  s   confront the question of women’s sexuality and their position in society. 
The Brahma as  perhaps hoped that through the control of women’s reproductive 
capacity and fertility they would bring about the social reproduction of their 
worldview.121 Here we have evidence of an early preoccupation with the ‘woman 
question’ as the IWM would classify it.  
This social reproduction was in effect the maintenance of the ideological and 
political apparatus that ensured their continued class and caste domination. As Moore 
(1994a: 90) comments,  
“The problem of societies, after all, is not just to reproduce sufficient babies… the main 
difficulty is rather to produce and reproduce persons with particular social identities… 
when societies reproduce individuals, they do not just produce biological individuals, 
they produce social and socialized persons”.  
Therefore we cannot start at the point of the inefficacy of the law in terms of the dowry 
legislation, rather we, on the one hand, need to question and examine the tensions 
between the old cultural texts and the playing out of custom or sadācāra,122 which may 
be equated with social tradition here. Both Derrett and Lingat have acknowledged the 
place of custom as “queen” in ascertaining dharma, or what is the right thing to do. The 
common error they made was to presume that these teachings were accessible in ‘text’ 
form to society as a whole. Therefore they discounted the application of social tradition 
as the means of ascertaining what the right thing to do is. If we examine the following 
verses from the Man s     , which clearly places a fourfold approach to ascertain what is 
dharmic or appropriate behaviour: 
“The root of religion {dharma} is the entire Veda {śr   } (then) the tradition and 
customs  s    }  of those who know (the Vedas), the conduct of virtuous people 
{sadācāra}, and what is satisfactory to oneself” MS 2.6 
  
“The Veda [śr   ], tradition [sm ti], the conduct of good people {sadācāra}  
and what is pleasing to oneself {ā  ana        } they say that this is the  
                                               
121 This ideal system bred the problematic conceptualisation of the essential woman and intensified 
confusion in placing women as goddesses and yet denying them any such glorified status at ground level 
(Arya, 2004: 50). 
122 A more in-depth discussion on sadācāra occurs below as this discussion progresses further. 
 
 
91 
four-fold mark of religion (dharma), right before one’s eyes” MS 2.12 (Doniger, 
1990.17)123 
The error lies in assuming that at ground level everyone had access to śruti or s     texts. 
They accessed instead, as today, a fluid customary tradition or even perhaps morality 
described in the epics. In ascertaining their svadharma, Menski (1987: 19) speculates, 
individuals would necessarily have to turn first to their own reserve of customary beliefs 
of right and wrong, ātmana  u    i and in the face of a serious dilemma turn to their 
immediate respected peer group. When one Hindu individual consults with another we 
arrive at the concept of sadācāra. There is no dispute that the term itself refers to custom, 
better still “good” custom (Derrett, 1968; Lingat, 1973; Menski, 1997). This is not, 
however, necessarily a visible process. One may simply observe others and absorb 
guidance from the behaviour of the group, or even listen to advice, all of which may not 
be seen as means of ascertaining dharma (Menski, 1997: 19). The dialectic thus 
continues and the larger framework of law making at the village level too is informed and 
inscribed by this customary understanding of the right thing to do. Here we have a 
specimen of ‘living law’ at work, and viewed practically it is not a farfetched method of 
ascertaining societal order. Essentially in the work of Lingat, in particular, there are 
inadequate reflections of social reality in the civil lawyer’s legal assumptions based on 
the old material.124  
Srinivas (1984: 8) points out that the social scientist will be fascinated by the 
resilience of dowry, and this underpins the current discussion. We are dealing here with 
the textual understanding of sadācāra, or the ‘right’ behaviour of ‘good’ people 
discussed in the s     literature. On the other hand, although the term sadācāra itself is 
not used currently, allusions to this concept of what is considered ‘right’ behaviour in a 
given situation is implicit in patterns of behaviour linked to dowry practices. Social 
expectations centred on the concept of ‘izzat’, which may be translated as honour or 
reputation outline the importance of the practice. The groups that underline this 
importance may be the peer group or even the larger community to which one belongs. 
Marriage, interestingly, is increasingly seen as an institution that is required to register 
                                               
123 This translation of dharma continues to be problematic, like other core concepts in Hinduism: according 
to Menski (2002: 112) it is neither ‘law’ nor ‘religion’ and yet he believes it “encompasses parts of both”. 
In fact this shows how internal categorisations in Hindu culture don’t quite match with those of other 
religious traditions. 
124 See Menski (2003: 125-126) 
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the credibility of a couple in any given society. This then would tie in with the need to 
uphold the social expectations of an adequate dowry, for a father to maintain and often 
gain a higher standing in his social group.  
Dowry, I argue, is clearly representative of sadācāra, and since this concept is 
interlinked with custom, we must examine here further how custom itself functions in the 
Indian context. In fact, if dowry is sadācāra then it is important that it should continue as 
it is perceived to somehow maintain harmony in society. So we need to understand how 
custom works in society, and in particular in Indian society in terms of dowry and the 
related dowry problem(s). Dowry is not important for itself alone but for the harmony it 
is seen to uphold in its very practice, as most traditions are.125 With particular reference 
to custom we have seen how custom is encapsulated within the textual tradition and then 
replicates itself in the behaviour considered appropriate by that particular community. As 
discussed, the composition and compilation of the texts comprised primarily of 
enumerating the ideology of the dominant group, the Brahma as , who upheld themselves 
as models to all society. In so doing they created a tradition of upward mobility 
characterised in various ways throughout the texts. Kulin polygamy is one such by-
product, dowry another. Since we have established that custom is indeed encapsulated in 
the texts in ideological form, it follows that what people practise today imitates the 
models set before them in tradition. Custom was put forward in terms of text, in terms of 
ideals. Text is not always required to attest reality, but the early texts in question do attest 
the ideal condition society was intent to attain.  
Sagan’s (1986) model forwards a three-fold evolutionary theory: primitive 
society, complex society and archaic civilisations. Briefly, a complex society may be 
further divided into three stages: chieftainship, early monarchy and complex monarchy. 
He calls the final two stages “advanced complex society”. The primary achievement of 
complex societies is the creation of non-kin forms of social cohesion and later more 
complex kingdoms. Most advanced complex societies are characterised by a centralised 
monarchy, a political bureaucracy, the systematised collection of taxes, an organised 
priesthood, a hierarchically organised social system and the development of rich cultural 
traditions. Most notably advanced complex societies also coincide with the rise of sexual 
                                               
125 Interesting to note here is Haraway’s (1988: 575-599) belief that “practice is persuasion”; in that the 
continued practice of any given act carries the coercive force of persuasion to continue that practice. And 
the emphasis in the present thesis is quite squarely on practice. See also Campbell, (2004: 162-182) for an 
able critique of Haraway’s feminist reflexivity for use in social science studies, and its wider applicability. 
 
 
93 
and familial tyranny, following the destruction of the kinship order and forging the 
authoritarian power equations of the monarch and the father. This link between 
authoritarian regimes and the control of women is not uncommon and further has been 
noted elsewhere.126  
Bonvillain (1998: 132-134) similarly argues that in Indian society ideological 
constructs strengthening and supporting male dominance were built up further during 
certain historical periods. This, according to her saw the consolidation of state power. She 
observes further that the “systematic codification of Hindu laws” in the post-Vedic period 
was primarily responsible for granting “official sanction to strengthened patriarchal 
rights” and the decrease in the status of women in such a society.127 This point of view is 
unfortunately supported by thin evidence. Sharma (1987: 9) believes that during the ninth 
to the third centuries BCE north India exhibited the same features described by Sagan as 
advanced complex societies. He further argues that if Sagan’s thesis is extended from the 
initial rise of kingdoms to the subsequent period when the stability and power of early 
kingdoms remained an issue, then a formative stage in the consolidation of kingdoms and 
nations, empires and dominions may be directly related to an increase in male 
dominance. How does he explain this? Sharma (1987: 11) declares that the period of the 
development of kingdoms was one marked by violent territorial domination and 
subsequent wars to consolidate those territories. These conditions he believes were 
conducive to the growth of aggression not only in the public, but also in the private 
sphere. Besides, uncertain periods in history are characterised by the religious emphasis 
on family and the need for male security and identity. Religion particularly emphasises 
continuity in the face of death and as a consequence patriarchal power is strengthened in 
these historical periods. This is further marked by the strengthening of patriarchal social 
structures; including marriage, patrilineal family organisation and succession through the 
male line. This ensures continuity just as it reflects male authority, power and control 
over key social institutions. Patrilineality is a clear means of fettering, through dharmic 
marriage, for their own benefit a woman’s procreative potential, and thereby rendering it 
un-threatening.128 Sharma’s (1987: 10-15, 17) observation is that women were dominated 
                                               
126 Scott (1986: 1072) explains this pattern at some length. 
127 Bonvillain (1998: 132) also examines Chinese society under the same lens.  
128 See Leslie (1995: 320) on the “controlled state of marriage” and also Arya (2004: 37-40) on the dharmic 
marriage of Hindu goddesses as a means of disempowerment. 
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to encourage and ensure pure lineages, and further that this strict male control over 
women was intended to prevent miscegenation.  
Roy’s (1994: 290) opinion concurs with Sharma’s; she observes that the 
consolidation of political authority in the monarchical state had an indelible impact on the 
gender equation in ancient Indian society. The change in the position of the   ha a   or 
householder effected and caused changes in the position of women within the household. 
Efforts were increased to regulate access to women, who were clearly identified as 
instruments of procreation. It is not possible that political and social changes alone 
impacted on this role or status asymmetry for women, or indeed how they were 
perceived.  In fact the Brahma  ca  view of women was integrally part of its complete 
discourse on society, polity and economy and stemmed from a desire to replicate the 
ideal social order that identified itself with Brahma  s  . To bring this to realisation was 
the intent of these texts, to bring about the harmonic linking as seen in Plate 1.  
The establishment of caste purity became almost an obsession; this was not 
possible without closely guarding women. Yalman’s (1963) influential ethnographic 
study identifies that to date there is an inextricable link between female purity and caste 
purity.129 Allen (1990: 6) elaborates on Yalman’s view (1967) stating that wherever the 
caste system has prospered a parallel development of institutions concerned with control 
of female sexuality can be seen. He argues that in the Indian context, where purity is 
paramount and may be called the very idiom of status differentiation, there is a deep 
preoccupation with the maintenance of female chastity. As he puts it, the purity of the 
caste is a direct function of its womenfolk. Male members of a caste are largely 
dependent for their own status rating on the purity of their women—primarily on their 
sisters and daughters whom they give in marriage, and secondarily on that of the women 
they take as wives. This is therefore the justification of the rigorous need to control 
female sexuality.  
 To conclude, this period between 500BCE and 300CE constitutes the tumultuous 
consolidation of the state through a centralised monarchy, emphasising a monetised 
economy, private property and the ownership of land, which in turn influenced the 
conceptions of dowry and the position of women. The  ar a  classification was 
strengthened with a clear demarcation of rights and privileges accruing to the two upper-
                                               
129 For further detail and specifics of Nur Yalman’s quote see (1967) and also Chakravarti (1993: 579). 
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castes, through strategic collusion. As a response to the emergence of several heterodox 
sects Brahma  s   emerged from the earlier Vedism, expressing itself through a vast 
corpus of literature—the śās ras and the epics— that represent the first phase of 
documentary evidence presented in my thesis.  
 Notably the Brahma  ca  discourse on women developed during this historical 
phase, not merely as a result of, but inextricably linked to, the changes that were taking 
place. This discourse first created the “natural” women constructed as sexual and 
dangerous, thus creating the need to control her. They then evolved a system of 
classification and control according to their procreative status; wives and daughters were 
potential mothers, this division ensured Brahma  ca  control over women’s procreative 
potential. Finally, the Brahma  s a  on of the epics and subsequently of the   r ā a s aided 
the dissemination of dharmic principles to women and the lower castes as we saw from 
section 2.3 above.  
 
2.5  Custom and the concept of sadācāra 
Customs bind people to their past, and can therefore be revered as tradition. The 
emphasis to continue things as they have been practised for generations gives a sense of 
harmony and propriety to society. Dowry as a practice appears to have the force and 
influence of such a long established custom. It is necessary to examine its binding nature 
in order to explain it in terms of sadācāra. Dowry and dowry-related practices both 
during and after marriage are governed by fluid rules operating within the jurisdiction of 
custom. This gives them the force of tradition and links them with unwritten sanctions, 
should there be any rescindment.  
As discussed there may be positive inducements to conforming to established 
customs (Moore, 1978: 219). In the particular context of dowry, this may refer to gaining 
an exalted position in the eyes of the community, and further establishing status. Thereby 
the need to outdo other members of a social group with larger guest lists and more 
functions to celebrate a daughter’s wedding grants the father a prestigious position in the 
eyes of his peers and particularly the groom’s family. There is also an element, and that 
should by no means be undervalued or disregarded, of women themselves benefiting 
from the dowry system. Clearly, a woman who brings a lot of property, in whatever form, 
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into her new marital home, will have a different status than one who came with less.130 
Such a woman is aware that she contributed to the new living environment and is not 
merely a burden. It is this kind of argument that appears to have persuaded earlier anti-
dowry activists like Madhu Kishwar (1986: 2-13; 1988: 10-13) to acknowledge that 
accepting dowry is not merely a form of ‘false consciousness’ on the part of such women, 
and rejecting a dowry would be shooting oneself in the foot. This would be so especially 
if one did not, as a woman, obtain a share in the joint family property. These brief 
comments at this stage indicate that the ‘dowry problem’ is a multi-facetted phenomenon 
and reference to custom here by no means implies uniformity. There is an expectation of 
a suitable marriage based on a certain standard, set by associated status roles and 
expectations. That these expectations are subject to constant change is picked up in a 
recent study of middle class moralities, which notes that in ‘love marriages’ these days,131 
there is often absence of a dowry, which may be asking for trouble in quite unexpected 
ways (Saavala, 2010: 51-54). 
 Interestingly, there is no single term for dowry prestations consistently quoted 
through the many phases of literature (Derrett, 1984: 183).132 In order to ascertain the 
way in which the custom of dowry has been passed down into the contemporary 
consciousness as traditional we need to examine the source of the ideas which have most 
influence on peoples’ minds. Epic poetry and its recitation appear to be the mainstay for 
the transmission of popular idealised notions. As seen in the previous discussion on the 
role of texts in forming tradition we see the pivotal position occupied by the epic poems 
and their abduction by the Brahma as  in order to propagate elite notions and incorporate 
these into the popular conscience. The manner of their being elevated to canonical status 
has also been discussed. We also saw how more recent televised representations of the 
ancient epics reinforced such practices as ‘traditional’. However, it is worthwhile to 
revisit this discussion here in order to sift the process by which custom is codified and the 
concept of sadācāra is informed. 
                                               
130 See the dilemma this can cause within a single family, between two sisters and their father in the British 
Sikh community for instance (Jhutti, 1998: 192).  
131 The notion that love marriages do not inherently carry the dowry-related problems while arranged 
marriages do, is a discussion to be taken up at another time. This thesis cannot focus on this angle of the 
dowry debate regarding love marriages versus arranged marriages, and which is better in terms of dowry 
expectations, and demands.  
132 See chapter 4 for an examination of the problems with defining dowry, also see Menski’s (1998: 15) 
discussion on the conundrum of definitions with relation to dowry.  
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 Dowry is sadācāra, even if it is not spoken of as such. Not all sad or good ācāra 
behaviour is necessarily ‘good’ in terms of modern expectations and norms. We must not 
lose sight of the range and change of expectations of positive and negative aspirations 
and related behaviour within the field of marriage considering the period under review is 
admittedly vast. However, we have a clearly marked presumption to make at the outset. 
Dowry, whether considered good, or not, is entrenched in the field as an influential 
determinant of marriage and its negotiation. Dowry exists, as the frequent references to it 
in the fieldwork-based study on Hyderabad (Saavala, 2010) confirm. As a researcher, and 
a woman who has experienced the burden of expectations at the time of marriage, it is 
clear to me that dowry cannot be outlawed out of Indian lives, whether in India or 
elsewhere in communities of Indian origin.133 Remarkably, rather than limit the scope of 
dowry as custom or living law, the statute that seeks to prohibit the practice makes us 
aware of how widely dowry functions across the Indian sub-continent. 
 Let us set a working hypothesis, then. Dowry as a cog of culture works. It has a 
proven life of its own; it has successfully operated for a minimum of three thousand 
years, give or take a century. It refuses to go away. Then perhaps, it is fair to stake an 
assumption that dowry is necessary to Hindu or Indian marriage in some way. 134 This is 
more than saying that people do not give their daughter in marriage with nothing at all. 
For Hindus/Indians/South Asians, there appears to be more to dowry than just adherence 
to ‘custom’. In this regard it has recently been found that Hocart’s (1970: 129) 
observation fits the preoccupation with emulating one’s betters; “[t]he desire to emulate 
one’s betters has been a most potent , perhaps the most potent, force in the diffusion of 
customs.” Hocart (1970: 129) further characterises this attitude as one of snobbery saying 
few people will “admit that they adopt new ways because they want to rise to a higher 
status or fear to drop to a lower one.” 135 
 Gold is crucial,136 particularly to the performance of the three life sustaining rites 
religious duty (dharma), progeny (praja), pleasure (rati), in the early Vedic literature.137 
                                               
133 See Fernandes (2009) “Sharia law UK” about how local people are dispensing their own law in the UK, 
for an albeit stilted opinion of this behaviour. 
134 See the case of Gracie and the acceptance of dowry in a Catholic scenario, where the Church accepts a 
‘cut’ or percentage of the dowry in a Keralan Syrian Christian marriage ceremony. (Dowry Today, 2002 
documentary) 
135 Jagbir Jhutti (1998: 192-193) found this attitude mirrored in the behaviour and explanations supplied to 
her during her fieldwork with the British Sikh community in the UK.  
136 See for much detail on ritual and its relation to gold, both in terms of material wealth and symbolic 
purity in Gonda’s The Functions and Significance of Gold in the Veda (1991) 
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Whether in the precise stated order of hierarchy or not is not relevant to the discussion in 
this chapter. However, the main argument is that gold, and its acquisition is central to a 
whole host of ritual ceremonies. In fact it is safe to state that wealth, prosperity and 
maintaining status are central to the harmonious functioning of early and later Vedic 
society. It could also be said that such concerns have not gone away today. The value and 
quantity of transactions at marriage may differ in accordance with the context and 
expectations of a given society and community at any one time. For instance in rural 
modern India a cycle would be valued in the late 1980s, but today a scooter or even a 
mobile phone may be seen as superior to a cycle. Similarly, in urban society a BMW may 
be no longer as valued as the latest model of a Japanese car. These changes are subjective 
to the fashions of a period and the relevance of material goods in a given context. 
However, the point that is crucial to our argument and hypothesis is that the underlying 
requirement is that ‘something must be given’ to accompany a departing daughter. Even 
in recent interviews fathers of marriageable women pay lip-service to an anti-dowry 
ideology, but concurrently almost whisper “how can you send a daughter empty-handed”. 
 My assertion is that something ominously powerful is at play here. The forceful 
public outcry against dowry in the decades following the women’s movement in India 
(1970s and 80s), and the institution of an anti-dowry statute (DPA 1961; following the 
Parliamentary debates of the early 1950s) has certainly informed the intelligentsia and the 
wider television watching, newspaper reading sections of the public. Enough to inform 
them, that the giving and taking of dowry is no longer acceptable behaviour. But what is 
it that asserts an influence and force more powerful than the sanction of law? What could 
possibly be worse than being imprisoned?138 If social and legal sanctions are not enough 
to curb a practice that is officially prohibited, what is the underlying ideology that 
continues to function against the grain? 
 In my research I find that associative texts, like the Rigvidhana (Gonda, 1951), 
clearly attest the acceptance of wealth and its ritual significance at both the engagement 
and marriage ceremony. Interestingly Vidhana translates as injunction. My research 
suggests that in spite of not being overtly stated in the primary literature there is reference 
to wealth and its transfer in some form at the time of marriage. The accompanying texts, 
                                                                                                                                            
137 In terms of their order of hierarchy and relevance I examine this argument below, in 5.4. 
138 Oldenburg (2002) finds that Tihar Jail in Delhi is filled with women prisoners, mostly mothers and 
sisters-in-law, who are serving terms for having associations with dowry-related homicide.  
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namely the grhyasū ras, clearly discuss how and when wealth must be transacted and 
change hands. Also, the behaviour required by the bride-giving and bride-taking parties is 
enjoined in clear narrative explanations within the adjunct texts in different communities. 
In recent times, particularly over the last hundred odd years, it became a thing of national 
pride to be seen as a society, which lived by Gandhian, and ascetic ideologies, de-valuing 
wealth etc. But this is at the level of ideology, not of practice. 
Kapadia (1958: 159) attests this view and finds that the ancient texts rank the 
purposes of marriage hierarchically as follows: religious duty (dharma), progeny (praja), 
pleasure (rati). In typically gandhian fashion, he takes it that ‘sex…is the least desirable 
aim of marriage’, and he adds: “Marriage was desired not so much for sex or for progeny 
as for obtaining a partner for the fulfilment of one’s religious duties’. It is questionable to 
interpret duty as excluding progeny, and there is a complete misunderstanding. As so 
often, this list indicates a hierachised totality, in which what is classified as the lowest 
(pleasure) is both limited and consecrated by its association with the other superior intent. 
Clearly duty includes progeny, as progeny presupposes pleasure. Pleasure is not ‘less 
desirable’; it is desirable in its subordinate place. As interpreted by modern individualists, 
the datum is atomised, because they lose sight of the need felt by the authors of the 
ancient texts: to order everything rationally in relation to the supreme and permanent 
ends (Dumont 1966: 282). 
 adāc āra should imply good behaviour, but that would be limiting its influence. It 
works more in terms of a pattern of behaviour deemed as acceptable by the relevant peer 
group (this keeps changing and is dependent on the context, at the relevant time, as 
Menski (1997) stresses. It is therefore socially sanctioned by that peer group which is 
influential in the given context. Similarly, dowry it appears is a phenomenon which can 
easily be identified as an example of Mauss’s total social/cultural phenomenon; it 
encompasses economic, religious, social, jural and political aspects of culture. Further, 
dowry is seen to function as a system of affinal gifting and transaction not for material 
wealth and status implications alone, but to seek, to harbour and maintain a relationship 
through an intricate and long-term progression of symbolic and actual gift-giving. 
Therefore, dowry fits into the explanation of the gift-giving system identified as ‘pot 
latch’ (see Mauss, 1990; White, 1987: 552). Dowry, therefore as a total social 
phenomenon, has an inbuilt sanction to its adherence by the wider, social group. As we 
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have seen, neither the legal sanction of prison or punishment is strong enough to delimit 
its influence in the field of marriage. Perhaps not even to curb it.  
Legal notions flow naturally from socially accepted norms of behaviour in all 
societies. Any legal evolution that does not work from within, working upward and 
outward from the society in which it aims to function cannot succeed, let alone be valid. 
Therefore the DPA has been repeatedly over the past six decades been seen as a 
disillusioned statute and virtually a dead letter of the law. Law cannot alone tackle an 
outgrowth of a social phenomenon. It must be understood and then carefully examined, 
as I am doing, in order to better deal with the fall out surrounding its practice.  
2.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter apart from the relevance of texts to tradition, the creation, discovery and 
academic analysis of the traditional cultural texts has been examined. This paves the way 
for an examination of first the relevance of these cultural texts as legal material, and 
eventually of the final layer of texts relevant to this thesis, modern legal texts. We have a 
virtual trifle of texts, layer upon layer, to understand and examine in order of importance 
and relevance to its influence on the acting out of the custom of dowry. The older texts 
may be seen as codified custom; Veda or śr    may be cast in the same mould as the 
s    s. Today in a world where these books are far less accessible, though even initially 
they may have been accessible to only a select few, the memorable guidance offered in 
the textual suggestions becomes a marker for society.  
My argument here stresses that the old texts did not and cannot represent social 
tradition. I therefore reiterate that the earlier Indian textual tradition, from the Vedas 
onwards, is a product of customary beliefs codified in order to generate ideals to 
influence the harmony of society with the world it inhabits and is not in any way 
reflective of social reality. Similarly, the texts that we produce in contemporary times, as 
law books or statutes, are also products of the contemporary period and its belief of what 
is considered right behaviour. Seen in these terms both types of text, the cultural texts or 
the ancient writings and the legal texts, specifically modern legislation and case law on 
dowry, become only representative of the period that produces them, in their reflection of 
the ideals the relevant society aspires to. Therefore dowry exists, and appears to have 
been existing, as part of the Indian Hindu tradition as a major determinant in suitable 
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marriage selections and it continues to co-exist today with a law that did not dare ban it 
completely as a defiant socially sanctioned custom, because dowry negotiations and 
transfers occur in an area outside the reach of official law. Neither modern nor ancient 
texts have the power to determine the route of on-going custom. There is a certain degree 
of influence, but that is all. Dowry practices are a matter of social practice, of ‘living law’ 
or sadācāra, and neither the ancient texts nor the modern statutes have total control over 
that entity and the field it covers.  
If we project a time in the future when modern Indian society disappeared, 
leaving only its Constitution and law books as clues to decode its belief-system, we 
would certainly believe that after considerable debate and struggle, dowry had been 
successfully outlawed. We are thus dealing with two layers of texts in this thesis: cultural 
and legal. What I am undertaking through this thesis, then, is a comparison of texts; the 
type of texts and the meanings ascribed to those texts, whether modern or ancient. For 
most people the concept of law and legality seems attached to books, but in practice and 
application it is based in tradition and living law, as will be described and further 
analysed in the following chapter. It seems like ideas filter into the public consciousness 
from written/remembered notions of what is right. And the concept becomes more 
important than the textually recorded notion. It seems to have worked like that when we 
consider how ancient texts sought to influence people’s practice, but could never really 
control it fully. Thus, today, the Constitution of India along with much well-intentioned 
legislation like the DPA rests on an un-dusted shelf, while life is lived out in accordance 
with a supposed customary harmony.  
Therefore, to conclude this chapter on the relevance and importance of history 
and anthropology as disciplines to guide the methodological tone in this thesis, the 
following preliminary summary should suffice. Between the Marxist and Hindu Right 
readings of Indology there is a moderate path, evolved and tread by Inden (1976) some 
forty years before as a student at the University of Chicago, where a confluence between 
historical and ethnographic studies in the 1960s and 1970s had emerged in the South 
Asian Studies department. This confluence allowed and equipped Inden to approach the 
study of medieval India with a fresh perspective. Not in any way trying simply to marry 
methods from distinct sciences but to critically evaluate the application of each to the 
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field of Indian studies. As Daud Ali (2006: 2) notes, Inden’s medieval research 
positioned him to examine the present using a more precise understanding of the 
“contours of change in social practises over time.” This approach informs the entire 
present discussion, too.   
Inden as a medievalist concentrated on the textual but his work remains 
influenced by the ethnographer’s inspection of detail coupled with the historian’s 
preoccupation with agency. This present study on dowry as symbolic of sadācāra is in no 
way an attempt to seek origins or roots. As Inden’s research has highlighted, historians 
and anthropologists deal with the same problem, understanding ‘the other’; in one case 
distanced by time and in the other by place. On a wider scale this analytical problem is 
shared by all social and human sciences, particularly against a colonial backdrop where 
society cannot be understood without access to cross-cultural examination. Inden 
criticised the social scientific traditions of the West which made caste central to decoding 
Indian civilisation as a whole. He instead highlighted the lordship theory which puts 
kingship theory and polity at the centre of Indian history. Inden’s unpacking of the past 
figures closer to my own understanding of Indian history and culture as an insider.139  
Daud Ali’s (2006: 15) summary suits the discussion here well as a concluding 
thought to the position presented above. The idea of a superseded and conquered 
traditional or ancient past as integral as it has been to most conceptions of modern society 
remains deeply problematic, not so much because traditional or ancient societies continue 
to haunt modern ones but because modern societies remain blind to the ways in which 
they themselves have reoccupied the functions and ideologies even the institutions of the 
past, which they may consider as remnants of a shadowy ancient past. Dowry as 
sadācāra is just such an institution. Bearing this in mind we may now continue to a 
discussion where the next phase of evidence contained in this older legal material is 
presented. The present chapter has shown that law flows from society, because custom is 
more important in understanding society than either text or law. Tradition shapes text, 
rather than text shaping tradition, in the negotiation of people’s daily lives. That said, 
though, we need to examine now in more depth what the text actually said or maybe tried 
to say.  
                                               
139 See also Kaviraj (2010:12) and for segmentary state in colonial context (2010:41) and Chatterjee (1993: 
14-35) for a discussion on the colonial state. 
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Chapter 3: Legal texts, religious rites and social traditions 
 
“Law has scarcely reached the footing of custom; it is rather a habit.”   
Sir Henry Sumner Maine 1861140 
 
This chapter strengthens the legal background for this thesis, which concentrates on a 
topic of religious studies that intersects with law. Further, it examines the backdrop 
against which the phenomenon of dowry works. The theoretical relevance of legal 
anthropology is considered here to place the discussion in a broader interdisciplinary 
academic context. The wider research question is whether one can root out a custom 
simply by applying the force of law through application of an authoritative text. This 
leads directly into the discussion on the nature of law in India, and an understanding of 
what is legal. Although it is a fact that Hindu law in a modern context has been codified 
and possibly reformed beyond recognition, the ‘legal postulates’ of Hindu law from the 
past remain. As Menski (2003: 266) continues to argue these postulates “could never 
have been legislated away. These are not rules that can be superseded by a statute or a 
case, they are cultural norms and values, which retain their vitality despite formal legal 
regulation, and which therefore only appear to have been abolished or reformed.” 
Bearing this in mind the object of the discussion here is to understand what these past 
‘legal postulates’ comprise, and how they factor into the argument on attempting to 
legislate dowry. 
 Can dowry be seen as a jural or legal postulate (Chiba, 1982)?141 Within the wider 
context of this thesis, I examine the nature and relevance of legal anthropology as a valid 
and ongoing science. Further I examine the notion of legal pluralism, that there may be 
many forms of law working on social behaviour in society at any given time. The basic 
underlying notion of this approach is that law is just one feature in a social field, and law 
therefore takes many forms (Moore, 1978). I argue here that from the earliest verses what 
has been preserved is a complex combination of custom and idealisation in order to 
influence ‘right’ behaviour and to thereby become a norm, although it is imperative to 
                                               
140 From Henry Sumner Maine’s Ancient Law; Its connection with early History of Society and Its relation 
to Modern Ideas [1986] originally published 1861. 
141 See section 3.1 below for a detailed discussion on Chiba’s notion of basic law and jural postulate. 
Further, an examination of what is considered a legal postulate.  
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consider that these norms still remain fluid and flexible. According to Hooker’s (1975) 
analysis of the establishment of British Colonial Laws vis-à-vis the Panchayat tribunal 
systems, traditional norms were not displaced wholly by official ones. The positivist 
assumption that an authoritative body of law could perhaps be isolated from within this 
medley of beliefs led to a search for such a compilation of texts that might represent 
Hindu law in totality. Regarding the position of law and law making as represented by 
these ancient texts or  ā stra what do we find about dowry? 
Beginning with the state of the modern, and an examination of various academic 
trends in section 3.1, the investigation moves to the ancient texts as possible legal 
precursors to modern law making. Finally the discussion in section 3.4 exposes the 
tensions between legal text and social custom versus custom and modern law in India, 
including the role of the state in formulating legal statute. To better inform this exposition 
it is necessary to briefly introduce the concept of ‘living law’, which Ehrlich (1936: 486-
506) early in the twentieth century established as a concept prevalent in every human 
group.142 It signifies a tendency to include in law a certain type of conventional norm. 
Weber (1967: 233) characterised ideally “the particular principles underlying the 
religious ethics” that limit the structure and function of secular law. This inclusion and its 
negotiation is a gradual process, and India is an excellent example of a country where 
colonial legislation laid the roots for a fascinating specimen of ‘living law’.143 
  
3.1 Legal anthropology and legal pluralism 
Hindu law has long been battling with the social consequences of outlawing bigamy, 
child marriage, sati and dowry, in the latter case for over half a century. A clearer picture 
of the situation vis-à-vis dowry and its prohibition can only be understood in the light of 
what the fluid uncodified Hindu customary law considers right and proper, even if that 
goes against the legal mandate of the state.144 This concept is not restricted to India; the 
                                               
142 Ehrlich’s original notion of law in action or “living law” was expounded in 1912. See also Nelken 
(1984: 157-174) a worthwhile comparison of Pound (1870-1964) and Ehrlich (1862-1922) in the institution 
of the sociology of law as an approach. More recently see Hertogh’s reconsideration of Ehrlich in a modern 
context (2009). 
143 The concept of ‘living law’ as a determinant in the field of law generally and Hindu law specifically is 
tackled further in section 3.4 below. 
144 Ronald Inden’s (2006: 129-175) interpretation of the pre-colonial state is not out of sync with the ideas 
of agency discussed further on in this chapter. Inden’s work highlights his belief, cursorily, that caste in 
ancient and medieval India functioned as a model for the state. In fact he goes so far as to interpret caste as 
not merely a system of ascriptive kin-dictated groups articulated through the ideas of purity and pollution, 
or even a ‘natural’ division of labour anticipatory of a sort of civil society, as caste is often too 
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concept of “doing the right thing” exists in all human societies (Hartland, 1924; 
Malinowski, 1926). In fact, the force of doing the right thing, another phrase for the 
Sanskrit term sadācāra, seems to have an influence greater than that of legal provisions 
for society at ground level; we examine this here.  
In contemporary India the modern state, as represented by the current governing 
political party, whichever that may be, turns to the past, glorifying selective symbols, like 
exorbitant rituals,145 as suitable alternatives to the “corrupting” influences of the West. 
However it must be noted that this is not just a political construct, as there is much 
evidence that middle class identity is constructed by people themselves wanting to be 
seen as Hindu. That is, then, another form of sadācāra. It doesn’t quite matter what 
exactly one does, as long as one is seen to be doing these rituals. So one performs rituals 
and makes a show of things, like preoccupations with vaastu śās ra in recent times. These 
sorts of concerns (a need to the link with Nature) and more commonly the Arya Samaj’s 
version of a modern Homa ceremony for most significant occasions like house warmings, 
or naming ceremonies, or the familiar satyanarayan pujas demonstrates this need to be 
seen to be in alliance with the rest of ‘good’ society. This is very clear from Saavala 
(2010: 10-14). This element of the present makes it important to note the influence and 
historical relevance of the ongoing process of Westernisation and consumerism as one of 
the determinants of the current shape of dowry. 146 In terms of Westernization it is 
                                                                                                                                            
simplistically explained away. Instead Inden argues for an interpretation of caste as a scale of inter-related, 
self-monitoring agencies, which were integral to the early formation and functioning of pre-colonial 
political orders. Ronald Inden’s position is in direct contrast to that of scholars like Louis Dumont (1970) 
and even Heesterman (1985: 10). Inden’s critique of their scholarship in this area gave rise to the notion 
that kingship and polity must appear centre-stage in any meaningful analysis of caste. See also Declan 
Quigley’s (1996) excellent excursus on a similar theory of political stratification in terms of interpreting 
caste as a different category. Also see Menski’s (2003: 266-267) examination of self-regulatory roles as 
self-controlled order or syndrome in modern society. Further, most recently Kaviraj’s (2010: 12, 41) 
examination of the relevance of self-regulatory roles in low-grade governance is a value worth noting in 
this context. 
145 In particular religious processions, or rathyatras, chariot-processions literally; Ali (2006: 9) notes 
“Processions, deemed a potential public-order problem in contemporary India, a benighted vestige from a 
frightening medieval past, form an interesting case in point. When we look closely at what medieval rulers 
and aristocrats thought they were doing in holding processions, a somewhat different picture emerges. They 
conceived of them as a means of ordering their realms under the practises of an immanent and participatory 
institution of lordship”. The B P government during its reign (1998-2004) attempted to institute a similarly 
stilted ideology by harking back to processions of the past. See for instance a continuing strain of this 
ideology at work in twenty-first century India: www.business-standard.com/india/...BJP...rath-
yatra.../387457/ “B P to start rath-yatra to press for vidarbha” 4th March 2010.  Also see how these 
processions are being blamed for home grown terrorism and communal violence “B P rath-yatra root 
cause of terrorism in India” ”October 2008 Indian Express.com.  
146 See Khilnani (1997: 197-198) for an analysis on the impact of western political ideas on India. See also 
more recently Chatterjee (2010), in particular Nivedita Menon’s incisive introduction for similar ideas. 
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important to acknowledge the process by which India as a national entity comes to grips 
with her own past.  
In the past the global mode of integration was led by administrative control by the 
older European powers, but this gets inverted in their post-War agenda. The older model 
rested on the cultural integration and assimilation of the colonies, previous to them taking 
on their own identity as “new nations”,  through the agency of the ‘elites’ of the third 
world. These elite were identified, even educated and through an engendered support of 
their Westernised ideals, were encouraged to take on the governance of their own 
countries. The model now becomes the regional one (Inden, 2006: 62-63). While the 
development of shared civic (Western) values during the imperialist period was almost 
intentionally delayed in its onset, perhaps even prevented, in the creation of the “new 
nations” it occupies centre stage. Geertz (1963: 140) in fact identified, particularly the 
Indian National Congress party as the elite integrating mechanism in India. According to 
him this political party, “tended to become an ethnically neutral, resolutely modernist, 
somewhat cosmopolitan force on the national level at the same time that it has built up a 
multiplicity of separate, and to a large extent independent, parochial party machines to 
secure its power on the local level”. Citing Shil’s study on India’s intellectual elite Geertz 
(1963: 140) further notes Nehru’s contribution as an exemplification of the modern, he 
casts the other regional heads of state as “deliberately manipulative”. In fact in Geetrz’s 
estimation these other “regional bosses” of the Indian National Congress he interprets as 
exerting power to manipulate what he calls “primodial” ties of the “local realities of 
language, caste, culture, and religion to keep the party dominant”. This view ably 
summarises the efforts of the Indian government through state and national government, 
from the earliest inception of India as a nation, through legal codification of laws and 
statutes, like the DPA, and other regulations, to cast India into the future. 
 By briefly examining the dynamic between legal text and social custom it is 
possible to unearth the loopholes projected in the wording of the statute, the DPA of 
1961.147 This will help to further analyse the inefficacy of a ban that actually allows room 
for the custom to continue a cursory examination of the DPA informs the wider 
argument: can a text be used to root out a custom?  
                                               
147 A detailed examination of this statute is undertaken in chapter 6, specifically in section 6.1 below. 
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As stated at the outset this thesis is an inter-disciplinary study charting legal 
concepts embedded in social behaviour, using sacerdotal literature employing 
anthropological and historical research methods. The methodological approach here must 
account for legal pluralism, however briefly, as Indian legal systems past and present 
display classic signs of two or more laws interacting.148 Since the primary source 
materials employed here are ancient Indian texts, the application of textual and legal 
anthropology remains important, as discussed in chapters 1 and 2. It is crucial to consider 
how law evolves to claim to assume control over society. For instance the nineteenth 
century tussle between positivist and anti-positivist views in the evolution of English civil 
law is not out of sync with what continues at ground level in India today.  
As the title of this thesis suggests, the idea of ‘tradition’ is crucial to any 
understanding of legal concepts. This has been widely recognised in the past, but fell out 
of academic concern for almost three centuries in western scholarship in particular. 
Tradition has again received renewed attention recently. In legal theorising, it appears to 
manifest itself as a fresh emphasis on the critical role of social forces in legal analysis 
(Menski, 2000). This seems also to be brought on by a set of internal circumstances being 
examined through an international social science survey of western society in the early 
1990s (Inglehart, 1995: 47).149 Notably, the survey highlighted a “post-modern shift” 
over the last twenty-five years or so of the twentieth century, moving gradually from 
“rational-legal authority” toward “self-expression”. To situate the argument in the wider 
concerns of universal ideas of law making and legal sources meaningfully it would be 
negligent to not address H. Patrick Glenn’s (2004) perspectives on the subject. According 
to Patrick Glenn (2004: xxiv) both political and social theory have begun to recognise, 
once more, the validity of ‘tradition’ as a possible means of “maintaining social 
coherence”. This notion underlies the discussion here whether it concerns modern or 
ancient law making agenda. 
It is hard to ascertain the role of law, as we cast it today. What role does society 
want this aspect of human behaviour to perform?150 In a current scenario where global 
societies are more in conflict than in conversation, ideas like Fuentes (1992: 409) “we 
                                               
148 Most legal systems display this intersection of two or more laws; it is therefore a feature not unique to 
Indian legal systems (Chiba, 1986; Menski, 2000 and 2002). 
149 This is a report on a 43 nation World Values Survey, carried out in 1990-1. 
150 Also see Fuentes (1992: 408) on a wider argument about why co-operation among nations calls for 
readdressing the ideas of what is common, rather than what is divergent. 
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have too many common problems which demand co-operation and understanding in a 
new world context, to clash as much we do”, are crucial. In this regard the wider need for 
an understanding of how law and traditio may be linked, or even perhaps in so many 
ways be the same, as in terms of dharma translated as tradition. In this regard, Patrick 
Glenn (2004: xxv) suggests that tradition seems the “most fruitful field” to meaningfully 
address this question, and similar concerns regarding sources of law. In Glenn’s view 
tradition is far more influential than has been thought in the recent past, since it  
“…does not appear to be a product of any particular civilization, yet appears 
present, explicitly or implicitly, as a formative influence in the law of all of 
them (including, and to the present day, that of the west). The same cannot be 
said of the notion of a legal system, the history of which is clearly and 
exclusively associated with western (and derived Soviet) legal theory, and 
which now may be thought of as part of the problem rather than the solution.”  
Here we have the ideas of a generation being called into question regarding the 
importance, even centrality of ‘tradition’ as a valid source, an formative influence of 
legal concepts from ancient to modern society, including all forms of society in between. 
It follows that we further understand how ancient law was perceived when law making 
began to take shape in its current form in the west, as this had a direct bearing to how 
legal precepts were set in the former colony of India. In particular we must briefly 
address the formative influences of Austin, Bentham and mainly Maine, as this has been 
formative in positivist law making agendas in India for over four centuries.151  
In his opening to Ancient Law, Sir Henry Sumner Maine draws the fascinating 
geological analogy that “[i]f by any means we can determine the early forms of jural 
conceptions they will be invaluable to us. These rudimentary152 ideas are to the jurist 
what the primary crusts of the earth are to the geologist. They contain potentially, all the 
forms in which law has subsequently exhibited itself” (1986: 2-3). In this enlightening 
                                               
151 Famously of course a corner stone of Indian Criminal Law the Indian Penal Code 1860 (IPC), was 
drafted by Macaulay and remains in effect, with numerous amendments, to date. The IPC was later enacted 
in other British colonies like Singapore, Sri Lanka and Nigeria among others. Worth noting is the positivist 
intent of this legislation to follow the progressive model of British law and history, considered widely 
superior to local peculiarities. This view is well attested in his writings from the period, see Macaulay 
(1935). 
152 The suggestion that older societies by mere fact of having gone before had “rudimentary” ideas rather 
than full-blown ones seems reflective of the Victorian superiority so common at the time. Maine was not, 
from contemporary reports, given to this superiority at all. Rather he seems to have gone to some length to 
establish a counter-point to the ideas of Jeremy Bentham and John Austin who held that ‘proper’ law 
flowed primarily from positivist precepts.  
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chapter, forward and supremely clear for the time, Maine examines ancient codes in other 
societies and lays out his ideology as anti-positivist. In direct contrast with, and 
challenging the dominant views of the day propagated by Jeremy Bentham and his 
follower John Austin, Maine discusses the dangers of resolving every law into a 
“command of the lawgiver, an obligation imposed thereby on the citizen, and a sanction 
threatened in the event of disobedience; and it is further predicated of the command, 
which is the first element in a law, that it must prescribe not a single act, but a series, or 
number of acts of the same class or kind” (1986: 7).  
Maine further suggests that this sort of “separation of ingredients” is reflective of 
mature jurisprudence, which may further be seen to apply to all laws in form from all 
epochs. Maine uses his argument well to set up his belief that the further one researched 
and penetrated into the “primitive” history of thought the further one would move from a 
notion of law as positivist. To him, then, modern law is a positivist construct. He 
suggests, and I concur, that “in the infancy of mankind, no sort of legislature, not even a 
distinct author of law, is contemplated or conceived of. Law has scarcely reached the 
footing of custom; it is rather a habit”. His thoughts bear resemblance to the ancient 
Indian scenario we have seen in the previous chapter during which much of the early 
material was composed and compiled. Bearing this in mind we may proceed with the 
discussion focussing on legal anthropology and legal pluralism. 
Why is law seen as central to human society? David Hume’s explanation is more 
psychological than philosophical,153  as summarised and cited by Popper (2002: 56-57). 
Hume talks about the fact that we as humans “believe” in laws; the operative term being 
the fact of “belief” it is worthwhile to understand what he means as it coincides with the 
assertions made in this thesis. According to Hume’s theory this belief stems from a habit. 
This is not unlike Maine’s (1861) assertion that law emerges and emerged, almost 
habitually in human society, through human society. Hume surmises about human law 
that “like other habits our habit of believing in laws is the product of frequent repetition –
that of the repeated observation that things of a certain kind are constantly conjoined with 
things of another kind” [emphasis added] (Popper, 2002: 56). An important clarification 
to make here is that there is no assumption that it is this repetition of a certain behaviour 
which caused that behaviour, in this case law, to originate. However what Popper says 
                                               
153 See Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature Book I, Part III, sec. vi & xii, as cited by Popper (2002: 57). 
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about the nature of a custom being enjoined through repetition and his allegory of the 
difficult passage of piano scales bears repetition itself:  
“(a) The typical result of repetition –say, of repeating a difficult passage on the piano—is 
that movements which at first needed attention are in the end executed without attention. 
We might say that the process becomes radically abbreviated, and ceases to be conscious: 
it becomes automatized, ‘physiological’ [sic.]. Such a development, far from creating a 
conscious expectation of law-like succession, or a belief in a law, may on the contrary 
begin with a conscious belief and destroy it by making it superfluous…On the other 
hand, even if it is true that repetition may create unconscious expectations, these become 
conscious only if something goes wrong…” 
If we consider Popper’s (2002: 56-57) summary of legal concepts being rooted in 
repetition it becomes clearer what the intent of the DPA was, and in the ancient context, 
what the composers/compilers of the older textual material that appears of a juridical 
nature to the modern eye, were intent on creating as well. In this manner, we have in 
academia an attempt to understand the human condition that grapples with the need to 
create order, as it perceives in nature and apply that to human nature. From this it 
becomes possible to extend our discussion to the nature of customs or even habits, and 
what forms in society normative expectation and behaviour surrounding marriage making 
and dowry. To be clear, habits do not only emerge as a result of repetition, however they 
are influenced by repetitious behaviour. According to Popper (2002: 57), “they may 
deserve to be called ‘habits’ or ‘customs’ only after repetition has played its typical part 
under (a) [quoted above] but we must not say that the practices in question originated as 
a result of many repetitions” [emphasis original]. Applied to law we may further seek to 
associate and assess early processes of law making, specifically in the Indian context as 
habit-forming behaviour. This of course lends itself well to the nature of language in the 
Vedic period. May we however further extend this understanding to the behaviour 
surrounding dowry exchange and demand? Is it indeed a habit? An analysis of the 
systems of law that operate in the Indian context, from the early times, will aid an 
understanding of this question. 
As Hooker (1975: 8-9) pointed out jurists tend to look for analytical categories 
founded in jurisprudence, while the sociologist or anthropologist grapples with the 
problem of classifying legal systems in terms of the kinds of societies they are found in. 
Traditionally, history concerned itself with the study of past societies while sociology and 
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ethnology have concentrated on those of the present; respectively treating traditional and 
modern societies. Although these partitions continue to exist, they are gradually 
becoming less exclusive. Further, in this respect, too, interdisciplinarity is strengthened 
and pluralism becomes more explicitly recognised as a ubiquitous phenomenon 
(Melissaris, 2009) 
 According to Rouland (1994:1) legal anthropology involves the study of the 
discourse, practices, values and beliefs that all societies consider “essential to their 
operation and reproduction”. One of the main objectives of anthropology, the study of 
humankind in all its diversity throughout time and space in all societies, must be kept in 
mind here. There are 10,000 distinct known legal systems, even if we gather precise 
information on a few hundred of these, the overall picture is that of diversity. 
“Humankind has celebrated difference to forge its own identity” (Norbert, 1994: 1), we 
exist only in relation to others. Confronted with such an explosion of social and legal 
systems anthropology develops a system of comparative classification. The ‘culturalists’ 
highlight the specific nature of a society’s value system; the structuralists try to sift an 
underlying order within cultural variability.  
My thesis constructs an argument by combining the approaches of legal and 
anthropological study in the social or textual field and examines the evidence in this 
methodological light. Koch (1969: 16) adequately described the methodology which is 
the starting point here: 
“In order to render a valid report on the law of a people, two separate but related 
tasks have to be worked out. One is to ascertain the cognitive categories by which 
the people whose legal system is to be studied structure their ideas of wrongs and 
their ideas of forms and procedures of redress to be taken. The other task requires a 
translation of these categories into our medium of communication. This is an 
exceedingly difficult job, for it demands both that the essential features of the 
native system not be distorted and that they be cast into a scientific terminology 
which makes cross-cultural comparisons possible.” 
The challenge, then, would appear to be to represent ancient perceptions of the need for 
giving some kind of ‘dowry’ in the language of today’s scholarship without running into 
the shooting line of human rights activism that sees all forms of dowry as evidence of the 
systematic suppression of women’s rights. More specifically as my argument 
characterises it, as ‘bad’ dowry, as already discussed in chapter 1. Matters may not be as 
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simple as gender-activist ideology suggests, life is more complex, law is more plural than 
was assumed for a long time. 
 Recent advances in research on legal pluralism have reinforced such realisations. 
The origin of ‘legal pluralism’ becomes apparent when other systems of law are found to 
work in tandem with state law, “whether in harmony or in conflict” (Chiba, 1989: 1-2); 
this is typically true of non-western society although it is found in western society as 
well.154 The leading proponent of this approach, the Japanese jurist, Masaji Chiba, 
discusses the main problem of previous legal analysis, a view crucial to note here as it 
helps define the particularistic academic thrust of my thesis. Chiba (1986: 1) keenly 
observes that historically law has been studied in exclusion from its social environment: 
There has been a long-established belief among both specialists and laymen that 
law is a special mechanism for social control isolated from other social 
mechanisms and, for this reason, that the scientific study of law should be confined 
to the special capacity of traditional, model jurisprudence. But since the beginning 
of the twentieth century this common belief has been challenged by new ideas 
concerning both the objectives and methods of the study of law. As a result it has 
become more evident that law is so inseparably rooted in society as to be 
approachable by sociological methods. Furthermore, it has also become accepted 
that law must be recognised as an aspect of the total culture of a people, 
characterized by the psychological and ideational features of each fostering people, 
and may therefore be approached by anthropological methods. 
 
The basic underlying notion of this approach, that law is just one feature in a social field, 
and law therefore takes many forms, was previously expounded by American legal 
anthropologist Sally Falk Moore (1978: 214), whose field-based theoretical study is a 
major source for several writers on legal pluralism. An important article “Law and 
anthropology”155 highlights the inter-textuality of the two, arguing that “every good 
ethnographic description contains a great deal of legal material, whether or not it is 
explicitly called ‘law’…”.  This is the starting point, then, for a social understanding of 
the literature of ancient India and its anthropological relevance to legal analysis today and 
it highlights the particular approach employed in my thesis.  
This means that the ancient Indian texts are not legal documents, but at the same 
time, as we saw in chapter 2, they are not merely ‘religious’. They are themselves 
reflections of the internal plurality of ‘living law’. Using Derrett’s (1976: 47) observation 
for a much needed collaboration between anthropologists and lawyers my thesis 
                                               
154 For a detailed assessment of the emergence and importance of legal pluralism see Menski, (2000: 69-73) 
and also originally Chiba, (1986: 1-5). 
155 Originally published in 1970, it appears in reprint form in Moore (1978: 214-256).  
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highlights a major problem faced by research attempting to employ both anthropological 
and legal data; the chasm between the people’s and  a lawyer’s conception of law.156 
  
Fig. 4 The Anthropological Field of Law showing the three influences on Hindu 
Marriage
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156 See also Holden (2003, 33-39) for an enlightening discussion on methodological issues when tackling 
these very research issues in fieldwork application. 
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3.2 The ancient Indian texts as legal material 
From the discussion in the last chapter (2.1 above) examining the nature and character of 
the texts in question the following questions were addressed: What do these texts 
represent, social reality or ideals, or an admixture? Do they encapsulate custom? I argued 
in chapter 2, and reiterate here, that from the earliest verses what has been preserved in 
textual form is a complex combination of custom and idealisation in order to influence 
‘right’ behaviour and to thereby become a norm, although it is imperative to consider that 
these norms still remain fluid and flexible. Pluralism, in other words, remains a fact even 
at that early time. Similarly, to take the discourse forward, the relevance of law in the 
Indian context, traditional and modern, as a highly fluid entity, must be highlighted. 
Menski (2000: 15-29, 52) observes that there is no universally accepted definition 
for law to date, despite recent research concerned with a ‘deeper study’ into the nature of 
law. Notwithstanding this lack of parity the word itself immediately sparks diverse 
assumptions: “The mere word ‘law’ has an honorific ring” (Harris, 1980: 128). Menski 
(2000: 52) on the other hand further observes that “all legal systems fail to provide 
justice, assuming that this was their main aim, in the first place, for doubts must remain 
even about that. For many people, thus, ‘law’ is immediately associated with abuse of 
power”. This, interestingly, is one of the primary apprehensions of litigants in India (and 
elsewhere) in accessing law; they are unconvinced that law means justice. Menski (2003: 
585-590) cautions that a critical reassessment of the modernist representations of Hindu 
law points to “deep-seated deficiencies in scholarly understanding of law as a 
phenomenon”. This assertion is kept in mind in the following discussion. 
Traditional writing on the nature of Hindu law in pre-British India is clear on one 
point: custom and its complex nature. Thus we read that “the body of law applicable to 
those persons who are ‘Hindus’ was never solely the law as set down in the texts but was 
and is made up of a mixture of rules which include custom” (Hooker, 1975: 58).  Also 
important to note here is the reading of these texts. Despite recognition that custom had a 
crucial role is ascertaining law, or the right thing to do, there was a consistently perceived 
need to ‘codify’ custom by the British administrators. Maybe this was because of the 
presumption that in the history of English law, the older ‘common law’ as a custom-
based phenomenon was gradually codified by judicial interventions. According to 
Hooker’s analysis of the establishment of British Colonial Laws vis-à-vis the Panchayat 
tribunal systems, traditional norms were not displaced wholly by official ones (Kaviraj, 
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2010: 12). On the contrary he asserts that traditional attitudes were strengthened. Though 
they might not have continued to effectively govern areas like creation of status or the 
transfer of property, they might be “even more pervasive than the orders of the courts” 
(Hooker, 1975: 65). What Hooker does not elaborate is the emerging distinction between 
‘official customary law’ and the living customary law, a distinction that is now made in 
Southern African legal systems, in particular (see Hinz and Mapaure, 2010) and seems 
not yet developed with regard to South Asian legal systems, and will therefore require 
much work and specifically tailored research agendas. 
In Emile Durkheim’s (1979: 24) view “the most visible symbol of social 
solidarity is law”. In his analysis of the nature and importance of a systematic division of 
labour in “great political societies”, Durkheim (1979: 23) discusses how these societies 
are unable to sustain their equilibrium with the specialisation called for in an organised 
division of labour. In the Indian context if we view caste in the sense of a cursory 
division of labour for the purpose of a semiotic analysis, this Durkheiminian model 
makes sense. See for instance the diagrammatic representation of the macrocosmic and 
microcosmic solidarity oriented societal model in Fig 5. 
In terms of religion and the notion of moral rules, the more Durkheim investigated 
the nature of religion he found the need to incorporate a vocabulary of voluntratistic love, 
respect and even desire, as opposed to that of fear, obligation and coercion in terms of 
religion applying to an individual’s life (Cosman, 2001: xxvii). In these terms Durkheim 
complained that other philosophers and sociologists, like Immanuel Kant,157 inadequately 
appreciated the moral ends of religious force in individual behaviour. For instance, 
doubting that “the imperative was, in fact the religious element in morality” created an 
incomplete understanding of obligation in human society with regard to compelling 
societal behaviours. Durkheim (1974: 70) argued that “the more sacred a moral rule 
becomes, the more the element of obligation tends to recede”.158 Durkheim maintained 
that progress toward a solution is possible by studying religion. Some might ask, what 
solution to an epistemological problem could possibly arise out of studying “that messy 
cultural” stuff; religion (Cosman, 2001: xxv)? Durkheim’s response was that reason itself 
                                               
157 German philosopher, Immanuel Kant [apriorism] (1724-1804), notably influential among other thinkers 
from the Enlightenment period like David Hume [empiricism], in the classic sequence of the theory of 
knowledge, and also remains seminal in the fields of philosophy and its effects on modern sociological 
thought. His Critique of Pure Reason (1787) presents an epistemological investigation into the limitations 
and the structure of reason itself. See Kant, (1998). 
158 However, Durkheim does not reduce religion as a category to be equal to morality (Cosman, 2001: xvii). 
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is shaped by the unkempt socio-historical institutions, and religion has been a principal 
one. 
Religion emerges from the “cauldron of collective effervescence” and that 
religion is itself the defining symbol of a group’s collective life. As Durkheim put it, if 
the totem is at once the symbol of god and of the society, are the god and society “not one 
and the same” (2001: 14). Max Muller believed that religion is born of the human 
imagination in confrontation with natural phenomenon like the wind, the star, lightning 
and rain. Personal agency was ascribed to the natural occurrences when early humans 
held captive by their language took their own metaphoric descriptions of natural events 
quite literally. E. B. Tylor, in contrast, held that religion was caused by the human 
confrontation with dreaming and death. Durkheim (2001) argued that religion is a form of 
authority and custom that powerfully links the individual to society. His belief was that 
collective consciousness is a product of religious behaviour, and vice versa, through his 
study of the Australian Aborigines, he hoped to forward a view for wider society of the 
very nature of religious experience.  
Interestingly, Durkheim practised what may be called “a sociologist hermeneutics 
of suspicion”, or the belief that people cannot adequately account for their beliefs and 
actions because most individuals remain unaware of the nature and strength of the social 
webs that surround them (Cosman, 2001: xviii). Therefore, as in the case of those who 
practise ‘bad’ dowry, people’s collective experience is not imaginary in religious terms, 
but remains a hidden source which is the collective human forces of which the actors are 
unaware, as Durkheim (1995: 88) surmised. In The Division of Labour Durkheim (1979: 
120-122) for the first time uses a religious idiom to identify a type of individualism; here 
he claimed that the modern idea of an individual –a being with dignity and rights—
became “the object of a sort of religion…a common faith”. He further clarifies however 
that modern individualism, as opposed to traditional individualism more in harmony with 
a common religious ideal, cannot or “does not constitute a truly social link”. Cosman 
(2001: xiii) highlights the fact that Durkheim characterises modern individualism as 
drawing strength from society in that “it is not society that binds us: it is to ourselves [as 
individuals]” [insertion original]. However in a few years he recanted this belief and 
came to identify that many modern social institutions displayed characteristics of 
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religion, in that they were markers of collective beliefs, values, and practices that 
profoundly shape and influence moral identities.159 
 Earlier Durkheim had identified religion with a moral solidarity found only in 
traditional society; he later found there to be a continuity between modern and traditional 
societies. However, modern society with its common faith,160 characterised by its 
principal dogmas exhibited an entirely different religious nature to that of traditional 
societies (Cosman, 2001: xiv). This corresponding evolution of ideals, underpinned by a 
belief system which upheld moral solidarity in terms of the well-being of the larger group 
coincides neatly with the  tic worldview, where cosmic and microcosmic ideologies 
intersect. The idea is that the microcosmic world of humans through a harmonic and 
superior linking with the macrocosmic world of the divine, underpins the well-being, and 
prosperous follow through of the material benefits and future progress of the 
microcosmic world (Miller, 1985: 38). 
In analysing the backdrop for the “ceremonial drama of marriage” (Menski, 1984: 
3) we must bear in mind that Hindu Law, as a conceptual construct, has continually 
redefined itself, a redefinition dependant on the situational context of the given historical 
period; “[e]ach period has its own characteristics and its own dharma”(Baxi, 1986a: 221). 
One may read into this the validity of legal pluralism (Griffith, 1986: 4), which is 
essential to Hindu legal philosophy, wherein uniformity of rules might be perceived as a 
“manifestation of injustice” (Menski, 1997: 4). This precept is essential to an 
understanding of Hindu concepts, including the apparently finite realm of law. The 
inherently contradictory nature of the texts, outlined below, bear testimony to this. In this 
regard the illustration above in Fig. 5 shows the negotiation between custom, and law in 
the religiously governed performance of marriage related rituals. 
This conceptualization of Order or Law in the early Vedic context appears to sit 
well, and fits into the framework of what scholars have unearthed as the principle of 
                                               
159 As cited by Cosman, (2001: xiv) Emile Durkheim, (1899) ‘De la definition des phenomenes religieux’, 
 ’Ann   soc o o  q   2 , pp. 20. 
160 Durkheim was influenced in his approach to religion as a reflection of moral solidarity through an 
alliance and association with the British anthropologist William Robertson Smith, (1894: 264-265). This 
was particularly the case after the 1898 Dreyfus affair, where many believed that the future of France’s 
democracy depended on the acquittal of Captain Dreyfus, a Jewish French officer. For further detail see 
(Cosman, 2001 : xiv-xvii) Smith helped Durkheim formulate his new understanding of modern liberal 
society, and thereby influenced his initial casting of traditional societies as upholding moral solidarity 
through an adherence to religion. 
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 ta.161  This early macrocosmic understanding of Order gave way to what might be called 
its microcosmic dimension: order as dharma.162 Dharma envisions itself as the core 
pivotal concept of Hinduism, and therefore of Hindu law. This vision of an ordered 
universe, where each participant plays a given harmonious role, bears legal implications. 
In the following section these fundamental concepts are briefly examined to see how they 
provide the canvas for marriage and dowry. By briefly examining the canvas of  ta and 
dharma we are able to access the early worldviews with regard to the manifestations of 
the earliest notions of law. This is necessary before we begin to unpack what the role of 
tradition is in the formation and shape of texts.  
According to Miller (1985)  ta, the earliest notion of a manifest natural Order, 
finds mention in various early Vedic verses. Translations describe it as an all-
encompassing cosmic Order or Truth. A minimalist definition indicates: “a complex 
system of unknown origins, with underlying rules that are not known to man” (Menski, 
1997: 7). Miller’s (1985) work on this speculative envisioning may offer clues to what 
would otherwise seem a baffling societal order. Using her lens we peer into this crucial 
aspect of the Vedic past to observe how this distant society functioned, specifically in 
ascertaining order as a reflection of Order. The understanding of this early society was 
influenced by a need to connect with the cosmic harmony represented in the 
diagrammatic representation of Fig. 3 above, which highlights the position of the 
individual in relation to the rest of the cosmic universe. The individual is at the centre, 
and yet rather than influencing the order, he/ she is influenced by it as much. 
 Vedic society, like most pre-literate animistic cultures observed the unfolding 
regularities and disasters of nature and developed theories seeking to explain these, 
theories which, based on vast amounts of literary evidence, we conclude seek to 
comprehend the maintenance of an invisible yet manifest Order/ order that they believed 
applied to gods and mortals alike. Therefore  ta looked at from the physical, ethico-
social, ritualistic,  or religious points of view, indicates  “...reality,  law,  order,  norm,  
basic  structure  of  the  universe,  universal harmony...” (Miller, 1985: 38) becomes 
critical to our discussion of a Hindu mindset in understanding law is this conceptual 
development of a Hindu ideal representing cosmic harmony. Miller’s discussion seeks to 
                                               
161 See in detail Miller (1985) 
 
162‘Order’ in this discussion denotes the macrocosmic principle of    c awareness; ‘order’ one of 
microcosmic dharmic preoccupation in this thesis. Similarly, ‘Law’ signifies the natural order, while ‘law’ 
the microcosmic man -made aspect of this for our present purpose. 
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explain this, when she calls  ta the “blue-print” on the strength of which, “the unmanifest 
becomes manifest ...the transcendent the actual, chaos cosmos” (1985: 90). While this 
first inkling of Order provides the soil to set the roots for the externalisation of dharma as 
order/law,  ta itself diminishes within the textual tradition. Thus, as implied in numerous 
verses, being able to connect in accord with the universe becomes an underlying 
axiomatic concern. This textual evidence formed the basis for observations seeking to 
define  ta. Renou’s definition, in terms of the interaction between the microcosm or the 
human, with the macrocosm, or the cosmos, seems most suited to our present purpose: 
“ ta, which for convenience [sic.] sake can be translated by order (cosmic order 
and moral order) or by Law, is, more precisely, the result of correlations, the 
product of adaptation, of the  ‘fitting together’ between the microcosm and 
macrocosm” [emphasis added] 163 
 
Awareness of rta, conscious or not, therefore requires an effort to harmonise both 
individual and social expectations, displaying a concern for the greater common good,164  
balanced with the manifest cosmic Order; defining, in a broad sense, what is permissible 
and what prohibited, while seeking to maintain the fine balance between ‘right’165  and 
wrong. The human being’s foremost duty was to play out his assumed role in society, 
which involved invoking the benevolence of various guardians of  ta through elaborate 
ritual sacrifices. We observe here a need to link with the regularities of this Order, 
lucidly expressed in the form of this intricate ritual science. These rituals are essential to 
understand the emergent worldview, and of the consequent legal system that this society 
founded for itself; a society too distant in time to otherwise accurately decipher. One may 
conclude first that religion, as we understand these rituals to represent forms the 
foundation for the growth of this unique ordering of society. Secondly it supplies an 
understanding of the order by which this variegated society continues to live. Therefore, 
 ta understood in these terms, provides the cosmic scaffolding upon which the later 
concept of dharma develops. 
The first mention of the root dhr (to uphold, maintain or sustain) refers to 
maintaining the life-sustaining openings, which may influence the harmony of the 
                                               
163 As cited by Miller (1985: 39) 
164 See also, “The Greater Common Good” (Roy, 1999) an article discussing contemporary perceptions of 
“common good”, or what here we discuss as sadācāra, or model or appropriate behaviour. 
165 Most of these expectations were however contextually interpreted. The word “right” in this essay when 
highlighted in this manner signifies the contextual concept of rightness within the particular historic period 
under survey as these notions change and evolve different dimensions over time. 
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universe (Halbfass, 1992: 14). With time this concept of dharma takes on definite 
microcosmic tones (Kane, 1968: 261). Like  ta, dharma develops out of macrocosmic 
dimensions but unlike  ta, dharma goes on to assume microcosmic proportions. Kane 
observes this change in the “active” participation of individuals within society to uphold 
and maintain, what is ‘right’. This develops a dimension of influencing the extant Order, 
which persists to this day. The Hindu concept of law, or justice, has therefore been from 
its beginnings based on a continuous dialectic. A process of negotiation which, one 
speculates has been inscribed to a great degree.166 Further, this represents an attempt to 
uphold what is good in order to own it, from a need not only to harmonise with but 
maintain the invisible world of  ta through an adherence to dharma. This represents what 
is perceived as the right and proper action to perform, and thus the ‘right’ and proper role 
to play. Marriage and practices that support this institution are important reflections of 
these expectations inherent in the satellite of society and the larger scheme of the 
universe. See the diagrammatic representation of these ideals in terms of linking with the 
universe through right ritual, Fig. 6, ambitiously situating dowry in the context of an 
ideal model marriage, as the centre of the dharmic universe. 
The purpose and expectations in Hindu marriage seem clearly linked to this 
underlying notion of inter-linkage with the wider, cosmic, especially macrocosmic reality 
for Vedic India. Inter-linkage with  ta through dharma was thus held supreme in early 
Vedic society, as we have discussed in terms of ritual superiority and purity through 
adherence to complete and auspicious sacrificial rites. Numerous elaborate creation 
myths assert this, attaching importance to issues related to birth and marriage hinged on 
acts of creation. Firstly, it is essential to keep in mind this worldview to understand this 
argument in relation to Vedic society. Secondly, notions of marriage and its purpose have 
not, despite an apparently unchanging linguistic code, been passed down age after age 
unaltered (Thapar, 1987: 3). Though considered a part of legal procedure, marriage has 
been defined within the traditional cultural texts. The domestic ritual manuals known as 
the  r hyasū ras, texts describing, domestic sacrificial rituals particularly the sareera 
samskaras, or life defining rituals.  Marriage, considered a samskara above all 
                                               
about, and does not represent unchanging concept of right. Specifically, as emphasized previously, given 
the fluidity of all terms in the Hindu context, no concept can truly be defined in watertight terms. 
166 This is witnessed in the dramatic portrayals of role and character conflict in the epics, roles 
representing ideals upheld in Hindu society to this day as binding to dharma. See Chapter 5 below for 
examples of this. This inscription is discussed in section as the concept of atmanatusti. 
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samskaras, heads this list (Derrett, 1957: 86).  That the  r hyasū ra begin with the 
marriage rites confirms that “[i]t is the central Hindu institution”, “only a married man 
accompanied by his wife is the complete persona religiosa entitled to perform the 
principal acts of sacrifice and procreation” (Olivelle, 1987: 387). 
Fig. 5 Marriage within the Cosmic circle 
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Working on the perceived need to impose positivist English law, as discussed in 
3.1 above, a fundamental assumption was made: that any valid legal system must 
comprise of a fixed and authoritative body of rules, preferably contained in text form. 
This was of course a typical 18th/19th century approach, but it was also a fundamental 
error, the social repercussions of which are surfacing to date. The British administration, 
from the East India Company onwards, was confronted with a perplexing assortment of 
texts and customs combined in an almost undifferentiated body of religious belief. 
However, the positivist assumption that an authoritative body of law could perhaps be 
isolated from within this medley of beliefs led to a search for such a compilation of texts 
that might represent Hindu law in totality. Although it was commonly argued that 
indigenous jurisprudence, whether śās ra or customary law, ‘left gaps’ in the substantive 
law of India, there were no available rules to govern the disputes occurring due to the 
changed lifestyles, including legal life, under British administration (Maine, 1890: 209). 
This was one of the reasons for the renewed emphasis on codification and to find a 
textual representation of Hindu law, which continued to hold a vacancy for custom. In the 
ensuing process snatched snippets from texts and from the interpretations of various 
sastris entered into the Anglo-Hindu code. This establishment of a definitive version of 
Hindu law from the written texts was in itself a process of haphazard selection; the rules 
selected were, however, henceforth taken to be ‘the law’.167 Interestingly, this was 
described by eminent Sanskrit authorities, in a hidden reference to Professor J.D.M. 
Derrett, as a ‘hybrid monstrosity’ (Hooker, 1975: 68).  
The early case of Muttu Vaduganadha Tevar v. Dora Singha Tevar,168 shows how 
these rules became well-settled in the form of precedent and further shows evidence of 
the early concept of ‘living law’ influencing text and custom.169  
 
“The Hindu law on the subject which the court should endeavour to ascertain is the 
existing living law which is to be sought not merely in ancient treatises and 
commentaries, but in the consciousness of the people and the practice of everyday 
life. From the commencement of the British administration of the Courts have 
made it their business to ascertain the alterations to which in the course of the ages 
                                               
167 When highlighted in this way; by ‘the law’ I refer to the positivist western model jurisprudence that 
assumes that law flows from textual prescriptions. 
168 (1879) 3 Mad. 309 at 310 
169 Later courts were in fact unwilling to upset prior decisions on the sole ground that newly translated texts 
would show up earlier deficiencies. 
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the ancient law has been subjected, and for this purpose the Judges have from time 
to time consulted text-books and commentaries and the opinions of learned Hindus 
and Englishmen who have made the subject of Hindu law a special study; and 
unless we are willing at the suggestion of recent writers to ignore the principle of 
stare decisis, we shall not be prepared to introduce doubt and uncertainty into the 
titles by treating every question of Hindu law hitherto decided as res integra, nor to 
confine ourselves to the consideration of obscure and conflicting texts, the binding 
authority of many of which has become obsolete; still less to yield to the prevalent 
spirit of depreciation of the labours of our predecessors and the long course of 
decisions on questions of Hindu law which tend to show what the law has been in 
modern times and still is.” 
Although this appears a somewhat extreme statement of judicial policy with reference to 
later cases,170 certain characteristics appear relatively clearly in the administration of this 
Anglo-Hindu law; primarily that there continued to be a gap between custom and law. 
This was more pronounced when custom was to be proved in the derogation of law. This 
was the legacy with which the legislature of independent India had to grapple, 
particularly in the light of the increasing division between the law in books and law in 
action. This is of particular concern to us here, as it impacts on our understanding of legal 
precepts in text and custom, and further demonstrates how these notions have evolved. 
Noteworthy here is Chiba’s (1986: 6-7) definition of a legal postulate,171 which 
may meaningfully be equated with the concept of sadācāra and further linked to dowry 
itself. As outlined a legal postulate signifies: 
“…a value principle or value system specifically connected with a particular 
official or unofficial law, which acts to found, justify and orient the latter. It may 
consist of established legal ideas such as the natural law, justice, equity, and so on 
in model jurisprudence; sacred truths and precepts emanating from various gods in 
religious law; social and cultural postulates affording the structural and functional 
basis for a society as embodied in clan unity, exogamy, bilineal descent, seniority, 
individual freedom, national philosophy, and so on; political ideologies, often 
closely connected with economic policies, as in capitalism and socialism; and so 
on. The legal postulates of a country, whether official or unofficial law, are as a 
whole required to keep a certain degree of consonance with one another. But 
complete consonance cannot be expected. First, because as each legal postulate is 
in support of a particular system of official or unofficial law, the potential of 
conflict with other systems… is high. Second, because the legal postulate may tend 
to upset the status quo of its supported official or unofficial law in order to improve 
or even replace the later. Formally speaking, a minimum integration among the 
                                               
170 See particularly Venkatachalapati v. Subbarayadu (1889) 13 Mad. 293, cited in Derrett (1968: 301-2). 
171 Chiba’s usage of this term was first labelled “basic law” (Chiba, 1979) and later as “jural postulate” 
(Chiba, 1982), he emphasises however that in essence these are all the same (1986: 4).   
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legal postulates of a country should be preserved if the people are to maintain their 
national identity. But the nature of integration, and accordingly its modes and 
degrees, may differ from culture to culture.”  
 
If this explanation is transposed onto the present thesis, the logic of dowry working 
within the Indian social context as a legal postulate linked to custom, and in opposition to 
the imposed law based on a foreign system, becomes clear. Is it therefore possible to 
examine the working of the dowry system as a legal postulate in constant conflict with 
official law? Is dowry perhaps a postulate, which is seen to influence or indeed maintain 
order in its adherence within a marriage? 
It is noteworthy that the particular literary tradition, known as the dhar aś ās ra, 
in which the laws and customs of Brahman  aical India are believed to be articulated spans 
conservatively twenty-five centuries. Contrary to expectation, although most concepts 
contained in these verses have undergone progressive sophistication during this period, 
one finds “little development” (Day, 1982: 19). Instead, this literature reflects a 
persistently conservative pattern of beliefs in its transmission down from Vedic to 
modern times. To better understand the relevance of the ancient textual tradition of India 
to my study it is necessary to consider the possible chronology of these works, a topic 
already touched on in chapter 2, above. The various layers offer clues from which 
insights can be gained into a culture far removed from modern society. 
The many-layered texts contain ideas and institutions whose authoritative forms 
have been formulated in ancient times. In this regard, methodologically speaking, it is 
preferable to use the term ‘early’ with reference to the sources of Indian thought rather 
than ‘Vedic’, ‘Brahman  aic’ or ‘Sanskritic’ for a number of reasons. It is easier to 
distinguish the primary legal source material from the medieval and modern legal 
writing, which may not have any resonance with Brahman  aic culture. Also it does 
exclude non-Sanskritic writing which are included into the early Brahman  aical literary 
collections.172 Finally, the word ‘early’ permits the consideration of references to custom 
and behaviour contained in later compilations within which early texts may be partially 
or entirely embedded. The number of such later works from which widely known minor 
dhar as ū ras and dharmas    s have been synoptically reconstructed justifies references 
                                               
172 For example the Ramayana and Mahābhāra a epics were certainly current in Prakrit for some centuries 
before their rendition into Sanskrit, possibly “shortly after the Christian era”. This was prior to their 
Brahman  aisation as discussed in chapter two above (Berridale, 1966: 1). These epics bear interesting 
cultural references to traditional marriage practices, particularly dowry. 
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to them. This continuous synoptic composition from early times has made the historian’s 
task complicated in terms of dating and assigning accurate dates to the early literature 
which has survived into modern times. For the present purpose it is necessary to 
categorise this literature before proceeding to evaluate the evidence from this early phase 
of literary material. Further, a brief history of Brahman  aism specifically relevant to the 
legal aspect of the traditional cultural texts, which produced these very texts, as we saw 
already, is not out of place here. 
By recounting the historical setting of the ancient period under survey it is possible 
to avoid a de-contextualised view of religious texts and religion. Before turning the lens 
to focus on the Brahman  aical discourse on women, it is necessary to set the stage with 
the relevant historical background of Brahman  aism itself. Dealing with the nature of 
Brahman  aism as a religious system allows us to locate the ancient textual tradition 
historically. The history of ideas is often distinguished from philosophy on the grounds 
that the latter involves an engagement and evaluation of ideas rather than a non-
committal examination of concepts within their own cultural and historical context. Once 
more positioning myself clearly as a woman examining these texts I research the question 
of women within this textual background. 
For a wider conceptual context, a brief historical layout of north India is useful to 
locate this thesis both geographically and methodologically. This study concentrates on 
the north Indian plains, examining a period considered to mark the spread of Aryan 
culture from the upper Gangetic plains into the lower Gangetic valley, and subsequently 
into the eastern plains of India leading further southward into the sub-continent.173 
Society between 1600-1000 BCE, in  g Vedic times, was pastoral, semi-nomadic and 
possibly marginally egalitarian. The institutions of class and state had not emerged 
according to Thapar (1996b: 94-6) and Sharma (1997: 22-25); it was a cattle rearing 
economy supplemented by agriculture and perhaps further strengthened by booty 
acquisition.  Around 1000-500BCE, see Map 1 representing the area of north India in 
question, usually classified as the later Vedic period, class and state appear to have 
remained embryonic. The development of territorial chiefdoms took shape, and a system 
of segmentary government appears to have been existent; the kin-based institutions 
                                               
173 The extension of Aryan culture into the middle-Gangetic is attested by the Satapatha Brahman  aa, some 
Pali texts describe the expansion into eastern Uttar Pradesh, Bengal and Bihar. Asokan pillars document 
this spread to Kalinga, Saurashtra and into areas beyond the Vindhyas mountains. For further detail on the 
spread of Aryan culture into the northern Indian plains and beyond see Sharma (1997: 77, 89, 90-91). 
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remained powerful, while there was a gradual disintegration of tribal society. Despite 
agriculture virtually taking over the earlier pastoral patterning of Vedic society, the 
priests appear to have enjoyed certain privileges, allowing a level of dominance in this 
non-monetary agrarian society. They certainly, through their elaborate rituals, provided a 
linking mechanism between the sphere of humans and the macrocosm. According to 
Sharma (1997: 162) this priestly dominance resulted from the expansion of Aryan culture 
and the integration of Vedic and non-Vedic peoples.174 There are evident structural links 
between religion, society and polity and the Brahman  aical perception of women which 
we cannot explore here in further depth. 
The historical conditions prevalent in India during the formulation of these texts 
form the backdrop for the re-invention of Brahman  aism and what has been called the 
Brahman  aical discourse (Ray, 1999: 6). The re-moulding of sexual behaviour and all 
other aspects of life during the period 500 BCE to 300 BCE, into a specific representation 
that Brahman  aism formulated constitutes this restructuring.
175 According to Thapar 
(1984: 155; 1996b: 117) the vaguely modern notion of the State began to develop and 
emerge around the first millennium BCE.176 This significant change occurred due to the 
widespread use of iron tools and the further expansion of Aryan culture eastward, leading 
to developments in economy, politics and society. The emergence of monarchy and the 
state system are important here as they seem to have bolstered the evolution of 
Brahman  aical thought and its concurrent discourse on women. See Map 2 for a 
representation of the north Indian and southern emergence of feudatory areas. 
Briefly summarised, this period is further marked by the second phase of 
urbanisation,177 supplemented by expanding trade, a monetised economy and private 
property, which are crucial aspects to the present discussion on dowry. The development 
of the concept of private property meant that land, previously owned and worked by clans 
or extended households could now be bought and sold individually.178 Significantly the 
                                               
174 See also Thapar (1996b: 96-105) and in more detail Sharma (1997: 56-88; 1996: 177-184, 357-62) for a 
description of later Vedic society and the development of its polity. 
175 This time frame is dictated primarily by the texts used as sources here. 
176 Sharma is of the view that the State as we understand it today emerged in the age of the Buddha (1996: 
185-232, 363-7; 1997: 89-134). According to Kumkum Roy, (1994:1-29) the monarchical state in India 
emerged between about the eighth and the fourth centuries BCE. No exact date has been agreed upon this 
however.  
177 The first phase of urbanization was possibly around the initial settlement around the Indus catchment 
area, or sapt-sindhu see Ray (1999: 6-18). See Map 1, pp. 80 above for a geographical orientation. 
178 Oldenburg (2003: 14-15, 104-6, and 146-9) asserts that the concept of the private ownership of property 
was introduced by the British and had far-reaching consequences on strengthening the strangle-hold of 
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emergence of the   ha a  , previously head of the extended household or community was 
transformed into a private land owner and trader.179 Roy (1994: 268-284) observes that 
this transformation left an indelible imprint on gender relations in ancient India. She 
argues that the increasing importance of the   ha a   figure rendered the roles of the 
others in the household, particularly women, peripheral. She in fact believes that this may 
have even led to a detrimental effect on the social/sacred order. This process emphasised 
the monopolistic ritual position of the   ha a  , the formal exclusion of women from 
ritual, stronger patrilineal ties within the household and the disintegration of extended 
kinship ties. As outlined above the period in question, 500 BCE -300 CE was rife with 
turmoil and change.  
There is the possibility that a Brahman  a-k a r ya alliance may have been resultant 
from such constellations whilst the monarchical form of government was strengthened. 
The political and economic struggle gave way to an increasing economic surplus, which 
Sharma believes transformed Indian society distinctly (1997: 163-4; 1996: 234-5). The 
 ar a  system legitimising the collection of the taxes from other sections of society, like 
the artisans, peasants and slaves, seems to have found added impetus in this period.180 
Even the most cursory reading of the dhar a śās ra literature reveals an extended 
emphasis on  ar a . Sharma has defined it as a device for regulating production, 
distribution and tax collection, further as a system that promoted subordination. An 
analysis of this system reveals a straightforward ideology of hierarchy, with the 
Brahman  as being afforded a privileged ritual status in society, while the k a r yas were 
characterised as the rulers, and therefore second in order of divine importance. Their 
 ar a  status authorised their right to rule and subordinate the other lower  ar a s through 
the collection of taxes, enabling them to support the Brahman  as who performed 
increasingly sophisticated rituals for the rulers, thus earning their upkeep. This kind of 
job creation stood them in good stead for several hundred years, and may be seen to date 
when Brahman  as insist that ‘proper’ marriage rituals need to be performed, an approach 
that is even reflected in the statutory regulation of the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955 
                                                                                                                                            
material dowry. I argue from the relevant evidence that this concept pre-dates the British by two centuries 
and that in fact an obsession with material wealth is a trademark of  rah an  a ca  ritual. 
179 Buddhist texts refer to gahapati in a similar sense. 
180 The first allusion to this system of distinguishing between sections of society may be found in the tenth 
mandala of the  g Veda. See Doniger (1981).   
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(HMA) itself, when for example section 7(2) indicates that rituals of homa and saptapadi 
remain central to Hindu marriage customs, at least of the Sanskritised type. 
This two-way legitimisation marks the transition to the monarchical state, since 
the Brahman  as legitimised the new political authority of the kings and in return were 
allowed to retain their high ritual status and were granted access to economic resources. 
Sharma calls perceptively this a tacit alliance between the religious and governing wings 
of the ruling classes for the benefit of the two upper castes. Through this alliance, they 
were able to corner the surplus produce to the exclusion of the  a śyas and ś dr as 
(Sharma, 1997: 127-8; Thapar, 1984: 167).181 Sharma (1997: 127-9) points out that some 
feuds may have erupted between these two castes in the division of this surplus, however 
these were overridden in the face of opposition from the other two lower castes. Although 
the symbiotic link between the two higher castes is emphasised in some texts, being 
decreed that cooperation between them would lead to harmony and bounty; it is safe to 
assume that this was a conscious strategic alliance in this period of the consolidation of 
state power. Therefore, the Brahman  as legitimised centralised monarchy and in return the 
k a r yas guaranteed their privileges. If they could do that, it is likely that they could also 
through their texts and other means engineer that certain patterns of dowry transaction 
should be part of ‘proper’ Hindu living law or sadācāra. 
 The subsequent crises reflected in descriptions of the Kali age, found primarily in 
the   r ā a s and in the epics, appear to be manifest in the political and social order in the 
third century CE. According to Hazra (1940: 215-8) the earliest description of the Kali 
age is from a text of this period. He further suggests that 200-275 BCE be assigned to 
represent the perceived start of the Kali age.182 The primary characteristics of this age 
appear to be the admixture of castes or  ar a samkara, deep hostility between the 
Brahman  as and ś d ras, the refusal of the  a śyas  to conduct ritual sacrifice and pay 
taxes, widespread heavy taxation, insecurity of private property and family, theft, and 
dominance by mleccha or heretic outcaste princes. Sharma (1997: 147-9) identifies 
                                               
181 For a further discussion on how  ar a  is seen to have strengthened monarchical states see Roy (1994: 
211-241), and also Thapar (1996b: 118). For a detailed analysis of the term  ar a  its shortfalls and its 
political allegiance see Vatuk (1975: 159-60). 
182 This period saw the decline in the rule of the Kushanas and the Satavahanas and the rise of the Guptas. 
According to Yadava (1978-79: 31-63) the Kali age alludes to foreign invasions, the emergence of  a new 
ruling aristocracy including foreigners,, natural calamities, economic decline including the decay of cities, 
trade, commerce and the monetary economy, disruption in the catur ar a  (four castes) system as 
experienced in the rise of the ś dr ass, the degradation of the  a śyass, the depression of the older ruling 
aristocracy, heavy taxation and severe exploitation, and the impact of heretical religions.   
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evidence of urban decay and decline in trade and commerce as a result of oppression, 
which further led to migrations. He also points out that invading foreigners and new 
dynasties took care to adopt the Brahman  aical way of life, in order to receive 
legitimisation by the Brahman  as. The emphasis seems to have been on  ar a samkara as 
the most potent pitfall of the age. Keeping in mind the hierarchical ideology which gave 
birth to the  ar a  system in the first place, since it could guarantee vast benefits to the 
two upper castes, it is scarcely surprising that texts composed by the Brahman  as should 
condemn in no unsure terms the intermixture of castes. This is most evident in 
discussions on suitable marriage unions, and especially various marriage forms suitable 
to the various castes.183 It was feared that  ar a samkara would in practice corrupt caste 
ideology and lead to a further decline in the social status and economic privileges of the 
priestly and ruling classes. 
During this process a discourse on women emerged, categorising women on the 
basis of their sexual or biological nature, ultimately leading to their perception as a form 
of property. For instance women in ancient India are never classified according to caste 
or other important Brahman  aical criteria like varnāśra a dharma, purusharthas or even 
samskaras. The theology of this rejuvenated Brahman  aism as well as its discourse on 
women is expressed in the texts of the period. Using these texts as evidence this thesis 
draws heavily on the dhar aś ās ras especially Gautama, Apastamba, Baudhayana, 
Vasishtha, Vishnu, Manu, Yajnavalkya, Narada and Brihaspati.184 In the religious sphere 
this period marked the rise of numerous rival heterodox sects, the most important being 
Jainism, Buddhism and the Ajivikas. The emergence of these sects severely challenged 
the older Vedism/Brahman  aism as they primarily refused to validate the  ar a  system, 
initially at least, which directly jeopardised the ritual supremacy of the Brahman  a version 
of a socio-political order. The popularity of these heterodox religions forced 
Brahman  aism to include ascetic principles and assimilate the concept of samnyasa as the 
fourth āśra a . This had an immediate impact on Brahman  aism’s earlier emphasis on 
                                               
183 See Altekar (1938) and Menski (1987) on marriage forms and their meanings for the communities 
inferred. 
184 Almost all the texts used through this study relate directly to the north Indian plains. However, the 
BaudhayanaDhar asū ra is believed to have been composed south of the Vindhyas (Bühler, 1882: xxv-
xxxv). The explanation for this belief is not supported with sufficient evidence. Although it is not 
impossible that this Dhar asū ra was composed in the south, in style and genre it is considered part of the 
northern Brahman  aical tradition. 
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procreation, and is reflected in its discourse on women, which accords them an 
ambiguous status as both dangerous and yet necessary.185 
 Women in ancient India were thus, as we began to see in chapter 2, a 
heterogeneous category identifiable by caste, class, religion and region. However, since 
the debate here concerns the Brahman  aical worldview on women it is important to 
identify what Brahman  aism meant by women as a category? The Brahman  aical texts use 
value-neutral terminology. In this regard Ray (1999: 2) explains utilising terms like stri, 
nari and yosit, which do not distinguish between class or caste differences the texts, 
assign value-neutral positions to women. The texts rarely refer to brahman  as or ś dr as, 
or distinguish between women of the ruling or working classes. Brahman  aical strictures 
were meant to apply to all women; however the main framework for these texts and their 
authors was filled by women belonging to the two upper caste groups (Brahman  a and 
k a r ya) and the upper, ruling class women who were considered indispensable to the 
process of the re-construction of the Brahman  aical order. Leonie Archer’s (1994: xvii) 
observations are significant here:  
“There are tensions, both in the attitude of the ancient writers to the construct that they 
and society have created (and the need for the chosen social order); and at the interface 
between this abstract and the actuality of daily existence. ‘Woman’ may in some sense be 
homogenous; women are not.”  
She also points out that women represented in textual sources tend to be upper-ranking. 
This is reflective of the problems faced by ancient writers, who at some level 
acknowledged this disjunction both within the representation and between the 
representation and reality. It therefore appears that the primary aim of both texts and 
discourse is to establish parameters to bind and guide the behaviour of the normative 
upper-caste/ class woman and by reflection of women in general. By reflection this thesis 
concentrates on these two categories, since the main referents of this textual discourse are 
upper-caste and upper-class women. So to what extent do these perceptions on women 
filter into tradition and practice affecting the role women are required to play? And, does 
this link to dowry expectations? 
 Returning to the thread of my argument within this thesis, when examining the 
position of law and law making as represented by these ancient texts what do we find 
about dowry? There is clear ideological preference for certain behaviours, whether or not 
                                               
185 See Jamison (1996: 14-17). 
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they are exactly prescribed, they certainly seem proscribed. Most clearly defined is the 
position on the bride-price marriage; and the disdain shown for it in preference for the 
dowry marriage. If we highlight here the fact that law as ‘living law’ is not found in mere 
positivist ideals, similar to Nietzsche’s refuting of the notion of golden beginnings as 
flawed, then perhaps we need to seriously re-consider the position within the history of 
thought and ideas as represented by the Enlightenment, that an evolution of thought 
might not always flow chronologically getting better, or more precise, or more just. So 
dowry as a custom may not be bad if we examine the evolution and context for the 
sociological rationale for behaviour that goes against the grain of a western mind-set. It is 
as Louis Dumont (1959: 520-1) predicted, that intervention of sorts has damaged the 
hierarchical functioning and processes of kinship organisation within disparate Indian 
communities. The homogenising effort of the west for the past several centuries, most 
often seen as good and proper going hand-in-hand with the democratisation of nations 
and their creation is today defunct. Man as much as he is a social animal, and is uniquely 
linked to the rest of his society, also thrives on hierarchy. Dowry seems very much a key 
within the keyboard of society, albeit a black one. Therefore dowry may not be as a 
custom problematic, as much as its practice today is out of sync with certain modern 
expectations of “civil” society. 
 
3.3 The role of the Veda and Dharma texts    
“The role the Veda has played in Indian tradition appears paradoxical, ambiguous…” 
(Halbfass, 1992: 1) 
Due to the extensive synoptic borrowing between texts of various periods it is hard to 
identify a clear chronology.  Besides the almost arbitrary handling of the literature 
through the ages, guided more by utilitarian purposes rather than any effort to 
maintaining an historical consideration, this has further complicated any attempt to 
chronologically arrange the history of Indian literature into a meaningful evolutionary 
framework. A single linear development does not appear tenable for the diverse literary 
traditions of the different shakhas which comprise the schools of arts and sciences of 
ancient India. It suffices for the present purpose to identify the overlapping nature of both 
the texts and the time-periods during which these emerged.186 The earliest stage that 
                                               
186 It is possible for a more generalised classification to refer to literary historians like Arthur A. Macdonell 
(1925), Max Müller (1926), Winternitz (1927). 
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concerns this study is that of written composition in which the oral traditions of a school 
of karma or the arts and jnana were initially put into written form either in metric or 
discursive form sometime between the nineteenth and ninth centuries BCE. This followed 
a period of commentarial writing that includes the earliest attempts at organising the vast 
layers of information first into elementary, then gradually more sophisticated systems 
between the ninth and sixth centuries.  
This systematisation reached its zenith of sophistication during the sū ra-stage, 
possibly between the fifth and third centuries, a time in which the systems were reduced 
to summary form in aphoristic texts. Appending commentarial literature by either the 
author of the text or by members of his school, introduced the stage of commentary in the 
development of this literary corpus. The emphasis on brevity that seems to be 
characteristic of this literature created a need to elaborate obscurities, interpolate 
corrections, and further supplemented rules of interpretation. As noted in chapter 2, to 
link to the Vedas, however general, was to notate authority. Interestingly these 
commentators acted not just as interpreters, they established the canonicity of the authors 
whose titles they adopted and endorsed. Most importantly these commentators created 
and reaffirmed an exceptional authority for successive generations despite continuously 
reinterpreting their teachings and adapting them for contemporary conditions. What this 
stresses is that there was no period in which commentary-making ceased, so that by the 
modern period several thousand authoritative commentaries competed for attention. The 
majority of those texts are not even translated into European languages as yet. 
The composition of the mahabhasyas or the major commentaries delineates the 
high-point in the history of Indian literature, though only generalised dates can be 
assigned for the commentarial stage of that history.  The major commentaries on the 
dharmaśāstra literature coincided with an energetic productivity in specialised works on 
themes and topics of jurisprudence. Such specialised attempts were bound to generate a 
similar trend in sparking further commentaries while also encouraging repeated attempts 
at more readily intelligible or concise and perhaps convenient presentations of early 
major authorities. To summarise therefore: 
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i) There was no linear literary development, neither were 
contemporaneous literary traditions equally paced in their simultaneous 
development. 
ii) The earliest commentators were the first to promote canonical status of 
selected works of their dharmaśāstrika schools, edited, redacted and 
generally published repeatedly for future generations. The deletion is to 
the extent that assertions which might have become obsolete or 
embarrassing were reinterpreted in a manner supportive of the prestige 
of the primary source or its school of interpretation rather than in a 
manner which could discredit them. 
iii) The commentarial and exegetical literary tradition thus generated, 
fulfilled a conservative function by rarely introducing new ideals to 
replace old ones, and by reiterating and updating concepts engendering 
the belief-system of ancient authority. 
It is possibly due to the strongly conservative nature of this literature that numerous 
ancient texts have survived either as independent sources or through extensive quotations 
in commentaries, compendia, and thematic digests. The reverence of the commentators 
for named authorities, particularly of legendary authors, and their seeming indifference to 
historical dates, makes dating, as stated earlier, difficult.  
An excellent and prime example of this reverence is the Manusm   , held among 
the sources of dharmaśās ra as a leading authority, a status acquired early. The other 
s    s on dharma texts are said to become authoritative only insofar as they reflect or 
support the Manu s    . It is worthwhile to discuss this text and its history at some length 
as it exemplifies my argument of tradition shaping text, and in turn therefore text 
influencing tradition. Dating this authoritative text has troubled historians to the extent 
that it continues to hold the dating of other early texts in suspense. It seems certainly an 
early work, based partly on the fact that many works agreed to be early texts either cite 
either the Manu sm    or earlier versions of it, in some cases they follow the order of its 
contents.  
There is evidence to suggest that its composite origins and character are evident in 
the Manus    ’s attribution of authorship to the sage Bh gu (MS 1.35, 1.59), in 
references to the Manu-sa hita at the end of each section which could be to an early title 
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of the work or even to the Bh gu Sa hitā; which may refer to an original composition.187 
Academics are not in agreement on whether an early sū ra existed that was named after 
Manu and which formed the basis for the extant Manu s    . Kane (1966), and Indian 
academics he cites, disputed Max Müller’s suggestion that a hypothetical Manava 
Dharmasū ra was the original source of the current Manu s    . This source, should it 
exist, is yet to be disinterred. There is the possibility that different compilations of 
dharma-teachings, even in the same school from which the Manu s      originated, which 
are comparable in subject matter and may be attributed to the same author, but are 
different in approach and treatment, virtually destroy any positive results of attempted 
dating. Maine notes “as regards the Manava Dhar a  ā stra, the Manu translated by Sir 
William  ones and asserted by [ ones’s] native teachers to be the basis of all sacred 
Hindu law, it is a late redaction of the legal doctrine of the Manavas, a gens or clan called 
after a Manu frequently mentioned in Sanscrit literature, but mentioned by the writer of 
the extant book as somebody different from himself” [sic.] (Maine, 1883: 16). Important 
to note here is Kane’s astute observation that “the chronology of all ancient works is 
somewhat in a nebulous state” (Kane, 1930: 1.107). 
 The dharmasū ra and the dhar aś āstra are recognised as forming a single genre, 
often misleading translated as “law books” (Winternitz, 1985: 538). The editor and 
translators of the Sacred Books of the East series set this definition, which Winternitz 
appears to agree with. He clarifies that in his opinion the Brahman  aas intended the 
Dhar as ū ras to impart instruction and not as written codes for practical use and 
application in the law courts, although he accepts that they possessed a certain “force of 
law”. Winternitz (1985: 538-45) suggests that the metrical s    s were for all the Aryas 
and represented an authoritative model for legal matters.  
 Of late, scholars qualitatively reject the śāstras as law books or codes (Menski, 
1997: 13-16). Now, the definition of śāstra as law book or “works of law” seems 
reductionist, almost restrictive. It is far more likely to imagine that these texts contain 
normative rules intended to guide behaviour on numerous aspects of human life outlined 
by the Brahman  aas as important, like political and social order, moral order, religion, 
hygiene and others. The foremost concern they express is with dharma. Dharma has to 
                                               
187Stylistic, structural, and substantive evidence, on the other hand indicate that the presently extant 
Manus     may not be an original work, but rather a compilation of earlier perhaps older works. 
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date been variously explained; as law, custom, righteousness, even duty and religion. 
However, none of these convey the entirety of this complex conceptual construct. Since 
these texts deal primarily with dharma an appropriate definition for śāstras is: treatises 
on dharma.188 
Dating has proved difficult in terms of the composition and compilation of the 
Dhar aś ās ra literature, considering that early Indian thought was transmitted primarily 
orally, the distance between the date a text was conceived and finally written down is 
considerable. Derrett points out a further difficulty, in spite of the use of writing from the 
fourth century CE on, most of the śās ras remained “fluid texts” till the final stages of 
śās r c composition in the nineteenth century (Derrett, 1975: 27; 1994: 32). See Kane’s 
(1941: xi-xii) Tentative Chronology, (pp.133) above. 
Max Müller’s is the earliest effort to date the texts; he used similarities in 
language and subject as the basis for his classification, arguing that the sū ras belonged to 
the period of Vedic literature but was later than the  a h  ā s and Brahman  aas. He argues 
further that these constituted the final branch of Vedic literature and were 
contemporaneous with the beginning of Buddhism in India.189 A number of Indian 
scholars refute the date he fixed for the sūtra period. Müller forwards between 600 and 
200 BCE, whereas Indian scholars maintain this too late. Some scholars assign 2000-
1000 BCE as the period of composition of the sūtra literature, Garg (1982) places it 
between the eighth and third centuries BCE. Bühler advises against assigning a blanket 
period for all the sūtras. He suggests instead that they differed according to the Vedic 
school to which they were affiliated (Bühler, 1879: x1v). This is most credible in my 
opinion considering the importance attached to teachers and their teaching in the high 
status afforded to the guru. 
The Gautamadharmasū ra is the earliest of the dharmasū ras and appears to be 
associated with the  a ā  Veda School, it is also normally attributed to the sage Gautama, 
and the manual possibly belonged to the Gautama Vedic carana or school. The extant 
text has not suffered too many interpolations (Bühler, 1879: x1v). This text is assigned 
                                               
188 In this thesis I do not use any of the previous translations given for dharma, but continue to use the word 
in transliteration as a term encompassing all the above assigned meanings, where they are contextually 
relevant, being partial to none. 
189 Müller (1849) cited in Bühler (1879: ix). 
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the period between 600-400 BCE.190 The Vasi    hadharmasū ra was considered supreme 
and appears to have been studied by the  g Vedins alone (Bühler, 1882: xi-xii), and 
appears to be the last remnant of the sū ras of a Vedic school which, along with the 
greater portion of its writings has perished. Its title and legend link this dharmasū ra to 
Maitra Varuni, one of the most revered rsis of the  g Veda who was a staunch champion 
of Brahman  aism, which account for its preservation. Derrett and Winternitz concur with 
Kane on dating this text around 300-100 BCE (Kane, 1930:19; Derrett, 1975: 28; 
Winternitz; 1985: 540). The Apastambadharmasū ra appears to have been intended for 
the benefit of adhvaryu priests, based on the Taittiriya recession of the Yajur Veda 
(Bühler, 1879: xi), thus fitting into the pattern of Vedic ritual cosmology and division of 
labour among priests. There is evidence to suggest that it may have been originally part 
of the Kalpasū ra of Apastamba, this does not necessarily mean that the extant text is not 
the original despite the additions and interpolations. Bühler (1879: xviii)191 believes that 
this dharmasū ras cannot be placed earlier than 500 BCE. Kane (1930: 40) writes that it 
could have been written around 600-300 BCE. The Baudhayanadharmasū ra belonged to 
the Yajur Veda School, and according to some was originally studied by and authoritative 
for the followers of the Taittiriya Veda alone. It later became one of the major sources of 
‘sacred law’ for all Brahman  aas (Bühler, 1882: xxiv) and formed part of a manual on the 
Kalpasū ras. Bühler (1882: xxxiii-xxxiv) also believes that the text available today is not 
original, he concludes that the original version comprised the first two prashnas, the third 
and the fourth being later additions.192 Kane holds that the author of the 
Baudhayanadharmasū ra could not have been earlier than Gautama and that the text or 
was composed around 500-200 BCE or 600-300 BCE (Kane, 1968: 28; Lingat, 1973: 21). 
Most of these ancient s     texts or remembered traditions were inaccessible to 
society at large; however it is possible to discern which texts were able to permeate into 
the social and popular consciousness by virtue of becoming common knowledge, 
although not everyone who quoted these appeared to have read them. Which were these 
popular texts which shaped the worldview definitively? In popular terms, in India and 
abroad, among both scholars and non-academics the most widely recognised of the s     
karas is Manu. One of the reasons for this wide-spread recognition to date may be 
                                               
190 See also Bühler (1879: x1ix, 1iv), Kane (1930:19), Lingat (1973: 24), Derrett (1975: 28), Winternitz 
(1985: 540). 
191 See in particular Bühler (1879: x1iii). 
192 See also Kane (1930: 23). 
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attributed to the fact that it was possibly the first s     made available to all Vedic 
schools. For this reason Derrett (1975: 40-41) considers the Manu s     the first attempt 
at a “secular legal code”. As outlined above the popularity of this text is understandable 
considering the attention paid to creating and maintaining its legendary lineage. 
Historians and scholars have argued the possibility of this text existing in its 
contemporary form by the second century BCE.193 Jayaswal (1930: 26) argues that it was 
a Sungan code composed around 150 BCE. Lingat (1973: 95-96) believes that it belongs 
to the same epoch as the Mahābhārata and therefore be dates it between the second or 
third centuries BCE to the second and third centuries CE, thus broadening the scope for 
interpolations another several hundred years. Despite disagreements on dating, it is 
generally agreed that including several additions and interpolations the current form of 
the text took final shape between the second century BCE and second century CE.194 
Doniger and Smith (1991: xvii, 1ix) have adequately summarised the pivotal status 
accorded to this dharmaśās ra: 
“More compendiously than any other text, it provides a direct line to the most influential 
construction of the Hindu religion and Indian society as a whole. … In the realm of the 
ideal, Manu is the cornerstone of the priestly vision of what human life should be, a 
vision to which Hindus have always paid lip service and to which in many ways they 
genuinely aspire.” 
 
The second dharmaśās ra to be accorded secular status was the Yājñavalkya Sm ti 
(YājñSm ), a work of considerable length expounding a variety of subjects over a 
thousand verses. Jayaswal holds that this was composed during the Kushana-Satavahana 
period in political history, but may not agree with this placing its composition between 
the first century BCE and the third century CE.195  
 Dating the Naradas     proves as problematic. Jolly (1889: xiii-xiv) places it in 
the period around the fifth century CE, while Kane (1930: 205) asserts that it was 
composed possibly between 100-300 CE on the legs of the Yajnavalkyas    . According 
to Winternitz (1985: 596) it could not have been composed prior to the fourth century 
CE, although parts of it may be dated to an earlier period. On the other hand Derrett 
(1975: 35) maintains that without argument the Naradas     was earlier than 600 CE. 
The author of the   has a   s     seems to have been an authoritative writer on śās ra, 
                                               
193 See Jayaswal (1930: 26-32). 
194 Kane (1930: 151), Derrett (1975: 31), Garg (1982: 401) and Winternitz (1985: 586).  
195 Jayaswal (1930: 60-61), Kane (1930: 184), Derrett (1975: 34), Winternitz (1985:599). 
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considering the vast numbers of quotations attributed to him in the later nibandhas and 
digests; however the complete version of this text has never been recovered. Jolly (1889: 
276) believes this s     was composed not earlier than the sixth century CE, while Kane 
asserts that   has a   prospered around 200-400 CE. Winternitz (1985: 598) places this 
s     a couple of centuries after Narada around the third and fifth centuries CE.196  
However the most challenging of the s    s to date accurately is Vishnu. It is believed to 
belong to the Katha School of the Yajur Veda, and undoubtedly contains some very old 
material. However, it features several excerpts which appear to be confusingly modern; 
particularly in its introductory and concluding chapters. While some scholars argue that it 
cannot have originated earlier than third century CE, Kane (1930: 69) helpfully suggests 
a solution. His brilliant thesis of two phases of composition sits easily with the evidence; 
the nucleus he suggests was composed as prose around 300-100 BCE, whilst an inflated 
text which exhibited considerable elements of verification appeared by 400-600 CE.197  
To conclude the debate on the nature of the ancient Indian texts and the role of the 
Vedas and the dharma texts Derrett’s (1970: 5-6) comments are most suitable: 
“The whole point of having a sacred scripture lies in the fact that the people’s aspirations 
and intuitions, refined after centuries of hard experience…, are committed to words, 
crystallised in the form of propositions, many of which are none the less real for being 
phrased poetically and in an exaggerated tone. Many of the classic hypotheses of 
Indology will not stand up to rational examination: but they are believed because such 
beliefs express the real attitudes, inherited leanings, and group-aspirations to which most 
individuals in their hearts (if not always in their minds) are committed from the cradle to 
the pyre. The ideas to be found in the śās ra are abandoned on the surface, but the 
attitude of mind and the conception of life remains the same. All the great features of the 
Hindu mind, its aptitudes, and (some will say) its shortcomings are voiced in the 
literature, where customs, usages, ethics, philosophy, superstition, religion, and fantasy 
meet and combine, to produce acclimate of self-expression which the texts individually 
and collectively serve. The texts have no more authority than the people give them, but 
they make a perennial claim on the Hindu mind such as few foreign productions, 
however prestige-worthy, can ever do, because they express what the people from time to 
time believe in.” 
                                               
196 See Kane (1930: 210). 
197 Also Lingat (1973: 25), Derrett (1975: 38), Winternitz (1985: 579). 
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Further, Derrett highlights the guidance-oriented nature of these texts in his assertion that 
rather than reflect what ‘is’, they mirror what ‘ought’ to be (1968: 79). It is clear that 
these texts are intended as normative guides, composed in poetic form in order to make 
repetition and retention easy and memorising easier.198 The dissemination of these ideas 
to the masses seems to have been a clear goal for these early writings.  
 
3.4 Legal text imprinting social behaviour and custom 
In this section I consider how families negotiate between official laws of the state and 
custom in how they practise dowry, and go on to imprint their behaviour on their specific 
community. It will also be relevant and pertinent to consider to what extent such practices 
are influenced by reference to texts. This complex pattern of negotiation is crucial to our 
discussion, particularly in order to understand the workings of social behaviour in 
formulating custom, under the guiding influence of text. Or is it the other way around? Or 
perhaps even a bit of everything? 
From the preceding discussion it is clear that texts have had a hand in influencing 
tradition as much as tradition itself has shaped text. But can these ancient texts be seen to 
represent social reality? Or should we read them as mere poetic renditions, perhaps 
seeking to influence normative behaviour, as some scholars inform us to? How indeed do 
modern Indian families view these texts, are they thought of as guidebooks or law? For 
instance when an act or idea is shunned as abhorrent what does this represent to the mind 
of an actor in Indian society, whether today or yesterday? Let us consider the medieval 
Purvamimāmsa “maxim” according to  abara (on Jamini II 4.21) when it clearly 
expresses that “the purpose of censuring anything is not censure pure and simple, but the 
purpose is to enjoin the performance of the opposite of what is censured and to praise 
such performance” (Kane, 1961: 581).199  
Dowry as a custom is underwritten rather than expressly outlined because like the 
verses of the Vedas the practice was commonly known, perhaps. As Menski (2002: 120) 
highlights Kangle’s presumption of a foreknowledge of the readers of Vedic verses, as 
                                               
198 Not unlike the poetic form used by William Shakespeare, making memorable quotations possible to 
recall for actors and audience alike, using the iambic pentameter a rhythm that mimics the human heart. 
(Abrams, 2009: 196-197) 
199 This is echoed in Nehru’s belief that the ultimate aim of legal reform is educative, as discussed in 
Chapter 1 above, also see Geertz (1963: 140-145) analysis of Nehru as a modernist. 
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“unspoken—or invisible—assumptions within Hindu cultural traditions”. In fact may it 
not be “purposeful textual silence” (Menski, 2002: 120)? 
More recently when marriage and its related practices were brought within the 
purview of the Hindu law, as the Hindu Marriage Act (1955) Louis Dumont made a 
prediction. Making an assessment on the economic nature of dowry and its position as a 
custom within popular Hindu marriages, he wrote on this in 1959, while discussions 
about outlawing dowry were being held during the Indian Parliamentary debates. It is not 
out of place to quote his thought process, as it fairly summarises the popular belief at the 
time when the statue was being deliberated on.  
“Marriage and the Legislator 
We can perhaps better understand now how it is that marriage is such an important 
occasion in Hindu India, accompanied with so much expense and display. We can also 
understand why the reformer’s attempts at making it more economical have failed. On the 
one hand marriage is a sort of apotheosis, during which the bonds of caste and status may 
seem to be temporarily removed, and it is, in a part of the country, an occasion on which 
wealth is exchanged for status. On the other hand it is, in another part of the country, a 
ceremony pivotal to the systematic organisation of kinship, the moment when lifelong 
and even hereditary ties and gift relationships are created or renewed. More generally, 
and quite in keeping with the best tradition, the marriage ceremony can be defined as the 
‘giving away of a girl’. In accordance with it, it was recognised in law that, while sons 
inherit or succeed to the property, daughters are entitled to the expenses necessary for 
their marriage. 
Recently, the legislator has upset this custom [emphasis added]. There was an 
attack in the Hindu Code Bill against what we have called here the Southern kinship 
system. According to the draft it would have been legal to marry one’s cousin. In the 
Hindu Marriage Act, as it has been passed, an exception has been made in favour of 
recognised custom. More drastic is the principle that daughters should inherit equally 
with sons. This disposition destroys the traditional differentiation between sons and 
daughters, and hence, the very significance of marriage which we have outlined here. 
What will be the real impact of this enactment in the country, especially in village India, 
in the next decades, it is of course impossible to say, for a good many reasons. One can 
predict [emphasis added] that it will result, to begin with in a fair amount of litigation. 
Moreover, the particular enactment which concerns us is only one element in a system...”  
 
Dumont’s (1959: 520) observation that the reformer and legislator “upset the balance of 
tradition” is very telling in terms of highlighting the invaluable position accorded to 
tradition within Indian society, and thereby by social scientists putting that group under a 
lens. Within this thesis we continually need to address the meanings accorded to 
tradition,200 the reverence afforded to it within western and eastern precepts alike, and the 
reason why it is important to the core argument here. Holding this in mind we can move 
                                               
200 As the very title of my thesis suggests ‘tradition’ is key to the discussion on hand, in the next chapter (4 
below) we will once more take up the meanings associated to this term, thereby adding to building on our 
previous exposition on it in Chapter 2. In this way we unravel and build at the same time.    
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on to the next historical fold in the canvas of law making with reference to dowry in 
India.  
 The Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961 (DPA) was a combined effort of the modern 
Indian state and the Indian women’s movement (IWM) to combat the rising trend in 
bride-burning as it was then called. The nature of this legislation perfectly lends itself to 
the exposition of this thesis. It claims to be “an educative measure” (Menski, 1997: 71) in 
its outreach, attempting to inform and thereby transform social behaviour rather than rule 
make. As noted earlier, the DPA allows a minimum payment and cost of gifts amounting 
to Rs. 5000, which is deemed acceptable. Section 6 of the DPA further provides that any 
dowry given in violation of the explicit provisions of the Act shall belong to the woman 
or her heirs. The conclusion is thus inevitable that this reflects recognition of the limits of 
law and of social realism:  “Thus it seems that the lawmakers even contemplated that the 
unfortunate woman might be killed, and were more concerned about the property aspects 
than about the potential victim of female murder” (Menski, 2003: 33).201 The aims of the 
DPA are clarified in its preamble: “…educating public opinion and to the eradication of 
this evil”.202 Interestingly this reflects the Hindu legal conscience at work; not making 
law, but coercing it. Modern Indian statutes offer only guidance it is not legal 
prescription; persuasive rather than prescriptive. Ought not rather than may not: or ought 
not is, as we saw above, in Derrett’s terms. This inquiry therefore also examines the role 
of law as an “educative measure” when it operates in conflict with social custom. 
In the opinion of most “the law does not appear to have enough effect on the 
minds of those who turn into murderers” (Menski, 1997: 67). It appears additionally that 
the judiciary is split in its approach on the one hand condemning the phenomenon of 
dowry murder but refusing to mete out the harshest possible sentences to perpetrators of 
these crimes. As Menski (1997: 73) points out, the pioneering approach of the Rajasthan 
High Court was cut short by the Supreme Court when the former wanted to set a clear 
public example by publicly executing dowry murderers. Interestingly the violation of the 
prisoners’ human rights was stressed and finally upheld as grounds to stay the 
execution.203 This attitude suggests that the human rights of the killers are more important 
than those of the victims. 
                                               
201 See also Allot (1981) on the limitations of legal application in positivist law making. 
202 This aspect of the Act is dealt with more fully in chapter 6, below. 
203 See Attorney General of India v. Lachma Devi and others, AIR 1986 SC 467. 
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 Legislation which lacks popular support is doomed.204 Jamila Verghese (1980: 
10) argued clearly that in order to effect any change in attitudes it was imperative to work 
alongside relevant legislation. By examining the living law of dowry as sadācāra, the 
futility of banning dowry in the light of marital expectations old and new is further 
highlighted. According to Glenn (2004: 289), the community of Vedic Aryans faced a 
host of local, indigenous customs on their arrival into the southern part of the sub-
continent. In his estimation the explanations offered in the Vedic verses demonstrates 
“why [these customs] should be accepted, and the surest way of doing so was to explain 
them [customs] largely in terms of local practice.” Derrett (1963:1) notes similarly, while 
Maine (1991:7) makes an analogy with grammar, in terms of recording rules of practice. 
About the Mānava Dharma-Śāstra Maine (1991: 27) notes the “unstructured nature” of 
the eighteen odd titles of law which relate to the “practical needs of society”.205 Glenn 
(2004: 298) characterises the situation aptly when he notes that the notion of law which 
did not appear to be contained in the books or verses of the Vedas needed to be gleaned 
“from somewhere”, he therefore rightly assumes that: 
“Local tradition, of the virtuous, could even be shown to have unsuspected, divine 
qualities. This must have been taken as good news. So from Manu on, sadachara, that 
which has been handed down from time immemorial, by those who are virtuous, has also 
figured as a source of hindu law. [sic] In contemporary books it is usually referred to as 
‘custom’ or ‘usage’ and we see here the same conversion of normative information into 
repetitive fact as has occurred in the west, yet the language of sadachara makes it clear 
that we are dealing with informal local tradition.” 
Lingat (1973: 14) warns that “one must take care” when making such assumptions. 
Interesting to note is Patrick Glenn’s linking sadācāra, an ancient and medieval assertion, 
to a modern legal pre-requisite for a ‘custom’ having been in evidence from “time 
immemorial” to have some credence in a court of law. I am not quite certain where he 
assumes this connection from, but it appears to have bearing in the local understanding of 
how customs flow from generation to generation. Of course, worthy of note is the fact 
that certain common legal parlance has entered everyday language usage as well.  
Staying with the idea of intent of law from ancient to modern times it is important 
to discuss the nature of the most recent additions to the law books of India. The 
                                               
204 For a detailed analysis of the negotiation between law and public opinion in comparative terms in India 
and USA see Gupta (2001). 
205 See also Venkataraman (1987: 2). 
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Protection of Women From Domestic Violence Act (2005) (DVA), for instance, has 
important repercussions for the DPA, instituted some decades ago. Modern Indian legal 
statutes therefore, similar to the ancient texts offer only guidance. Once again we see the 
notion of persuasion over prescription. It is not legal prescription: ought not rather than 
may not. Nehru believed that it is impossible for legislation to solve deep-rooted social 
problems without the rallying support of the people. He admitted the limited role of law 
in fostering social change during the joint sitting of both the Houses of Parliament on the 
DPA in May 1961, when he declared:  
“Legislation cannot by itself normally solve deep-rooted social problems. One has 
to approach them in other ways too, but legislation is necessary and essential, so 
that it may give that push and have the educative factor as well as the legal 
sanctions behind which help public opinion to be given a particular shape.” 
(Bhatnagar, 1996: 3). 
 This view has been reiterated by the higher courts in the country on several occasions, as 
this Supreme Court judgement summarises:  
“The greed for dowry, and indeed the dowry system as an institution call for the 
strictest condemnation. It is evident that legislative measures such as the Dowry 
Prohibition Act have not met with the success for which they were designed. 
Perhaps, legislation in itself cannot succeed in stamping out such an evil, and the 
solution must be ultimately found in the conscience and will of the social 
community and its active expression through legal and constitutional methods 
[sic.].”206 
 
3. 5 Conclusion 
To contextualise the above discussion in order to summarize and lead into the following 
chapters it is important to return momentarily to the current situation in modern Indian; 
both in terms of law making efforts, and social activism. This keeps the argument alive, 
as there is still older textual material to look at in, in chapter 4 and particularly in chapter 
5 order to finally examine dowry in the past. This layering of the argumentation, in 
onion-like strands, allows the discussion to move between past and present and suits the 
subject better, in terms of the process of history itself. Dowry functions in a similar 
ongoing dialectic, rather than a mundane chronology. Therefore to conclude the 
discussion of legal precursors in the past we must attend to the present.  
Outlawing dowry outright has perhaps not been the ideal way of dealing with the 
‘dowry problem’. It has in fact exacerbated the current situation, combined with 
                                               
206 Shri Bhagwan Singh 1983 2SCWR. 
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consumerist trends.207 Not only does a father have difficulty in not giving his daughter 
any gifts at marriage, but girls now demand trousseaus that reflect their status (Menski, 
1997: 68; Jhutti, 1998: 183).208 Few women would like to enter their marital homes 
unaccompanied by trousseaus, though modern ‘love marriages’ may mean that a dowry is 
not part of the equation – only to cause trouble later (Saavala, 2010). The steady rise in 
the statistics of dowry deaths reflects possibly an adherence to the ongoing practice of 
dowry. There are an estimated 19 dowry-related deaths a day or one death every 75 
minutes according to the latest National Crimes Bureau all India statistics.209 Many 
deaths are, however, wrongly registered as dowry killings or dowry-related suicide 
(Wyatt, 2008). Many other deaths, at the same time, go unrecorded.  
Therefore, the state has been forced to recognise and address the steady increase 
in the actual death rate of young brides. Perhaps each quarter, when it is politically 
correct, a fresh reform is announced to prove that the state does not tolerate cruelty to 
women, or indeed condone it. Whatever the motivation for the renewed reformist stance 
of the various governments might be, there is some movement forward in a more 
meaningful direction recognising that the area which requires careful scrutiny is the grey 
area of law during which marriage negations occur. Recent attempts have been made in 
this direction by various state governments to curb the practice of dowry.  
Criminalising dowry has not worked, as Derrett, a legal theorist and Dumont, a 
social scientist warned. The dowry system remains stubbornly in place. “The obvious 
remedy is to decriminalise the giving of dowry” (emphasis added) (Menski, 1997: 72) but 
this has not yet been attempted by lawmakers. Therefore, as this thesis continues an 
examination of this custom, informed by both legal and anthropological science, we find 
the following. The state continues to display efforts of activism. In one instance, as 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, DPOs210 were mobilised by the Haryana State 
                                               
207 See two recent dowry-related cases reported in the past month (2010): One is a tragic case of homicide 
being disguised as suicide (July, 7 2010, Mumbai Mirror), another shows initiative on the part of the police 
to arrest an absconding film producer Gaurang Doshi (September 4th 2010 Mumbai Mirror), for further 
detail see the online articles at http://www.mumbaimirror.com. Both these cases reflect the notion that more 
than dowry mars these marriages, and that at times dowry is being used to bring difficult husbands to book.  
208 See also “Delhi girls rebel over dowries”, 2003/05/19 Sanjeev Srivastava. 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/world/south_asia/3040681.stm). 
209 These were the most comprehensive statistics valid in August 2004. The National Crime Records 
Bureau (NCRB) updates its website with monthly updates of these figures, or should. As of April 2010, the 
latest numbers are as follows: In 2007 the figure of 8093 dowry deaths was reported on this website, as all 
India figures. For detailed statistics see: www.ncrb.nic.in 
210 “The Battle of the Barat Begins”, India Today March 10, 2003: 17. 
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Government as a last resort in the first decade of this century. These officers had been 
“empowered” with ‘The Haryana Dowry Prohibition Rules’, to not just register 
complaints but also conduct surprise raids. This step was taken in response to the 871 per 
cent rise in dowry deaths in this state, between the years 1981-2002: 28 deaths rose to 
263. In 2002 1,512 cases of harassment by in-laws were registered. Can such extreme 
measures be employed to continually police every community marriage celebration in a 
nation of over a billion? In the next instance, in 2004, the Maharashtra state government 
was put under pressure by the government at the Centre, who ordered the research unit 
and the vigilance cell at the Nirmala Niketan College of Social and Home Science to be 
disbanded. In an interview ex-principal of the college, Prof. Kalindi Muzumdar, recorded 
her opinion that this disbanding was in order to redirect funds to more amenable social 
rehabilitation projects, where a progressive and empirical outcome could be recorded, 
i.e.; women rag-pickers. The then principal, Sister Mary Alphonse, as an academic 
mourned the fact that fifteen years of research and statistics carried out by Sakhya on 
over one hundred cases of dowry harassment, burn victims and murder trials would have 
come to nought.211 The issue, as has no doubt become apparent from the above 
discussion, is that dowry as a custom and approaches to curb, or ‘eradicate’ it have been 
confused and confusing. What remains it to understand the custom, which the wider 
argument in this thesis, within the framework of text and tradition, attempts to do. 
Therefore the question raised at the outset persists, what is the role of ‘the law’ in 
this social context to effect dowry as a custom? In fact, is there really a role for law? 
Doesn’t custom play a more decisive part in forming social attitudes to socially 
embedded practices? This reiterates the key conceptual question that my thesis addresses: 
Does custom or law inform the ‘right’ behaviour of people? Briefly analysing the role of 
the DPA at this early stage in the thesis has shown how custom is being worked upon by 
textual dictates.212 Importantly, the layers of texts are being treated similarly; modern day 
law books may be perceived as another layer added on to the medieval and modern 
commentaries. In attitude texts might be revered, but rarely adhered to; what operates in 
the social field is custom. Statutory law has had a tough task in dealing with custom. 
                                               
211 Both Prof Kalindi Muzumdar and Principal Mary Alphonse’s statements were recorded in March 2003, 
in an interview for a documentary film made during the course of this thesis study, Dowry Today. 
212 A more cursory analysis and brief critique of the modern anti-dowry law is found in section 6.1 below. 
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From the discussion above it is quite clear that a text cannot be employed to root out a 
custom.213 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
213 The ancient Chinese custom of foot-binding, it is argued, was successfully rooted out in rather different 
political context of a revolutionised reformist government in modern day China. In the Indian social 
context, there seem to be similar success stories in terms of child marriage and sati, but the reality certainly 
for child marriage - remains questionable (Sagade, 2004). 
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Chapter 4:  Dowry in context and text 
     
Dowry terminology is a far more complex conglomerate of culture than may be at first 
imagined. My thesis examines this complexity in order tto underpin the key argument. 
Namely, that any attempt to control or curtail such a complex phenomenon by textual 
intervention is a difficult task for any social engineer or law maker. As discussed in the 
three chapters above, a need for this type of study, which co-relates the various issues at 
play and underpins the debate itself, has been demonstrated elsewhere and is recurrently 
articulated (Oldenburg, 2002: 6). Without a historical reference point it is difficult to 
combat the controversial and troubling Hindutva argument that dowry is constructed by 
‘the other’; thereby, exonerating Hindu society of any serious socio-political 
responsibility. Evans-Pritchard mentions that a researcher must have the capacity “to go 
straight to the sources” in order to understand the ‘total’ phenomena in their totality (cited 
in Mauss, 1970: vii). Further, the importance and relevance of hypergamy to dowry is 
evaluated in this chapter, highlighting textual evidence from early British anthropological 
data to substantiate how dowry has developed into a crucial determinant in contemporary 
Indian marriage culture.  
In order to meaningfully examine the nature of dowry we need to turn to linguistic 
definitions of the term. Both in colloquial usage and in historical etymology dowry 
appears to be a chameleon like custom, changing, altering appearance from time to time 
and from community to community. And, then pretending it is not even there. Dowry, as 
a word in the texts virtually disappears. However, in order to further our understanding of 
the complex conglomerate of culture that dowry is part of, it is worthwhile to begin by 
analysing the various meanings; even symbolism ascribed to the term in India over the 
last several hundred years. This chapter ends with a summation of how dowry may be 
construed as contemporary sadācāra, leaving room to examine the evidence from the 
ancient and modern texts in chapter five.  
A number of studies have documented the expectations and marriage customs 
prevalent in different regions of India. What is required here is an analysis of this 
literature with a firm focus on those expectations related to dowry. I do not intend to 
conduct a field study as the emphasis here is to discover the conceptual foundation for 
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dowry. The intent is to prepare the literary ground for a future research project to conduct 
field analysis to develop the concepts that will come to light through this thesis.  
The conceptualisation of dowry as good behaviour, and therefore good practice; 
or as a symbol of sadācāra is dealt with in detail. For instance, the sympathy for a father 
is supreme in Indian society. These attitudes and their associated social backlash are 
further examined below in section 4.2 and also with reference to custom and sadācāra in 
section 4.5 as an investigation of the influence of custom on contemporary society in 
India, as compared to that of official law, on the collective conscience of the people. The 
primary research question raised and reiterated here is how dowry as a ‘custom’ 
continues to defy legal prohibition. Using the theoretical framework of Sanskritisation it 
is possible to examine the present prevalence and wide-spread nature of dowry in India 
today. The wider argument, as seen in chapter two and three above, examined the role of 
text in ancient law making. In this chapter we examine the applicability at ground level of 
the legal process as it was conceived of in ancient times in order to tease out the 
conceptual underpinning of this process.  
 
4.1 Definitions of dowry 
What precisely constitutes this custom of dowry? And why is it so peculiar to Indian 
marriages at home and abroad? In order to answer, or even begin to understand the 
answers to these and other questions we must trawl through the textual material 
discussed and analysed in chapters two and three. We must take into account a number 
of crucial factors which underlie the process of evidence gathering, and factors which 
must not be lost sight of as they have bearing on the conclusions that we are led to. 
Outlined are three observations: 
[1] There is no iconography or visual imagery available for the people we are putting 
under the microscope in the earliest period of our study, or the pre-classical stage of 
what may be called Vedic Law (BCE 1500- BCE 800);214 there is of course an 
immensity of literary sources. However, in anthropological terms there is an accepted 
paucity of direct testimonies215 and observations216 of the women and men about whom 
                                               
214 For an assessment of the possible evolution of laws in the dominant Western model jurisprudence sense 
see Menski, (1997: 6-7; 2003: 69-130). 
215 As we will see in chapter six, the compelling nature of a woman’s dying declaration, either recorded by 
a social worker, police officer or in some poignant cases scrawled on the victim’s own body in a desperate 
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we are concerned. Our sources are completely oral or verbal, committed to textual form 
in arbitrary fashion across millennia.217 However the Warli paintings come close.218 
[2] The character of these texts is nearly always assumed as religious.219 Their 
preservation and propagation is owed in the major part to diligent transmission; at first 
orally and later through writing, by an elite socio-economic class. In an attempt to 
transmit the very verses we see today, unaltered and unadulterated, extreme mnemonic 
devices were utilised so as to preserve every syllable. These have functioned as self-
checks, it is assumed, but as noted by Stephanie  amison, “these devices are only as 
good as the next generation” (1996: 7).   
We must take note of how this transmission has been controlled through quasi-
official organisations, the gurukuls or schools, passed from teacher to students every 
generation. This would have depended on highly structured guidance, with socio-
economic leisure and freedom to devote numerous individual lives to developing 
themselves into “mnemonic automata”. And as is often assumed with oral traditions that 
they tend to operate in the inner sphere, informal and “non-institutional” under the 
sculpting hands of the womenfolk, this particular society was unique. Although, there is 
some evidence of early writing, and oral histories passed down from woman to woman 
(Lakshmi, 1995), it is the men whose domain centred on this oral tradition. In fact the 
Aryan oral tradition is quite the opposite of other oral traditions,220 in being “regimented, 
institutionalised, and purposeful” ( amison, 1996: 7-8). A text required the stamp of 
orthodoxy in order to survive, as evidenced in the case of the MDŚ. The likelihood of the 
intervention or influence of women in this sphere, given the patriarchal nature of the 
work, seems highly unlikely. 
                                                                                                                                            
attempt to have their version heard. During the early period of our study we have no such anthropological 
records available from this period. 
216 In modern day cases we have the verdicts of judges, which guide and track the overall nature of 
society’s abhorrence of this custom about its absolute frustration at being able to sensibly be rid of it. 
Again, we have no such accounts available to us from the ancient period.  
217 In fact Jamison alerts our attention to the fact that this nature of the ancient texts, particularly of concern 
when accessing gender studies in non-Western cultures is “more often an anthropological than an historical 
enterprise.” (1996: 7) This assertion is relevant to the methodology of this thesis as well. 
218 See the photo plates representing early tribal notions of the world in terms of solidarity in circles. See 
also Sudpta Kaviraj’s (2010: 12) inversion of Hegel’s circles. 
219 Though we have remarked earlier (chapter two) on the wide and unruly nature of Hinduism as a religion 
per se when contrasted with the other major institutionalised religions of the world, historically the ancient 
Hindu textual material is continually referred to as primarily ‘religious’. 
220 See Pinkola (1992: 3-9) for accounts of folklore and its function in other oral societies. 
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Most academic writing attempting to analyse the practice of dowry begins by 
defining the term. It is clear that no consensus has been reached in terms of what is the 
best definition. This section examines the problems with defining dowry adequately, 
both in terms of legal application and for academic argument. The importance of 
definitions to a scholastic work needs no explanation; academics require definition as a 
matter of course. In terms of this custom however it seems almost as if the name itself 
were not meant to exist. There is no one uniformly accepted word for dowry, as resilient 
as the practice is, no single, individual term has been as strong as the practice itself. 
Other than the English, dowry, with its roots in the Latin word dower we find no 
standard Indian language word for dowry. This in itself presents an insight into the way 
the custom works, phantom-like, with clear impacts on law and society but with no 
name. This is a vital clue for my argument here, about how custom itself controls 
tradition. Here we have a custom and associated behaviour, which is entrenched as a 
determinant in marriage culture across India but which has been given no real Indian 
name.  
Words like ‘dahej’ of Hindi origin, or daaj, of Rajasthani origin, come closest to 
being identified with the custom, but no real written rules are expressed as being adhered 
to in its practice. In Maharashtra the word ‘hunda’ has been locally and traditionally 
associated with marriage payments. In Bengal the term ‘totto’ or tattva,221 is used to refer 
to the competitive range of beautifully designed and prepared gift baskets and sweets 
which go from the bride’s family.222 The entire customary sphere of marriage is under-
researched and continues to be in the control of certain appointed men, and at times older 
women at the time of the ritual to finalise a marriage transaction. Very little is recorded 
or written down in modern times. It is almost as if the community conspires to act in 
secret. The amount of dowry, when and who receives the money, is it all in cash, are 
there specific items like a car, or a house being given or being agreed to be given as well? 
All this is done in intense secrecy. Bank loans are easier available to men of good social 
                                               
221 Linguistically similar in sound to motto, it is a non-technical term, but field research has adequately 
recorded the importance of this part of the marriage celebrations and ritual ranking for us to gain an in-
depth view of just how central these gifts are in ascertaining the status of the girl and her family as the 
relationship progresses to become affinal. See Inden’s translation of tattva as truth as well for a curious 
linguistic link (1976: 3). 
222 In this community gifts are exchanged. There seems to be a uniquely egalitarian approach to the 
exchange, since the flow of gifts is reciprocated. However, the pressure seems to be on the girl’s family to 
‘outdo’ the boy’s side in terms of decorative beauty, detail and even number or gifts. There is a certain 
informal needling about the value and number of presents between the families (Fruzzetti, 1990: 38-40). 
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standing in society who are the father of marriageable daughters. If a bank is hesitant then 
other members of his family, or his peer group, perhaps even a loan shark, gets involved. 
For contemporary examples of the social burden on the father of the bride a cursory 
glance at Indian films, particularly Hindi films which furnish one with a host of situations 
where a father is either forced into bankruptcy or belittling himself for the purpose of 
arranging a suitable match for his marriageable daughter. The amount of understanding in 
wider society about the burden and often associated depression of a man who is ‘saddled’ 
with girls to marry off, or a suicidal man who takes down a whole family with him, is 
often forgiven by society because of the burden it is known to carry.  
Cunnison’s (1970: xi) comment on the inadequacy of dowry as a word is 
noteworthy, particularly that “there is no convenient English word to translate the French 
prestation so this word itself is used to mean any one thing or a series of things given 
freely or obligatorily as a gift or in exchange; and includes services, entertainments, etc., 
as well as material things”.223 Most ethnographic studies use this French term prestations 
to mean a complex pattern of gift giving. This usage suits the intent and context of this 
thesis, which will therefore employ the term dowry prestations to represent the entirety 
of gifts given, before, during, after and for the occasion of the marriage. Menski (1998: 
15) observes the “conundrum” of dowry definitions and maintains that there is no “one 
explanatory model” that may be adopted to better understand the problem. I would agree 
that definitions are by nature exclusive, and this explains the resultant confusion in 
distinguishing the concept of s rīdhana  or women’s property from dowry practices 
(Garzilli, 1995). I shall therefore not attempt to introduce any new definition to the 
prevalent admixture.  
An inherent problem with defining transactions at marriage is that they tend to be 
ambiguous in nature. The current legal definition of dowry does not take cognisance of 
the on-going payments incumbent on the wife-givers for the duration of their daughters’ 
life, though “in consideration of marriage” was finally altered to “in connection with” 
(Bhatnagar, 1996: 4). How much this has aided the actual application of the DPA is 
another matter. Most lawyers and activists find this definition problematic as it still does 
not identify the chain of gift-giving as cognisant with dowry. Also dowry negotiations 
                                               
223 I use the same term for reasons elaborated by Ian Cunnison in his translator’s note (1970: xi). 
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begin well before the wedding ceremony.224 These may include various payments, for 
instance the costs of the actual wedding or betrothal ceremony, the couple’s honeymoon, 
the arrangements for wedding guests, perhaps even financing the prospective son-in-law 
to study abroad. Recent cases have firmly established that demands of dowry are 
recognised as grounds of cruelty and divorce.225  
There has been recurrent confusion in distinguishing the concepts of s rīdhana  
and dowry. Srinivas (1984, 11-13) categorically distinguishes modern dowry from both 
dakş na or gift, and s rīdhana . This economic aspect of dowry is taken up further here. 
Today, in order to retrieve the gifts made at marriage the police and activists insist on 
calling all retrievable items s rīdhana . This is because as far as ownership is concerned 
the accepted definition of s rīdhana  is clearly identified as belonging to the girl 
throughout both textual tradition and its customary interpretations and readings. The 
articles that accompany the bride are quite clearly considered her own property, and are 
also referred to as s rīdhana .  Upadhyaya points out, “[w]e have nothing on record to 
show that the wife retained the items of dowry for her own distinct use although it is 
possible, as remarked elsewhere, that they formed her Strīdhanam” (1974: 152-3). 
“According to some, the share of the wife consists of her ornaments and the wealth 
(which she may have received) from her relatives” (Ghose, 1917: 375). Therefore, to 
meaningfully differentiate the associations attached to both these terms as essentially 
separate at this early stage in the textual evidence is not possible. Conversely both the 
terms dowry and s rīdhana ,  especially in a legal context today, have acquired definitive 
meanings that we should not attempt to transpose on their fundamental original 
understandings.  
Dowry in a wider global context is often conceptualised as belonging to the 
married couple as a single unit, as an impetus to start their new life together separate 
from their respective parents. In the current Indian context most newly married brides 
shift residence to their husband’s parental home. This persistent virilocality ascertains 
that the bride is to some extent deemed the property of the husband, and by implication 
that of his family. The husband’s family therefore may be tempted to consider the dowry 
                                               
224 See the Indian Supreme Court ruling in the judgement on S. Gopal Reddy AIR 1986 SC 2184, which 
confirms that the DPA does apply to demands for dowry made during the negotiation period before the 
actual wedding takes place.  
225 Dowry demands were equated with cruelty and amounted to grounds for divorce in Shobha Rani v V.M. 
Reddy AIR 1988 SC 121.  
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also as unequivocally their property, something they might make use of for their own 
daughters. This question concerning the actual ownership of the goods is considered one 
of the main problems of dowry. How this is handled in practice, however, seems to 
depend largely on the women involved, mainly the approach taken by the mother-in-law. 
A number of social and economic studies conducted across the sub-continent 
during the late 1980s when the dowry problem was granted centre-stage, by the media 
and the public, have brought to light various aspects of the problem. Some of these 
studies have shown that women have no control over the items that constitute their 
dowries (Srinivas, 1984; Kumari, 1989). This further highlights their inferior status as 
perceived in the marital context, in comparison to female natal members. These ties of 
kinship hierarchy are crucial to consider when defining dowry in sociological terms 
(Dumont, 1962; Karve, 1965; Raheja, 1988). Notably, the rotating capital theory was 
forwarded by some sociologists like Dr Indira Rajaram (1983: 277) but is no longer 
widely accepted. Another theory also forwarded by Rajaram (1983: 276), asserted that 
when women from richer groups are withdrawn from agricultural work it was in order to 
enable them to have more leisure: “…The decline in female participation in gainful work 
i.e., increase in female leisure, may then simply be something purchased by the 
community with its increased prosperity”. Srinivas (1984: 17) suggests that this theory is 
misleading. Instead, he states:  
“It is pleasant to think that when peasants get rich they prevent their women from 
working for wages outside the homes so that they could have more leisure but 
unfortunately that is not true. When parents acquire enough land they think that 
their new status as landowners is incompatible with their women working for 
wages. Their women should no longer be seen by the hoi polloi. In this 
connection it may be noted that Brahman  a women, however poor, do not work on 
the land for the wages like women from the other castes because their status is so 
high. (In the case of the Brahman  a, social and ritual status is to some extent 
independent of wealth)” [emphasis added]. 
 
Relevant anthropological data substantiates Srinivas’ standpoint of marriages being 
negotiated with the Brahmanical model, or the Brahma marriage in mind. There seems to 
be a ripple effect with Sanskritisation setting a clear trend of customary practice, with 
regard to marriage. Whether this model is real or imagined it is widely perceived as being 
higher in ritual terms and better in economic terms for the groom’s family, while it 
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further ascertains a superior status in social terms.226 For instance, McKim Marriot (1955) 
observed that the family to which the girl is given becomes respected just as the act of 
giving the girl accords the family inferior status. Marriot’s view on hypergamy is based 
on his research in the fifties on a village near Aligarh in U.P. (1955: 118-119) and 
follows a similar vein in purporting the ritual and social status of wife-receivers versus 
wife-givers. More recently Raheja’s (1995) study in a Hindi-speaking region of northern 
India, specifically in the village of Pahansu, Saharanpur district, U.P., found that gifts are 
given precisely because of the assumed superiority of the former group over the latter.227   
Leaving the present behind for the moment let us examine the earliest evidence as 
transmitted in the textual material assigned for use in the marriage ceremony. Within 
Vedic literature certain references might be interpreted as crucial links to modern 
understandings of dowry practices. Is there mention of gifts and presents, and their status 
or nature? The term dowry itself is not clearly identified at all, across the texts, in spite of 
the practice being implicit in the actions of marriage and associated ritual processions 
leading away from the marriage ceremony. This apparent absence is in itself an emphatic 
clue to the very nature of dowry as a custom. It could be suggested that since it was 
normal to have a dowry, so there was no need to mention it specifically in a text. 
One specific hymn, interestingly used during the Brahma form of marriage in 
modern day Hindu marriages, has been noted as the “marriage hymn”. Therefore our 
attention must be focussed on the marriage verses of the  ūr yās k  a,     da X.85 in its 
entirety. Marriage in Sanskrit is vi āha loosely translated as movement; implying 
movement ‘away from’. The one term associated with dowry in the Vedic literature, as a 
concept, since there has so far been no Sanskrit equivalent for it, is  āha  .228 The 
significance of the word  āha  / āha  m in this context is important. Both words bear 
within them the Sanskrit root  āha, implying movement.  
According to noted Sanskritist, and compiler of the only extant Vedic 
concordance,229 Maurice Bloomfield (1962, 851-52) the occurrence of  āha is most 
commonly linked to chariots, cars or horses. It embodies an interpretation of movement 
                                               
226 See in particular the discussion centring on the eight forms of marriage in chapter five, specifically 
section 5.1. 
227 This discussion about status and its relevance is tackled alongside hypergamy below (4.3). 
228 See Bhattacharya (1999) Dowry in Ancient India, an unpublished masters’ thesis. 
229 The Vedic Concordance (1962) is a text of extraordinary importance to researchers trawling through the 
old text in search of single words, as clues. It painstakingly notates the occurrence of important Sanskrit 
words and where they appear, and how often. Bloomfield’s work has not been recently duplicated, and the 
area of Vedic studies would greatly benefit from such a new addition, compiled in a modern context. 
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within it as vi āha does. Therefore the assumption may be drawn that the word  āha   
refers to items of value, whether gifts given willingly or demanded, which accompany the 
bride and groom on their way to the bride’s new place of residence. This is carefully 
examined here in order to understand the nature of these transactions. Important to note 
here, with specific reference to the Vedic period, is the inherent confusion with defining 
the concept of s rīdhana  as separate from dowry.  
The  ūr yās k  a,     da X.85 verses identify a model marriage, and idyllic it 
might seem at first glance. The opening lines acknowledge the place of rta, the 
predecessor of dharma in terms of cosmic guidance and harmony, thereby clearly 
claiming allegiance to more philosophical conceptual leanings. Further, from various 
following verses, it is evident that the term  āha  m or  āha   refers to the ‘bridal 
procession’ that leaves with the bride on her journey to her husband's family home 
(Menski, 1998: 225). The term  āha   finds mention in verse 13 as suryaya  āha  h, 
translated as the bridal pomp of Surya, and in verse 14 as  āha  m suryaya referring to 
the three-wheeled chariot of the Ashvins who lead her away. This decking of the bridal 
chariot as part of the bridal procession is crucial to our understanding of what kind of 
transaction may have occurred during this life-defining ceremony. The bride and groom, 
perhaps having spent the nuptial night in her natal home, though that is not clear, proceed 
on their way to his parent’s home. The gifts given to the married couple, and those given 
to the bride as part of her trousseau, form part of an elaborate bridal procession of which 
the bridal chariot or cart are a part. There is important evidence of the presence of wealth 
involved at this stage of the marriage ceremony. The verses clearly refer to the safe 
passage of the couple and their train, without molestation by thieves on their way. 
Simultaneous verses from the     da make references to dowry giving and taking, fairly 
clearly giving us clues about the gift-giving and the associated expectations involved. 
From an analysis of these verses it is possible to assess the gift-giving practice and the 
expectations which enjoin this behaviour. For instance another verse, in its translation by 
Griffith,230 makes explicit mention of some of these expectations: 
                                               
230 It is worthy of note that Griffith’s translation of the     da material was coloured by social issues of his 
time. While a later interpretation by a female academic, Wendy Doniger some hundred-odd years later may 
be similarly influenced in its reading by the values of its time. A comparative study of these two 
translations would not be out of place to fill a gap in our social understandings of academic analysis. As 
noted severally, philologists and historians function often in a vacuum, there is little connection with them 
and their audience; such a study might go some way to shortening or even filling that gap (Jamison, 1996: 
8).  
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When a man’s daughter hath been ever eyeless, 
who, knowing, will be wroth with her for blindness?/ 
Which of the two will loose on him his anger –the man 
who leads her home [ āhate] or he who woos her?// 11 
The situation described mentions the essential qualities required of a bride. Sadly the 
bride lacks the essential quality of having sight. Therefore the assumption is that her 
father will be held responsible by either the man who seeks her hand for his friend or 
employer (the man who woos her), or the man who will lead her away, as her husband 
will “loose his anger” on the father. Another interesting practice is highlighted here. The 
role of the mediator, either an employee or some other representative sent to make the 
match. This is a practice in evidence to date, wherein we also have some compensation 
changing hands for fulfilling that role successfully. The parties are rarely involved in the 
actual direct discussions or even negotiations. Professional negotiators are called upon, as 
Inden (1976: 2) and Fruzzetti (1990: 32) found in the case of medieval and modern 
Bengal. This of course leaves room for several interpretations of what has been said, and 
leaves room for both misunderstanding and negotiation, all of which is accepted as the 
way things must progress in contracting the union of not merely two individuals but 
essentially two families, and importantly their associated clans.  
  How many a maid is pleasing to the suitor 
  Who fain would marry for her splendid riches?/ 
  If the girl be both good and fair of feature, 
  She finds, herself, a friend among the people.//12[ V  27.11-12] 
Griffith (1889: 154) makes an additional note to accompany this translation by way of 
explaining the use of svyamcit as herself, that it implies she is able to find herself a 
partner “by her own worth, independently of her dowry”.  
Another verse unrelated to the actual marriage ceremony but from a hymn 
addressed to Indra seeking his benevolence shows clear evidence of the notions of wealth 
and the payment of dowry. 
 For I have heard that ye give wealth more freely 
Than worthless son-in-law or spouse’s brother/ ( V  I. 109.2) 
Here we see a representation of both the notions; that of bride-price, given by the son-in-
law, and that of dowry, often considered the responsibility of the girl’s brother. 
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Where the term  āha occurs elsewhere in the     da hymns it is almost always with 
reference to bearing away, or carrying, or to the carriage. We may interpret from this that 
although there is a single reference like “ āha  m” in  V  . 85 it represents a practice 
that was ongoing and is corroborated by cross-references in other unrelated hymns as 
well as in later texts. Concentration on the bridal procession itself, fear for the safety of 
the married couple accompanied by their gifts and the bride’s trousseau, as well as the 
stipulation of who may or may not be part of this procession underlines the central role of 
the  āha  m in the     dic context of marriage. 
These verses examined in the section above provide clearly the conception of both 
the qualities of bride and groom and how these are linked to the payment of a dowry. 
What bearing does this have on wider society? Are there expectations implicit in the very 
practice of dowry marriage? Interestingly Zimmer231 with reference to the same verse 
declares “a good dowry would have helped many girls to get a husband”. Now whether or 
not there was some amount of academic creativity, influenced by the social values and 
concerns of the time of these translations is open to interpretation. How often we are 
tempted to transpose our own value system onto the world we are studying? What must 
be borne in mind is that in this case we are constantly creating an interpretation and a 
reality based on words from an age to which we have no real documentary evidence. 
Words are all we have, no photographs, no paintings, nor pictures to elaborate 
viewpoints, or accentuate points of argument. My assertion is that based on what we have 
in society today, a learned behaviour pattern, a sanction giving certain norms an 
acceptability in wider society, even a blueprint in ‘living law’ that continues to formulate 
and practise a custom, often chopping and changing to suit the context and time frame 
within which it functions, but dowry continues as a major determinant in marriage. 
Surely this resilience is itself worthy of note as a clue to its inherently powerful nature? 
In the following sections we sift through further evidence to understand this nature. 
Returning to the modern day situation as a reflection of history and an 
anthropological process we can turn to recent studies on what is, and has been, said about 
dowry and its nature. In some contemporary readings dowry prestations are often 
referred to as pre-mortem inheritance for daughters (see Tambiah, 1973: 59-169).232 A 
                                               
231 As translated by Menski (1984), from Zimmer (1879: 315). 
232 For a relevant discussion on Tambiah’s controversial anthropological approach to dowry as pre-mortem 
inheritance and academic feedback see Hershman, (1981: 245), Agarwal (1998: 135-8), Oldenburg (2002: 
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large dowry is often used as a justification to cut off or deny a daughter’s share in the 
natal property, so as to allow the ancestral home to remain undivided. Girls often 
willingly, or at times reluctantly, sign away their inheritance rights to their brothers, male 
cousins or an uncle or other male relatives, with this attitude imposed on them. It is 
believed that a girl will cause conflict in her family by asking for a share of her rightful 
inheritance (Basu, 2001b: 117). Contesting or challenging one’s natal family in a court of 
law is an uncomfortable step to take (Basu, 2001b: 2; 41-42). Women are often led to 
believe that any confrontation to secure their rights will lead to an annulment of their 
emotional security in their natal home; all the time being aware of the fact that they 
threaten the sanctity and harmony of the Hindu Undivided Family (Basu, 2001b: 128-29). 
Kolenda’s (1984) study ably demonstrates the very real severance of natal ties on 
marriage and the direct link to dowry in two disparate Hindu communities. According to 
this study natal groups that consider the girl’s marriage as “losing” her to another 
community sever all natal connections and pack their daughters off with a dowry, and 
little subsequent inheritance. Whereas those communities that have no such belief of 
having lost daughters to another group through marriage, and who consequently 
conceptualise the couple as ‘belonging’ to both families tend to make gifts of land and 
property to their girls. They even convince their daughters to consider living close to the 
natal home. Kolenda’s (1984: 98-112) findings suggest that the Hindu marriage rites and 
ceremonies of kanya dan that permanently change her name and caste (including her 
funerary affiliations), symbolise this vivid severance of natal ties. Thus in these 
communities the property is considered the brother’s as he remains “in” the family and is 
not “lost” through marriage. 
In keeping with such findings as Kolenda (1984) and Basu (2001b) it has been 
argued that dowry can be conceptually constructed as a daughters’ inheritance. If so 
conceptualised, this property may be considered empowering to the daughter, therefore 
granting her a dowry may ensure the well-being of a newly wed bride. In reality none of 
these concepts seem to have worked. In fact the opposite is true; giving an adequate 
dowry invites extortionist claims. Besides, how much is enough? Further it is important 
                                                                                                                                            
23). Also in her book analysing the patriarchal roots of the dowry system in India, Hooja (1969) directly 
contradicts many of Goody and Tambiah’s major assertions. Hershman in his discussion on marriage 
customs in Punjab, is in agreement with Tambiah on an important characteristic of dowry, which must be 
noted here: “the re-circulation of dowry, such as a woman giving her gold to her husband’s sister at the 
time of her wedding (or having it taken from her) is something considered shameful and performed in sub 
rosa fashion” (1981: 245). See also Dumont (1959: 520-1; 1966: 121). 
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to note that women do not have a right to the marital property should there be any 
dispute. They are shuffled between their natal and marital families in terms of property 
ownership. In practice women are not allowed to enjoy the right to property which they 
have been accorded in text. There is therefore a view among modernists that if a woman’s 
right to the marital home is secured, her position will be clear and valued (Jaising, 2000; 
14-15). As a matter of fact this may undermine her father-in-law/husband’s authority and 
ownership creating another area of conflict in the current context. Discussions on what 
makes up a dowry have been problematic, as no clear consensus has been reached, 
specifically with regard to ownership of the ‘gifts’ that change hands. Furthermore, these 
gifts do not cease at the wedding, they continue throughout the married life of the couple, 
and gifts are presented not only to the bride but also to her affinal family.  
  
4.2 Dowry as a customary norm 
How is a customary norm born? Does it evolve unaided, naturally or is it established 
through long and studied practice of peer groups, sadācāra? That in the practice and 
emulation of dowry marriage as a model we have an established and recognisable pattern 
is not under dispute. Whether it is the intent of a society to recreate a potentially harmful 
pact is what is under question. What if dowry inherently does not imply harm, but in fact 
accrues spiritual and of course material credit and merit? Now if we shift the lens to 
examine dowry as a practice without the weighted preconceptions of it being ‘bad’ 
custom we may have an interesting, even enlightening outcome. I address in particular 
the assertion of an activist, Madhu Kishwar, who has battled with the very nature and 
expression of dowry and how we as women must treat it.233 Kishwar’s (1986: 2) 
assertion, early in her attempt to address dowry problems on the ground in the Indian 
capital, stresses the need to unpack the understanding of this custom in order to 
meaningfully tackle it: “Until we understand how dowry actually works we will not be 
able to do anything about it”.  
                                               
233 See all of Kishwar’s (1984; 1987; 1989; 1990; 1994a, 1994b) many arguments for and against dowry, 
and her battle with her own staunchly held views particularly in “Rethinking Dowry Boycott” (1988) for a 
clearer picture of how activism tries to address social problems (Kishwar, 1994b: 5-17). 
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The evidence of dowry present in the literary sources available on Hindu marriage 
negotiations234 yields clues to the nature of the practice of dowry prestations as a custom 
considered exemplary by a socially elite group. The argument here is that dowry 
prestations and related practices evolved over time as a representation of higher caste and 
class status, implying better social position and standards of living. This association 
remains to this day where groups that did not traditionally practice dowry marriages 
reject their own customs, favouring and incorporating the seemingly financially viable 
custom of dowry, which gives them access to higher class status, more prized than caste 
in today’s market economy. 
In order for a practice to become normative it must follow a certain pattern of 
socialisation. The clues to this inherent and diligent socialisation have been embedded in 
the behaviour at marriage and during the negotiations surrounding marriages for 
millennia. The repetitiousness is itself evidence, and emphatically points our vision 
toward a clear desire to emulate what is considered best during a specific historical 
period, and perhaps because that is the practised, even safe path. In particular in a 
society so absorbed with its own perpetuation, the need was to find means to support 
‘good’ unions, which brought forth ‘good’ progeny, which in turn perpetuated and 
ensured the survival of a way of life and philosophy. Interesting to note is the emphasis 
on the type and form of marriage repeatedly underlined as the best to ensure the safety 
of both ancestors and self. Let us examine how this process unfolds, in the various 
verses in the textual literature at hand. 
For instance, from the above discussion it is evident that the physical appearance 
and the character (caritra) of bride and groom, especially the girl as referenced, to a 
much greater degree, were crucial especially in the approved forms of marriage, where 
they assume the status of ideals. We find sufficient evidence to assume that the amount 
of the dowry would have depended upon the qualities of the bride, according to the 
verse we have already noted from  V  . 23.11 and what it states. With regard to similar 
examples of the importance of the qualities of bride and groom to the type of union we 
have a host of verses. In what is considered the oldest, and perhaps most respected of the 
S    s Yajnavalkya 1.55 stresses “virility”, among other necessary “qualifications” for 
                                               
234 See Fruzzetti’s (1990: 32-33) observation of modern marriage negotiations, specifically as an area 
where customary norms are elaborated through adherence to set accepted behaviour, between the 
professional go between or ghatak and the families about to enter into the negotiations. 
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the groom. Another equally influential voice is recorded in Naradas     XII.8, and 
further, at verse 19, which similarly underlines the purpose of marriage being 
procreation and therefore has strong injunctions laid down against impotence, thereby 
emphasising that an “incapacitated male was not competent to marry, as the chief 
intention of marriage was the procreation of children” (Chatterjee, 1974: 373). 
As the following discussion in chapter five will highlight, there existed a clear 
notion that the type of marriage union effectively had implications on the qualities of the 
progeny born of that union. In chapter two we examined the intense preoccupation of 
Vedic society to perpetuate itself through “noble” lineages, this preoccupation 
consequently led to a marked emphasis on procreation as the basis for every marriage. 
This also implies that the quality of the progeny was crucial, and numerous texts cite the 
ideal rtu or women’s cycle, during which to approach one’s wife in order to procure 
ideal offspring. Therefore we see a clear relation drawn between external causes and the 
quality of children born. 
The qualities of the bride and groom were carefully scrutinised so as to ascertain 
that the couple had ideal offspring, preferably sons.235 The bride of course came under 
greater scrutiny as she would perform the major biological and social function of rearing 
the child first in her womb and then in her husband’s home. Manus     III.6-7 lists a set 
of families from which a bride should not be selected to ensure strong unions. This is 
clear evidence of enjoining certain behaviour in society. The commentators deduce 
eugenic justifications for this; as Chatterjee (1974: 372) observes specifically 
Medhatithi’s belief that “off springs [sic] of persons of bad pedigree are supposed to 
inherit bad elements”. Yama236 outlines a list of families similar to the ones outlined in 
the Manus    , which “should be avoided”. The primary aim of this emphatic concern 
with “pedigree” according to Harita was to ensure “excellent quality of progeny [sic]”. 
Avoidance of certain lineage and insistence on the family-affiliation of the groom were 
meant to ensure that “…defects would not reappear in the children born” (Chatterjee, 
                                               
235 Choosing ideal partners to produce, and procreate an ideal society was not unknown in other ancient 
societies. Records exist to suggest that the State encouraged the choosing of potential mates for soldiers in 
ancient Sparta to ascertain the quality of the offspring of such a union. Also, Spartan society is known to 
have gone to the length of abandoning deformed babies outside the city-state. See Kiernan’s ( 2007) Blood 
and soil for an elaboration on genocide and extermination from Sparta to Darfur. 
236 Samskaraprakasa 588, cited by Chatterjee (1974: 372). 
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1974; 373). The s     literature enumerates the qualities inherited by the children born of 
each type of marriage. The reward for each form of marriage is measured in the number 
of ancestors that the son born of that particular marriage form might succeed in freeing 
from hell. Compared to such detail, the relatively sparse information about dowry in 
these texts indicates either lesser importance given to financial arrangements, or may 
suggest that dowry was just ‘normal’ practice; there are certainly no eugenic or other 
biological consequences. 
The child born of the Brahma marriage is most highly prized in this sense, 
thereby emphasising the ideal status of this marriage as “he frees from guilt ten of the 
ancestors who came before him, ten later ancestors, and himself as the twenty-first” 
(Doniger, 1990: 47). The progeny of the first four forms of marriage are further blessed 
with longevity and beauty and are valued far above those born of the unacceptable 
forms. From the above we may deduce that the forms of marriage were elaborated to 
underline the importance of the role of the householder to produce perfect progeny who 
would carry forward perfect sacrificial rites. In order to be able to carry on these rites, 
however, considerable wealth was essential, to gain which it was necessary to idealise a 
form of marriage wherein the wealth moved into and not away from the husband's 
family.  
An exploration of the Brahma versus the Ās r a form of marriage in text, and 
context is valuable at this juncture, as it raises both questions and clues about the 
expectations involved in marriage practices at ground level and how these in turn have 
shaped the powerful persistence of dowry within Hindu/Indian marriage. A detailed 
examination of the Brahma form of marriage and its subsequent codification as the legal 
form of marriage in the modern Hindu Marriage Act (1955) therefore underlies the 
discussion here. This will lead into the consequent displacement of other marriage 
prestations by dowry, among the indigenous communities in India, who have since been 
absorbed into the dominant cultural mass. An examination of bride-price marriage and its 
conception as Ās r a, that which is unacceptable, literally “out of tune” with a 
harmonious society render clues about the further conception of the ideal marriage 
payment. Brahma marriage is upheld as the exemplary form, as conceptualised it carries 
within it the sanction for dowry as the accompanying gift that goes with the ‘more 
auspicious’ kanyadān or the gift of the virgin.  
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These two forms of marriage, with specific reference to their connections to 
bride-price and dowry payments in the modern context express how dowry comes to be 
the major player in the modern context, and why? If one form is being given both ritual 
and social sanction, and merit over all the others, and particularly over the bride-price 
form, then it is clearly the preference of the elite group, who control the dissemination of 
knowledge, virtues, and social mores. They decide, even divine, what is accepted and 
therefore acceptable. This conceptualisation of marriage at a pan-Indian level in the 
explicit terms of kanyadān as the best form of marriage, and the best form of gift 
highlights the emphatic idealisation of dowry marriage in the current context (Raheja, 
1988: 121).   
As a matter of fact there is evidence to suggest that acts of giving and receiving 
carry clear messages, coded within the very act of the custom they denote. Moreover, 
power equations are set and controlled between kin-groups and this is what foretells the 
future for the survival of dowry as a practice. The theory of dānadharma or gift-giving 
particularly relevant here considers Mauss’s (1990) conceptual examination of marriage 
prestations.237 A newer reading of Mauss for contemporary use suggests “[a] gift that 
does nothing to enhance solidarity is a contradiction” (Douglas, 1990: vii). In terms of 
Sanskritisation, examining dowry as a construct and symbol of the traditional 
Brahmanical patriarchy is informative. Hindu marriage is also discussed in the same vein 
to highlight the process of Sanskritisation as it gradually displaces other marriage 
transactions, both in the current Hindu and the non-Hindu context. Hindu marriage is the 
ceremonial backdrop within which the drama of dowry negotiations unfolds. References 
from the texts in translation trace the development of dowry into an ideal marriage 
payment above others in the dhar aś ās ra literature.  
In a lucid article replete with śās r c references, Derrett (1984: 181) claims in no 
uncertain terms that “[d]owry does figure in the śās ra, and has done so for a very long 
time.” Interestingly his observation that the practice is dealt with in a “…sly fashion, 
half-heartedly, shamefacedly” highlights the conceptual underpinning of this intensely 
                                               
237 Marcel Mauss’s study although released in French between 1923-4, became more widely translated and 
available to academics and others in 1950. Therefore, in reference to the conceptual idea this date is used in 
the thesis. In the discussion of gift theory in this thesis two versions, or translations of Mauss are used. The 
more widely accepted of these two for social scientists is by Ian Cunnison (1970). However a more recent 
reading is relevant for a much changed world. Interestingly the very title is translated variously. Halls’ 
(1990) version uses the phrase “form and reason for exchange” as opposed to the previous translation 
“form and function”. This represents the shift in focus of our society from a more functional to one that 
attempts explanations, perhaps?  
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patriarchal construct. The findings in this thesis thus contradict Oldenburg’s238 
observation that dowry functioned as a safety-net for women and was a custom created 
by mothers to ensure their daughter’s happiness in her marital home (2002: 24-25). This 
phenomenon may well be there as well, but there is a much wider system at play. The 
marriage negotiation usually takes place between the men of both families, assisted 
usually by professional matchmakers or ghataks (Inden, 1976: 46; Fruzzetti, 1990: 32-
34). Even when the father of the girl is not present it is crucial for a male guardian to 
represent her to the groom’s family. According to Madan (1975: 231) “Once the 
negotiations for a marriage have been successfully completed, it normally is in the home 
of the chosen wife-givers that the decision to establish a union is formally and publicly 
taken by the two parties”. Although there are exceptions, this appears to be the rule to 
date.  
Dowry as experienced elsewhere functions as an accumulation of wealth for the 
joint family of the bride takers, as Derrett points out, the “family’s chest” (1984: 188).239 
Both Hershman and Agarwal refer to dowry prestations constituting a “circulating” pool 
or fund accessed by members of the husband’s family and clan (Hershman, 1981: 244; 
Agarwal, 1998: 137). All the references within the dharmaśās ra texts and their adjunct 
commentaries cited by Derrett tie in neatly with my own findings (Bhattacharya, 1999) of 
the concept of dowry in early Vedic literature, highlighting a clear line of continuity with 
the traditional Brahmanical patriarchy. 
The theory of the gift, or dānadharma, as investigated by Marcel Mauss (1970; 
1990) from the dharmaśās ra literature, lends further valuable insights into the behaviour 
incumbent on the givers and receivers of gifts. This theory juxtaposed with the gift-
giving patterns and associated status games ingrained in the North Indian jajmani system 
was analysed by Raheja (1988: 118). The exchange and behaviour patterns associated 
with dowry define the formation of ideals to be followed through history. The 
auspiciousness and inauspiciousness of the transactions will also be discussed with 
reference to Raheja’s argument that “The well-being and auspiciousness of the givers of 
                                               
238 It appears that Oldenburg (2002: 4) did not examine the abundant evidence for dowry analysed by 
expert legal theoreticians like L. Sternbach (1965) and Derrett (1984), or Inden (1976), although she does 
refer to his 1990 study on the political construction of Indian society, and imagining India. Further in spite 
of referring to Fruzzetti’s (1982) findings in Bengal, Oldenburg seems to miss the point completely.  
239 See also Rheubottom (1980: 221), for similar conceptions of family wealth in Yugoslav Macedonia. 
Interestingly, in this context of a non-Indian community it is the unique quality of the gifts stressed above 
actual monetary value in most cases, similar to that of the Bengali ‘totto’ concept discussed below in 
chapter 5.  
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the bride are only assured when the marriage is a kanyadān, an unreciprocated gifting 
away of the daughter”. This aspect of the reciprocity and the problem highlighting the 
preoccupation of families to marry off daughters is uncovered by Raheja and lends 
valuable insights into the further conceptualisation of dowry as a necessary 
accompaniment with the gift of the bride. Also noteworthy here is  amison’s (2002: 79) 
lucid observation on the particularistic dimensions of giving in ancient India: “‘Giving’ 
confers power on the giver; ‘receiving’ is a sometimes shameful act that can put the 
receiver in the power of the giver”. This aspect of a complex power equation linked to 
the giving and receiving of dowry will be further underlined below. 
An almost universal assumption in the study of marriage and affinal prestations 
highlights the role of hierarchy as a dominant feature structuring all relationship between 
wife-givers and wife-receivers. There has been some question regarding when this 
ranking begins to exert influence: before the marriage or as a consequence of it? Despite 
these minor debates the pervasiveness of this ideological construct has not been 
sufficiently queried.240 Both Dumont (1966) and Vatuk (1975) argue and demonstrate 
that crucial aspects of North Indian kinship are articulated through various kinds of 
marriage prestations. Dumont first highlighted the manner in which relatives of at least 
two successive generations are identified by virtue of their roles as wife-receivers and 
wife-givers or bride-bearers. The bride’s family merely seem to bear the girl till she is of 
marriageable age, and the groom-givers have the higher gift to give. 
Such analyses further demonstrate the importance of the “alliance” aspects of 
affinal relationships characterising the particular valuation and elaboration of the 
enduring relationship between wife-givers and wife-receivers. However, applying their 
findings to North Indian society at large is problematic. Both Dumont and Vatuk 
identified hierarchical elements in the affinal relationship among the Uttar Pradesh 
Brahman  a castes studied by them, and they have translated marriage and post-marriage 
prestations in terms of this overarching hierarchy. They believe that gifts are given 
precisely because of the superiority of the wife-receivers over wife-givers.  
Raheja argues that their study has two main limitations. Firstly, that it does not 
account for the wider cultural meaning associated with kinship and prestations and 
secondly, that the ritual contexts of the prestations and their linguistic aspects of the gift-
                                               
240 See for more detail Vatuk (1975: 159) and Raheja (1988: 20). 
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giving circumstances have not been adequately specified. She argues instead that “[m]ost 
important… is that many of these prestations are dān, and that as such they involve 
transfers of inauspiciousness in which it is the obligation of the wife-receiving people to 
act as recipients for the well-being of those who are related to them as wife-givers” 
(1988: 119). Raheja points out that in the Gujar community she studied they avoid 
marriages of exchange, since these suggest the “taking for a price” of a bride, which then 
contravenes the fundamental purposes of dān, since inauspiciousness can never be 
transferred in a reciprocated exchange. Raheja’s study highlights how the groom like the 
“Brahmans, Barbers, and Sweepers, must “spread out the begging bag” (jholi pasarna) to 
accept dān and that it is his obligation to do so. Interestingly in both affinal and intercaste 
prestations, the emphasis is on the ritual centrality of the one who gives dān rather than 
his hierarchical position with regard to the recipient. Crucially, Raheja’s (1995: 26) 
findings in Pahansu reflect that women in this society perceived themselves as “little” in 
comparison to the boy’s people, who are considered “big” in terms of status.241 This 
assertion highlights the obligatory nature of the transactions that take place at marriage 
and highlights the unequal balance of power between the two groups. These concepts act 
on the pattern and behaviour of the gift givers. 
Emphatic in their influence are the continuing oral and linguistic tradition of 
communities, which uphold dowry, reinforcing the advocacy of the custom. Songs, 
lullabies, proverbs and sayings perpetuate the acceptance of this custom, contributing to 
the general belief that indeed dowry is, and has been, a socially sanctioned necessary part 
of good or ideal Hindu marriage.242  
Groups that favoured very different forms of wedding transactions or prestations 
to begin with have swapped their own practices or incorporated their own versions of 
dowry. These groups that practised bride-price, or even where there was supposed 
egalitarianism between wife-givers and wife-takers, have abandoned their previous 
customary behaviour in favour of dowry marriages. Should we account for the 
widespread acceptance of dowry as a fall-out of Westernisation and inflation alone? Are 
                                               
241 For an incisive analysis of Raheja’s findings in terms of Punjab and the deconstruction of hypergamy 
see Oldenburg (2002: 37-39). 
242 Dr Tej Purewal, University of Manchester, presented an incisive analysis of wedding songs underlining 
the value of dowries to a happy married life from Punjab in her paper entitled “A Matter of Choice? 
Engagements with son preference and sex selection in the South Asian diaspora and beyond” on 5  anuary 
2003, at the Sixth International Conference on Dowry and Bride-burning and Son Preference in India, held 
at New Delhi. 
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there elements of Srinivas’ (1952) conceptual Sanskritisation involved as well? What are 
the elements at play here?  As Oldenburg suggests, is the colonial British administration 
to be held solely responsible for the creation or corruption of the custom of dowry? 
The belief is that if dowry is not given something terrible may happen. In fact 
deaths are likely to occur when, apart from other things, there has been inadequate 
dowry, or at least that is sometimes the justification given for murders. These sayings and 
songs form the unwritten ‘codes’ which collectively represent custom and will be used to 
play off the textual references that support it. These trends lend clear insight into the 
social sanction accorded to dowry as a customary norm.  
Succinctly: Other forms of marriage prestations have been displaced in favour of 
dowry, which is currently established as the dominant model of marriage prestations in 
India. This shift is adequately documented in anthropological data and appears to have 
occurred along the lines of Sanskritisation, whereby lower castes and classes emulate and 
appropriate the symbols and practices of the highest caste in order to better their own 
status. Further, this shows a custom based on ancient textual sources has claimed 
precedence over the rules and the text of the official law.   
 
4.3 Hypergamy and its impact on the nature of dowry 
The structural relevance of hypergamy to dowry as a customary norm is evaluated in the 
following section, calculating evidence from early British anthropological data (Risely, 
1891; Prinsep, 1899; Ibbetson, 1916; Baines, 1921; Rivers, 1921; Hutton, 1961) 
alongside the academic thrust of the understanding of hypergamy as a feature of Indian 
marriages. This is a crucial aspect of dowry under consideration here, in terms of its 
association with hypergamy, a ranked relationship between wife-receivers and wife-
givers. In anthropological literature we come across two marriage forms known as 
hypergamy and hypogamy, one of which is particularly pertinent to this discussion. 
Hypergamy involves the gift of a daughter along with the gift of wealth or a “dowry” to a 
groom of higher rank (Rivers, 1921: 9-13; Inden, 1976: 98). This notion of rank 
encompasses a complex mix of markers, socio-economic in particular and also in the case 
of ancient India, one of high ritual status directly associated with rank. Hypogamy, 
conversely involves a marriage where the gift of a daughter to a groom of lower rank is 
accompanied by wealth given to the bride’s father. Crucial to my thesis is the notion of 
trading wealth for status, as a direct result of marriage prestations and the possibility of 
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movement by this act of giving and taking in the minds of both low and high grades of 
clans as a matter of prestige.  To set the stage for the peculiarity of hypergamy and its 
relationship to dowry and Kulinism as it was perceived by the first ethnographers who 
encountered it, it is useful to note some of the ongoing debate in London society in the 
early part of the nineteenth century. This discussion highlights once more the need to 
understand customs in their own given context. Further, the discussion here must always 
make room for the ongoing evidence of what popular beliefs of the period held, by way 
of accounting for an academic and wider socially aware form of sadācāra. Presented here 
is an ongoing debate in the editorial pages that troubled the then Editor of the London 
Times enough to finally call upon George Bernard Shaw to summarise and therefore 
draw a line under the entire argument. There is a curious to and fro between viewpoints 
which highlights also the nature of the argument undertaken here.  The entire debate 
begins with a piece by Sir Henry Cotton on Kulin polygamy and its effects, where Cotton 
claims that “so-called child marriages among the educated class are now the rarest 
occurrence, and polygamy among Kulin Brahman  as is absolutely non-existent…The 
practise had died before I went to India”.243 An informed discussion then ensued, 
involving the editorial department to clarify their own position. The paper makes room 
for the heated debate which then continued for several months. Details of this would go 
too far here. 
 Worth specific mention here is, however, another response linked to the ongoing 
debate in the London Times, about the wide recognition of a father’s obligations toward 
gifting his daughter herself and the enjoinment in the customs of the people with regard 
to dowry, and indeed “buying” a husband for her: 
 
Sir, - I desire to offer my experience of Kulin Polygamy in contradiction of Sir Henry 
Cotton’s statement. I entered the Bengal Civil Service about 12 years before Sir H. 
Cotton, and my service in Bengal overlapped his in its termination. 
In 1866 the Government of Bengal appointed a committee to inquire into and 
report on Kulin Polygamy. It was thus moved by a learned Brahman  a Pundit, at whose 
instance a few years before the legislature had passed the Hindu Widows Remarriage 
Act. Sir Charles Hobshouse, who is still alive, was president of that committee, and I was 
a member and its secretary. Our inquiries showed that Kulin Polygamy was very 
prevalent in Bengal and that there were instances of Brahman  as having nearly 100 wives, 
many of whom they had never seen since their marriage with them as girls. That was 
about the year before Sir H.Cotton came to Bengal. His statement therefore, that “in my 
personal experience…polygamy” shows singular ignorance of the social habits and 
customs of the country amongst the people of which he so long lived. His experience is 
                                               
243 The Times, Tuesday, September 24, 1907, p. 10. 
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evidently derived from association with Bengalis whose Western education no doubt may 
have tended to induce them to abandon it. But it would not be to such men that this 
pernicious system would have much attraction. Profit in a pecuniary sense, and not 
sensuality, is its stronghold. The father of a girl is obliged by Hindu law and the custom 
of the country to marry her before she attains puberty; she must marry in her own caste; 
and he has to buy a suitable husband for her. Kulin Polygamy, it can be easily 
understood, appeals to Brahman  as of the mendicant and priestly classes of small means. 
Education may have done much to reduce its sphere; but education has not reached such 
classes, and obviously they will be last to come within its influence. 
I do not desire to attempt to discuss or explain at length the marriage system 
among the Hindus in Bengal; but I would point out that though education may have done 
something to mitigate its evils, it cannot claim to have done much to reduce the rates 
payable in the marriage market. The usual rate demanded by one who has taken a degree 
of Bachelor of Laws in the Calcutta University is, I was credibly informed not many years 
ago, Rs.10,000, or nearly £700. It may be asked why does not the congress which 
professes to act as a body anxious to reform all matters to the benefit of India apply itself 
to such social matters of the highest importance? Why does it not commence work at 
home before it stirs up matters of political controversy? The answer which suggests itself 
is obvious. Because it does not suit the aims of its leaders. Alas! That should be so. 
September 27 H.T.Prinsep244  
 [emphasis added] 
 
This debate highlights two issues inextricably linked to the discussion of hypergamy and 
dowry: how a custom holds sway over the customary conscience of an entire society, in 
spite of it being uncomfortable, and an unmitigated link to wealth and status play.  
To link this with the present argument, the work of Marcel Mauss and Louis 
Dumont in the anthropological and sociological fields of marriage exchange is important. 
In their study of marital exchange behaviour patterns a significant trend was noted. In 
fact the very term hypergamy, by which superior lineage is sought through marriage, was 
coined in order to accommodate this peculiar upwardly conscious move made through a 
marriage alliance. Until then it had been referred to as Kulinism, or in an ancient context 
as pratiloma marriage alliances, contracted for reasons of superiority as Dumont found 
(1966: 301).245 Both Dumont and Mauss note the peculiarity of Hindu families that are 
anxious to maintain and project a clear line of gift giving, which in turn supports an 
ongoing relationship between generations. All this behaviour seems implied in marriage 
negotiations during and before the act of marriage itself. Though so far in historical 
research not many links have been found between specific marriage customs linked to 
and concerned with dowry, and the ancient and medieval texts seem to proscribe such 
behaviour, I am now confident that throughout the textual material there is constant 
                                               
244 H.T. Prinsep in The Times, September 27, 1907, p. 4.  
245 See below a description of the pratiloma and anuloma marriages as researched by Dumont. 
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reference to and confirmation of one type of marriage as being the ideal form.246 This is 
the Brahma marriage. Several grhyasū ra texts attest this. In fact there is reference to the 
need to spend and lavish gold, extremely relevant in terms of auspiciousness and purity; 
Gonda (1991: 6-8; 88-89) directly linked this to the desire for prosperity and 
strengthening lineage through the birth of sons. There is also the clear acknowledgement 
that a payment of sorts exchanges hands at the wooing of a girl, or at the arranging of the 
marriage, and this too is made in gold. Gonda (1991: 104) highlights the behaviour at the 
wooing: 
The man who wishes to marry sends wooers to the girl’s father who take flowers, 
fruits, barley and a pot of water, say three times “here I am, sir!”, ask the girl in marriage 
and—when both sides approve—touch a vessel in which have been put flowers, fried 
grain, fruits, barley, and gold whilst pronouncing appropriate mantras (SG. 1, 6, 1 ff).247  
 Further, Gonda (1977: 606) in his trawl through the ritual sū ras finds and 
highlights several supporting statements which signify that gold was integral to the 
Brahma form of marriage. This is clearly followed through also in Rgveda X.85, the 
marriage hymn; and in other lesser gryhasū ras linked to the Rgveda. More recently 
Ronald Inden finds that in order to exchange and maintain a higher rank in Bengali 
society hypergamy in the form of Brahma marriage was preferential in the middle period. 
He quotes Ibbetson (1916: 23-24) who first used the term hypergamy with reference to 
India and its peculiar marriage practice: “They may also be referred to as two laws, which 
I shall call the laws of isogamy and hypergamy. By isogamy or the law of equal marriage, 
I mean the rule which arranges the local tribes in a scale of social standing and forbids 
the parent to give his daughter to a man of any tribe which stands lower than his own. By 
hypergamy or the law of unequal superior marriage, I mean the rule which compels him 
to wed his daughter with a member of a tribe which shall be actually superior in rank to 
his own. In both cases a man usually does not scruple to take his wife or at any rate his 
second wife from a tribe of inferior standing”. 
 The word hypergamy was introduced at the end of the last century to designate a 
different pattern which is sometimes encountered in the north of India, although it is not 
                                               
246 Dumont’s footnote on the reasoning behind the list questions how the authors of these texts are 
justifying one marriage form as better than the other and clearly coincides with the view in this thesis that 
sadācāra and custom is enjoined in the ancient material. 
247 See also Gonda’s (1991: 223) observations about the possible use of gold with reference to the marriage 
verses on RV X.85. 
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universal there.248 Blunt (Dumont, 1966:116) says of Uttar Pradesh: ‘Indeed amongst all 
Hindus there is probably a tendency towards hypergamy.’ And Dumont (1966: 116-117) 
himself observed in the Gorakhpur district an illuminating trend “that even among castes 
who do not actually practice it, hypergamy is influential as a conscious model, a 
language” [emphasis added]. This behaviour, to be aware of a conscious model of 
marriage, is what the underlying argument in my thesis stresses. Further to identify 
hypergamy as Brahma marriage clearly, and to link this to the ideal model of dowry 
marriage (Srininvas, 1984: 12), as the discussion below will demonstrate. 
In this pattern of marriage alliances, a slight status difference, a slight inferiority 
of the wife’s family in relation to the husband’s, is considered normal and does not in the 
least affect the offspring’s status. Of course this relates to the principal marriage, and in 
no way excludes endogamy. It is because in such a marriage the daughter marries into a 
superior family (she ‘marries up’) that it has rightly or wrongly, been called ‘hyper’ 
gamous. According to Dumont (1966) three points are worth noting: 
(I) the term ‘hypergamous’ is not used to designate all marriages or 
unions in which there is a status difference in the direction indicated, 
but more precisely the fact that such a difference is, within certain 
limits, neutralised normatively in the first marriage. The term even 
implies if not an obligation, then at least a strong recommendation for 
the girl’s parents to find her a superior partner.  
(II) As the woman is in general considered inferior to the man, the pattern 
would seem natural to the people concerned.  
(III) Most notably, this pattern of marriage alliances correlates most closely 
with the Brahmanic-classical, as well as its universal ideology of a 
girl’s marriage being the ‘gift of a maiden’ (kanya dan).  
Dumont’s discussion is further informative to my thesis in its analysis of the importance 
of the gift in general terms in Indian society past and present, and more specifically to the 
material relevance of the gift of a girl. According to Dumont (1966: 118), the gift in 
general terms is an inherently meritorious action. The giver acquires merit by the gift of 
materials of no value for spiritual goods. However, the ‘gift of a maiden’ is a special form 
                                               
248 See for more detail Dumont, (1966:116-119). Blunt as cited by Dumont (1966: 300) observed these 
trends in Uttar Pradesh specifically. While for the Maratha country, which in this respect seems to represent 
the transition from the north (hypergamy) to the south (cross-cousin marriage) see Karve (1965: 156). 
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of gift, even sampradan or a perfect gift. This is meritorious on condition that no 
payment is received for the girl. This squares with the pattern of the gift discussed by 
Dumont: one gives a daughter and goods to a superior in exchange, not in this case for 
spiritual merits, but for something similar, namely the prestige or consideration which 
results from intermarriage with him.  
Interestingly, Risely and Wise were the first ethnographers in Bengal to note 
Ibbetson’s terms in describing the correlation between marriage patterns and clan ranking 
agenda (Hutton, 1961: 53-54). Dumont almost shouts his disdain from the page when he 
observes the “lack of understanding on the part of modern Indian authors” (1966: 282), 
and goes on to quote several contemporary sources, particularly K. M. Kapadia, whose 
efforts in Marriage and Family in India are referred to as studious work (Dumont, 1966: 
301).  
 Following Blunt’s (1931: 70) analysis of hypergamy among modern academics, 
Tambiah in his examination of marriage prestations in South Asia assumes that 
hypergamy is ideologically crucial to the conception of marriage, particularly in the 
context of the symbolic kanyadān,249 or gift of the girl and in the dowry accompanying 
this. He believes this status superiority of wife-receivers over wife-givers operates in 
relation to his argument that dowry represents “female property or female right to 
property which is transferred at a woman’s marriage as a sort of pre-mortem inheritance” 
(Tambiah, 1973: 64). Raheja’s examination of marriage prestations in Pahansu in north 
India clearly demonstrates not only that the hypergamous ethos may be contextually 
distinct from the symbolic kanya dān, but most importantly that Tambiah’s belief of 
dowry as pre-mortem inheritance does not tie in with linguistic and ritual data concerning 
these prestations. If anything, this appears to confirm that there are different types of 
dowry transactions at work throughout South Asia. Raheja’s investigation shows that 
givers and receivers are ranked only with respect to each other and not necessarily by 
caste or clan groupings and that too only with reference to a specific marriage (1988: 
120). This discussion clearly encapsulates the plurality of marriage prestations and 
                                               
249 Oldenburg (2002: 25) observes the “ideology of kanyadān” at play in the belief system of the Punjabi 
community. This belief system permeates a much wider pan-Indian community in reality.  
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highlights the ongoing tensions between the groups involved in the give and take process, 
which is crucial to the wider arguments made in this thesis.250 
Here therefore is the evidence that not only was the most desired form of marriage 
alliance the Brahma form, which involves the kanya dān; or gift of the maiden. More 
importantly, this evidence is propped up with demands and requirements for the father or 
brother, or other responsible male relative to furnish gold, with and for the husband’s 
family to make the girl more desirable to be accepted. In explanation of this behaviour we 
have the complex, and unique gift-giving behaviour minutely researched and referenced 
by both Dumont, in support of his caste study and its dynamics; and also by Mauss in 
terms of the singularly significant sanctions and norms that go with gifts. The clear 
understanding that emerges from even a cursory reading of this material is that first and 
foremost “there is no free gift” as Mary Douglas (1990: vii-xviii) emphasizes, that even 
charity is not without repercussions and forms a relationship between the donor and 
receivers. Therefore when a gift exchanges hands there is merit associated and a clear 
blueprint laid out by the domestic ritual manuals, whereby certain behaviour is desired 
and better. And that is sadācāra.  
Even the list of acceptable marriages is itself a form of textualised sadācāra 
which is enjoining the preference of marriage by gift rather than marriage by purchase. 
Dumont highlights the ideology at play when he mentions how the Brahmanical authors 
are giving voice to their own preferences, to ensure that that practice will then become a 
wider spread custom. We have further evidence from the entire sub-continent and further 
afield, that the preferred model is the dowry marriage. I lay out the evidence within the 
argument here that dowry marriage as we see it today is clearly a reflection, if not a 
mutation of the most ritually meritorious marriage or the Brahma marriage, as was the 
intention of the śās r kars. 
 A crucial thought here is to constantly be aware of there being no golden 
beginnings. But that also means that dowry may not in itself be bad. It is simply complex. 
What we need is a clearer study of various types of dowry marriage. The ones that go 
bad, and the ones that survive. Also we need a cross-section of these from different 
communities. 
                                               
250 See also Menski (1984: 556) in an associated context relating to the priest, especially for an examination 
of the complex permutations involved in gift-giving to the priest, dakshina as opposed to dān.  
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 To elaborate the notion that dowry as a custom is not ‘bad’ or d r ācāra; but that 
the practice related to it may be problematic we have some ideas presented in similar 
research issues in the past. For instance the search for a better understanding of law, its 
development and evolutionary precepts by Sir Henry Sumner Maine highlight the 
difficulty of breaking free of positivist ideals. It seems that coupling Maine’s legal, 
ideological and philosophic belief that law is not per se found in positivist ideals—and 
Nietzsche’s refuting the notion of “golden beginnings” (Rabinow, 1984); we may need to 
reconsider, to even “go back” to seriously imagine that evolution of a thought might not 
always flow chronologically getting better, or more precise or more just.  
 What seems evident is the hypergamous behaviour at play, where the inherent 
inferiority of the bride’s family and kin in comparison with the bride-groom’s is now 
very much at play in society. These behavioural subtleties and the more obvious scorn by 
one set of kin for the other, as displayed in marriage ceremonial rituals and even through 
communal games etc. underlie the deeper rooted gift exchange pattern that has been in 
place for a long time. The astonishing similarities that may be noted in the way dowry is 
demanded, and the insistence often of the father of the bride that it is his duty to ‘bedeck 
her suitably’ to meet ably with that demand are all clues to the inter-play and competition 
between wife-takers and wife-givers in terms of superiority and maintaining this power 
relation. Neither group wants to be beholden to the other, or to be in the power, as it 
were, of the other one. This therefore becomes a tussle to stay one step ahead or one step 
on top in terms of status. Mindsets are minutely influenced by these behaviours; as much 
as people pay lip-service to the anti-dowry campaign enacted and today even championed 
by the state, personal behaviour has not really changed. Gifts must exchange hands when 
a bride is taken and given at a marriage ceremony. The harmony of power tilting one way 
or the other must be maintained. Fascinatingly all this is supported by clear 
recommendations within the textual material of both types; not as previously thought by 
being absent, but by being very much present.   
Maine mentions “immemorial unwritten tradition” (1986: 1) and how its presence 
in the field of ancient Roman law distinguished it from the more positivist leanings of 
ancient English legal development. His recognition of this phenomenon is crucial to the 
argument here. We can easily equate the notion of sadācāra to that of “unwritten 
tradition” to make comparisons in a wider international context. At the end of the 
nineteenth century, Maine’s observations drew attention to the lack of a philological and 
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more complete analysis of the Sanskrit literature, arguing that when seeking to 
understand the early development of law in society and jural phenomena “our best 
sources of knowledge” continue to be Roman or Hellenic (1986: 2). In over a hundred 
years little has changed in this regard. Much research and even pertinent fieldwork has 
been added during this period. Numerous attempts have been made to give what for lack 
of better nomenclature continues to be called “Hindu” law, a place on the world’s legal 
stage, but to little avail. Essentially any ‘other’ systems of law remain on the outside, 
despite the valiant efforts of Prof. Derrett and now Prof. Menski (2003). For the present, 
concepts and notions like sadācāra; although not unique to Indian society, continue to 
fall outside the precept of wider international society when considering varying sources 
of law because it does not quite fit with the understanding of European models of 
behaviour; particularly with reference to sadācāra as dowry and dowry as sadācāra.  
 In the Indian mindset, pre-conditioned by the national agenda to appear Gandhian 
and therefore non-violent, non-greedy etc., to accept dowry as a determinant and player 
in Hindu/Indian marriages is an uncomfortable admission. And further, dowry death can 
be seen as almost natural to the way in which an unwanted gift is dealt with (White 1987: 
552). It appears that most of the modern literature and the attitudes within society as 
reflective of that literature, cannot quite accept that dowry has been a crucial, if not 
primary trademark, both literally and otherwise, of Hindu Indian marriage. While the 
older textual material in and of itself reflects the injunctions or vidhana of following the 
ideal model of marriage with dowry, as hazily described in these ancient texts, if we 
examine the later sū ra literature, this evidence has been denied, perhaps due to a 
growing level of discomfort. Although it may seem simplistic, the anthropologists whose 
efforts were focused on India were primarily seeking to find reasons for criticising the 
divergent, even deviant level of society and civilisation.251 Therefore we have a situation 
where, defensively, the Indian intelligentsia almost conspire to keep certain forms of 
knowledge about their own social processes away from outside scrutiny. Convenient 
translations are not errors, but much deliberate omission occurs. Kanya dān, for example, 
is ultimately propitious, but is always made with the gift of wealth, albeit depending on 
                                               
251 For instance the justification for the initial translation of the  gveda was to prove its inferiority in the 
most democratic of ways in comparison to the Bible, thereby encouraging conversions to the superior 
religion of the west (Keay, 1981: 38). 
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the ability of the father of the bride. Further, the burden on that father is very real. White 
(1987: 554) notes:  
…Perhaps the most oppressive practice of gift giving in Hinduism, likewise 
representative of an aspect of caste or subcaste behavior, (sic) is the system of exchanges 
between a bride’s family and a groom’s family, sometimes observed for a number of 
years both before and after the marriage proper. The prevailing custom places the burden 
upon the bride’s family, and the demands are so excessive that responsible parents in the 
poorer classes are frequently forced into penury to provide a daughter with a husband. It 
is not unheard of for a father to commit suicide so that his insurance money can be used 
to pay off the resulting indebtedness. 
Wealth has been a major preoccupation of Hindu society, with various textual references 
underlining the right and proper use of wealth, its status and ritual quality etc. (Gonda, 
1991; Gupta, 1987). In fact, Gupta’s (1987: 41) analysis of the mythology of the Vedas in 
terms of materialism is worthy of note for the present purpose:  
Religion…did not originate with a revelation of any divine or spiritual reality, but with 
man’s consciousness of the powers that be to be vitally affecting human life. To the 
Vedic Indian, life in this world was the dearest most valuable thing. Religion…is a means 
of achieving this mundane value or goal…The will to live, positively aiming at material 
prosperity and negatively aiming at destruction of anything that stands in the way of 
enjoyment of life, is very prominent in the Vedic prayers and sacrifices. 
That materialism may be an aim of the mostly mystically interpreted worldview of the 
early writings is important to the discussion of a preoccupation with gathering wealth 
through the practice of giving and accepting dowry.252 These views provide insights into 
the conceptualisation of status and power equations based on wealth. This conceptual 
leaning forms the canvas on which the economic aspect of dowry is painted. Dowry and 
related prestations, as noted earlier, is certainly not a practice unique to Indian society. 
The dowry chest figures prominently in most cultures (Rheubottom, 1980: 224).  
 Crucial to the present discussion is the significance of dowry to the wife-givers 
and the wife-takers, respectively. How do these groups view this transaction? What does 
it symbolise to the two groups and indeed to the marrying couple? This is where we come 
up against the issue of dowry demands. How is it that the wife-givers find themselves in a 
                                               
252 On similar studies preceding Uma Gupta’s work focussing on notions of materialism during Vedic times 
see Shastri (1957) or Lefever (1935). More straightforward theses in this regard are Edwards’s (1924) The 
Philosophy of Religion or Huxley’s (1957) Religion without Revelation.  
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position of vulnerability when marriage negotiations begin? Why do they accept the 
servility incumbent on them? Is this representative of hypergamous unions? Has wealth 
replaced ritual purity? 
A major effect of hypergamy is the status asymmetry between affinal groups, as 
stated above, the boy’s kin being regarded as superior to that of the girl. The latter 
improve their status through marriage, while the former secure cash, jewellery, expensive 
clothing, furniture and other consumer goods. Marriot (1955: 112) points out: 
 
Behind this organization of marriage is the feeling that one’s daughter and sister at 
marriage become the helpless possession of an alien kinship group. To secure her good 
treatment, lavish hospitality must be offered and gifts made to her husband’s family 
throughout life. The economic effects of this patterning of marriage are considerable. Not 
only marriage and other expenses are kept high, but quantities of goods follow the 
women in later years by the same non-rational path. 
 
Several field studies corroborate these findings and will be employed in the present 
inquiry; there is a constant tussle in the social field creating newer dimensions to old 
customs.253 This chapter in particular examines the changing relevance of dowry as it 
changes hands from one family to the other. Varied components of dowry have been 
identified as common to most societies across the globe (Rheubottom, 1980: 223). The 
trousseau takes precedence in most modern societies today, while the provisions made by 
the girl’s family, especially her father, are emphatically underlined in Hindu and Indian 
conceptions of dowry. 
Therefore, we may conclude the following from the discussion in this section: 
Crucially, Inden’s (1976: 98-107) thesis states without a doubt that hypogamy and 
hypergamy as respectively represented by the Brahma and Ās r a forms of marriage are 
used to trade rank, or Kula. The gift of wealth is clearly preferred to go from the father of 
the bride to the groom givers, rather than the reverse. Further, wealth is part of worship. 
In the case of dowry this is particularly damning evidence, particularly as a counter point 
to those Gandhian and nationalist researchers who refused to look through an objective 
lens, saying that it was the ‘pure’ gift of the daughter that the śās r kars were enjoining, 
not in any way a justification for conspicuous consumption. Clearly the evidence of 
fieldwork in Bengal (Inden, 1976; Fruzetti, 1990) attests this as discussed in chapter 5. 
                                               
253 See Holden, 2003; Hershman, 1981; Fruzetti, 1990; Raheja, 1988; Blunt, 1931; Dumont, 1966, 
Malhotra, 2002; Pocock, 1972; Van der Veen, 1972; Tambiah, 1973; Smith, 1987, Marriot, 1955.  
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 Further Dumont’s observation in his footnote as discussed above, highlights the 
rationale behind the eight forms of marriage, when clearly only two, and even then 
mostly the Brahma form alone, was the type being enjoined by the śās r kars as the ideal. 
Therefore, although the research evidence has always existed to make these crucial 
connections, was it mostly Indian shame that kept dowry under a veil of silence? 
 
4.4 Women as property 
 
It is customary that an exchange of gifts should take place at a wedding in order that the 
two families recognize their new status as affines to each other; this occurs in most 
communities across the globe. In India this exchange of gifts and particularly the flow of 
gifts from the bride-givers to the bride-takers is seen to be of prime importance to the 
standing of the woman in the wider community into which she enters as a wife, and as 
potential bearer of children who in turn will carry on the male family name. The quantity 
and extent of these gifts would depend on the financial standing of the families and 
individuals concerned. When these gifts change hands it is difficult to ascertain who 
becomes the absolute owner, especially in a Hindu marriage transaction. The blur that 
has existed between what has long been understood to be solely a woman’s property or 
s rīdhana , and what belongs to the husband’s family, continues to be disputed at 
ground level. Importantly individual rights as opposed to the rights of the family, even 
where provided and supported by law, continue to be in conflict with common belief 
systems across Indian communities and in various strata of society. Human rights may 
provide for the recognition of bride and groom as individual parties to a marriage in the 
modern context. However, in terms of ‘living law’ for all practical purposes the essential 
unit of man and wife is considered to belong to the wider kin-group of the groom’s 
lineage, and thereby the girl is conceived as a part of that unit, and not as an individual 
for herself. Further, the marrying couple are conceived of, for all practical purposes, as 
one unit. Then, as they in turn belong to the groom’s family, it might be argued that any 
gifts given at marriage should belong to the husband’s family and not just to the bride or 
even just to that individual couple. 
The historic period during which the S     literature was written was less 
speculative in nature than the preceding one, during which the  r    verses came into 
existence. It is in the very nature of the       literature that claims to suggest or even 
make rules are evidenced in the dharmaśāstras and the Dhar as ū ras. The survey of 
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these texts betrays an attempt to impose an idealised and rigid structure onto an otherwise 
fluid tradition, at least in text if not in practice. This layer of literature provides important 
clues to developing attitudes towards dowry practices as it enumerates possible rules 
about how to conduct oneself and the performance of certain obligations. Especially in 
terms of how best to spend one’s wealth there is mention about the status of the wealth 
one receives as part of dowry. According to  olly’s translation of the duties of the 
householder outlined in the Visnu Sm ti, we find the following verses directly related to 
dowry: 
 What has been inherited, friendly and the dowry of a wife, that 
 Is called white property, for members of any caste indiscriminately//(VS LVIII. 9) 
The entire section from which this quotation arises, deals with three types of wealth that 
it is possible for a man to own. These types of wealth are classified as follows: black, 
mottled or white. In the explanation that accompanies these ‘strictures’, white property is 
considered the most auspicious and therefore the most appropriate for ritual and 
ceremonial purposes. Here we have rather clear evidence about the positive 
conceptualisation of dowry wealth and its status. The fact that it is considered to 
constitute “white” property clearly means that it is an acceptable form of wealth; it falls 
under sadācāra. We also learn from the text itself that this form of property was passed 
from the bride’s family to the groom’s. Further, this property was believed to belong to 
the person who owned the wife, as there is clear evidence in these texts that the wife, 
children and servants of a man were believed to be his property. 
 Three persons are said to have no property: a wife, a slave, and a son. 
 Whatever they get belongs to the one to whom they belong (NS 6.39).254 
Lariviere (1989: 114) points out that this stricture could presumably have neglected to 
include s rīdhana , which he describes as “the property of the wife given to her at the 
time of her wedding by her family and throughout her marriage by her husband out of 
affection”. In the wider joint family context, this “protected property” usually excluded 
immovables (Kane, 1961: 770-802), and this constitutes the core of the arduous debates 
surrounding the inheritance rights of a Hindu woman. The widespread belief has been 
that tackling this aspect of the problem will help alleviate the horror of dowry murder 
from within contemporary society (Kishwar, 1989: 587-88). 
                                               
254 Compare this verse with MS VIII.416 and Sabara on Mimamsasū ra VI.1.12-13. 
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However the husband could not dispose of this property in any manner. In the 
Narada Sm ti’s section on the resumption of gifts we find evidence of this. Gifting away 
one’s wife, even in the face of terrible calamity, was considered invalid. It qualifies 
therefore as an illegitimate gift. Her dowry, however, as a nuptial present, constitutes 
what may be given away as a legitimate gift. At this stage the shift of emphasis from 
procreation to control of procreative potential, finally implying a monopoly over a 
woman’s sexuality/chastity is evident. There emerges a relational equation between 
procreation and property, underlined by control of a woman’s sexuality. One could, 
however, also read this type of verse as indicating the position that a wife, as a human 
being, is infinitely more precious and important than any form of material wealth. 
Whatever the precise status ranking between the married woman and the property that 
she brought with her into the marriage, this kind of text also indicates and confirms that 
dowry property was well known in those times as a form of valuable asset. 
In order to further understand the above discussion in its wider context it is 
relevant to examine the nature of the various forms of Hindu marriage as recognised by 
the sastris. This will lay more evident emphasis on the idealising role of these texts. As 
we have seen, the interaction between law and society involves both the ideal and the 
actual, to the extent that the particular legal system of a society may be regarded as a 
reflection of its innate value system. Further, both customary and codified law represent 
also as a “means of controlling societal function…an attempt to…perfect the legal 
framework, which then becomes a reflection of the aspiration of the society” (Thapar, 
1996: 23). Societies differ considerably with respect to the rules governing how the roles 
of husband and wife are assumed, with specific reference to rights and obligations, which 
fall to those assuming these roles. This extends further to the behavioural and jural 
attributes created by marriage: rights and duties enforceable, first by sanction, then by 
law, giving rise to the notion of marriage as a contract. 
In the Hindu context this poses a definite problem, firstly because the element of 
free choice and consent is ambiguous (Derrett, 1957: 84). Secondly, in most types of 
marriage (vi āha) the union leads to an alliance of families, not of individuals alone. An 
alliance would appear to imply the continued practice of gift giving and the creation of 
specific role functions for both families, probably far more incumbent on the family of 
the girl. For a Hindu marriage to be considered a contractual union the basic requirement 
is a textual specification of rights and duties for both partners. Derrett (1957: 100) argues 
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that the responsibility of the husband to maintain his wife is well defined in the śās ras, 
that however seems to be the extent of his duties; while there are copious duties listed for 
the wife (Kane, 1961: 561-71; Leslie, 1989). Kane's ‘duties and obligations’ for the 
married couple are consolidated from an ambiguous list of ideals, with a marked 
emphasis on the ‘obligations’ of the wife,255 who was considered to belong to the 
groom's family for all practical purposes, as in most patriarchal forms of marital 
residence, and clearly her procreative function was most prized. This attitude is reflected 
in later writing as well as current legal judgements. Vedic society is emphatically 
patriarchal, and numerous references regard women as ‘chattel’ and ‘evil’, enumerating 
reasons to control them.256 It appears that a marriage ceremony performs the essential 
function of moving two individuals from the state of being unmarried to becoming 
husband and wife. Hindu marriage ceremonials reflect a secular and religious element, 
representing a rite de passage. “Rites of passage are defined as the rites that accompany 
a change of state… or social position” (Olivelle, 1987: 387) a rite of passage is also a 
medium for moving an individual or group from one way of being to another through a 
series of culturally recognised stages. 
Marriage as a rite receives “the good auspices of magic” (Malinowski, 1963: 3), 
as is evident in the Hindu marriage verses in Atharvaveda 14. The texts also declare that 
a man becomes complete only after securing a wife and begetting a son, and other 
samskaras either lead up to marriage or flow directly from it (Olivelle, 1987: 387). 
Therefore according to Hindu philosophy vi āha is not merely a sacred union but a 
‘sareera-sa s kara’, a sacrament sanctifying the body. The Dhar as ū ras seem to view 
marriage as a religious rite rather than a samskara in the sense of sacrament (Menski, 
1984: 668). “Though the character of the Visnu Sm ti shows a high ideal standard, 
marriage is never referred to as a samskara, it mentions possibly for the first time that 
vi āha is to be considered the initiatory rite for women” (Menski, 1984: 708). 
Interestingly, the Sanskrit term punarbhu (Kane, 1961: 619), meaning literally ‘to 
become again’ is used for women who were re-married, especially widows. The 
performance of the marriage ceremony for these women was not the full-blown 
                                               
255 See Menski (1984: 849) on role descriptions delineated in the Vi āhapaddhati, a modern treatise on 
marriage. 
256 In recent years academic writing has attempted to reform patriarchal ideals, making justifications for 
these references, but none of this challenges the essentially patriarchal nature of this society. See Ray 
(1999) for detailed discussion of this construct of patriarchy. 
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Brahmanic version, but a compromise, and we do not know whether a remarriage would 
also involve dowry payments. In addition, we must not lose sight of the fact that more 
than one marriage, in certain communities was considered perfectly acceptable, even 
legal, until the HMA 1955 formally outlawed polygamy among Hindus. 
Hindu marriage represents also not a mere religious ritual, but “a public event of 
great importance” (Menski, 1991: 43). Turner (1987: 220) believes that whatever else the 
marriage ceremony entails, it constitutes a public as well as a private occasion. A 
possible reason for the elaborate nature of Hindu marriage was and remains to ‘register’ 
the marriage in the eyes of the community, which is all that counts in the Hindu context 
(Menski, 1991: 43). Here the notion of sadācāra is evident again in the need to do what 
is right and acceptable in the community. If therefore the aim of an ideal Hindu society is 
to uphold a cosmic and moral order by ritual action, then the idea of marriage as a ritual 
dramatisation of that original ideal is not far-fetched. From this discussion it appears that 
the primary purpose of the ideal samskara type of marriage union was to rtically uphold 
Vedic society through the principal acts of procreation and ritual. 
Marriage or vi āha may thus be considered a means to fulfil individual and 
collective dharma, in keeping with rta. The following observations are drawn from this:  
(i) the term vi āha, implies movement/ transition either physical or psychological. 
This is concurrent with Gadadhara’s argument that the ceremony itself effects a change in 
the minds of the marrying couple and their families (Menski, 1984: 180);  
(ii) the idea of contract, or a union based on specific conditions was not unknown 
to the ancient and classical view; 
(iii) in the textual material vi āha is not definitively referred to as a samskara.   
Since there is no uniform conceptualisation of the bond between husband and wife as 
either sacred or contractual, it may be viewed as a transition from one stage to the next, 
and therefore a rite of passage, representing elements of both sacrament and contract. 
This is clear in the reference to marriages as vi āha. A necessity to ground this union in 
the realm of the sacred is emphatically an expression of the importance of ritual sacrifice 
and further an obsessive perpetuation of pure lineage to this society. It does not appear 
that financial considerations are uppermost in people’s minds at that time. 
These texts do not offer evidence of the agency of the bride; her looks and 
temperament are not sufficient to convince the husband’s family that she is not a 
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threat.257 The role of the girl in Hindu marriage both past and present is minimal, in terms 
of agency even in svayamvara, or self-choice ceremonies.258 Moreover, in spite of the 
name, this mode of marrying, which is often held up as evidence of women’s agency, 
even free choice in ancient India, there is little independent control involved on the part 
of the bride. Everything takes place under the aegis of the father, who invites prospective 
suitors and then controls that pool of suitors. Most references to svayamvara (Schmidt, 
1987),259 in reality describe the viryasulka type of marriage where the choice of groom is 
based on a competitive test of some sort, usually valour, or strength, which are set by the 
father. The daughter is at the end of this display paraded out, bedecked and beautiful to 
dutifully “choose” the winner, who is therefore the successful suitor ( amison, 1996: 238-
9). Several verses attest this. In particular the following verse demonstrates this most 
popular form of marriage choice in the epic Mahābhārata, in the case of Kunti:  
  This maiden, (though) glorious, abounding in beauty and youth, 
  and exceedingly endowed with womanly virtues, no earthlords wooed. 
  so, King Kuntibhoja, her father having invited the kings, 
  gave his daughter at a svayamvara, o best of kings.  (MBh I. 1129) 
Also it seems restricted to k a r yas, mainly king’s daughters, for instance Damayanti, 
Draupadi, Sita, Kunti among others. Jamison (1996: 238) suggests that it is likely that the 
svayamvara was not merely a means to gather a host of suitors, but seems to be resorted 
to when the girl’s prospects seem diminished. In this case certainly the reason for Kunti’s 
father to arrange an expensive ‘self-choice’ ceremony appears to have been Kunti’s lack 
of prospects.  
To confirm that the girl is a mere vehicle, consider the quotation we have just 
examined, in 4.1 (above) As Sharma (1984: 70) puts it: 
Contrary to the dominant ideology and the terminology of traditional Hindu law, dowry 
property is not women’s wealth, but wealth that goes along with women. Women are the 
vehicles by which it is transmitted rather than its owners [emphasis in the original]. 
This statement carefully undoes Derrett’s assertion that dowry property constituted 
s rīdhana  (1984: 185). It is possible to clarify the conceptual beginning of dowry with 
recourse to textual evidence as the point of speculation. Numerous discussions exist 
                                               
257 Every stranger is considered a threat and is therefore dangerous. See AV14.2, verses 28-29 “take on you 
her evil luck”. Griffith (1917: 176) finds these verses out of sync with the general benedictory tone of the 
main marriage verses, suggesting that they may have been recited during the bridal procession. 
258 For a detailed critical analysis of the changing patterns in Hindu marriage past and present, see Menski 
(1984). 
259 See in particular chapter III (Schmidt, 1987). 
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regarding the relevance of dowry payments both at the time of marriage and afterwards as 
‘pre-mortem’ inheritance (Krishnamoorthy, 1981: 36). These are not irrelevant to any 
discussion about the conceptual framework for this practice, but it is essentially rooted in 
a wider argument regarding the status of women, both in ancient and contemporary times. 
There is no space to include an extended discussion of this argument on the status of 
women here. Women are provisioned to own six types of property, according to the 
MDS, as follows: 
 MDS IX.194  
What is given at the (bridal) fire, on the (bridal) journey, in token of affection, 
what is acquired from brother, mother, and father—these are traditionally 
considered the six types of women’s property. 
Verses like the above give rise to the confusion, and often contradictory nature of the 
ideas expressed in the textual material. While it is clearly stated that women do have 
wealth, it is conceptualised as stridhan.260 In an almost continual link with the past the 
police and activists working in the area of retrieval of marriage goods after a union has 
gone wrong and it is registered as a case of dowry, today, insist that the woman making 
the claims classify her property in terms of stridhan, even if she does not think of this 
being so. For practical purposes therefore women will cast and present dowry as stridhan. 
This does not help the issue of definition, as we discussed (above in 4.1), nor does it aid 
an academic understanding of dowry and stridhan as separate. Further, in terms of 
antiquity the Naradas     and other       literature clearly identifies the power and 
control of the husband over what the wife owned, or her property as wealth or goods he 
could legally dispose off. So the contradictions abound.  
Another specific view that requires critiquing is the belief that dowry protects 
women and acts as a virtual “safety-net”. According to Oldenburg (2002: 4), “[i]n pre 
colonial India, dowry was not a ‘problem’ but a support for women: a mark of their social 
status and a safety net”. Her view is that imperial policies created a more “masculine” 
economy and deepened preference for sons that fostered the covert or hidden murder of 
girls. According to her argument, the very establishment of property rights for peasants, 
inflexible tax demands and various other imperial measures prepared the ground for 
worsening gender inequality that effectively increased the vulnerability of women to 
                                               
260 In some Keralite communities this term refers to dowry transactions in reality, which is quite different 
from the original ontological origin of the term in its Sanskritic sense, as the wealth solely of the woman. 
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violence in both their natal and marital homes. This thesis attempts to critique the view 
that imperial policies strengthened the son preference rampant in Indian society, instead 
adequate evidence will be provided to sustain the argument that son preference originates 
quite clearly within the textual tradition of ancient India itself. That the ongoing process 
of modernisation, fuelled by the Orientalist impact,261 gave further impetus to the firmly 
rooted gender inequality cannot be disputed. Similarly, there have essentially been two 
arguments for and against dowry: One that it assists women and thereby provides them a 
safety-net, and the second that it exploits and commodifies them (Menski, 1998: 7). Both 
these views represent the current perceptions of dowry within the academic community. 
In modern terms, the theories of Indian feminism in the wider context of global 
feminism, examining the role of the patriarchal family structure creating and maintaining 
the norm of violence to exert authority and control shows a unique positioning of an 
acceptance of certain kinds of violence as part and parcel of the subjugated status of 
women.262 Dowry, and in certain cases dowry death, by implication, are examined as by-
products of this patriarchal environment. The argument here relies on the negotiation 
between the state, the family and religion in shaping the form contemporary dowry and 
related violence and murder has taken, with specific reference to the Indian patriarchal 
context contained in antiquity.  
Mothers-in-law are often demonised as perpetrators of cruelty; this fact has been 
unceremoniously highlighted by those opposing the women’s movement. After all if the 
worst crimes against women are committed by women how does it make men culpable? 
In the 1980s the major criticism faced by the Indian Women’s Movement (IWM) was 
that “dowry violence was in fact violence by women against women” and that the IWM 
“should first put its own house in order” (Palriwalla, 1998: 510). Unfortunately these 
allegations though addressed through the rigorous anti-dowry campaign have not had a 
wide-spread impact. The power-relations within a family and imprinting of female 
participants to propagate and control patriarchal norms in order to wield patriarchal 
power by females continue to be an ongoing political process. The actual process of 
negotiation between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law remains un-researched. It is the 
                                               
261 See for an in-depth discussion Chapter 5, section 5.1 in particular. 
262 See for instance the arguments in the Indian press and further in the parliamentary debates surrounding 
the institution of the Domestic Violence Act 2005, where it was asserted that a ‘simple slap’ did not 
constitute violence. Further to aid the application of this Act a set of rules was also passed in 2006. See 
Shelkar (2010). 
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link between patriarchal power structures that function in the home that yield clues about 
why it is ultimately women who act against women, either sisters-in-law or mothers-in-
law. Women as mothers of men are finally accorded some authority, when they have this, 
it is used by the men in the family to exercise control over the newly incorporated wife, 
to establish the status quo. These acts of cruelty are means of ascertaining and reinforcing 
authority in the home. After all the immediate threat is felt by the mother-in-law who 
must share her son and her kitchen, both of which are considered sacred. 
It has been argued that women in Indian households rarely enjoy fulfilling 
relationships with their husbands. They are not considered equals. The birth of a son not 
only elevates her position as the mother of a man, but she is finally able to have a 
satisfying relationship with her son, who is a grown male. Sharing this with an outsider is 
intolerable and gives rise to an added element of jealousy and therefore another area of 
conflict. Many young women complain of the “all-encompassing” relationships their 
husbands share with their mothers. It is important to recognise the interrelatedness of 
these issues when examining the context of alleged dowry harassment and violence 
(Wyatt, 2008).  
Disturbingly, hidden among the many contrary views expressed in the ancient 
material are clear examples of condoning violence against women in particular instances.  
As such references to the beating of women are not unknown in the śās ra and s     
literature, it belies the hitherto held opinion of women being seen in this tradition 
primarily as “divine” or even as goddesses. Similar references to violence against women 
being condoned in the literary epic tradition show a clear pattern of inferior treatment, 
often explained as a need to control or fetter the un-tameable, impure, essential nature 
that is the female principle. These have helped conceptualise the notion that men have the 
right to beat women. A domestic violence pamphlet aimed at sensitising women to their 
own situation and dispelling myths about the actual nature of domestic violence is 
interesting to note here:  
In the Indian cultural context, however, a husband is often referred to as 
 “Pati Parmeshwar” (God) thereby elevating his status from an ordinary human  
being to that of “God”. In accordance with this belief therefore, a husband  
has total control over his wife (her individuality and her body)263 
                                               
263 “Stop Domestic Violence”: Dealing with Domestic Violence. Sakhya, Women’s Guidance Cell. 
Goregaon: Mumbai, 2004. 
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This attitude informs largely the behaviour of women in relation to their husband and is 
often extended to members of his family. Women believe that a certain amount of beating 
within the context of an argument is acceptable; this reflects that they may feel that they 
are indeed the property of their husbands. Despite the spread of a number of feminist 
views within the social context through educative measures, the perpetuating patriarchy 
reasserts itself strongly through various media. This aspect of control over women’s 
bodies and women as property is discussed further in the following section below. 
 
4.5 Dowry as a contemporary form of sadācāra  
Recognising the limitation of space and time, it is necessary to confine the extent of this 
doctoral thesis to an in-depth study of the conceptual framework that underlies dowry. 
Without a historical reference point it is difficult to combat the Hindutva argument that 
dowry murder is an oppressive construct created by ‘the other’,264 especially laying 
blame at the door of the British Administration,265 thereby exonerating Hindu society of 
any serious responsibility. The attitude that supports the belief that dowry is a creation of 
‘the other’ brings to light a crucial nexus between the state, the patriarchal family 
structure and institutionalised religion in formulating oppressive social practices. Dowry 
is one such social practice, a custom deeply linked to marital and affinal relationships 
exercised by men but thrust on women to conform to and reinforce. It is also important to 
consider the social, religious and psychological dimensions of dowry to avoid a one-
dimensional study, as Geertz (1973) points out, using an effective anthropological 
cultural description. This skewed viewpoint constitutes one belief at play in the field of 
sadācāra today. The wider belief crystallised over time is that no matter what the west, 
the state, or the police as agents of the state or lawyers say on that matter, dowry giving is 
essentially ‘good’ and can and should equip a couple to have a better marriage, and by 
association a better more auspicious married life. This ancient Hindu material clearly 
considers one type, or form of marriage as superior to others, namely the Brahma form. 
Interestingly, it is this form that in popular traditional memory is linked indubitably to 
                                               
264 It has been forewarned that universalistic and cosmic claims of Hindu concepts may very easily be 
hijacked or “exploited today in communalistic and Hindutva fashion” (Menski, 1997: 8) to satisfy their 
own agenda of recasting a new modernity based on a new reading of the past. This remains a problematic 
plod forward toward a progressive modernity.  
265 Dr Mahesh Mehta, President of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad-Overseas (VHP) speaking at the 6th 
International Conference on Dowry and Bride Burning, 3rd January 2003, New Delhi. Nevertheless, the 
involvement of the British administration and its process of codifying law cannot be discounted. See 
Derrett, (1978: 74) for the negotiation between dharmaśās ra and the British codification.  
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dowry. And in the case of current popular belief let us examine a representative statement 
made by the father of a bride, where he confessed to a journalist, “no one cares what the 
law says, without a dowry it is impossible to marry a daughter, we must follow what 
society says”.266  But first, let us examine the concept of dowry as sadācāra itself. 
 In our first discussion of sadācāra (section 2.5) it became clear that whatever is 
‘acceptable’ and therefore ‘good’ behaviour in a given peer group or collective context 
constitutes sadācāra for that particular group or context. And by extension this concept 
of sadācāra is what a society aspires to achieve in terms of daily existence to maintain 
and even create a semblance of civil harmony, even civil society. Over an extensive 
historical period we see the evolution and exchange of ideas which converge on the need 
for a society to achieve a sense of cohesion within itself. As the ancient pictographic 
representation pulls our focus toward the harmonising effect of working together as a 
society, the individual is not the focus ever. Similar to Inden’s interpretation of caste as a 
vehicle of ancient/medieval polity, and the under-wire that holds up society by providing 
an initial framework on which to build the notion of the modern nation state, sadācāra 
provides a building block for Indian society, both in ancient and, right through up until, 
modern times. It becomes the basis on which civil society grows, with or without overt 
knowledge of the fact.  adāc āra is almost equatable to fashion, however it stands more 
as an underlying rule like the use of certain colours, or fabrics that work and create the 
desired impact and effect to move a certain society towards it as an inherent and 
aspirational goal, in the Hindu/Brahmanic mode of superiority.  adāc āra therefore 
becomes the bare piece of rolling rock, which gathers gradual lichen and moss as it 
travels through, weathering with history. All the bits that get stuck on to the original rock 
do not entirely change or alter the nature of the rock itself. So every community, every 
historic period contributes some specificity to the practice of the particular custom, which 
we call sadācāra. But at its base is the nugget of bare rock that aspires to goodness, 
wholeness, and taking its place as the catalyst which propelled that particular society 
toward progress. 
                                               
266 Mr Sharma’s daughter Kajal Sharma died under suspicious circumstances. The case is still pending 
hearing in the Delhi Court. When questioned by Adam Mynott, BBC’s South Asia correspondent about 
breaking the law of gifts valued at more than Rs 5000, he reiterated that it is not important what the law 
says. In marriage there are a different set of rules that apply, he believed and those rules demand the 
practice of dowry. 
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In terms of unpicking Sanskritisation, whereby lower castes and classes emulate 
and appropriate the symbols and practices of the highest caste in an attempt to better their 
own status, dowry is the ideal symbolic custom to appropriate. Here is the total social 
phenomenon that Mauss mentions, and it further represents the transfer of money and 
power to the man. Unfortunately, in modern scenarios it thereby, undermines the position 
of the woman in the basic family unit. Where in the ancient and even medieval past the 
procreative potential of a woman was prized to a certain extent in a contemporary context 
things are far more complex. Further, the analysis here will show that Sanskritisation 
does not merely imply an aspiration to caste-status, but rather to class-status (Saavala, 
2010). This is borne out by the huge economic ramifications of dowry, highlighted here 
by the discussion of the rich-poor distinction. The groups that have appropriated this 
custom, including non-Hindus, have also appropriated the practice of dowry murder.267 A 
detailed examination of this cannot be taken up here.  
One of the primary questions this thesis has raised is how dowry has long defied 
legal prohibition. In this respect it is important to consider the following: 
“Hindu philosophy and Hindu law show that dharma – doing the right thing at the right 
time- needs to be promoted by the state, by moral education, by the good example of 
individuals (in Hindu legal terminology sadācāra), the behaviour of model figures in 
society, who need not be elderly men who claim to know some sacred sources. This 
model behaviour does not have to be seen in terms of dharma; …but the message ought 
to be meaningful to the addressees in a particular socio-cultural environment.” (Menski, 
1998: 40) 
 As Menski (1998: 40) goes on to say, this element of an active reflection of one’s human 
duty, “seems to be lacking in the perpetrators of dowry violence”. In fact I argue that an 
innate consciousness of the concept of sadācāra is very much at play in the practice of 
dowry and dowry-related violence. As Menski points out, this “model behaviour does not 
have to be seen in terms of dharma” as long as the message of a socio-cultural practice, 
in this case dowry and its associated practices, is “meaningful to the addressees in a 
particular socio-cultural environment” you have the successful transmission and practice 
of what that society considers right, which need not fit in with the received notions of 
                                               
267 Pakistan has instituted positions for women police officers in most rural areas to look specifically into 
cases of dowry violence (BBC: Asia Today Report, April 2003). A host of activist websites have sprung up 
to offer legal and aid services to Pakistani Muslims with specific reference to dowry violence and 
harassment. Bangladesh has also had to institute a law prohibiting dowry, which has resulted in dowry 
murder and harassment. 
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law. I argue that the practice of dowry itself is considered sadācāra, a fact borne out by 
its wide acceptance despite bans and public agitation. Whether or not killing a girl who 
has threatened the harmony of the home is considered sadācāra remains to be researched. 
Prof. Derrett (1984: 184) makes mention of the fact that dowry may come within the 
concept of sadācāra  in relation to expectations surrounding a good marriage, but casts 
doubt on whether it was considered “essential”. I believe as a legal theorist he may have 
overlooked the exceedingly binding nature of custom that Malinowski (1926) mentions 
as “absolutely bound by tradition”.268  
Custom carries within itself the need to be perpetuated, and this in turn is actuated 
by traditions. When we consider honour-killings in Pakistan and elsewhere,269 where men 
take the law into their own hands and knowingly defy the state because it is considered 
the ‘right’ thing to do in that socio-cultural context, we get a glimpse of the continuing 
force of custom, as underlined by Malinowski when he deems it is “absolute” in nature. 
Seen in this light dowry represents a custom, which needs to be followed since its 
practice is bound to the traditional performance of marriages. Few women would like to 
enter their marital homes unaccompanied by trousseaus. Therefore dowry is and has been 
a custom highlighted as sadācāra in the perception of people and therefore continues 
despite legal and moral bans. This is the chief assertion of my thesis and herein lies its 
originality.  
My argument is that dowry and dowry-related practices both during and after the 
marriage are governed by these fluid rules operating within the broad jurisdiction of 
custom. This gives them the force of tradition and links them with unwritten sanctions 
should there be any abrogation. Often as discussed by Moore (1978: 219) there are 
positive inducements to conforming; in the particular context of dowry it means gaining a 
certain position in the eyes of the community. Thereby the need to outdo other members 
of a social group with larger guest lists and more functions to celebrate a daughter’s 
wedding grants the father a prestigious position in the eyes of his peers and the groom’s 
family. Custom here by no means implies uniformity. There is an expectation of a 
                                               
268 See Moore (1978: 218-19) on a relevant discussion of Malinowski’s preoccupation with positive 
inducements to conforming to tradition over sanctions and prohibitions. 
269 Several cases have now been reported in the Pakistani community in Britain. See the tragic case of 
Shafilea Ahmed, who was killed in 2003, the case finally saw a complicated resolution through the 
conviction of both her parents, neither of whom wholly accept responsibility. (BBC news online 3rd August 
2012). 
 
 
192 
suitable marriage based on a certain standard, set by associated status roles and 
expectations. 
Therefore we cannot start at the point of the inefficacy of the law, rather we need 
to question and examine the efficacy of custom or sadācāra. Srinivas (1984: 8) points out 
that the social scientist will be fascinated by the resilience of dowry, and this realisation 
underpins the current extended discussion. We are dealing here with the textual 
understanding of sadācāra, or the ‘right’ behaviour of ‘good’ people discussed in the 
s     literature. On the other hand, although the term sadācāra itself is not used 
currently, allusions to this concept of what is considered ‘right’ behaviour in a given 
situation is implicit in patterns of behaviour linked to dowry practices. Social 
expectations centred on the concept of ‘izzat’ or auspiciousness, which may also be 
severally translated as per context, as honour or reputation. This auspiciousness outlines 
the importance of the practice of dowry further as prestations and on-going gifting to 
secure the auspiciousness linked to the initial gift. The groups that underline this 
importance may be the peer group or even the larger community to which one belongs. 
Marriage as discussed above is increasingly seen as an institution required 
acknowledging and thus ‘registering’ the credibility of a couple in any given society. This 
then would tie in with the need to uphold the social expectations of an adequate dowry, 
for a father to maintain and often gain a certain higher standing in his social group. 
Dowry, this confirms, too, is clearly representative of sadācāra, and since this concept is 
interlinked with custom we must examine how custom itself functions in the Indian 
context. In fact, if dowry is sadācāra then it is important that it continue, as it is 
perceived to somehow maintain harmony in society. Dowry is not important for itself 
alone but for the harmony it is seen to uphold in its very practice.270 
This section outlined the two broad research agendas within which the following 
chapters will continue their analysis. Therefore, to answer the first research question 
directly is not simply how dowry functions; but how custom functions and how dowry 
functions within the wider framework of custom. In examining this, it will be possible to 
isolate the role that official law is expected to play (as discussed in chapter 6 below), but 
                                               
270 Interesting to note here is Haraway’s (1988: 55) belief that “practice is persuasion”; in that the continued 
practice of any given act carries the coercive force of persuasion to continue that practice. The emphasis in 
the present thesis is quite squarely on practice. 
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also a role that customary law performs instead. In fact it will become clear that law 
intends to influence custom, but custom tends to follow its own erratic ruling.271 
Therefore to summarise as we saw in chapter two along with the discussion 
centred on the invention of tradition (Hobsbawm, 1983: 1) one section was devoted to 
examining the nature and character of the texts in question: What do they represent, 
social reality or ideals, or an admixture? Do they encapsulate custom? I argue that from 
the earliest verses what has been preserved is a complex combination of custom and 
idealisation in order to influence ‘right’ behaviour and to thereby become a norm, 
although it is imperative to consider that these norms continue to remain fluid and 
flexible. Derrett (1970: 5-6) surmises the role of this literature most adequately for the 
present purpose: 
The whole point of having a sacred scripture lies in the fact that the people’s aspirations 
and intuitions, refined after centuries of hard experience…, are committed to words, 
crystallised in the form of propositions, many of which are none the less real for being 
phrased poetically and in an exaggerated tone. Many of the classic hypotheses of 
Indology will not stand up to rational examination: but they are believed because such 
beliefs express the real attitudes, inherited leanings, and group-aspirations to which most 
individuals in their hearts (if not always in their minds) are committed from the cradle to 
the pyre. The ideas to be found in the śās ra are abandoned on the surface, but the 
attitude of mind and the conception of life remains the same. All the great features of the 
Hindu mind, its aptitudes, and (some will say) its shortcomings are voiced in the 
literature, where customs, usages, ethics, philosophy, superstition, religion, and fantasy 
meet and combine, to produce acclimate of self-expression which the texts individually 
and collectively serve. The texts have no more authority than the people give them, but 
they make a perennial claim on the Hindu mind such as few foreign productions, 
however prestige-worthy, can ever do, because they express what the people from time to 
time believe in. 
Interestingly there is no single term for dowry prestations consistently quoted through the 
many phases of literature (Derrett, 1984: 183). I have examined here at length the 
expectations and patterns of behaviour involved in the negotiations for marriage, which 
precede the actual ceremony. In this way it has been possible to delineate how and why 
the dominant dowry model has come to occupy centre stage and is held as exemplary.  
                                               
271 See discussion on legal pluralism in chapter 3, section 3.1, also see Hooker (1975). 
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As discussed above, Hindu marriage falls squarely (rather triangularly; see fig. 3) 
within the scope of religion, custom and practice. The practices involved in negotiating a 
marriage have helped to understand how dowry as a custom functions in various contexts. 
Eminent anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski was indignant about early theories of 
primitive law like Hartland’s (1924), which emphasised the nature of man’s obligation to 
follow custom. It asserted how primitive man automatically obeyed the customs of his 
tribe because he was absolutely bound by tradition. Interestingly, what is of great 
significance here is that Malinowski was little concerned with the sanctions and 
prohibitions contained in customs. Rather he was struck by the “positive inducements to 
conformity to be found in reciprocal obligations, complementary rights; and good 
reputation” (Moore, 1978: 218-19). Malinowski believed that the dynamic force behind 
the performance of obligations was the social and economic stake of the man who wished 
to remain in good standing among his fellows. Malinowski’s early analysis of crime and 
customary notions of punishment proved influential to the academic study of law.  
This view ties in with my assertion that dowry as sadācāra demands a similar 
obedience from fathers of daughters, and mothers also, who wish to remain in “good 
standing” and therefore continue to succumb to dowry demands rather than wise up to the 
real danger that might face their daughters by meddling in the entire gamut of the dowry 
give-and-take game. This chapter prepares the ground for a deeper insight into how 
modern day versions of law and society operate in tackling dowry as a custom, and the 
fall-out from this custom in terms of harassment, dowry demands, and even dowry 
murder, by setting the context for contemporary customary behaviour. The wider 
argument in the preceding chapters examined the role of text in law making and legal 
applicability at ground level in order to tease out the conceptual underpinning of this 
process. The focus here has to some extent been on the tussle between dowry and bride-
price where dowry displaces bride-price. The hypothesis surmised that this displacement 
occurs by using Sanskritisation, through an emulation by the lower grades of society of 
the practices of the highest caste in an attempt to better their own status.  ohn Christian’s 
letter from 1907,272 with reference to the Kulin polygamy debate is worth quoting: “It is 
hard to kill a social custom when bound up and interwoven with the material interest of 
still a very influential class”. This goes to the core of how Sanskritisation works. 
                                               
272 The Times, Wednesday 2 October 1907, p.2. 
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Dowry has therefore been the ideal symbolic custom to appropriate. The clear 
transfer of money using and creating a complex power equation between one man and 
another man, it thereby undermines the position of the woman. Important also to note 
here, and reiterate is the notion that one must constantly be aware that there are no 
“golden beginnings” (Rabinow, 1984). That dowry as practice may not be ‘bad’, it is the 
extorinate demands that make it go bad. It is complex. What we need is a clearer study of 
various types of dowry marriage in the modern contemporary context, the ones that go 
bad, and then compare them to the ones that survive. Further, it would be essential to 
have a representative cross-section from several Indian communities in order to better 
understand the current state of the debate.  
It is important to recall the circle of solidarity, the envisioning of a worldview 
which sees all elements are parts of a whole. In this regard consider the photo plate 
(pp.10) where the cosmic dance or the microcosmic dance at the harvest festival calls into 
action the natural forces of harmony. This represents the way the ancients may have 
envisoned their world, during important festivals, and rituals especially like marriages 
and births.Though we have no iconography from this period, we have evidence that the 
Warli painters of Maharashtra have roots in a similar animistic society (Dalmia, 1988: 
121). However, for the moment we must now turn to the ancient verses, which hold the 
verbal ideology of the distant Vedic world. 
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Chapter 5:  Dowry and marriage arrangements: Examining the ancient texts 
 
“The conceptual universe of ancient India is difficult to access.” ( a mison, 1996: 3) 
 
This chapter examines the conceptual model underlying the practice of dowry in the light 
of the ideals laid out in the many layers of a contradictory textual tradition. This 
approach, difficult as it may be given the nature of those texts, further identifies the 
development of dowry as an ideal custom. This leads on to the examination of the 
struggle between custom, text and practice. In this chapter I finally start my search for 
what may be considered the conceptual core of dowry in textual tones. We therefore 
examine the verses themselves in the sections that follow, mainly in translation, however 
the original Sanskrit for     da X.85 and Atharvaveda Book 14, which form the main 
evidentiary body of verses, with an adjunct transliterated text, is appended to the thesis 
for practical purposes. 
 It is necessary to complete the literature review and to open this crucial chapter 
with cautionary statements made by fellow academics who seek to delineate a more 
progressive path for future research and for approaches to be adhered to by scholars yet 
to come. As philologist and cultural anthropologist Stephanie Jamison notes (1996: 3-11), 
the historic periods of later, primarily post-Vedic India have been trawled and 
“obsessively mapped” by anthropologists, historians, sociologists, ethnomusicologists, 
folklorists, feminist researchers and scholars of religion in definitive cross-cultural 
studies. Later India is therefore a period of history within easy access on a library shelf to 
any researcher starting out on their own journey of discovery. However, for those seeking 
to gaze at ancient India the horizon is that little bit further. Particularly the Vedic period 
and early epic India remain elusive to the wider scholarly community. As Jamison 
cautions - and her words are now just over a decade old - this fact rings true still: Ancient 
Indian texts tend to be the exclusive domain of Sanskrit philologists and students of 
obscure literary trends. There is an urgent need to further plough the depths of ancient 
Indian history for clues that can link in with India’s allegedly shining present and 
unknown future. 
 As neither a Sanskritist nor a philologist certain areas of research remain outside 
the gamut of my own expertise. However, it is crucial to note at the outset that the 
accusation against those scholars outside this relatively small group who are not entirely 
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familiar with the intricacies of Sanskrit philological method, and who are virtually 
“walled off” from these processes, is one I will bear in mind. My intent is not, sadly like 
too many works that have gone before, to project a “picture of ancient India… [as] a 
projection of fantasy, a golden age,273 or a leaden one, created from shards of later India 
reflected in a distorting mirror” ( amison, 1996: 3).  
I am all too aware of the “insider” issues which might alienate my work from the 
wider scholarly community, however in a virtual academic capsule of intense isolation, I 
have attempted to remain objective and un-biased in the conclusions I have drawn in the 
course of writing and researching this work. This chapter examines in some detail the 
nature of Hindu marriage in its various forms and then shows how certain marriage 
transactions emerge as norms in other layers of text to inform the wider analysis of dowry 
as the superior or valid marriage exchange. The Sanskrit texts classify a marriage into 
eight types. What distinguishes these types from each other is the manner in which the 
bride comes into the possession of the groom. Although there is no room for an extensive 
debate about this typology it is relevant to briefly highlight and examine the varying 
exchange relations that characterise these. For instance the anxieties of gift exchange 
which arise from the unacceptable marriage by abduction illuminate the discussion below 
further. No matter the differing forms of marriage as presented in the cultural and ritual 
texts, they have at the core of them the notion of exchange (Levi-Strauss, 1969; 1971; 
Rubin, 1975; Jamison, 1991; 1996).274 This is crucial to consider in terms of an 
evidentiary chapter examining dowry and marriage payments in the ancient and medieval 
textual tradition. 
 
5.1 Dowry within the context of Hindu marriage 
Within the literature several forms or versions of marriage have been considered valid. 
An alliance made through marriage is crucial, as the pre-occupations in this society belie; 
this is primarily because of the linkages and associated continuation of kinship that flow 
                                               
273 As a matter of note, I re-examine the evidence from sources which can easily be seen to attempt a sort of 
creative manipulation of the historical data by fashioning a golden age, namely Altekar (1938, 1995) and 
Kane (1961).  
274 This “exchangist” view of marriage alliances as categorised by Claude Levi-Strauss has been critiqued 
by Goody (1990) in terms of disputing whether the standard in all human marriage is the bride having to be 
“given” away to the groom. This act of giving as gift and an analysis is taken up further in section 5.3 
below. 
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from marriages. For the purpose of this thesis I suggest, as Jamison (1996: 207) 
categorises, to view marriages in terms of a wider social agenda in Vedic society: a  
Fig.6 Dowry as the centre of the dharmic 
universe
 
 
 
199 
synchronic and diachronic model, see Fig. 6. As a synchronic alliance a marriage 
performs the function of cementing linkages between non-contiguous parts of the Aryan 
community, thereby providing social cohesion through sadācāra. Further, an ideal or 
appropriate marriage alliance is diachronic in that it provides a perpetuation for proper 
lineage and therefore a foundation for family through dharma. In these terms marriage 
fulfils two fundamental functions as seen rtically and dharmically. How were marriages 
made? What was considered valid or legal in terms of making marriages and why? These 
questions will be tackled in the following discussion, always looking out for any signs of 
economic and exchange-related aspects. 
Sifting ideals from actuality is difficult. This becomes more apparent when the 
period under survey is considerably removed from the present. However, through an 
examination of the roles women inhabit and play in the controllable, hypothetical world 
of ritual it becomes possible to establish some of the underlying conceptual perspectives 
in the “messier realm of reality” ( amison, 1996: 207). Any evidence from social 
documentation is absent, as we have discussed previously. Reality as depicted by these 
texts is, acknowledgedly, removed to some degree. The texts that present themselves for 
analysis are vast, often contradictory. However, in search of a single custom, essentially 
reference to one term, within the single context of marriage the journey is a 
straightforward one, signposted by expectations. Ideas about ancient India may be found 
in unexpected places (Patton, 1996: xvi).275 In this case, although there are references to 
expectations outside the context and scope of the texts dealing with domestic ritual, 
primarily the customary practice of dowry is encapsulated neatly within the expectations 
of marital alliance making behaviour. Further, in terms of text versus reality, we are 
constantly aware that these expressions of thoughts, ideas, positions on life and living are 
in constant negotiation, and constant conflict with one and another. They present ideals, 
mostly but what are ideals if not the crystalline creations of customary threads in society?  
In terms of assessing the Vedic worldview for women the most obvious social 
institution affecting women as a group in ancient India is marriage. Within the realm of 
                                               
275 Patton (1996) draws attention to the fact that Vedic voices are often out of sync with each other. As a 
philologist and anthropologist working on Vedic conceptualities she finds that myths combine often in 
conflict. That often myths, grammatical rules, even discussions on the epistemology of the names of deities 
form an uncomfortable, un-harmonic admixture in the Vedic verses of the earliest and even later periods, 
encompassing some three thousand years of composition, and this is not surprising (see Table 2). Her work 
on the   hadd  a ā examines the position of myth-making, and ritual as clues to Vedic Indian society’s use 
of language and myth as an argument not merely for transcendence but that this provides clues to the 
current incorporation of myth into the very structure of language past and present. 
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marriage we find further clues to the conceptual position of women, and their property 
rights, including their incumbent responsibility to create linkages where none have 
existed. The cementing and creation of kinship ties is one of the ways in which anxieties 
about the nature of inter-linkage between “mutually obligated strangers” ( amison, 1996: 
207). Specifically in terms of exchange, whether in or outside the context of marriage, the 
nature of transactions is fraught with tensions. Further, the exchange at the heart of 
marriage as an institution, exemplary to this society, necessitates tensions of its own. And 
as Jamison comments, these specific tensions “need their own institutionalised means of 
resolution” (1996: 207). This role is crucial. Menski (1984: 503) found the detail and 
attention paid to the welcoming rituals and necessity to mark and incorporate the new 
bride into her new role as joint-householder and partner particularly noteworthy in his 
thesis on role plays in ancient Indian marriage expectations. 
Before further analysis of the evidence (section 5.2 below), it is important to 
assess Inden’s (1976: 5; 51) argument that in the medieval period in Bengal marriage 
exchanges were the defining actions by which high and low ranks were maintained, or 
even altered. Inden admits that at first he was guided in his research by a hypothetical 
model based on the “aristocratic” or “class” model based on European cultural concepts. 
He found he had to adjust this considerably faced by what he found in the field, in terms 
of the vital importance marriage had in terms of gaining and securing rank. In medieval 
times dowry marriages were the order of the period, attested and declared in the 
commentaries of the day. In modern times, there can be little doubt about how ‘heinous a 
crime’ it is considered. But in the past giving of a dowry was prestigious, even proper. 
So attitudes have changed. But it has been claimed by academics and others that dowry 
is categorically un-Hindu, even constructed, as discussed previously. So what evidence 
do we have to the contrary? We need to link this with the Vedic view to complete the 
wider aim of this thesis and to keep the discussion between past and present ongoing, 
and alive. As seen so far, dowry is one such case in point of a custom which elicits 
different views at different times. In such cases one must access information which, 
given the level of antiquity here, is in itself difficult. Clues to expectations and attitudes 
to customs may be found in the voluminous literature. The various forms of marriage 
need to be re-examined from a perspective narrowing in on the financial transactions 
linked to them. The belief is that this research will provide essential clues about how 
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“such ancient practices and assumptions” relate to marriage expectations and, further, 
how these transactions were “socially valued and treated” (Menski, 1998: 225). 
In terms of Vedic notions of prestige, fame and respect clan rank was seen as 
crucial. We examine in some detail the sources which lead us to the evidence of how this 
clan rank underlines the giving of dowry as a crucial determinant in a good future for a 
marriage. Further, we will see how wealth is inexorably linked to the gifting of the girl at 
the time of and even before and after the actual ceremony of marriage. Worship was 
predominantly the focus to a genus code of conduct in terms of Vedic society (Inden, 
1976: 147), as seen in chapter 2. This has been linked to the divine power to transform 
bodily substance, varied from caste to caste and clan to clan. Higher castes and clans 
were believed to be higher because of their greater power to generate and transform 
coded substances while performing an act of worship. Therefore in terms of caste, the 
Brahman was more powerful and higher than the   dr as, primarily because he possessed 
knowledge of the Veda, or the entire corpus of sounds believed to embody the divine 
power by which all of Vedic/Hindu society itself was called into creation.  
Similarly at clan level the Kulina, was more powerful than the non-Kulina, 
because this sect was considered to have powers to generate new caste rank for sub-
castes that had fallen out of favour, through being worshipped themselves. Most 
importantly, it was believed, and continues to be so, that the high and low Vedic qualities 
and codes of the ranked worship  ā  s were not transcendent “ritual” or even “spiritual” 
elements with respect to the material wealth and power of the humans who possessed 
them. In fact quite the contrary, these elements were imbedded in the bodily substances 
of the Kulinas and non-Kulinas and fed by the wealth and food offered in worship. 
Therefore the relationship between them was a transformational one. Selfless gifts of 
wealth and food caused the worshippers’ embodied rank to be transformed into prestige, 
fame and respect. Or perhaps even higher, into superior clan-rank or caste, and the 
acceptance of wealth and food caused the bodily substance of the worshipped to be 
nourished (Inden, 1976: 148). More of this discussion is relevant to the       literature 
and commentaries and therefore taken up briefly in section 5.4 below. 
The following discussion examines which form of marriage came to be 
considered as the ‘ideal’, enumerating possible reasons for this in the given historical 
context. Additionally, a brief examination of the ‘ideal’ qualities of the bride and groom 
leads to a discussion of any possible correlation between these qualities and the amount 
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of the consequent marriage prestations and other payments. Evidence in the form of 
expectations for particular progeny from particular types of unions is analysed to 
understand the rationale behind marriage prestations. 
  
5. 2 The eight forms of marriage 
The s     texts have “recognised eight methods” by which two individuals might be 
“united to lead the life of a householder” (Pandey, 1969: 158). The list of marriage types 
is a consistent feature of the dharma texts,276 and occasionally found in the g hya texts. 
Interestingly it is dealt with in some detail in the epic literature, specifically the MBh not 
merely in dharma related passages (MBh XIII.44.3-9), but also in narrative form (MBh 
I.96.8-11). In descending order of preference these eight forms of marriage are Brahma, 
Daiva, Arsa, Prâgâpatya, Ās r a, Gandharva, Raksasa and Paisaca. These are further 
subdivided into two categories:  the first four being prasasta (acceptable) marriage 
unions, while the others are considered aprasasta (unacceptable). As Pandey points out, 
however, these methods have not been mentioned in the pre-sū ra literature, neither are 
all the eight  forms  mentioned  in  all  of  the  grhyasū ras,  with  the  exception  of  the 
Asvalayanagrhyasū ra I.6. It is clear from the commentaries that certain marriage forms 
were preferred for specific groups. The texts outline the first four as acceptable for the 
dvija (twice born), the following four being unacceptable for them but acceptable for 
those of lower rank.277 The texts differ in their view regarding of the legality and 
desirability of these marriage types. They almost all condemn the last type, likening it to 
rape, rather than marriage and applaud the first three, sometimes four, but remain 
ambivalent even contradictory regarding the ones in between. This provides an 
interesting social comment on the need to perhaps manoeuvre on the behalf of offspring 
of such an unnatural or forceful union. Kane (1961: 521-22) presents a useful summary 
                                               
276 For more details on the dharma literature and how it treats these types see for instance MDS III.20-34; 
ApDS II.11.17-20; GDS IV.6-15; BDS I.20. 
277 Later writers, particularly commentators who find fit to pass value judgements on the validity and 
degrees of sanctity of these “unusual” unions include Gooroodas Bannerjee (Tagore Law Lectures 1889). 
In his view it was important to take note of and condemn the ‘barbaric’ forms of marriage which undermine 
the golden past of Indian history. He commented more than disparagingly on these four unacceptable forms 
of marriage. Understandably during the British Raj period the neo-Hindu reformist elite emerged, feeling 
the need to conform to the “civilised” ideal presented by the west. This school of thought clung to the need 
to conform highlighting monogamy as the only viable choice for a civilised society. Seeing the rooting out 
of all other marriage types by law represents one such imported “ideal”, which also has been impossible to 
enforce. Case law is rife with second and third wives suing for rights of their children and families. And 
again this is not restricted to India, but is a marker of modern society elsewhere where polygamous 
societies continue to grapple with the need to conform to the western model of monogamy.   
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of the varying views.  amison’s (1996: 296) conspectus is worth considering in the 
context of gift exchange and how the classification of each type affects this.278 
Derrett points out that the samskara type of marriage was one conceptualisation 
of these prasasta unions. In his view the       texts “constitute two threads which ran 
right through the law as it was expounded in early medieval times” (Derrett, 1957: 84). 
The first threads of literature were those that recognised varying circumstances that led to 
marriage, even if considered aprasasta “unapproved”, as a means to “satisfy natural 
urges”, such as sale of the bride, a union through mutual attraction and therefore without 
the consent of the parents, or capturing a bride by foul means. The second, “seek to 
satisfy the desire of families to establish noble and pure lineages” by elevating the union 
to the level of sacrament; a union necessary for the performance of essential religious 
sacrifices requiring the participation of both husband and wife, and for the production of 
progeny (Derrett, 1957: 85). 
The dharma texts do not underline the aspects of solemnisation and there is little 
evidence that the form of marriage has any effect on the actual performance of particular 
rituals. Two aspects are stated however; first the means of acquiring a bride, and second 
the quality of the offspring accruing from the nature of the union (Menski, 1984: 185). 
Both these have definite implications on the transactions taking place within its particular 
context. It instantly creates notions of ideal and undesirable, placing emphasis on one 
                                               
278 As cited in Jamison (1996: 296) the tabulated conspectus of legal doctrine is as follows: 
MDS III.23  first six legal for Brahman  a 
  Last four for   a r ya 
Same (except Raksasa) for  a śyas or   dras 
 24  first four: Brahman  a 
  Raksasa:   a r ya 
Ās r a:  a śyas and   dr as 
25 Paisaca and Ās r a never to be used; other three of the last five acceptable [for all?] 
26 Gandharva and Raksasa:   a r ya 
39-41 first four produce good sons/ last four bad sons 
ApDS II.12.3  first three (Brahma, Arsa, Daiva) good (in that order) 
GDS IV.14 first four (Brahma, Prajapatya, Arsa, Daiva) 
15 or first six (+ Gandharva, Ās r a) 
BDS I.20.10 first four (Brahma, Prajapatya, Arsa, Daiva) in order: Brahman  a 
 12 6 and 7 (Ās r a, Raksasa):   a r ya 
 13 5 and 8 (Gandharva, Paisaca):  a śyas and   dras 
 16  Gandharva: for everyone 
ViSmr XXIV.27 first four (Brahma, Daiva, Arsa, Prajapatya): Brahman  a 
28 also Gandharva:   a r ya 
MBh XIII.44.8 Paisaca and Ās r a: always illegal 
44.9 Brahma, Ksatra [Raksasa], Gandharva: legal 
Kane, HDS II.1.521 all s    s agree on first four (Brahma, Daiva, Arsa, Prajapatya) almost all agree 
Paisaca worst.  
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form as preferable to another. None of these forms enumerate the expected marital duties 
of the spouses (Menski, 1984: 640). 
A few of these forms of marriage remain prevalent today. Others have fallen into 
disuse. However, the fact that a fusion of two or more forms has come to represent the 
‘ideal’ of the kanyadan marriage today highlights the conceptualisation of dowry 
prestations. It bears repetition that there is no one Hindu vi āha, but various possibilities, 
and as many if not more customary practices accompanying each form. Most of these 
may not be recorded but have been passed down in fluid form through language as 
preserved in memory. In order to gain a clearer understanding of the transactions that 
took place during these variant marriage practices we need to enumerate the forms 
themselves and examine their nature. The list is presented in descending order, which in 
itself is a clue to the conceptual hierarchy being enjoined: 
The Brahma form of marriage emphasises the apparently “free gift of the 
daughter” to a suitably chosen, qualified groom by her father or guardian. Chatterjee 
observes that the role of the bride in this marriage is minimal regarding the choice of 
mate (1974: 370). He surmises that the father made the choice chiefly based on the 
groom’s respectability. The giving or gifting away of the girl or the kanya, as a gift or 
daan was clearly considered a high honour. In this form of marriage the suitability of the 
groom is emphasised as one well versed in the Veda, and essentially a responsible mate 
who will maintain and preserve his wife in a manner she was accustomed to. The 
Gautamadhar as ū ra I.44, clearly states that in this form of marriage the maiden is 
gifted away “bedecked with clothes and ornaments”. The Manu Sm ti III.27 echoes this 
practice: 
“[W]hen a man dresses his daughter and adorns her and he himself gives her as a gift to a 
man he has summoned, one who knows [    i] the revealed canon and is of good 
character” (Doniger, 1990:45-6). 
 
The commentator Medhatithi “prescribes that the act of adoration with clothes and 
jewelleries [sic]” be directed toward both bride and groom. Interestingly, these 
“adornments with clothes and ornaments should...be of a special type befitting the 
occasion” [emphasis added] and should reflect affection for the daughter and honour for 
the groom (Chatterjee, 1974:  370). This commentary, dated at approximately 800 BCE, 
highlights a definite delineation of the amount and nature of endowments at marriage, 
clearly dependant on the qualities of the bridegroom. This name was given to this form of 
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marriage to enjoin and ensure the emulation of the Brahma form of marriage as a model 
for all sections of society, regardless of their rank or clan. Pandey (1949: 169) believes 
that it was so called as it was thought most fit for the Brahmanas, conceptualised as the 
ideal gift givers and receivers (Chatterjee, 1974: 406-7). Chatterjee notes the possibility 
that the chosen bridegroom should be a Brahmana. For two reasons, in terms of being 
well-versed in the Veda and as one who was in the position of being honoured with a gift 
and also in a position to accept such a gift. Here the element of caste is subtly introduced 
into the picture of an ideal marriage. Chatterjee instead believes, once more propounding 
the notion of Hindu marriage as an indissoluble sacrament, the inextricable link between 
dharma and attaining the absolute (Brahma) leads to this most ideal form being called 
Brahma as this is most suited to “the idealistic framework of Hindu society” in those 
times. It certainly seems plausible given the belief system of this ancient society. 
All these four forms are further referred to as dharmava or acceptable specifically 
in terms of dharma; a crucial characteristic in terms of the larger framework within 
which these marriage forms need to be seen. Being a householder was the mainstay of 
human society, which was upheld by furthering the aim of procreation through taming 
the untameable feminine principle in the woman. Through this set of ideal rituals the 
tamed woman and the taming man set up an ideal household within which to create a 
mirror for the cosmic order which they saw in the order of the ongoing natural cycle of 
the elements around them. They as one unit of wider society seek to uphold their right 
and good duties, which in turn underpins the working of all society. Marriage, in any 
form is the ideal to uphold all of society in this worldview.  
Most pertinent to the present argument is the fact that this form of marriage does 
in fact bear resemblance to the marriage of Surya with Soma, as described in the     da 
marriage verses. There is a clear delineation of it in     da X.85 in verses recited by the 
father of the bride, and the groom who receives her. The element of kanyadān is clearly 
evident and in this case it is possible to trace to the earliest Vedic compilation, to what 
Pandey calls a “prototype of the Brahma form” (1949: 169-70). He notes: “This form is 
still current and the most popular in India, though it has been prostituted with the morbid 
stipulation of dowry”. It  is  fascinating  to  note the  clear  shift  in  the  conceptual  
model  whereby  this  formerly honourable practice of gifting away an adequately 
“bedecked” daughter, has turned into grounds for an objectionable extortion.  
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The Daiva form of marriage signifies a noteworthy development on the Brahma 
form of the bride as the ideal gift.  Here we observe the bride being gifted by the father to 
the “officiating” priest, to accrue spiritual and secular merit (Chatterjee, 1974: 418).279 
The active agent in both these forms of marriage appears to be the father for apparently 
different reasons however. In the Brahma form it appears to be out of a concern for his 
spiritual gain, though nowhere clearly expressed. While in the Daiva form the ceremony 
surrounding the marriage appears to be beneficial in spiritual and social terms to the 
father and according to Chatterjee (1974: 419) was not a “selfless” act. The daughter was 
forwarded as sacrificial fees toward the ceremony, once more suitably adorned. The 
nature of the payment was important being in the form of sacrificial gift to a priest, who 
performed the Daiva ceremony, therefore the name, on behalf of the father (Pandey, 
1969: 169). A craving for spiritual and secular benefits might be traced to the     da 
[1.54.9; X.49.1], where the hymns bear direct reference to hopes for both spiritual and 
material benefit. The usage of this form, being directly linked to the evolution of the 
priestly class, was thus crucially linked to the notion of the value and nature of the gift 
given. The higher the value of the gift given at the marriage, the better the spiritual gain 
it brought. Medhatithi commenting on Man        III.28 does not agree that the gift of a 
daughter may constitute a sacrificial fee. These sorts of disagreements within the adjunct 
texts abound. Even in the primary texts we have numerous conflicting views on the same 
subject. 
The Vaikhasana Grhyasū ra stresses the ornamentation of the girl. The 
Asvalayana Grhyasū ra I.6.3 also states that the girl suitably “bedecked” with ornaments 
should be given in marriage to an active priest. The   sn        XXIV.34 stresses that 
one who gifts his daughter in this manner not only gains svargam or heaven, but also 
sends fourteen generations to heaven. This testifies to the highly meritorious nature of 
this union, but the element of sacrificial gift underlines the financial aspect of the 
transaction as well. Chatterjee cites evidence of the exorbitant nature of these gifts, as 
presented in archaeological and epigraphic proof (1974: 456).  
The Ār a form is distinguished emphatically from the Ās r a form as the latter 
was looked down upon as the sale of one’s children (Manu Sm ti III.51). Here the 
                                               
279 At what precise or possible stage during the development of Vedic ritual science the priests came to 
occupy and create this job-function is unclear and therefore cannot be discussed here at length. However, 
for a full assessment of priestly role function and kingship theory see Heesterman (1957 & 1985). 
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daughter was given away to a groom who offered “a pair of kine” not as bride-price but 
purely for sacrificial purposes to the bride’s father. Here we observe a clear conceptual 
bias against the practice of compensating the father of the bride, or her family in any way. 
This is looked down on in definite terms. Menski finds this element of “disrespect” 
attaching itself to this form purely because the transaction flowed unilaterally from the 
groom’s family to the bride’s and not the other way (1984: 188). This attitude is a vital 
clue towards the idealisation of the opposite transaction, from the father of the bride to 
the groom, as in the Brahma from of marriage. In Pandey’s view as well this form fell 
into disuse because of an apparent similarity to the Ās r a form, which was clearly seen as 
not acceptable. Within the description of this form of marriage we already find the seeds 
of idealising one particular kind of marriage payment, the dowry form and quite 
definitely not another, bride-price.  
In most societies marriage patterns involve the gift or exchange of wealth flowing 
from wife-givers to wife-takers or vice-versa. There are several reasons cited for the 
acceptance of the flow of wealth in one particular direction, and a preference for this. 
This phenomenon usually characterises hypergamy,280 or anuloma unions in the ancient 
Hindu context better. It is not unheard of to better one’s social and financial standing 
through a suitable alliance at marriage. This is evidenced across the literature and 
prevalent to this day. Women are clearly conceptualised during this entire phase of 
literature as the most essential instrument to attain, even acquire status betterment 
though. Here we clearly have an early conceptual seed for the idea of bartering for better 
ancestry as we evidence in medieval Bengal, being enjoined in the clan charters, or kulaji 
texts (Inden, 1976). 
The Prâgâpatya form of marriage recognises the “fixing of conditions”,281 here 
the bride’s father gave his daughter to a suitor on the clear understanding that they 
should perform their civic and religious duties together. The name of this form of 
marriage suggests that the purpose of the marriage was that of the couple discharging 
their duties to the main deity of early Vedic India, Prâgâpati. Through the very act of 
procreation and then the rearing of children, they were fulfilling the dharmava kula 
(appropriate or right clan practice and duty) karma and dharma. The element of consent 
                                               
280 As we have seen from the discussion in 4.3 above.  
281 Devala as cited by Pandey (1949: 165). 
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seems relevant here as to take on these duties both individuals had to be aware of its 
implications. The Prâgâpatya form also emphasises the role of the householder and his 
wife as upholders of sacrificial ritual practice, as in the idealised Brahma form. 
However, certain conditions are incumbent on the groom, making this form inferior to 
the previous three, as the gift is not “free” but conditionally made (Pandey, 1969:167). 
Gautama dhar as ū ra I, 4.5 characterises this union as one where the bride is gifted 
with a special mantra stressing their joint performance of religious duties, while the 
Baudhayana dhar as ū ra I.11 20.3 elaborates the need to bedeck the bride and also 
dress her in new clothes. This Baudhayana dhar as ū ra verse is explained by 
commentators as expressing the duty of the bride’s family to adorn her suitably 
(Chatterjee, 1974: 464).  
This clear enjoinment to the parents, particularly the father of the bride, to bedeck 
the daughter suitably enough to become acceptable as a gift is of repeated primary 
concern here. This reiteration through the sū ra and śās ra literature is a very telling 
clue toward the idealisation of dowry, or goods that go with the girl. It clearly was a 
custom to do so, but maybe people needed to be told to take it seriously. In its earliest 
sense the notion of moveable property, in terms of brilliant attire, jewellery and 
adornments all point clearly to the conceptual importance of bedecking the girl. This 
must be read as an enjoinment to the father of the girl to make her ritually acceptable in 
the eyes of the groom, and the family who will receive her. This also ties in with ideas 
of status of the giver and receiver, as seen in sections 4.2 and 4.4 above. 
The role of the father in the act of gifting, both the girl and the goods that go with 
the girl, is emphasised in all of the above accepted forms of marriage. However, it is 
evident from the verses that though offspring were considered to belong to their father 
and his family, they were not possessions on the same terms as cattle or other items that 
could be given away when in debt for instance. The married couple were ideally 
considered joint owners of property, a fact borne out by the term dampati used for the 
couple. Essentially the pair was looked upon as joint upholders of the world of rta 
through an adherence to dharma (dharmena). Sternbach (1965: 370) in his analysis of 
the Brahma, Daiva and Prâgâpatya forms notes: 
“[i]n the case of these three forms, contrary to the Arsa-vi āha, the obligation to 
give a dowry was clearly expressed. So we may say that the bestowal of the 
dowry was the essential point in these... and they were the highest most 
esteemed forms...” 
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Sternbach (1965: 370) further explains Man        III.56, in the light of commentarial 
writers who declare that women are honoured by giving gifts. This becomes the possible 
reason why a dowry should be given; as a means of “honouring” women.282 Chatterjee 
writing in the late 1960s and early 1970s disagrees (1974: 419) clearly on moral grounds, 
that this ideal marriage could not have been one that upheld the (by then) heinous 
practice of dowry. He further cites Krsna from the Mahābhāra a Adi-parva 213.14, 
“belittling” this form of marriage in order to uphold the alternate Arsa-vi āha form 
(1974: 413). Chatterjee cites Man        III.55-59 as well to emphasise the importance 
of gift giving to women within, the context of marriage.  
-[55]  Fathers,  brothers,  husbands,  and brother-in-law  who  wish  for great  good  
fortune  should revere women and adorn them.[56] the deities delight in places where 
women are revered, but where women are not revered all rites are fruitless. [59] therefore 
men who wish to prosper should always revere these women with ornaments, clothes and 
food at celebrations and festivals.” The interim verses enumerate the death and 
destruction of families and houses that might occur if women are not so “adorned” 
(Doniger, 1990: 48) 
 
Interesting to note is the commentarial elaboration on the prestige of this particular 
marriage union. It shows the evolution of a particular thought pattern, resonant even in 
the tone of contemporary writers upholding the religious obligation of a father to give 
away his daughter as the “sacrificial gift”, thereby creating merit for himself and his 
ancestors (Chatterjee, 1974: 418; Menski, 1984: 187-8). These ideals couched in ritual 
evolve with the nature of canonical assertions that this form of marriage is indeed the 
ideal form. In contrast, the four unacceptable forms are characterised by financial or other 
transactions clearly not considered ideal within the larger framework of the Brahmanic 
world-view.  
The Ās ra form of marriage was one “where the husband having paid money to 
the relations of the bride and the bride herself, accepts her out of free will...”[sic.] 
(Pandey, 1949: 164). According to Pandey, as the primary consideration for this marriage 
was money, it was “more or less, a purchase”, which is a fascinating reiteration of the 
commentarial literature in its own classification of the Ās r a 283 marriage as the one 
                                               
282 Mahābhāra a 13.46 and 5-6, as cited by Sternbach (1965: 370), also highlight the same passage. 
283 The term Ās r a particularly in early Vedic usage tends to refer to those people outside the Vedic 
framework, who were possibly the early inhabitants of India, before the advent of the Aryan people. The 
fact that this correlates also with practices of bride-price marriage in matriarchal societies is noteworthy. 
The darker skinned dasyus and their customs were considered ritually inferior. This explains the name for 
 
 
210 
which constitutes the sale of one’s children, an unacceptable and demeaning act. He 
argues that with the growing conceptualisation of marriage as a religious union “where 
the bride was regarded a meritorious gift by the father to the bridegroom”, this form of 
sale was increasingly frowned on or looked down upon (1949: 165). An ardent but 
“undesirable suitor” according to the     da attempts to please the father of the bride 
with large amounts of money:  
Asravam hi bhuridavattara vam vijamatur uta va gha RV I. 109.2 
The term vijamata here has been interpreted as the husband of a woman who is 
purchased. From a range of explanations in the various gryhasū ras, and their subsequent 
commentaries it is evident that this form of marriage was accompanied by definite 
transactions of wealth from the wife takers to the wife givers. Here the notion of 
kanyadāna is clearly absent. The girl appears to be a prized asset in her natal home, 
which worth literally weighed in gold. The Kathaka Grhyasū ra outlines a separate set of 
rites for this marriage, and within these the mention of gold is vividly evident (Chatterjee, 
1974: 258).   
Pandey’s assertion that the custom of dowry did not exist in ancient India 
contradicts not just the evidence stated here, but he also contradicts himself by stating 
“the guardians of the girl had to offer dowry to the bridegroom” [emphasis added] 
(1969:166). An exceptional reference is made in     da X.23.111, where it is deemed 
acceptable to “dispose of with money [sic] a daughter who had “physical defects”. The 
compensatory element of this payment is noteworthy; as it displays a value system 
entrenched in physical beauty.284 This also indicates that financial inducements may be 
used to dispose of a daughter who is not considered ideal as a bride. This, too, is an 
aspect of the ‘dowry problem’ that is still relevant today. 
Before proceeding to describe the remaining three unacceptable forms of marriage 
a brief analysis of the five we have just described is required. What characterises these 
first five marriages is the terms of exchange linked with the ritual rites. Each of these 
involves the gift of the girl, by the father, or other responsible male guardian. This clearly 
distinguishes these from the three marriage types we have yet to describe in terms of the 
practice of gift-giving, whichever way that gift travels. The MDŚ expresses in mostly 
                                                                                                                                            
this form of marriage as well. There are verses relating to the behaviour of the Ās r as, who appear in 
constant conflict with the devas or the gods. (Macdonald, 1896; Berridale, 1966).  
284 Several verses from the Manu Sm ti enumerate the kinds of women considered unsuitable by stating 
their physical features. Women with bodily hair and red hair were considered dangerous, for instance.  
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synonymous terms the acts of giving: dāna  kanyāyāh (Brahma), s  ādā nā  (Daiva), 
kanyā r adāna  (Ār a,  rā ā a ya, Ās r a). The MDŚ V.152285 clearly dictates that this 
gift is what creates “the bridegroom’s mastery over the bride” ( amison, 1996: 212). As 
we will see in the marriage verses from the  V  X.85 both the parental and the conjugal 
representatives are willing participants in the exchange of property, changing hands by 
means of the reciprocity governing the arena of such gifts. This act, and the ritual process 
recognising this act as an important life-cycle rite, creates a specific kind of link between 
the two people, however predominantly the men involved in this exchange, not 
necessarily bride and groom. As  amison’s (1996) research characterises the giving of a 
gift implies and acknowledges a relationship of mutual obligation. The act of giving in 
itself implies a conscious and willing recipient, who by accepting the gift acknowledges a 
relationship of obligation with the giver. Both these roles hinge on risks (Levi-Strauss, 
1969:115; Rubin, 1975: 174-5). However, the making of these alliances may be of benefit 
to both parties for differing reasons. Since these marriage types are classified as gifts, it 
also invests them with the incumbent qualities involved in ordinary gift-exchange. In 
concentrated form of course the ensuing relationship is a vital one, and may be likely to 
have longterm repercussions where a fertile girl is concerned (Jamison, 1996: 212). 
More to our purpose is the enjoinment made in these marriage classifications. The 
texts do not consistently treat the marital typology in terms of ‘gift’. Notably the Brahma 
form is most consistently associated with the gift reference directly.286 The Daiva form is 
often identified as a gift, while the Arsa and Prâgâpatya forms at times, while the Ās r a 
is never classified as such, outside of the MDS. Importantly the implication of the 
appearance of the words ‘give’ or ‘gift’ in any particular text is not always significant, 
says  amison (1996: 297) because of the “condensed style of the sū ras”; the term may be 
supplied for subsequent entries from the first marriage type in each list, namely the 
Brahma form. However, the consistent lack of gift terminology in association with the 
Ās r a form in all texts apart from the MDS seems almost deliberate, and belies the 
attitude thereby consistently enjoined by the texts. After all the gift is the ultimate 
offering with which to placate, induce further gifts from, and secure wealth in this life, 
for both gods and men. 
                                               
285 MDŚ V.152  r adāna  s ā yakārna . 
286 YājñSm  I.58; GDS IV.6; VāsDS I.30; BDS I.20; ViSm  XXIV.19; ĀśvGS I.6.1; MBh I.96.8, XIII.44.3. 
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The Ās ra form is not described as a gift outside of the MDS, condemns bride-
price in no uncertain terms. Some texts do utilise the word give, for instance the BDS 
I.21.3 notes: “Those crazed with greed give their own daughter for a   śulka”287 (Jamison, 
1996: 297). While the epic literature follows the trend of the older texts in categorically 
demonising bride-price marriage; MBh  I II.95.72 “Let him (not) give a maiden for 
śulka”.288 The MGS I.7.11 also has a similar enjoinment: “He should give an approved 
(maiden) by the Brahma or Bride-price rule”.289 Here the term śulka is used 
interchangeably with the notion of dowry rather than bride-price in terms of flow of 
wealth because it is clearly linked to the Brahma marriage rite, as the use of terms like 
dharmena or done in accordance with dharma. This is crucial and noteworthy for the use 
of language and ideology in the early thought processes as expressed in these texts. This 
gives us further clues as to the conceptualisation of marriage payments and prestations. 
The earliest use of the word ś  ka  within the context of marriage in the older 
textual material appears in a story about the dire effects when a marriage rite is not 
accompanied by an approved cycle of gift-giving, and or exchange. In fact the word is 
linguistically used quite clearly implying reciprocal exchange between bride and groom, 
in a mutually contracted marriage. The Jaimini Brahman  a is positioned in terms of age 
somewhere between the Vedic  a h  ā s and the Upanishads, approximately between 
700-500 BCE (See Table 1 and 2, chapter 2 above). The cautionary tale, clearly 
underlines the textual intention for following the practise of gift-giving at the time a 
marriage is contracted: 
JB I.145: These two worlds [heaven and earth], being (originally) together, went apart. 
Nothing came to either one of them (from the other). The gods and men went hungry, for 
the gods live from what is given from here [earth], men from what is given from yonder 
[heaven]. The Brhad and Rathantara (Samans) said, “Let us arrange a marriage by means 
of these two dear bodies of ours.” They arranged a marriage by means of them. Yonder 
[heaven] made a saline soil (as) a śulka for this (earth) from yonder; this (earth) made 
(sacrificial?) smoke (as a śulka) for yonder [heaven] from here. Yonder (heaven) made 
rain (as) a śulka for this (earth) from yonder; this (earth) (made) the place of worship (as 
a śulka) for yonder (heaven) from here. 
                                               
287 BDS I.21.3 ś  k na y   r ayacchan   s as  ā   obha oh  āh. 
288 MBh XIII.95.72 dadā   kanyā  ś  k na. 
289 MGS I.7.11 sa   s  ā  dhar  no a yacch  a brāh  na ś  k na  ā. 
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The repetitive notion here appears to be that ś  k a is not characterised as a merely, one-
sided transaction or bride-price. But rather the idea expressed here, as Jamison (1996: 
213) explains, is that of a wedding gift that “elicits a complementary counter-gift”. In her 
estimation the cycle of gift-giving in this picture is one where one gift completes the 
other; that the transfer and “traffic” of gifts creates and completes two worlds virtually 
weaving them into a tapestry of text. The idea that earth and heaven, in possibly a more 
secular sense,290 are knit together with the operative gift of rain, as the producer of 
progeny and renewer of life completes the picture in terms of an early Vedic notion of 
complementarity. As Jamison says (1996: 213) “the traffic of gifts from here to yonder 
and yonder to here knits together the two worlds again and makes life possible”. If ś  k a 
is used to represent this reciprocal act, and behaviour, then surely the later texts should 
not so categorically classify it as tantamount to the sale of one’s daughter. For instance 
the ViSm  XXIV.24 treats it in the bluntest possible terms, in Sanskrit it reads as one 
word: krayenāsurah; in translation it is at least an entire sentence. However, the 
dismissive disdain is clear. The evolution in meaning and, perhaps to some extent, the 
practical value of the ś  ka  may in part account for the “extreme ambivalence” ( amison, 
1996: 213) demonstrated in response to the Ās r a form of marriage in the dharma texts. 
Further, this marriage is in theory clearly condemned, in legal texts291 and in the epics. 
 The Gandharvavivāha seems to have been current and is somehow assumed to 
be most natural during the     d c period, and is therefore considered the oldest 
(Pandey, 1969: 162). It finds mention in the  V VI.30.6, and in the AV VI. 36. 
According to Gautama and Harita it is that form of marriage where the girl selects her 
own husband, and as  V  . 27.17 proclaims, “that vadhu alone was bhadra who, 
brilliantly attired, herself selected her mate, even in the midst of an assembly” (Pandey, 
1969: 162). It is also described as “that... where a man and a woman having entered a 
contract approach each other” in ĀśGS I.6, and comes closest to being considered a 
contractual union. The form itself suggests that the exchange or gift giving would be 
considered part of the joint property of the married couple. Items given would possibly 
                                               
290 In a personal sense I find the classification of these early modes of worship as purely religious 
uncomfortable in terms of imposing western notions of instituted religious norms. The texts reflect in my 
view a rather more speculative tone in terms of gods, and heaven which the Chicago school tend to gloss 
over in using the terms more readily as clearly  and identifiably theistic in tone. 
291 MDŚ III.51-54; ĀpDS II.13.11; BDS I.21.2; MBh I.213.4, XIII.45.19-20, XIII.95.72. For further detail 
and references with regard to Āsura marriage conceptualisations in the texts, and modern analysis see Kane 
HDŚ II.1 (1961: 503-9, 519); Chatterjee (1978: 38); Apte (1978: 145-149). 
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include household goods intended to help the couple set up their new home. The mention 
of the brilliant attire, and the evidence cited from  V  . 27.12 attest the fact that the 
wealth of the girl was an asset. It made her further desirable to a suitable groom. The 
notion of moveable wealth, worn on the body, before a monetised economy or society is 
not difficult to understand.  
Not many rituals are associated with this form of marriage as the pair 
consummated it probably with relative acceptance from their kinsfolk. This marriage 
form was considered praiseworthy being based on mutual attraction and love, but was 
not considered stable since parental guidance was irrelevant to the union. On moral and 
ritual grounds, too, it was not considered an ideal form.292 
Raksasa, described as “the capture of a bride by force while she is still weeping, 
having killed, scattered and injured her relatives” (Pandey, 1969: 160), is that form of 
marriage where the element of father's consent or that of the girl is irrelevant.  
Paisaca, the least approved form, involved gaining possession of a bride through 
‘fraud’. According to the Asvalayana Grhyasū ra, “carrying off a girl, who was sleepy, 
intoxicated or unconscious, was called paisacha” (Pandey, 1949: 274), and was severely 
criticised as an unacceptable form. Kane and others argue that this form reflects the 
possibility to regulate society where there were unions created during unnatural times of 
war. 
In these last two forms of marriage an element of force is recognisable, which 
clearly does not allow for any idealisation, rather it explains the taboo related to unions 
of such marriages. Clearly the taking over of the property and rights of the girl 
accompany these two forms of marriage; of the individual woman as well as her natal 
home. Therefore the concept of the voluntary giving or notion of gifting is absent 
altogether. The previous six forms discussed, on the other hand, clearly make mention of 
exchanges taking place during negotiations, the ceremony, as well as further obligations 
incumbent on the girl's family, maybe throughout her married life. 
From the discussion above, specifically with reference to the various marriage 
forms noted in the s     literature it is clear that a process of idealisation is at work. 
Often, the manner in which the importance and centrality of marriage as a functional part 
                                               
292 In the modern context see Fruzetti’s discussion on this marriage form conceptually considered equal to 
‘love marriage’ being openly ostracised as ‘khara ’  or bad—causing disharmony, particularly because it 
does not carry the ritual consent of the parents and perhaps even that of  wider society. 
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of wider Vedic and later society goes, it may even be seen as the texts codifying an ideal. 
Thereby, in terms of marriage we have a mirror of what is desired to happen in society. 
The manner in which certain behaviour is enjoined clearly identifies early thoughts and 
preoccupations with the ceremonial drama of marriage, and it clearly conceptualises 
dowry as a necessary fixture within it (Fig. 6). To further highlight this process of 
idealisation a perusal of the verses themselves is required, and the following sections are 
concerned with this. 
 
5.3 Textual analysis 
The primary aim of this thesis is to trace the development of dowry as a custom from its 
earliest conceptualisation to its current form, therefore the period under survey is 
substantial, charting modern to ancient sources and vice versa. As the historical period 
under review here is vast, however the discussion focusses specifically on ancient India. 
This then raises the question, what do I mean by the rather sweeping term “ancient 
India”? Specifically this refers to a period beginning with the arrival of Indo-Europeans 
in c. 1500 BCE and lasting until approximately the time of Asoka (3d c. BCE). This 
historic period, of approximately twelve hundred years encompasses the Vedas and their 
associated texts, including older legal texts and the older strata of Sanskrit epics, in 
particular the Mahābhāra a.293 This literary period provides researchers with some of the 
most extensive documentation from any ancient society. The material available reflects 
and records the tumultuous transition from the pastoral society of the Indo-Europeans 
who entered the Saptsindhu294 region of north-western India to the very different social 
and political organisation of “classical” post-Vedic civilisation. These primary sources 
record in extraordinary detail the concerns of a small-scale mobile, non-sedentary 
society, their complex ritual religious practices as well as, and of particular concern to us 
here, the religious and social challenges and the subsequent accommodations to these 
challenges that evolved over this period. Tomes of tradition were developed, as we have 
                                               
293 The research in this thesis cannot include within its limited scope the culture and practices of the pre-
Sanskrit Indus Valley civilisation; although comparisons and co-relations between the two would be a 
fascinating research project to be taken up at another time, when the language of the Indus people becomes 
finally accessible.  
294 The confluence of the seven ancient rivers of India is often referred to as Saptsindhu or ‘the land of the 
seven rivers’. The river Sindhu has deep significance for the nomenclature associated with ancient India, 
including the very name finally given to the sub-continent. Sindhu, corrupted to Indus, and finally to India, 
because the Arab traders frequenting the region were supposedly unable to pronounce the ‘S’ (Keay, 1987: 
86). 
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seen in chapters 2 and 3, and in a number of areas—law, astronomy, medicine, statecraft, 
and grammar to name a handful. And all of this is achieved in a textual tradition of 
exceptional narrative prowess and literary sophistication. In the search for dowry through 
this vast material the research needs to remain focussed on expectations rather than just 
linguistic clues linked directly with the custom alone. 
The primary sources which we treat as texts, as in traditional cultural texts, from 
this period have a religious leaning in some or other sense of the word. However each 
type of text deals with a different aspect of religious and sometimes domestic or even 
secular life; these broadly may be categorised as ritual, legal and literary. Before the main 
task of evidence gathering can begin it is worthwhile to note the classification of these 
ancient texts within the three categories as described in chapter 1, but here delved into in 
some detail for non-specialists: 
Ritual: 
Considered the very oldest texts in the vast collection of this ancient culture are the four 
Vedas; the  g, the Sama, the Yajur, and the Atharva. These four collections comprise 
verses dedicated to ritual formulae for pronunciation and recitation during ritual 
ceremonial practices. The rituals may be solemn public or even semi-public, and of 
course life-cycle rituals (including birth, marriage, funeral but also shaving a boy’s head 
for the first time) healing rituals (including those to bring on afflictions), white and black 
magic generally. The two collections of particular note here are the first and last:  the 
 gveda and the Atharvaveda, the first concerned with conceptual clues and the second 
with magical pronouncements from the earliest period of this ancient culture. 
Further to these ritual-internal texts we have accompanying treatises associated 
with each, which may be noted as the ritual-external texts. These describe in specific 
detail every action to be undertaken by every participant in the whole ritual structure of 
that society. These have been called ritual manuals, and are concerned with solemn 
(shrauta) rites, requiring a host of priests (in the shrauta sū ras), but also in the 
grhyasū ras domestic (grhya) rituals to be performed within the household as part of the 
prescribed stages of life, including those concerned with mundane preoccupations of 
daily life. In addition there are the exegetical texts which presuppose the shrauta sū ra 
rituals, and supply commentary on the meaning and purpose of the rites of each 
individual ritual. Apart from giving a clear picture of the expanse and concerns of Indic 
theology these texts are credited as a valid source for mythology and folklore.  
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Accounting for the primarily patriarchal means of textual preservation,295 we can 
say that these ritual texts do not focus on or indeed describe women’s rituals per se. It 
must be noted, though, that women are considered necessary participants not just in the 
domestic realm but also in the solemn public rites.296 However, due to a vast number of 
these texts remaining un-translated they remain inaccessible to most scholars. In this way 
the worldview of this far removed society remains the purview of the few specialists. 
Most non-Sanskritists, including non-specialists, have no access to this.  
Further, this wealth of material has not yet been examined for the depth of detail it 
can provide on and about women and their preoccupations in ancient India. Interestingly, 
it is the fullness of the minutiae and the detail these texts provide which makes their 
relevance to this thesis invaluable. By exploiting this material extensively it becomes 
possible to observe some of the things that these texts do not know that they are saying. 
As Jamison (1996: 10) notes,  
“The women acting in the ritual are not the point of the texts; as we will see, they are 
fairly marginal at least in terms of the composers’ focus. They are neither demonized nor 
divinized as fictional exemplars so often are. They simply sit in the background, waiting 
to perform their little tasks – carry the little pot of water or exchange glances with a 
priest. But when we assemble the little tasks, they produce a remarkably telling 
conceptual portrait.”[emphasis added] 
It is this conceptual portrait that we seek to align alongside the conceptual framework 
which emerges for the functioning of dowry as a custom within the context of Hindu 
marriage, because it helps a little in understanding what we are dealing with in the bigger 
picture of answering the main aim of this thesis. 
Legal: 
Of the several treatises concerned with dharma (law, very broadly as it is most often 
translated) the one most repetitiously quoted is the one ascribed to Manu, the Māna a 
Dharma- ā stra (MDS)297 perhaps because it is considered the most orthodox in tone. As 
we noted, be orthodox or be forgotten, this particular school certainly achieved a high 
status using these means. Classified for at least a hundred years now within the wider 
                                               
295 See chapter 2, specifically section 2.2, and chapter 4, particularly section 4.1 which describes the means 
of diligent preservation and propagation of the textual material as being the domain of men.  
296 See for more detail Leslie (1991) and Jamison (1996), for discussions on the contradictory role and 
status play accorded to women throughout this ancient period. 
297 See chapter 2 for a more detailed analysis of the importance afforded to this treatise, even though it is 
not among the oldest. 
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academic community and widely considered as law codes, these are not judicial or 
legislative codes in the ordinary sense.298 Although, quite often severe penalties are laid 
down for numerous even petty infractions, an enforcing body or judgment authority is 
never made quite clear. In fact the texts present themselves more as idealised codes of 
conduct. Clearly the conceptualisation of dharma included, and perhaps we can say 
continues to include, an element of ‘duty’ alongside ‘law’. Further, in a modern context 
these ‘codes’ contain several areas of life within their gamut, which we would not 
conceive of as being part of the legal domain. The texts agree in broad outline, in most 
provisions they make, but differ or even contradict themselves on others. The various 
codes though not linguistically very old, appear to be the very same reworked older 
material in places. It is agreed among most scholars that for pertinent research purposes 
we should assume a code with fixed verbal formulae at least by the time of the earlier 
Sanskrit prose compositions (prior to 1000 BCE).  
Literary: 
Interestingly, though considered the realm of myth and folklore in the western world 
today and during translation, the Sanskrit epics, in particular the Mahābhārata (MBh), 
qualify traditionally as dharma texts. In fact, extensive sections of the MBh, specifically 
Books 12 and 13) contain threads of legal maxims sometimes closely associated, if not 
identical to the dharma śās ras. At times these are mixed in with learned or even legal 
discussions and disputes in narrative form. Far more pertinent to our purpose is the 
manner in which narrative is used to overtly and covertly illustrate, and thereby 
disseminate dharmic issues. The narratives show dharma in action, how ‘duty’ and ‘law’ 
may be transgressed or fulfilled through the miscarriage or neglect of particular precepts 
in particular cases. Of course we cannot assume to afford modern case-law status to this 
realm of the heroic epic, however it would be misleading to read the epic content without 
an awareness of the legal and religious duties that the participants enact or ignore. 
Importantly, the disagreements and contradictions within the legal tradition are almost 
entirely ignored. Further, the correlation or interrelation between these idealised rules of 
conduct in the legal codes and the idealised narratives where the selfsame dharmic 
principles are demonstrated are neither applied nor established as important.  
                                               
298 Chapter 3 takes up this discussion at some length to delineate the position this thesis affords this area of 
the literature for the present purpose, and although relevant will not be repeated here. 
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For the purpose of elaboration in this thesis I refer to the extensive research 
carried out by Professor Ronald Inden on the cultural categories maintained into 
contemporary times by Bengali society. The sources he uses are relevant here because 
they deal specifically with the transactory nature of marriage and the mobility of caste 
and clan rank through marriage in this society. Because there is such a vast array of 
sources from the medieval period it is possible to relate similarities to the old Vedic 
material, with which most of these commentarial texts claim allegiance. Pertinently, these 
texts continue to be used for modern day marriage ceremonies, and are therefore vital 
clues to the nature of the mindsets at play. As has been extensively studied, (see Dumont, 
Vatuk, and Karve), historically the higher castes in India have been organised into 
lineages or ranked clans. In Bengal the highest Hindu castes are the Brahman, or the 
priest and the Kayasth, or the writer. Their organisation also follows a similar widespread 
pattern of lineages, and the in further internal organisation tends to be complex. However, 
a cursory understanding of these two castes is important at this point in order to 
contextualise the gift giving patterns of behaviour linked with their systems of marriage 
and the accruing benefits of superior rank.   
 Now the genealogical records or books of clan rank of the Brahmans and 
Kayasthas, which form the bulk of the evidence for attitudes to marriage in medieval 
Bengal, are contained in what have been called kulaji, kula-panjika, kula-karika. Written 
in Sanskrit, and sometimes also in Bengali, these texts are considered the corporate 
property of the sub-castes. They are still recited, usually from memory, at marriages and 
kept updated by professional genealogists known as ghataka, who are a sub-caste in 
themselves. The contents are judged for accuracy at the time of recitation by the 
assembled wedding party, and often this has to be approved before the ghatakas get their 
honorarium. These texts can be considered the corporately approved “charters” of the 
sub-castes (Inden, 1976: 2-3). The section of these texts most relevant to this study is that 
concerning the codes of the clans and their actions, or the kula dharma and the kula-
karma enjoined to help preserve the clan rank during the medieval period. Most of these 
actions centre on the actions prescribed for the vidhana or rules governing the “gift” or 
dāna and acceptance grahana of daughters or kanya in marriage (vi āha). Most 
importantly, these prescriptions include the honorific gifts of wealth or pana to be made 
at the occasion of marriage. These codes presuppose knowledge of the earlier Sanskrit 
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texts on codes of conduct like the dharma-śās ras and these kulajis often cite passages 
from these older texts. 
 Among the numerous researchers who worked on the genealogies and clan 
charters of the medieval period in Bengal the work of Nagendranāth Vasu seems most 
important (Inden, 1976: 4).299 The gathering of these disparate and often bulky scrolls of 
text was definitively published in the collection Vanger Jātiya Itihāsa, or the history of 
Bengali castes, and the majority of the medieval references which follow in the 
discussion below stem from this text.  
 The analysis here therefore charts the ancient and medieval mindsets recorded 
through idealised narrative schemes and apparent rules in the layers of text we have from 
these two periods. 
 
5.3.1 Expectations in   v  da X.85 
In an adjunct text, the   hadd  a ā often considered linked to the    eda and therefore 
authoritative, there is an itihāsa recounted about the buying of a bridegroom. It is of 
particular interest to the evidence in this thesis because it points clearly to the 
expectations asserted in the texts, through this systemic story-telling, at such an early 
stage of the literature. The story or itihāsa goes that the young poet Kak īvat, the famous 
seer and poet Dīrghatamas’s son, falls asleep in the forest. He is found by a king, asleep. 
This king is struck by his beauty and considers him to be an ideal candidate for a son-in-
law. The verses record a negotiation between the king and the sleepy boy. They continue 
the negotiation and then settle on an agreement of terms. The king goes on to bestow his 
prospective son-in-law with manifold wealth. In fact the story closes with an intricate 
description of the wealth the boy gains: numerous chariots, strong steeds all yoked in 
auspicious fours, brass and other ornaments. The young poet thanks the king for the gifts, 
singing a mantra or chant, from the    eda (I.125). 
Interestingly, to add to the valuable clues we gain from the interpretation of these 
verses a commentarial complication arises in assigning a voice to the verse, which is in 
praise of the good fortune of the person who has received such an abundance of wealth 
                                               
299 Inden asserts that it is unreliable to pay too much heed to the glorified origins that Vasu argues for the 
Kayastha and Brahmans of Bengal. The historian R C Majumdar has added valuable insights into these 
early arguments by securing the original manuscripts which formed Vasu’s collection for the University of 
Dacca where he became vice-chancellor. Majumdar re-examines much of Vasu’s argument in his History 
of Bengal, Vol. I (1943) after Vasu’s death. 
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and gifts. According to Patton (1996: 275) in true Vedic dialogic style, this verse might 
have been interpreted as a reply from the king; however, it is not so straightforward. The 
commentaries engage in great discussion and the final consensus is reached that the 
speaker of the verse in great praise of wealth, is either the boy himself or his father. 
Patton raises an important point, why such intricate to-ing and fro-ing about a simple 
matter of ownership of voice in  V  I.125.2? Are they being simply pedantic? It appears 
not; as Patton (1996: 275-304) discusses these issues point to something far deeper. The 
entire group of stories contained in the later narratives of the   hadd  a ā attest to the 
importance of money and materialism, but not in mere expressions of mundane 
acquisition. No, in Patton’s belief, these stories underlie the very core of Vedic discourse, 
throughout the literary tradition of a pre-occupation of language as a medium of 
exchange. And in the context of that exchange the relative value of words and wealth 
grow and evolve in the early and later Vedic period. While in the      da and a number 
of early collections/compilations there is a fluidity of exchange between words and 
wealth, in the later stories of the   hadd  a ā a clear connection between power and the 
utterance of words has developed. Therefore these later verses will permit a king to 
bestow wealth but not have the privilege to utter mantras.  
 What this interpretive analysis makes evident is the notion that throughout the 
composition/compilation stages of the literature ideas about wealth and its importance 
grew and changed. However, crucially the juxtaposition of mythology and money creates, 
or tends to create, quite intense methodological reactions. The seemingly irreconcilable 
difference between the symbolic and the concrete, the figurative and the economic, 
frequently encourages mythologists to see one in terms of the other (Patton, 1996: 
276).300 These ideas cause great concern for those who see Vedic Literature in purely 
mystical or spiritual terms. I will argue below in section 5.3 that in fact, Vedic 
materialism is at the core of an adequate understanding of how dowry as wealth comes to 
occupy such a central position in the field of marriage past and present. 
In the  ūr yās k  a, or verses dedicated to  ūr yā301, we find the unusual usage of a 
single word,  āha  . In Sanskrit, this word bears as its root the word  āh. There are only 
                                               
300 See Silver (1992: 73) for an examination of ancient mythologies linked to money in a Mediterranean 
context.  
301 Not to be confused with  ūr ya, the Sun deity, who is cast as her father in this set of verses. Sūryā is also 
considered an alter-ego of an elemental early Vedic goddess  āc; see Patton (1996: 170). This has 
important repercusions from a literary perspective to understand the elemental nature of the marriage 
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a handful of times that the term appears in Vedic literature as noted by Bloomfield in his 
Vedic Concordance. Three times in the marriage verses of  V  . 85, in the body of the 
text. And a few more times in the body of the AV Book 14, which also deals with 
marriage rites. From Max Műller’s research a curious connection may be found with a 
similar word that keeps making an appearance in sacrificial verses,  āhn . According to 
Műller, the context in which the word reappears helps to identify its translation as 
“sacrificial flames” (1869: 25). In a translator’s note he expresses a similar observation to 
later researchers who found  āhtu a difficult word to comprehend:  
 āhn  is in fact a most difficult word in the Veda. In later Sanskrit it means fire, and is 
quoted also as a name of Agni, the god of fire, but we do not learn why a word which 
etymologically means carrier, from  āh, to carry, should have assumed the meaning of 
fire. It maybe that  āh, which in Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin means chiefly to carry, 
expressed originally the idea of moving about (the German be-wegen), in which case  āh-
ni, fire would have been formed with the same purpose as [page 26] ag-ni, ig-nis, fire …, 
ag-o. But in Sanskrit Agni is so constantly represented as the carrier of the sacrificial 
oblation, that something may be said in favour of the Indian scholastic interpreters who 
take vāhni, as applied to Agni, in the sense of carrier. However, that may be, it admits of 
no doubt that vāhni, in the Veda also, is distinctly applied to the bright fire or light. In 
some passages it looks very much like the proper name of Agni, in his various characters 
of terrestrial and celestial light. It is used for the sacrificial fire: 
   v.50, 4. ya ra  āhn h abh -hitah 
Where the sacrificial fire is placed. 
It is applied to Agni: 
vii. 7, 5. asad   r  ah  āhn h a-gaganvan agnih Brahma. 
The chosen light came nigh, and sat down, Agni, the priest. 
Here Agni is, as usual, represented as the priest, chosen like a priest, for the 
performance of the sacrifice. But, for that very reason, vāhni may here have the meaning 
of priest, which, as we shall see, it has in many places, and the translation would then be 
more natural: He, the chosen minister, came near and sat down, Agni, the priest. 
viii. 23, 3.  āhn    nda    as .  
Agni finds wealth (for those who offer sacrifices?) 
More frequently vāhni is applied to the celestial Agni, or other solar deities…” (Max Mueller, 
1869: 25-26) 
                                                                                                                                            
verses. As a non-Sanskritist I am unable to unpack this further, and the relevance and importance of this 
link must be made by the appropriate experts of grammar and linguistics. 
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From this discussion we may make a number of associated assumptions; especially that 
words are replete with meanings not always clearly evident within themselves. But when 
taken in context and particularly with reference to behaviour enjoined by certain linked 
verses, one may gather a clearer view of what may be taking place. 
In particular the significance and link of the elusive word  āhn  to the word 
 āha  / āha  m, which appears in the marriage verses of     da X.85, is important to 
underline.302 To understand the nature of these dowry-related transactions; was it 
demanded or given freely? Any assertions about voluntary dowry endowments are rooted 
in the assumption that Hindu arranged marriages tend to be hypergamous, so such 
assertions may be questioned. Marrying one’s daughter to a groom from a higher caste 
represents a clear desire to better one’s social standing. This is one simplistic explanation 
of how and why dowry endowments may have assumed such monstrous proportions. It is 
perceived as buying into a higher status. Dowry as a marriage transaction represents an 
intricate socio-economic phenomenon with religious undertones. To analyse these 
undertones we need to carefully examine the textual evidence. 
A craving for spiritual and secular benefits might be traced to the     da (1.54.9; 
X.49.1) where the hymns bear direct reference to hopes for both spiritual and material 
benefit. The divine prototype for human marriage is the hierogamy of Sūryā (daughter of 
Sūrya, the sun) and Soma (here for the only time in the     da, regarded as the moon, as 
well as the sacred plant and its expressed juice). Later marriages are modelled upon this 
one, and the bride is called Sūryā in emulation of the model marriage. The first nine or 
ten verses refer back to Sūryā (vv.20, 35 and 38) and to Soma (40-41), though the former 
seems merely to designate the bride and the latter is a reference to Soma in his alternate 
aspect, his droit de seigner over all brides. Verses 20-47 present formulaic verses, some 
of a highly magical nature, to be recited at a human wedding (Doniger, 1981: 267). 
 The Sūryāsukta verses 
The Marriage of Sūryā, RV  .85 
 
1 The earth is propped up by the truth; the sky is propped up by the sun. Through the 
law the Ādityas stand firm and Soma is placed in the sky. 
2 Through Soma the Ādityas are mighty; through Soma the earth is great. And in the 
lap of the constellations Soma has been set. 
                                               
302 However, as neither a Sanskritist nor a philologist, a detailed deconstruction and linguistic analysis of 
the correlations between these two words, their context and occurrence in the literature, and their 
significance to the ceremonial rituals surrounding marriage past and present must be undertaken to further 
clarify the role of dowry in Indian in both ancient and modern times. 
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3 One thinks he has drunk Soma when they press the plant. But the Soma that the 
Brahman  as know – no one ever eats that. 
4 Hidden by those charged with veiling you, protected by those who live on high, O 
Soma, you stand listening to the pressing stones. No earthling eats you. 
5 When they drink you who are a god, then you are filled up again. Vāyu is the 
guardian of Soma; the moon is the one that shapes the years. 
6 The Raibhī metre was the woman who gave her away; the Nāvāśamśī metre was the 
girl who accompanied her. The fine dress of Sūryā was adorned by the songs. 
7 Intelligence was the pillow; sight was the balm. Heaven and earth were the hope-
chest when Sūryā went to her husband. 
8 The hymns of praise were the shafts and the metre was the diadem and coiffure. The 
Aśvins were the suitors of Sūryā, and Agni was the one who went in front. 
9 Soma became the groom and the two Aśvins were the two suitors, as Savitr gave 
Sūryā to her husband and she said ‘Yes’ in her heart. 
10 Thought was her chariot and the sky was its canopy. The two luminaries were the 
two carriage animals when Sūryā went to the house. 
11 Your two cattle, yoked with the verse and the chant, went with the same accord. You 
had hearing for your two wheels. In the sky the path stretched on and on. 
12 The two luminaries were your wheels as you journeyed; the outward breath was 
made into the axle. Sūryā mounted a chariot made of thought as she went to her 
husband. 
13 The wedding procession of Sūryā went forward as Savitr sent it off. When the sun is 
in Aghā “they kill the cattle, and when it is in Arjunī” she is brought home. 
14 When you Aśvins came to the wedding in your three-wheeled chariot, asking for 
Sūryā for yourselves, all the gods gave you their consent, and Rīsan, the son, chose 
you as his two fathers. 
15 When you two husbands of beauty came as suitors for Sūryā, where was your single 
wheel? Where did you two stand to point the way? 
16 Your two wheels, Sūryā, the Brahman  as know in their measured rounds. But the one 
wheel that is hidden, only the inspired know that. 
17 To Sūryā, to the gods, to Mitra and Varuna, who are provident for all creation, to 
them I have bowed down. 
18 These two “change places through their power of illusion, now forward, now 
backward. Like two children at play they circle that sacrificial ground. The one gazes 
upon all creatures, and the other is born again and again marking the order of the 
seasons. 
19 He becomes new and again new as he is born, going in front of the dawns as the 
banner of the days. As he arrives he apportions to the gods their share. The moon 
stretches out the long span of life. 
20 Mount the world of immortality Sūryā, that is adorned with red flowers and made of 
fragrant wood, carved with many forms and painted with gold, rolling smoothly on 
its fine wheels. Prepare an exquisite wedding voyage for your husband. 
21 ‘Go away from here! For this woman has a husband.’ Thus I implore Viśvāvasu with 
words of praise as I bow to him. ‘Look for another girl who is ripe and still lives in 
her father’s house. That is your birthright; find it. 
22 ‘Go away from here, Viśvāvasu, we implore you as we bow. Look for another girl, 
willing and ready. Leave the wife to unite with her husband.’ 
23 May the roads be straight and thornless on which our friends go courting. May 
Aryaman and Bhaga united lead us together. O Gods, may the united house be easy 
to manage. 
24 I free you from Varuna’s snare, with which the gentle Savitr bound you. In the seat of 
the Law, in the world of good action, I place you unharmed with your husband. 
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25 I free her from here, but not from there. I have bound her firmly there, so that through 
the grace of Indra she will have fine sons and be fortunate in her husbands love. 
26 Let Pūsan lead you from here, taking you by the hand; let the Aśvins carry you in 
their chariot. Go home to be mistress of the house with the right to speak commands 
to the gathered people. 
27 May happiness be fated for you here through your progeny. Watch over this house as 
the mistress of the house. Mingle your body with that of your husband, and even 
when you are grey with age you will have the right to speak to the gathered people. 
28 The purple and red appears, a magic spirit; the stain is imprinted. Her family 
prospers, and her husband is bound in the bonds. 
29 Throw away the gown, and distribute wealth to the priests. It becomes a magic spirit 
walking on feet, and like the wife it draws near the husband. 
30 The body becomes ugly and sinisterly pale, if the husband with evil desire covers his 
sexual limb with his wife’s robe. 
31 The diseases that come from her own people and follow after the glorious bridal 
procession, may the gods who receive sacrifices lead them back whence they have 
come. 
32 Let no highwayman, lying in ambush, fall upon the wedding couple. Let the two of 
them on good paths avoid the dangerous path. Let all demonic powers run away. 
33 This bride has auspicious signs; come and look at her. Wish her the good fortune of 
her husbands love, and depart, each to your own house. 
34 It burns, it bites, and it has claws, as dangerous as poison is to eat. Only the priest 
who knows the Sūryā hymn is able to receive the bridal gown. 
35 Cutting, carving, and chopping into pieces – see the colours of Sūryā, which the 
priest alone purifies. 
36 I take your hand for good fortune, so that with me as your husband you will attain a 
ripe old age. Bhaga, Aryaman, Savitr and Purandhi – the gods have given you to me 
to be mistress of the house. 
37 Pūsan, rouse her to be most eager to please, the woman in whom men sow their seed, 
so that she will spread her thighs in her desire for us and we, in our desire, will plant 
our penis in her. 
38 To you first of all they led Sūryā, circling with the bridal procession. Give her back 
to her husbands, Agni, now as a wife with progeny. 
39 Agni has given the wife back again, together with long life and beauty. Let her have a 
long life-span, and let her husband live for a hundred autumns. 
40 Soma first possessed her, and the Gandharva possessed her second. Agni was your 
third husband, and the fourth was the son of man. 
41 Soma gave her to the Gandharva, and the Gandharva gave her to Agni. Agni gave me 
wealth and sons – and her. 
42 Stay here and do not separate. Enjoy your whole life-span playing with sons and 
grandsons and rejoicing in your own home. 
43 Let Prajāpati create progeny for us; let Aryaman anoint us into old age. Free from 
evil signs, enter the world of your husband. Be good luck for our two-legged 
creatures and good luck for our four-legged creatures. 
44 Have no evil eye; do not be a husband-killer. Be friendly to animals, good-tempered 
and glowing with beauty. Bringing forth strong sons, prosper as one beloved of the 
gods and eager to please. Be good luck for our two-legged creatures and good luck 
for our four-legged creatures. 
45 Generous Indra, give this woman five sons, and the good fortune of her husbands 
love. Place ten sons in her and make her husband the eleventh. 
46 Be an empress over your husband’s father, an empress over your husband’s mother; 
be an empress over your husband’s sister and an empress over your husband’s 
brothers. 
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47 Let all the gods and the waters together anoint your two hearts together. Let 
Mātariśvan together with the creator and together with her who shows the way join 
the two of us together.303 
 
As far as the conceptual positioning of this mandala or collection of verses goes, 
there is little doubt that a model of sorts is being spun. The intent is clear. A model 
pairing are chosen to carry the ideal, to make it more real for the human pair who will 
witness and understand the enormity of the ritual process they are about to undergo. The 
male model husband is Soma,304 and the bride to-be is Sūryā, the daughter of Savitr. As 
the girl in the role of the bride is called Sūryā, her sun-god father is given his alternate 
name of Savitr, although to witnesses in early, and possibly also later Vedic times, these 
fine differences of naming would have needed no explanation. For instance, the 
assumption that those present, or hearing these verses were also aware of Sūryā as 
another name for the goddess Vāc. In cosmic terms this knowledge lends greater 
importance, influence and a note of status superiority to the hierogamy of the union of the 
gods and what it will represent and enjoin in the minds of the mortals. If Soma is cast as 
the Moon, and is set to marry the daughter of the Sun, the relevance of the cosmogony is 
evident in the roles that Sun and Moon play and therefore the importance they hold in an 
ancient animistic society. However, if we add to this the dimension represented in the 
alternate meanings attached to these very names, as Soma being the juice, or the highly 
prized hallucinogenic, and Sūryā as Vac, then the nature of what these verses signify 
changes. It then becomes ritually and grammatically a still more significant set of verses, 
giving us an additional insight into what the composers were attempting. The prototype 
for human marriage is no longer merely a cosmic model in terms of a divine marriage, 
but also the much more potent marriage of ritual to speech. In Vedic terms this 
identification is immense. If these verses mean to set in motion the very basis of the 
Vedic world coming into being, the ideal they represent is far more meaningful not just 
for us in this distant time, but for the human couples who are subject to this ritual in 
several Vedic communities across several millennia.305 
                                               
303 Taken here from Doniger’s (1981: 267-274) more recent translation; for an older translation see 
Griffith’s (1892). 
304 See a notable aside on the reasons why Soma is not quite a model husband, as observed by Macdonald 
(1896: 175-176) weighed against the model of monogamy in a late Victorian context. 
305 See Patton (1996: 166-171) make an illuminating assessment of the language, etymologies and 
cosmology of the early Vedas, with particular reference to the goddess  āc. 
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In terms of other relevant expectations listed in this most idealised of texts, a 
number of quotations tend to devise an ideal of behaviour with regard to finding a suitor, 
to marrying a daughter, and to securing a good marriage. All of these enjoin acts of good 
behaviour. An ardent but “undesirable suitor” according to the     da elsewhere, 
attempts to please the father of the bride with large amounts of money:  
 
Asravam hi bhuridavattara vam vijamatur uta va gha ( gveda I. 109.2). 
 
The term vijamata has been interpreted as the husband of a woman who is purchased. An 
exceptional reference is made in  V  . 23.111 where it is deemed acceptable to “dispose 
of with money [sic] a daughter who had “physical defects”. The compensatory element of 
this payment is noteworthy; as it displays a value system entrenched in physical beauty. 
 V  . 27.17 proclaims, “that vadhu alone was bhadra who, brilliantly attired, herself 
selected her mate, even in the midst of an assembly” (Pandey, 1969: 162). 
 The mention of the brilliant attire, and the evidence cited from  V  . 27.12 attest 
the fact that the wealth of the girl was an asset, and desirable. This exchange is more 
acceptable than the sale of one’s daughter. Interestingly, plying the groom with wealth is 
not considered ‘buying’ him for the girl. In terms of “Vedic materialism”306, too, there is 
enough evidence to be certain that the wide term ‘dowry’ has Vedic roots. 
 
5.3.2 Atharvaveda  Book 14 
The verses in this book are dedicated entirely to the more intricate rituals concerning the 
manner in which a marriage must be conducted. In clear correlation the verses of AV 
14.1 begin by quoting the reference, and thereby delineating an allegiance to RV X.85 
and its verses. Interestingly there is some detail and emphasis on the safe passage of the 
bridal carriage and the couple from the point of marriage onwards. These verses are 
particularly relevant to the conceptualisation of wealth being transacted at this point in 
the proceedings and are therefore important to consider here. 
AV 14.1 
 
7. The rāíbhī was the parting [song]…, the nārāçañsī was the welcoming one; Sūryā’s 
garment verily was excellent; she goes adorned with song (gatha) 
13. The bridal ( āha  ) of Sūryā, which Savitar sent off (ava-srj), has gone forth; in the 
Maghās are slain the kine; in the Phalgunī’s is the wedding. 
                                               
306 See for much detail Uma Gupta’s (1987) analysis of where materialism should feature i.e. beside the 
other more base human instincts.  
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14. When, O Açvins, ye went asking, with your three wheeled [chariot], to Sūryā’s bridal, 
where was one wheel of yours? Where stood ye for pointing out? 
40. Weal be to thee gold, and weal be waters; weal be the post (methi), weal the 
perforation (tardman) of the yoke; weal be for thee the waters having a hundred cleansers 
(pavitra); for weal, too, mingle thyself with thy husband. 
42. Hoping for well-willing, offspring, good-fortune, wealth, becoming obedient 
(anuvrata) to thy husband, gird thyself in order to immortality. 
55. Brihaspati first prepared (klp) the hairs on the head of Sūryā; with this, O Açvins, do 
we thoroughly adorn (cubh) this woman for her husband. 
61. The well flowered (sukiincuka), all-formed bridal-car ( āha  ), golden-coloured, 
well-rolling, well-wheeled, do thy mount, O Sūryā, to the world of the immortal; make 
thou a bridal-car pleasant to husbands. 
 
AV 14.2 
1. For thee in the beginning they carried about Sūryā, together with the bridal-car; mayest 
thou, O Agni, give to us husbands the wife, together with progeny. 
2. Agni hath given back the spouse, together with life-time, with splendour; of long life-
time, may he who is the husband of her live a hundred autumns. 
10. What yák  as go to the brides brilliant (candrá) car among the people, let the 
worshipful gods conduct those back whence they came. 
12. I cause the bridal-car to be viewed by the houses with worship (bráhman), with a 
friendly, not terrible eye; what of all forms is fastened on about, let Savitar make that 
pleasant for the husbands. 
30. The gold-cushioned ( ras  ara a ) vehicle, bearing all forms, did Sūryā, Savitar’s 
daughter, mount, in order to great good-fortune. 
41. This bridal garment and brides dress, given by the gods together with Manu, whoso 
gives to a knowing (c k   āns) priest (bráhman), he verily slays he demons of the couch. 
42. What priest’s portion they (dual) give to me the bride-seeker ( adhūyú), the bridal 
garment and brides dress, do ye, O Brihaspati and Indra, assenting, together give it to the 
priest (bráhman). 
70. I gird thee with the milk of the earth; I gird thee with milk of the herbs; I gird thee 
with progeny, with riches; do thou, being girded, win (ā-san) this strength ( ā a). 
 
The implications of this textual model cannot be analysed here in detail, it would go far too far in 
terms of ritual changes and priestly involvement in the marriage rituals. Details are found in 
Menski (1984). The number of times the term vāha   occurs however, are more in number than in 
the RV X.85. The verses also display more concern for the safe passage of the couple after the 
wedding rituals are completed, with specific mention of their being laden with wealth. What is 
most evident is that the pattern is set: marriage involves also economic transactions and is not just 
a ritual activity or a legal process.  
 
5.3.3 Expectations in the S      literature 
In Derrett’s research the       texts “constitute two threads which ran right through the 
law as it was expounded in early mediaeval times” (1957: 84) particularly with marriage- 
related practices. A number of quotations from this layer of texts points to the idealising 
process continuing by the śās r kars in an effort to hold up as ideal one particular form of 
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marriage, and its associated practices. Thereby this enjoins the custom of dowry to be 
repetitively rendered as the most ideal marriage prestations. The Vaikhasanagrhyasū ra 
III.3.1 indicates, for example: 
When a damsel, well adorned, shall be given to a suitable (young man) of good conduct 
and in the prime of life who has been invited and honourable received (with the honey-
mixture by the father himself), that is called the Brahman  a form of marriage. 
When he presents a damsel (viz. his daughter) to a priest who performs a sacrifice of his 
own (viz. of the giver’s), after having adorned her, that is called the God-form of 
marriage. 
When by the words: “May both of them together perform their duties” he gives his 
consent and, having himself performed the rite (of  the āghāra) into the fire, gives away 
his daughter, after having shown honour (to the bridegroom), it is the Prāgāpati-form of 
marriage. 
When he gives his daughter in exchange for a cow and a bull or two pairs (of these), they 
call this the   i -form of marriage. 
When he obtains a maiden, after having put ornaments on her and after having given to 
her kinsmen as much wealth as he can afford, they call that the Ās ra  form of marriage. 
When there is a union of both, out of love, that is the Gandharva-form of marriage. 
When the maiden is forcibly abducted, that is the Rāk a sa-form of marriage. 
When he cohabits with a damsel, who is sleeping or intoxicated, that is the Piśāca-form 
of marriage. 
The first four of these forms of marriage, preceded by a gift of water, are approved for a 
Brāhmin, but not the last four. For a son born of a mother wedded according to the   i -
form purifies three ancestors and three descendants; a son born of a mother wedded after 
the Prajāpati-form purifies six ancestors and six descendants; a son born of a mother 
wedded after the God-form purifies seven ancestors and seven descendants; the son of a 
mother wedded after a Brahman  a-form purifies ten ancestors and ten descendants and 
himself as the twenty-first. 
 
This text stresses the ornamentation of the girl, while the Asvalayanagrhyasū ra I.6.3 
states that the girl suitably “bedecked” with ornaments must be given in marriage to an 
active priest:  
 Asvalayanagrhyasū ra I.6.1-3 
1. (The father) may give away the girl, having decked her with ornaments, 
pouring out a libation of water: this is the wedding (called) Brahma. A son 
born by her (after a wedding of this kind) brings purification to twelve 
descendants and to twelve ancestors on both (the husband’s and the wife’s) 
sides. 
2. He may give her, having decked her with ornaments, to an officiating 
priest, whilst a sacrifice with the three (Srauta) fires is going on: this (is the 
wedding called) Daiva. (A son) brings purification to ten descendants and 
to ten ancestors on both sides. 
3. They fulfil the law together: this (is the wedding called) Pragapatya. (A 
son) brings purification to eight descendants and to eight ancestors on both 
sides. 
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The Visnusm ti   IV.29 stresses that one who gifts his daughter in this manner not only 
gains svargam, but also sends ten generations to heaven. This testifies to the highly 
meritorious nature of this union.  
A son procreated in a Brahma marriage redeems (or sends into the 
heavenly abodes hereafter mentioned) twenty one men (viz. ten ancestors, 
ten descendants, and him who gave the damsel in marriage). 
 
A son procreated in a Daiva marriage redeems fourteen persons, as Visnus     XXIV.30 
indicates. The Gautamadhar as ū ra IV.6 states: 
(If the father) gives (his daughter) dressed (in two garments) and decked with ornaments 
to a person possessing (sacred) learning, of virtuous conducts, who has relatives and a 
(good) disposition, (that is a) Brahma (wedding). 
 
This also clearly states that in this form of marriage the maiden is gifted away “bedecked 
with clothes and ornaments”. Another quote, from the Manusm ti III.27, echoes this 
practice: 
“[W]hen a man dresses his daughter and adorns her and he himself gives her as a gift to a 
man he has summoned, one who knows [Sm ti] the revealed canon and is of good 
character” (Doniger, 1990: 45-6). 
 
Gautamadhar as ū ra I, 4.5 characterises this union as one where the bride is gifted 
with a special mantra stressing their joint performance of religious duties: 
At the Prâgâpatya (wedding) the marriage formula is, ‘Fulfil ye the law conjointly.’ 
 
 While the Baudhayanadhar as ū ra I.11 20.3 states: 
If (the father gives his daughter away) after clothing her and decking her with ornaments, 
(saying) ‘That (is thy wife), fulfil the law (with her), that (is) the rite of Pragâpati 
(prâgâpatya) 
 
This also elaborates the need to bedeck the bride and dress her in new clothes. This 
Baudhayanadhar as ū ra verse is explained by commentators as expressing the duty of 
the bride’s family to adorn her suitably (Chatterjee, 1974: 464). Sternbach (1965: 370) 
explains Man s      III.56, in the light of commentarial writers who hold that women are 
honoured by giving gifts:  
Where women are honoured, there the gods are pleased;  
but where they are not honoured, no sacred rite yields rewards. 
 
Man s      III.59 makes a more general statement about gift giving:  
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Hence men who seek (their own) welfare, should always honour 
women on holidays and festivals with (gifts of) ornaments, clothes, and 
(dainty) food.  
 
This becomes the possible reason why a dowry should be given, as a means of honouring 
women.307 The Ās ra form, in turn, was clearly looked down upon as the sale of one’s 
children.  
 The girl is a prized asset in her natal home and her worth is weighed literally in 
gold. The Kathakagrhyasū ra outlines a separate set of rites for marriage, and within 
these the mention of gold is more than apparent (Chatterjee, 1974: 258). In the 
commentarial literature, too, the special occasion of marriage is highlighted in 
abundance. Medhatithi prescribes that the act of adoration with clothes and jewelleries 
[sic] be directed toward both bride and groom. Interestingly, these “adornments with 
clothes and ornaments should...be of a special type befitting the occasion” [emphasis 
added] and should reflect affection for the daughter and honour for the groom 
(Chatterjee, 1974:  370). This commentary, dated at approximately 800 BCE, clearly 
identifies the amount and nature of endowments at marriage, inter alia dependant on the 
qualities of the bridegroom. No indications are found, as far as I am aware, to warn about 
excessive use of finery and thus there is no indication of a ‘dowry problem’.  
 
5.3.4 Re-iterating expectations in the epics 
The key role of the epics seems to have been disseminating points of view and teaching 
on dharma and thus on social and cultural enjoinments through the medium of story-
telling and mythological songs. This role is common to most narrative traditions 
universally. Of particular note here is the importance given to the dharmic role associated 
with the epic stories. The principles and behaviour these narratives compile and spread 
are often coded in terms of strings of legal maxims, virtually identical to those contained 
in the dhar aś āstra texts. There are accounts within this literary tradition of learned 
discussions of specifically legal questions, thereby illustrating guidance of how to tackle 
certain complicated situations, should they arise in real life.  
 To demonstrate how these narrative traditions contained in the epic poems of the 
Mahābhāra a (MBh) and the Rā āy a   (R) show dharma in action we examine some 
examples presented here which have a specific bearing on how expectations govern 
                                               
307 Mahābhārata 13.46 and 5-6 cited by Sternbach (1965: 370) also states the same passage. 
 
 
232 
social behaviour in the context of marriage. These episodes show how law and duty are 
fulfilled or transgressed in specific situations and cases. Very often the situations 
presented illustrate a dilemma created by the clash of two dharmically enjoined actions. 
The stories and episodes in these poems highlight the unfortunate results of difficult 
dharmic requirements, even at times specifying situations where dharmic authority is 
manipulated and show the outcome of such manipulations. Some grey areas are covered, 
and though this cannot in any way be treated as ancient or medieval “case-law”,  amison 
(1996: 9) cautions that it is misleading to read this material without recourse to legal and 
religious duties which the actors in the stories enact or ignore. 
 We consider here specifically the role expectations of the father to find a suitable 
husband for his daughter and the possible dangers of not doing so, as illustrated by the 
epic literary tradition. The texts do not concur exactly on the appropriate marriage age for 
girls. However, it is enjoined that a father must find a husband for his daughter 
somewhere during the first three months and three years of her having attained 
puberty.308 If not, he is held to be guilty of one of the gravest crimes: bhrū aha ya  or 
embryo- murder (Jamison, 1996: 237)    
 Jamison (1996: 9) makes note of how modern readings and interpretations of the 
epic literature tends to gloss over the interrelatedness of idealised rules of conduct with 
the idealised narratives where dharmic principles are applied. She highlights the fact that 
“The epic narratives tend to be stripped of their dharmic skeletons” (1996: 9), flattening 
the complex character of several women participants in these narratives into the modern 
cliché of the submissive-wife-type, while their epic dimension is clearly more layered. 
For instance Kakar (1988: 55-56) recasts a defiant and by no means submissive character 
in the MBh into this role-type, which rather typifies the investigator’s conception of 
ideological narrative.309 This sort of modern ideological manipulation is telling of similar 
role assumptions for women today. And though this use, or misuse, of the narrative 
literature may be illuminating about underlying patriarchal assumptions and attitudes in 
the epic period and even modern India, it cannot be easily imposed on the picture of 
ancient India. This is why one needs to be cautious in viewing modern media versions of 
                                               
308 Three months is held by GDS XVIII.20; ViSm  XXIV.40. The dhar aśāstra which allow three years 
after the menarche are: BDS IV.1.12, 14; MDS IX.90 and the  r ī ās   hadhar aśāstram XVII.67-68. Also 
for further discussion on this subject and details see Schmidt (1987: 22-23) and Kane (1961: 439-447). 
309 See in particular the treatment of Sāvitrī by several modern accounts: Wadley (1988: 32); Carmody 
(1989: 47). 
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these epics, which have certainly been re-interpretations of the ancient material in the 
light of our times rather than verbatim transpositions.  
 While a detailed examination of the epic material on marriage prestations is 
beyond the scope of the present thesis, it can be stated firmly that here, too, there are no 
signs of any reservations about the involvement of ‘dowry’ in marriages among Hindus. 
The epic layers of text, too, then, underwrite the general principle that giving something 
in marriage together with one’s daughter is broadly in line with dharma. 
   
5.4 The evidence in terms of dānadharma gift theory 
As discussed through the analysis of gift in this thesis so far, it is clear that the act of 
giving creates rather than severs relationships. This is specifically why the form of 
marriage preferred by the śās r kars was the one which causally created a host of inter-
linked kinship relationships and duties, ideally in terms of the Brahma marriage. And, in 
turn, this explains why the form of marriage which discourages binding relationships by 
characterising the exchange almost as a quick sale, namely the Āsura type, is historically 
passed over in preference for the Brahma form. In fact the Āsura form is seen almost to 
sever relationships. The gift itself is a link between giver and receiver. The gift is of 
course the girl herself and the additional package in terms of her clothes and her 
jewellery as well. This notion of gift as the cement which binds, even establishes society 
has been adequately addressed by Gonda (1975: 175), and suits the present argument 
well: 
To the gift, indeed, a mystic power is attached which establishes community: giver and 
receiver participate in the gift and therefore, in each other. The man who gives places 
himself in relation to the man who gives; the accepted gift often binds. 
This “exchangist” (Levi-Strauss, 1969; Jamison, 1996: 207) view of marriage is 
important to any pertinent analysis of the evidence laid out in the above sections. It is 
clear that gift exchange underpins the binding knot which ties two people together in a 
marriage and links them in with their families (See Fig. 5 & 6). The idea that in the 
standard marriage type the girl is “given” to the groom has been vigorously disputed in 
Goody’s (1990: 167) recent analysis of “oriental, ancient and primitive” marriage 
systems whilst examining the structural unit of families in the pre-industrial societies of 
Eurasia.  
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 However, noting the relevance of the characteristics common to most human 
marriage alliances, as recognising the centrality of gift-giving, I can continue the present 
argument in light of the Sanskrit texts’ evidence. If the testimonial of the texts, as laid out 
above, is considered carefully then it is impossible to sideline the conclusion that 
marriage is conceptually a part of the wider gift-exchange system in ancient India. To 
clarify, Goody’s protest seems to rely on a fundamental misunderstanding about the very 
focal nature of gift-exchange in this society. His view is that giving severs rather than 
makes relationships between the giver and receiver (1990: 169; 222). Further, he argues 
that the gift alienates the gift from the giver. His belief is that since the wife retains her 
natal ties of kinship, the marriage cannot in theory involve gift at all.  
 I would argue in favour of previous studies which seem to outline the nature of 
giving and the complexity of the relationship this giving creates inalienably. Most 
importantly Gonda’s (1975: 175) assertion that the act of giving “binds” in the context of 
marriage. In order to further understand the nature of giving and its relationship to the 
exchange and barter of rank for better ancestry, it is worth contextualising the ancient 
evidence with its shoots in the medieval period, in order to finally draw the branches into 
contemporary time.  
 With specific reference to unpacking the gift theory in terms of application to 
ancient Indian society it is worth summarising Mauss’s proposal regarding the 
significance of gift giving. According to him gift-giving creates an undeniable social link, 
the vital significance of gift-giving behaviour is that it affirms, expresses, and confers on 
the participants a unique, and ongoing relationship, which is binding in nature. However, 
gift-giving behaviour may also be the idiom of competition and rivalry between the 
participants.310 To that extent Goody’s arguments, as outlined above, have a point.  
 In particular, there are many instances where one person humiliates the other by 
intentionally giving more goods than can be reciprocated. An aspiring status seeker 
desires to give away more than can be reciprocated and he gets in return: prestige. Mauss 
and Levi-Strauss underline the nature of gift-giving as social discourse; the means by 
which early societies were cemented together in a circle of social cohesion, in the 
absence of specialised state organisation. This ties in with the wider Vedic worldview, of 
                                               
310 For instance, as seen in some political systems in highland New Guinea, like the Big Man systems 
exchanges are based on the unequal exchange on the material plane (Mauss, 1966). 
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underpinning dharma through adherence to the sadācāra of giving dowry. Further, it is 
worthy of note that universally in early societies there is a recognition that “the gift is the 
primitive way of achieving peace that in civil society is secured by state…Composing 
society, the gift was the liberation of culture” (Sahlins, 1972: 169; 175).  
 Levi-Strauss’s (1969: 50-51) addition to the theory of primitive reciprocity is 
crucial to note here; in his view marriages are the most fundamental form of gift-giving, 
wherein it is women who are the most precious of gifts. He adds that the incest taboo (as 
seen in India in the prohibitive degrees)311 imposes the social aim of exogamy and 
alliance on the biological act of procreation. Specifically by forbidding alliances and 
unions within a given group it enjoins marital exchange within groups. The prohibition of 
incest is less a rule prohibiting marriage with the mother, sister or daughter, than a rule 
obliging the mother, the sister, the daughter to be given to others. “It is the supreme rule 
of the gift…” (Levi-Strauss, 1969: 481). 
 The result of a gift of women is more profound than the result of other gift 
transactions because the relationship affected is not just one characterised by a kind of 
reciprocity, but importantly one of kinship. The participants become affines; their 
descendents will as a result of the original gift be related by blood. At the same time, 
marriages may be intensely competitive, as characterised by modern dowry marriages 
that may go wrong (Wyatt, 2009).312 There are many references to affines fighting each 
other. Nonetheless, the argument is that the taboo of incest creates a wider network of 
inter-linkages through marriage, a set of people who are connected in a kinship structure, 
a web of interdependence causally linked by the gift-giving behaviour, “all other levels, 
amounts, and directions of exchange—including hostile ones—are ordered by this 
structure” (Rubin, 1975: 174). Most ethnographic records typify marriage ceremonies as 
mere moments in an endless and organised procession in which women, children, shells, 
words, cattle names, nuts, yams, spells, dances and mats are passed hand to hand, 
cementing thereby the binding ties of kin. And, most crucially, Levi-Strauss (1969: 115) 
classifies the nature of this transaction lucidly: 
                                               
311 Details of prohibited degrees are highlighted throughout the literature, and see Kane, HOD II.1 (1961: 
436-438) for further discussion on this topic. For reasons of brevity this discussion limits itself to the 
relevance of exogamy to the notion of idealised marriage alliances. 
312 See for instance Best (cited by Levi-Strauss, 1969: 480-1) “Two people may meet in friendship and 
exchange gifts and yet quarrel and fight in later times, but intermarriage connects them in a permanent 
manner”.  This correlates to the discussion below in section 6.3 examining recent case-law where warring 
families face a dichotomous dilemma because of the gift-giving relationship created through the act of a 
dowry marriage, connecting them even when they no longer want to remain connected. 
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The total relationship of exchange which constitutes a marriage is not established 
between a man and a woman, but between two groups of men, and the woman figures 
only as one of the objects in the exchange, not as one of the partners. 
Rubin (1975: 174) also describes this transaction in the links they create between the 
groups of men and the significance this therefore carries for an entire social grouping. In 
her view: 
If it is women who are being transacted, then it is the men who give and take them who 
are linked, the women being the conduit of a relationship rather than a partner to it…If 
women are the gifts, then it is men who are the exchange partners. And it is the partners, 
not the presents, upon whom the reciprocal exchange confers its quasi-magical power of 
social linkage. 
Quite clearly from the sound research conducted by giants like Marcel Mauss and Louis 
Dumont in the anthropological and sociological fields of marriage exchange and 
behaviour patterns, a significant trend was noted. In fact the very term hypergamy, by 
which superior lineage is sought through marriage, was coined in order to accommodate 
this peculiar upwardly conscious move made through a marriage alliance. Both Dumont 
and Mauss note the peculiarity of Hindu families that are anxious to maintain and project 
a clear line of gift giving, which in turn supports an ongoing relationship between 
generations. All this behaviour seems implied in marriage negotiations during and before 
the act of marriage itself. And although so far in historical research not many links have 
been found between specific marriage customs linked to and concerned with dowry, and 
the ancient and medieval texts which seem to prescribe and proscribe these behaviours, I 
am now confident that throughout the textual material there is constant reference to and 
confirmation of one type of marriage as being the ideal form, the Brahma marriage. It 
seems to be a one-directional form of gift-giving, but in effect it creates an ongoing 
relationship between two families, in which forms of gift-giving are bound to be an 
integral part. That there may be certain imbalances between the two flows of gifts is a 
different matter, and it will be necessary to consider that today’s wife-giving family is 
tomorrow’s wife-receiving one. A too simplistically drawn juxtaposition of the two types 
of giving entities is highly questionable. 
It is worth pausing here to briefly reflect again on possible intent of the sastikars 
in composing the classical list in ancient literature of the eight forms of marriage.313 It 
                                               
313 See e.g. Kane, History of the Dharmaśās ra, II, I: 516. 
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seems initially perplexing until the intention is interpreted in terms of idealisation; that it 
essentially contrasts marriage as gift to marriage as purchase: the Brahma versus the 
Āsura form, clearly showing preference for one over the other. Dumont (1966: 116) 
believes what is primarily at issue is a “theory of the prestations among the orthodox and 
the others.” In the Brahmanical theory of marriage the union is conceptualised as a gift in 
terms similar to those in other ancient and pre-literate societies (Rubin, 1975), and the 
prestations, presents or gifts, must accompany exclusively the wife. That is to say, they 
must go from the wife’s family to the husband’s. As we shall see, this theory has to a 
large extent become fact.  
By contrast with this conception, the Brahmans concocted a notion of marriage by 
purchase. According to Dumont (1966: 116-119), such marriage may never have existed 
anywhere, but the notion serves to express the fact, found among less elevated castes, of 
bilateral instead of unilateral prestations. The Brahmanic authors of the śās ras are here 
portrayed as similar to modern anthropologists who albeit without justification in India, 
often speak of ‘bride price’ or ‘bridegroom price’ when they see that prestations in one 
direction predominate. Dumont seems to ignore the possibility of an ongoing dialectic 
between the Aryan new-comers, during the early period of composition of the Sanskrit 
texts, and the indigenous population,314 and their competing, indeed opposing, forms of 
marriage. Patrick Glenn (2004: 289-290) more recently highlights this when he refers to 
the reasons for the enumeration of the local customs and habits of the Aryan newcomers. 
It is highly possible that the demonised Āsura might indeed have been the form of 
marriage customary to the non-Aryans from whom the Aryans desired to take wives. 
There is evidence of a kind of controlled exogamy, as we have discussed already, where 
the Aryan community is not allowed to marry within certain degrees of relationship. 
Though marriage alliances are ideally meant to arise from the same caste group, there are 
prohibitions against belonging to identical subgroups within that caste. The result of these 
is to enjoin and therefore require a controlled exogamy of sorts.315 
 As discussed earlier, Gonda (1990) in his trawl through the ritual sū ras found 
several supporting statements which signify that gold was integral to the Brahma form of 
marriage. This is clearly followed through also in  gveda  . 85, the marriage verses; and 
                                               
314 The Aryan invasion theory remains heavily contested in many circles today, academic and otherwise, 
and though intriguing is a topic this thesis cannot digress into.  
315 For an interesting correlation of the continued effect of these prohibitions a glance at the modern 
matrimonial columns of the national dailies in India is informative.  
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in other lesser gryhasū ras linked to the  gveda. In addition, we have the complex and 
unique gift-giving behaviour minutely researched and reference by both Dumont, in 
support of his caste study and its dynamics, and also by Mauss in terms of the singularly 
significant sanctions and norms that go with gifts. It is evident from even the most 
cursory reading of this material that there is no such thing as a free gift (Douglas, 1990). 
This view emphasizes, as noted, that even charity is not without repercussions and forms 
a relationship between the donor and receivers.  
 In most contemporary studies of Hindu marriages the emphasis has been on the 
perception of the Brahma or kanyadān form of marriage as the form which is or should 
be free from any gift, other than that of the “pure gift of the girl”. This is in itself 
fallacious, as the girl embodies a significant gift in herself, and as we have seen she is 
always “brilliantly attired” or “ornamented” or “bedecked” to the suitability of her father 
and family’s abilities, which constitutes wealth (Fruzetti, 1990). During marriage there is 
a range of relationships being underpinned and created by the very act of the ritual tying 
of the knot between the groom and the bride. A range of gifts are made, there are gifts 
exchanged and given by the father to the groom in acts of worship which are significant 
in terms of the show of superior rank of the groom vis-à-vis the father of the bride. 
Further, the research of several scholars shows evidence of gift-giving enjoining certain 
codes of conduct by both givers and receivers during and in the period that follows the 
marriage. Therefore, when a gift exchanges hands there is merit associated and a clear 
blueprint laid out by the domestic ritual manuals, whereby certain behaviour is desired 
and better. And that again contributes to and constitutes sadācāra.  
 Seen in this light, even the list of acceptable marriages is itself a form of 
textualised sadācāra which is enjoining the preference of marriage by gift rather than 
marriage by purchase. Dumont highlights the ideology at play when he mentions how the 
Brahmanical authors are giving voice to their own preferences, to ensure that that 
practice will then become a wider spread custom. We thus have extensive evidence from 
the entire Indian sub-continent is replete demonstrating that the preferred model is the 
dowry marriage. I will lay out below (See chapter 6, below) some more evidence that 
dowry marriage as we see it today is clearly a reflection, if not a mutation, of the most 
ritually meritorious marriage or the Brahma marriage. 
 According to the medieval interpretation of the śās ras, the Ās r a form of 
marriage was an act of dharma or worship, where the father of the bride “should accept 
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wealth (pana) in the house of the groom (vara) and in exchange for that wealth he should 
make a gift of his daughter to that groom”.316 The Brahma form of marriage is 
conceptualised as the precise opposite of this terms of wealth giving, as we have 
discussed. According to Inden’s (1976: 98-99) research this form of marriage enjoins that 
the father of the bride should bring a groom endowed with “good clan and good conduct 
(kula-sila) to his own house and he should adorn his daughter with valuable clothes and 
ornaments” [emphasis added].317 Then, the bride’s father should pronounce their personal 
names and gotras and give her to him. The gift of wealth to the groom which was 
supposed to follow his acceptance was called a dakş na, the same term applied to the 
honorarium given to the Brahman priest after he performed an act of worship for 
someone, the gift of which transferred the benefits from the priest to the worshiper. Seen 
as acts of worship by Inden (1976: 99); both these “acts of worship”, make inequality an 
issue of rank between the father of the bride and the groom to be. In the Ās ra form the 
father of the bride is respectfully and “worshipfully” invited to the groom’s house, where 
he offers a gift of wealth in exchange for the more valuable gift of a daughter. Clearly in 
terms of rank, the father of the girl is superior to the groom in this marriage transaction. 
In the Brahma form, the father of the bride invites the groom-to-be to his own house, 
where with a gift of wealth and through an act of worship, he respectfully, even humbly 
asks him to accept not only his daughter but also the accompanying gift of wealth. 
 It has been noted that this is “a strange exchange” (Inden, 1976: 99) because 
although the groom is accorded a higher rank in this transaction he appears to give 
nothing in return. However, this is not the case, because by a peculiar set of cosmic 
transformations and transmutations during the act of worship performed during the 
marriage ceremony, and the acceptance of wealth, the daughter having been incorporated 
into the family of the groom, in her rightful position of wife, the giver of the daughter 
gains certain intangible and highly prized benefits. By subordinating his own natal 
family’s desire for the gain of wealth at marriage, and by therefore shunning the un-
popular Ās r a form of marriage, the father of the bride pays heed to the well-being of the 
groom and his family by in effect “feeding” them a healthy, ornamented daughter and by 
overtly accepting nothing in exchange, or in return, the father of the bride gains the 
                                               
316 Nibandha, Dacca University Library MSS (uncatalogued), n.d. (as cited by Inden, 1976: 99). 
317 For a clear conceptual mirroring of the importance of vastra or bastra, clothes especially adorned and of  
special nature befitting the social status and manner of the father’s position in Hindu society in modern day 
Bengal, see Fruzetti (1990: 57-59). 
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invaluable benefit of “immunity from the effects of improper acts for twenty-nine 
generations”318.This is a gift of far greater value than the one he has just parted with: that 
of wealth.319  
 A list of gifts exists, which enjoins a number of recipients, who may also be 
considered deities to be worshipped through the act of giving: important relatives on 
either side of the marriage parties (namaskari), the guests got given departure gifts 
(bidaya) by both fathers, the gods and their priests at each house were given (pranami), 
the priests further got an honorarium (dakş na) and finally attending members of the 
wider community who were dependent on the houses of each family and played a role at 
the ceremony, e.g. the servants and the barbers, were gifted with community gifts 
(samajikata).  
 Although there is almost an symmetrical giving of both families at the occasion of 
the marriage in these terms to other kin, and clan members, including servants, this is in 
sharp contrast to the giving during the hypogamous Ās r a exchange, and the 
hypergamous Brahma transaction. The clear need to gift and dispense wealth in order to 
gain status, whether temporary or imaginary, also in terms of cosmic benefits to accrue to 
ancestors and future generations, shows a preoccupation of Hindu society to perpetuate 
gift giving patterns of behaviour during marriages to propel their own favoured way of 
life and thus to fall in line with sadācāra. The research by Inden (1976) does not suggest 
that modern legal proscriptions of gift-giving have been effective ‘on the ground’, people 
in Bengal use gifts related to marriage to achieve a variety of purposes.   
 Another term often associated with the giving and taking of dowry is kula-
maryada which refers significantly to the notion of “the prestige of the clan”. Here we 
can see directly the symbolisation of a custom into a norm that carries within it the 
marker of status. This in itself as a practice has been clearly recognised by 
anthropologists (Inden, 1976: 105; Fruzzetti, 1999: 43) as a pointer to the purpose behind 
the giving of wealth at marriage. In modern terms the equivalent of the Sanskrit word 
pana as paona in its colloquial Bangla is not dissimilar to the original. Interestingly when 
referring to dowry gifting in colloquial terms the word dena is additionally used as 
                                               
318 Nibandha, Dacca University Library MSS (uncatalogued), n.d., fol. 7 (as cited by Inden, 1976: 100) 
319 It is important to note that from Inden’s fieldwork his informants classify rank very differently and 
stress that these gifts were not perceived in and of themselves to transmute rank to the worshipper in terms 
of worldly prestige, or fame and respect. Neither was the other gifts given during and after marriage seen to 
transmute rank. 
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well,320 which simply means giving. Very crucially the terminology is here linked 
directly to the status of the gift or pana (or paona) that this gift was not like the dakş na 
given at marriage either in the Brahma or Ās r a form. Though similar to it in terms of 
wealth given to the father of the bride in the latter, and the groom in the former the pana 
quite clearly represents something different. Its main purpose was neither to accrue 
intangible merit after death as in the Brahma nor to gain the benefit of a bride as in the 
Ās r a, the pana was intended very clearly to transmute one’s embodied inherited rank 
into the superior fruits of fame, glory and prestige, or kula-maryada in the here and now. 
It is a secular concern, therefore, linked to status and rank. Inden (1976: 108-120) clearly 
demonstrates how the Kulina marriages of Bengal were unique in the status symmetry 
and how it was dictated by the flow of gifts on the occasion of marriage, where the family 
of a higher clan gave less and there was a clear enjoinment on the inferior ranked family 
to give more. Such patterns may or may not be followed in other parts of India.  
 Inden’s (1976) research plays an important part in providing the link to modern 
research by Fruzzetti (1990), who finds parallels to similar behaviour patterns at 
marriages still in performance in contemporary Bengali society in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. From the above discussion it emerges that dowry as a custom, and not only 
in Bengal, is not seen as ‘bad’; but that the practice related to it may be problematic.  
 According to Madan (1975: 231), “[o]nce the negotiations for a marriage have 
been successfully completed, it normally is in the home of the chosen wife-givers that the 
decision to establish a union is formally and publicly taken by the two parties”. He then 
goes on to describe what happens next: 
The brief proceedings follow a set pattern: The spokesman of the wife-
takers…humbly requests his counterpart from the other side to promise that the 
girl will be given in marriage to them. The request is accepted but a great deal of 
verbal finery is employed to stress that the customary marriage gifts will be 
modest. Thus: ‘We are a poor household. We have but a vessel of pure water. If 
that is what you want, you may have it. Expect no more.  
An exchange of flowers and some small gifts, such as fruit, follows. Invariably, the wife-
givers add money in cash to the symbolic gifts. The most striking feature of the ceremony 
is that the wife-takers appear in the role of supplicants and, when the gifts are exchanged, 
                                               
320 Dena Paona, Tagore’s (1861-1941) play bemoaning the plight of the father of the bride, was a strong 
social messenger in its time and has been recurrently staged to propel the cause of the anti-dowry 
movement. As recently as 2003, where a staging of the play was presented in conjunction with the 6th 
International Conference on Dowry and Bride burning in Delhi, these attempts at demonstrating the evils of 
the dowry system continue.  
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their spokesman spreads the hem of his gown wide, bows and stretches his arms, all in 
the manner of a recipient, to accept the gifts. As we saw above, the notion of jholi-
pasarna or to spread out the begging bag, as the lowly recipient, in section 4.2 above. 
This is the beginning: ever afterwards the gifts flow unidirectionally from wife-givers to 
wife-takers. When the marriage takes place, the girl is bedecked with fine clothes and 
ornaments, and given as a gift to her husband. The kanyadān (gift of the virgin) is one of 
the central rites in the marriage ritual. Contrary to what is said at the promise-giving 
ceremony, many gifts of various kinds, accompany the bride to her conjugal household. 
 Most notably for the purpose of the status play at work in this system of dowry 
gifting is Madan’s (1975: 231) observation of the deferent behaviour of the wife, and by 
implication of the gift-givers:  
“Those who give gifts also give deference to those who receive them. Unlike other 
receivers of gifts who become demeaned by the act (this is true of, for instance, Pandit 
priests vis-à-vis their patrons), wife-takers assume the higher status in relation to wife -
givers after the promise-giving ceremony.” 
What seems evident here is the hypergamous behaviour at play, where the inherent 
inferiority of the bride’s family and kin in comparison with the bride-groom’s is now 
very much at play in society. These behavioural subtleties and the more obvious scorn by 
one set of kin for the other, as displayed in marriage ceremonial rituals underlie the 
deeper rooted gift exchange pattern that has been in place in Indian society for a long 
time now. The insistence, often of the father of the bride, that it is his duty to ‘bedeck her 
suitably’ to meet ably with the expectations and demands of the boy’s side are all clues to 
the inter-play and competition between wife-takers and wife-givers in terms of 
superiority and maintaining suitable power relations, but also reflect the basic pattern 
shown in this chapter as coming from the ancient texts.  
 Mindsets are minutely influenced by these behaviours, and as much as people pay 
lip-service to the anti-dowry campaign enacted and today even championed by the state 
government, personal behaviour has not significantly changed. Gifts must exchange 
hands when a bride is taken and given at a marriage ceremony. The harmony of power 
tilting one way or the other must be maintained. Fascinatingly all this is supported by 
clear recommendations within the textual material; not as previously thought by being 
absent, but being very much present. This contrasts of course with criticism, such as 
expressed by White (1987: 554): 
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“…Perhaps the most oppressive practice of gift giving in Hinduism, likewise 
representative of an aspect of caste or subcaste behavior, (sic.) is the system of exchanges 
between a bride’s family and a groom’s family, sometimes observed for a number of 
years both before and after the marriage proper. The prevailing custom places the burden 
upon the bride’s family, and the demands are so excessive that responsible parents in the 
poorer classes are frequently forced into penury to provide a daughter with a husband. It 
is not unheard of for a father to commit suicide so that his insurance money can be used 
to pay off the resulting indebtedness.” 
   
The exchange of gifts represents one of the most illuminating characteristics of human 
culture, and has been seen by some scholars as the original basis for economics. Gift-
giving has been identified to have two aspects linked with it in most societies, which 
makes it more amenable for analysis. The first is the religious aspect ruling customs and 
sanctions; the second is the sacrificial aspect. From the particularly religious perspective 
it is crucial to observe how gift-giving is incorporated into the practised set of religious 
customs and sanctions that may regulate social behaviour, and in the case of dowry, the 
behaviour associated with marriage and its negotiations. The second, sacrificial aspect 
involves offering the gift to a deity or deities. This ritual presentation may take the form 
of re-distribution of the gift items within the selected social group; or more sinisterly it 
may entail the destruction of the gift. This destruction has been recorded by social 
scientists in many forms, and in various social groups across the globe. The peculiar 
nature of this destruction takes on the function of destroying all or part of the thing given, 
which ritually symbolises its disappearance into the metaphysical realm and thereby its 
acceptance.321 In terms of the sacrificial aspect we have no room in this particular study 
to examine the ominous face of dowry where the girl, who is the primary “gift” is being 
ritually sacrificed. This aspect of dowry gift destruction needs to be analysed carefully 
with reference to the mind-set and the justification process at play with those individuals 
who turn into alleged or actual dowry murderers (see Wyatt, 2008).  
 There has been no evidence of the wealth given with dowry being destroyed when 
the girl is killed. Fire is a potent symbol of ritual sacrifice in ancient Vedic times 
(Henninger, 1988: 555), in modern India as well as in a number of other world 
societies.322 And it remains so. Therefore, I suggest fire is used as a tool of ‘sacrifice’ 
because it is seen to essentially purify. The numerous references to ritual purification of 
                                               
321 For more detail see Van Baal, and also for a discussion of sacrifice at joyous occasions (1976: 168-178). 
322 See in particular, Henniger’s discussion on Hindu-Vedic sacrifice in general and in particular the 
relevance of sacrifice at the time of extraordinary occasions and extraordinary time and place, e.g.: 
marriage (1988: 548).  
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women through the use of fire become the reference point for women at ground level, 
typically the apparently non-fictional exemplars of Sita and Savitri as famous women 
who upheld dharma at personal cost to themselves (Jamison, 1996).    
 With specific reference to how the pot-latch theory of gifting ties in with the 
notions of dowry gifting, White (1987: 552) discusses that the purpose of the potlatch 
among the Kwakiutl was “not to accumulate goods but to show one’s ranked status in the 
community by the level of munificence one displayed”. Most scholars writing on the 
relevance of this gift system have compared the gift giving involved at the potlatch to a 
kind of warfare or war game, during which the bestowal of particularly extravagant gifts 
could inflict “wounds” on other participants. Although the similarities of the pot-latch 
system with practices in India in Hindu communities has not been commented on by 
leading writers, an analysis of the potlatch system reveals more than a few traits in 
common with the Hindu caste system.  
The Hindu system of caste assigns rank also at times of feasting, in communal 
settings. This festivity, usually seen at times of births and marriages for instance, includes 
a very large element of redistribution of economic resources. Indeed, those who ranked 
highest on the curve of potlatch status owned not only goods in quantity but sacred names 
that could be distributed only during the communal feast. Moreover, those of highest 
ranking regarded themselves as an exclusive group. Notably they had only limited 
contact with those lower in the system, very much in conjunction with the behaviour of 
caste groups in the Indian, Hindu context. Indeed, the bestowal of magical and sacred 
names is an almost universal phenomenon throughout the Hindu religious system. Of 
course this does not imply that the pot-latch gift-giving system is the same as the caste 
system. But if Mauss’s (1925) original insight is to be believed, then the socially 
sanctioned distribution of gifts and other tokens of relationship, fraught with historical 
and structural significance as these things are, may be an irreducible element in human 
culture. The pot-latch and caste system are perhaps instances of general principle, which 
underlie behaviour sanctioned and governed by these fluid rules. The universal relevance 
of these systems is clearly defined and established. 
I would argue that the dowry system could be seen as an example of the pot-latch 
system of gift-giving. Further from White’s (1987: 552-553) summation, it is possible to 
connect this system of archaic societies and their sanctions and taboos relating to gift 
exchange, and the pressures of keeping to tradition, to the similar pressures of dowry 
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gifting incumbent on marriage negotiators. In fact I would argue that dowry may be 
clearly identified with what Mauss (1990: 36-37) has referred to as a “total” cultural 
phenomenon.  
The gift or acceptance of a daughter was clearly conceived of as an act of 
worship, creating relations between persons belonging to different clans. Marriage may 
even be seen as the ultimate transformative act. It transformed the daughter into a wife, 
changing her bodily substance,323 and code of conduct into those of her husband and his 
clan. Further, for the primary purpose of Vedic marriage as praja or procreation, of 
rendering her reproductive substances thereby into the “field” wherein the husband 
planted his “seed” for the means of procreation and upkeep of the clan name.  
Environment and time both effect change in the concept of law, specifically here 
of marriage. Even within one plural tradition, like Hinduism, there emerge apparently 
divergent and contradictory attitudes to customs at various levels of society for which 
there might be little or no explanation. Why some types of marriage fell out of favour and 
others flourished has not always been clear. Customs, like dowry which function within 
the wider framework of marriage, have similarly seen historical shifts in attitude. In 
ancient India, there seems to have been an array of marriage forms in existence. 
However, from all the corresponding literature of that period we find one form of 
marriage being enjoined as the best and the ideal one. And that ideal form of marriage 
involved not just the transfer of a bride but clearly also had economic connotations and 
consequences. 
Having thus examined the evidence from the various layers of text in their 
repetitious enjoinment of one preferred behaviour over a long time, we can make the 
assumption that dowry in its textual form is not so different from the way in which it is 
practised today. It could be argued that the śās r kars knew to cover their tracks and did 
not speak about ‘dowry problems’. As a researcher it is my task to uncover these tracks to 
discover the clear trail of behaviour as we see it in practice and therefore now see it in 
existence, in no uncertain form, in the layers of these traditional texts as well. We can 
now proceed to the task of tying in this evidence with the crucial state of the dowry 
question in contemporary times, particularly in the body of the statute itself. The next 
                                               
323 In Fruzzetti’s (1999: 43) experience “The bride retains her own father’s blood; otherwise she would not 
be able to carry her husband’s line”. This discussion of gotra and how women acquire new relatives not 
through the bloodline is taken up below in section 6.2. 
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chapter will show how even the modern statutory text that claims to be against pernicious 
dowry customs does not quite and fully disallow all forms of dowry.  
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Chapter 6:  Anti-dowry law: A misguided strategy? 
 
This chapter specifically examines key issues related to the current condition of legal 
reform with regard to and surrounding the contemporary dowry debate. However, as the 
thrust of this thesis so far has been the ancient material and its relevance to the custom of 
dowry and its conceptualisation, it is important to root the discussion in the past five 
chapters through the present and necessarily brief analysis. From the ancient and 
medieval texts and their interpretations and social reflections, we now move the lens to 
the modern text of the statute. Additionally the intent is to outline a clear conceptual 
model based on the examination of evidence thus far to delineate the continuing function 
of dowry as a custom in order to properly comprehend its prevalence, if not persistence. 
It is important before this is formulated to turn to the process of modern law making that 
has been seen as “toothless” (Thakur, 1998: xiii). 324 
Indian legal theorists warned that legislation curbing a custom would not work.325  
I do not see an end to the dowry-system. As long as the joint-family system  
survives as a sociological fact (irrespective of what happens to it at law) the 
purpose, not less than the possibility, of these gigantic dowries will survive.  
(Derrett, 1984: 192-3) 
Derrett’s observation reads like a prophecy and is an important point of reference to 
begin the present discussion. The anti-dowry law has failed, it is claimed by many 
observers. But was it intended as an enforceable law? Were the law makers aware that 
they were fashioning in the body of the statute, or DPA, merely a deterrent?  
With specific reference to women and their recourse to law we must consider the 
accessibility of law at ground level to those who need it. Particularly when women find 
themselves in an awkward position, where neither their natal families nor the family they 
have married into are entirely clear about who owes an allegiance to her and her welfare. 
We examine this aspect of law and its accessibility more in section 6.3 below, with 
                                               
324 The term “toothless” has come to be linked inextricably to the way the DPA is seen in both academic 
and legal terms. Sister Mary Alphons, Principal Nirmala Niketa College for Women 1990-2006, also 
classified the DPA as “toothless” to highlight its inapplicability and therefore the frustration of social 
workers, activists and lawyers at ground level. This is an important aspect of sadācāra. 
325 For a discussion on the role of reformers like Nehru and Ambedkar, both instrumental in the 
introduction of the Hindu Code Bill of the 1950s, see Gupta, (2001: 30-36). Gupta’s discussion is also 
worthwhile for a further analysis of the impact of public opinion on law making with specific reference to 
dowry. 
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reference to what the case law shows. Here we first undertake an analysis of the available 
anthropological literature with a firm focus on the expectations related to dowry. My 
intent has not been to conduct a field study of my own, as this thesis set the task to 
discover the conceptual foundation for dowry. The intent is to prepare literary ground for 
a future research project to conduct field analysis to develop the concepts that will come 
to light through this thesis. The research here, as was already shown, also builds on past 
secondary sources of anthropological monographs (Inden, 1976; Fruzetti, 1990) dealing 
with marriage customs in India in order to examine the nature of dowry as a custom.326 
Derrett’s (1984) assertion highlights the extent to which the dowry system is 
ingrained within the Indian social context, a point recognised by many academics.327 The 
thesis emphasises the fact that we may be looking through the wrong end of the lens. 
Modern case-law and relevant judgements are examined here to enable an insight into the 
contemporary concepts of right and wrong in the light of the ancient evidence. Further, 
the current social context presented here through recourse to the text of the statute law 
itself may enable us to understand the prevalent mindset that allows the acting out of 
dowry as a crime in contravention of the law, yet with social sanction, and more or less 
silent and certainly quite conspiracy-centred approval. Is dowry (or even dowry murder) 
conceptualised as a crime at all? And if so, why is it unable to be curbed effectively by 
the judiciary? Such questions of course raise huge issues over the powers of judges as 
social engineers, and we shall see that judges may be aware of that role, but also face 
serious limits. 
 
6.1 Examination of the modern anti-dowry statute law 
The Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961, as noted in the introduction, was a combined effort 
of the state and the early women’s movement in India to combat the rising trend in 
“bride-burning” as it was then called. The nature of this legislation lends itself to the 
exposition of this thesis perfectly. It declares at the outset its intent as a well-intentioned 
“an educative measure” (Menski, 1997: 71) in its outreach, attempting to inform and 
                                               
326In this thesis the work of Fruzzetti (1999) is relied on for a modern conception of dowry arrangements 
within marriage in modern day Bengal, as a yardstick. Further the work of activists (Bhattacharya, 1984; 
Shukla, 1985) carrying out research in the state of Maharashtra with a view to examining the shift from 
bride-price to dowry model marriages, will be relied on here to construct a picture of modern conceptions 
of dowry as sadācāra. 
327 The dowry debate is over a century old in terms of social discourse (see Banerjee, 1879; Baxi, 1986; 
Karve, 1953; Hooja, 1969; Kishwar, 1986; Menski, 1997; 1998; Sen, 2001, Oldenburg, 2002). 
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thereby transform social behaviour rather than simply rule make. In fact, the aims of the 
DPA 1961 are clarified in its preamble: “…educating public opinion and to the 
eradication of this evil”. Interestingly this reflects the Hindu legal conscience at work; not 
making law but coercing it. This law was held to apply to “the whole of India except the 
State of  ammu and Kashmir” (Bhatnagar, 1996: 65). However, because there was a lack 
of implementation in terms of criminal convictions, within a few years of this Act being 
instituted it was by common consent declared a dead letter of the law (Menski, 1998: 
109).328 Being thus regarded as a “toothless paper tiger” has reputedly underlined the 
ineffectiveness of a law informing social behaviour. 
An examination of the original purpose and “object” of the Act, stated at the 
outset demonstrates that the legislators conceived of dowry more as a social problem, 
thereby they saw their role more as educators than legislators. It is stated: 
The object of this Bill is to prohibit the evil practice of giving and taking of dowry. This 
question has been engaging the attention of the Government for some time past, and one 
of the methods by which this problem, which is essentially a social one, was sought to be 
tackled was by the conferment of improved property rights on women by the Hindu 
Succession Act, 1956. It is however, felt that a law which makes the punishable and at 
the same time ensures that any dowry, if given, does enure for the wife will go a long 
way to educating public opinion and to the eradication of this evil. [emphasis added] 
This statement goes on to interestingly begin making room for the practice that it insists 
on demonising as “evil”, by recognising that some form of exchange, specifically gifts in 
the form of “clothes etc.” may be seen as harmless. This recognition and an allowance for 
the very things that the ancient texts, as we saw in the previous chapters, specify shows a 
clear link in the thinking of the insiders in this society. As the “Object” states, there was a 
call for a law of this kind “persistently”, both from within and outside Parliament. This 
further demonstrates that the actions of those considered upright in society is being 
considered in the shaping of law at the most fundamental level. This conscription is 
clearly sadācāra at work. The statement is worth repeating: 
There has also been a persistent demand for such a law both in and out of 
Parliament. Hence the present Bill. It, however, takes care to exclude presents in 
the form of clothes, ornaments, etc. which are customary at marriages, provided 
                                               
328 The first reported case under the DPA was interestingly a Christian case in Kerala, Thomas 1975 KLT 
386. 
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thereof does not exceed Rs. 2.000/-. Such a provision appears to be necessary to 
make the law workable. [emphasis added] 
The allowance for “customary” practice is interesting here, particularly since the items 
allowed are in keeping with traditional ancient and medieval textual prescriptions and 
expectations. The quantitative ruling, in terms of monetary value of the “allowable” 
dowry has created another dimension of the ‘dowry problem’, which is not possible to 
examine here at length. However, it does need to be mentioned. When a certain amount is 
given as “officially” acceptable, it invites all sorts of status play, class and caste attitudes 
spring into action whereby a washer-man might judge himself superior to his employer 
because he can out-do him by giving several time the “official” amount. There are such 
cases recorded in British administration census reports, when dowry began to be seen as 
an exorbitant practice for the first time (Panigrahi, 1972: 176). 
In the opinion of most “the law does not appear to have enough effect on the 
minds of those who turn into murderers” (Menski, 1997: 67). It appears additionally that 
the judiciary is split in its approach, on the one hand condemning the phenomenon of 
dowry murder but refusing to mete out the harshest possible sentences to perpetrators of 
these crimes. In particular, as we shall see, the courts are shying away from death 
penalties, which raises of course yet another huge debate of much relevance to Indian law 
which goes beyond the ambit of the present chapter.  As Menski (1997: 73) points out the 
pioneering approach of the Rajasthan High Court was cut short by the Supreme Court 
when the former wanted to set a clear public example by publicly executing dowry 
murderers. Interestingly the violation of the prisoners’ human rights was stressed and 
finally upheld as grounds to stay the execution.329 This attitude suggests that the human 
rights of the killers may be perceived, in a weird logic, as more important than those of 
the victims because they are already dead? 
  Finally, before we proceed to unravel the bundle of modern case law to add to our 
already highly piled academic plate, it is important to note the contention that legislation 
which does not have popular support is doomed.330 As Jamila Verghese argued (1980: 
10) it is necessary for a change in attitude to work alongside relevant legislation. Nehru 
believed that it is impossible for legislation to solve deep-rooted social problems without 
                                               
329 See Attorney General AIR 1986 SC 467. 
330 For a detailed analysis of the negotiation between law and public opinion in comparative terms in India 
and the USA see Gupta, 2001. 
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the rallying support of the people. He admitted the limited role of law in fostering social 
change during the joint sitting of both the Houses of Parliament on the DPA in May 
1961, when he declared: “Legislation cannot by itself normally solve deep-rooted social 
problems. One has to approach them in other ways too, but legislation is necessary and 
essential, so that it may give that push and have the educative factor as well as the legal 
sanctions behind which help public opinion to be given a particular shape.” (Bhatnagar, 
1996: 3). This view has been reiterated by the higher courts in the country on several 
occasions, as one Supreme Court judgement summarises:  
The greed for dowry, and indeed the dowry system as an institution call for the 
strictest condemnation. It is evident that legislative measures such as the Dowry 
Prohibition Act have not met with the success for which they were designed. 
Perhaps, legislation in itself cannot succeed in stamping out such an evil, and 
the solution must be ultimately found in the conscience and will of the social 
community and its active expression through legal and constitutional methods.331 
[emphasis added] 
In chapter two we mentioned the relevance of codification to the process of lawmaking in 
India. It was initially a necessary part of gathering all the various threads of discourse 
together under the aegis of one path, or school or even clan into one set of guidelines. In 
the ancient context this took on the role of orthodoxy, as we evidenced in the usage 
assigned to the treatises of the MDS or ‘Manu’ as it is so affectionately but entirely 
misleadingly called. In the context of modern India the role of codification is relevant to 
modern lawmaking.332 This tends to be referred to when introducing a statute, or legal 
text. It is notable that the words rarely differ; one of the more recent is worth mention 
here to set the tone for an understanding of how people at large view text, particularly 
legal text: 
Hindu Law has to a considerable extent been codified but the significance of 
Hindu Law has in no way been undermined by such codification. Though through 
the process of Codification the Parliament has given due recognition to the basic 
principles of Hindu Law as is apparent, from the provision of the Savings clause 
                                               
331 Shri Bhagwan Singh 1983 2SCWR. 
332One version of the Dowry Prohibition (Aiyer, 1998) text begins with the revered Gayatri Mantra on the 
fly leaf; this shows a continuum with a need to connect to the past when setting down a text, or a set of 
guidelines, even law in India. The Gayatri Mantra in a modern context particularly in popular terms is 
considered to dispel the eye of evil and is meant to encourage good beginnings. 
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in the many enactments, several statutory alterations have been made in old Hindu 
Law as required by the changed social concepts and ideas over the years. 
(Bhagwati, 2007: v) 
The importance of a former Chief Justice making note of old and new or modern Hindu 
law is hard to ignore. Particularly, how both the H and the L are capitalised in Indian 
usage of the term denoting “Hindu Law” as distinct from law, as a more generic term. 
This preoccupation with prefacing Hindu law as an entity that somehow remains fluid, 
and even uncodifiable is crucial to our discussion because it highlights the mindset that 
bears on the operating of and the purview of this law. Perhaps there is also an element of 
the otherworldly in implying that Hindu law after all remains at its roots a “received” 
guidance. A quote that exemplifies the broad scope of Hindu law states: “On one hand it 
regulates matrimonial ties, which are brought into existence by choice while on the other 
hand it operates on blood relationships which are brought into existence by nature” 
(Bharihoke, 2008: vii). This opening seems to echo the old śās r kars’ efforts to 
continually link the old texts to the past, or to the universe in terms of allegiance and 
justification. Note, also for instance the following summary introducing the above text 
(Bharihoke, 2008: ii), essentially contextualising the place of law in the life of Hindus: 
Origin of Hindu law can be traced from the ancient sources of law. Equal 
significance is attached to the schools of law as Hindus follow one of these 
Schools. Hindu law exists in both codified and uncodified form. Presence of 
uncodified law is felt more in law relating to Joint Hindu Family, coparcenary, 
separate and coparcenary property, rights and powers of Karta etc. Codified law 
marks its presence more in law governing matrimonial relations, law of adoption 
and maintenance etc. For the applicability of any enactment which codifies Hindu 
law, the essential requirement is that both parties have to be Hindus. [sic.] 
The discussion in this section represents the topical peg for the broader concerns of this 
thesis. It contextualises the historical analysis of dowry as a custom, using substantial 
activist and legal source material, both primary and secondary. Papers commissioned 
(Bhattacharya, 1984; Shukla, 1985) especially to help understand the varying views of 
women to dowry-related problems are used alongside relevant recent case-law to seek an 
understanding of what is going on in terms of the popular mindset or sadācāra today. 
What do people really think, no matter what they say? And what do they actually do? 
And, can one assess that on the basis of some scattered papers and interviews held for the 
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purpose of criminal conviction? As in the case of the ancient material it is impossible to 
be sure. No information is considered empirical any more. In this age of twitter and 
facebook, where people attest to their views in person, albeit through the screen of words 
on computer screens, we have a new layer of text, another conglomerate of newer 
traditions. This is what we are going to assess in terms of what this thesis sets sadācāra 
out to be, the belief system of a peer group of ‘good’ people. 
The dowry-related conviction that caught India’s imagination in 2003 remains 
relevant here for our discussion on sadācāra. Munish Dalal,333 a greedy husband-to-be 
was imprisoned for making exorbitant dowry demands from Nisha Sharma and her 
family on their wedding day. On 10 May 2003 Nisha, with her father’s support called in 
the Delhi police to arrest Munish who demanded “a car and £10,000 cash” (Dillon, 2003: 
64-65). Nisha has since become a heroine of sorts. Scores of young brides-to-be are 
following her example and the very act of reporting exorbitant dowry demands, where 
previously a girl would have been expected to accept her fate more demurely.334 In terms 
of academic analysis, however, what does this case represent in the ongoing dowry 
debate? Is this a step forward in the direction of positive public action to ensure the 
working of a forty-two-year-old statute law? Does this represent the much-demanded 
change in attitude that academics and activists have been calling for? This section will 
employ this new evidence to examine the progress and status of the current dowry debate. 
The current urgency to examine this debate is the danger of intensely patriarchal 
traditions being hijacked as symbols to emulate by the Hindutva brigade. A call to 
reinstitute Sati as an acceptable practice has already been asserted.335 There appears a 
clear co-relation between reiterating the traditional Brahman  aical patriarchy and 
undermining the autonomy of women. The State is turning to the past, glorifying 
                                               
333 Dillon, Amrit [2003]: “The Bride who said I don’t” Now Magazine.23 July 2003. London, Stamford: 
IPC Media. 
334 See “Delhi girls rebel over dowries”, 2003/05/19 Sanjeev Srivastava, BBC correspondent in Delhi 
where three middle class girls over a span of ten days refused marriage gaining inspiration from Nisha 
Sharma. (http://news.bbc.co.uk/world/south_asia/3040681.stm). 
335 There is an ongoing debate in leading Indian newspapers discussing the present political climate in the 
sub-continent where a conservative regime is determined to redefine itself as a Hindu nationalist state, 
intending to raise old demons to glorify as new gods. See Praful Bidwai, “ ingoistic hysteria takes hold of 
India” Asia Times, 17th July 1999. Sati is one such practice; there was even a call to reinstate it as an 
acceptable social practice, albeit a decade ago. (Hindu Times, 8th February, 1999). Most conservative 
regimes seek to undermine the position of women in an attempt to control and tame society (Reiter, 1975: 
16-17). The reluctance of the Catholic Church to recognise the rights of women with regard to 
contraception and abortion is another example of this. Broadcaster Steve Bradshaw critically examined the 
Vatican’s campaign against contraception in the Phillipines, Kenya and Mexico tying this in with the need 
to control women’s sexuality not long ago. (Sunday 12th October, 2003 Panorama, BBC 1). 
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selective symbols, like exorbitant rituals, as suitable alternatives to the “corrupting” 
influences of the west. This element of the present makes it important to note the 
influence and historical relevance of the ongoing process of Westernisation and 
consumerism as one of the determinants of the current shape of dowry.336 
Summarising the present scenario we may say succinctly that outlawing dowry 
outright has not been the ideal way of dealing with the ‘dowry problem’. It seems in fact 
to have exacerbated the volatility of the situation. This combined with the ever-growing 
consumerist trends of a mushrooming middle class in what is being acknowledged as the 
new super-power in the east, alongside China.337 New research reports that middle class 
Indians expect to give dowries, it is part of the status game of belonging to the right 
group (Saavala, 2010). This combination of factors presents a grossly disproportionate 
picture in the media. Not only does a father have difficulty in not giving his daughter any 
gifts at marriage, but girls have begun to demand trousseaus that reflect their status 
(Menski, 1997: 68; Jhutti, 1998: 183). There are an estimated 19 dowry-related deaths a 
day or one death every 75 minutes according to the latest National Crimes Bureau all 
India statistics. Since the original statute, the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 came into 
force on July 1st 1961,338 the situation has not improved, as the intent of the law makers 
would appear to hope. Many deaths, we know now, are wrongly registered as dowry 
killings or dowry-related suicide (Wyatt, 2008). Many other deaths go unrecorded. One 
can merely guess what the real figures are. 
 
6.2 Women, dowry and law 
The socio-legal significance of dowry prestations and payments appears directly linked to 
the position of women in wider Hindu society. As we have seen there is a clear 
preoccupation of early Vedic and later medieval society with the purity of lineage and 
clan prestige or kula maryada. Carrying on from this preoccupation there is a clear 
correlation of purity of clan with the purity of the women of that clan (Yalman, 1967: 
                                               
336 See Khilnani, (1997: 197-8) for an analysis on the impact of western political ideas on India. 
337 The new British Prime Minister David Cameron was recently(29th July, 2010) on a visit to India, 
exploring the possibility of renewing an old relationship with India, but calling it now a “special 
relationship”, a term normally reserved for ties of trade and friendship with the USA.  
338 Notification no. S. O. 1410 dated 20th June, 1961, Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, Section 3 (ii), 
pp. 1005. 
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14).339 Women carry the procreative potential to perpetuate the clan. Women of one’s 
own clan cannot maintain or progress the lineage of their fathers and brothers, they need 
to be given away in order to enable their clan to receive women. Women as wives 
therefore can maintain and progress a male line (Fruzzetti, 1999: 29).  
The payment of dowry accompanies the gift of a daughter, and this is symbolised 
within the marriage ritual as we have seen, in ancient and medieval marriage models. It is 
important to distinguish the significance of each gift with reference to the modern 
conceptualisation of women as daughters and wives, seen as the carriers of the line, 
particularly underlining the difference between status and power. With specific reference 
to past academic classification of dowry and bridewealth being both considered gifts 
travelling in the same uni-lateral direction. Tambiah (1973a) for instance does not oppose 
the concept of dowry with the concept of bridewealth, instead he states that the latter may 
be classified as a gift in itself. In Hindu marriage, as we have seen over several millennia 
“the dowry is quite separate from the gift of the virgin (sa  radān)340” (Fruzzetti, 1999: 
30). According to Lina Fruzzetti, in the modern day Bengali version of the marriage 
alliance the gifts of dowry (pon) and the gift of the girl (dān) are related and taken 
together express the essence of the alliance. The giving of gifts marks marriages with the 
possibility of two groups establishing future and further ties with each other. Dowry plays 
an important role in this establishment of relationships, which is necessary to examine in 
the modern context if we must understand how dowry in conceived as complementary 
alliance-making behaviour, or in terms of the thesis, as sadācāra. In fact according to 
Fruzzetti’s (1999: 9) findings, dowry precedes the marriage ritual itself and may be 
classified as a purely economic activity. Fruzzetti’s study was concerned with the dual 
nature of the exchange within the marriage system in Bengal. She examines the 
convergence of how the sacred and the non-scared interact in the hierarchical system of a 
caste society. This aspect of her study is of particular note to the subject of this thesis in 
an examination of ideals based on clan-rank and status purity, linked directly with the 
pursuance of prestige, fame and respect on the one hand and bartering for better ancestry 
                                               
339 See in particular Nur Yalman’s (1962; 1967) pioneering research on the inter-linkage between clan 
purity and its boundaries and how this is influenced by the question of women’s purity in the specific 
geographical regions of south India (Malabar) and Sri Lanka (Ceylon). 
340 The translation of the term sa  r adān is used by Fruzzetti (1999: 8-9) to represent “the gift of the 
virgin”. However, linguistically it is a complex Sanskrit term, a compound of two words: sampra and dān 
thus carrying within it the notion that it is the ‘sampra’ or complete even supreme gift. In Bengal today 
marriages are made up of two elements, which go to reflect a link to the making of marriages from the past 
as well: the gift of the girl (sa  r adān) and the payment of dowry (pon). 
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on the other. In this sense Fruzzetti’s discussion of Bengali notions of ‘right and good’ as 
expressed through the rituals of marriage as crucial to this study. Fruzetti relies on two 
modes of exchange the giving and taking of gifts, both of which occur simultaneously in 
the marriage ceremonies. Fruzzetti (1999: 9-10) classifies the concepts of pon as dowry, 
dāb  as a rightful obligatory gift, dān as a bestowal and paona as a gift given for services 
received, one which necessitates payment to the givers of services. All of these involve 
numerous kin relations in bloodline and in marriage, caste brothers and others.  
 If we consider the case of modern day Bengal here, to contrast and compare the 
case of medieval Bengal, we find crucial links between dowry and marriage negotiation 
behaviour considered appropriate in terms of sadācāra. As researched by Fruzzetti (1999: 
17) the significance of the sa  r adān or supreme gift that a father must make are 
governed by kinship rules, which are enshrined within the rites and rituals performed in 
marriage ceremonies. This is the very core of sadācāra. The behaviour enjoined in the 
customary practices surrounding marriage reflect the status-play and the essence of what 
a given society considers right and good in the given context. In terms of marriage the 
father’s gift of his daughter as sa  r adān to a groom, under the guidance of a Brahman 
priest as we evidenced in the     da model, is governed by a set of rites.341 This process 
of making the gift transforms the groom into the son-in-law ( ā ā ) to the bride’s natal 
family and the bride into a “wife-mother” (bo  ā ) of the groom’s household. Each action 
is performed in a series of ritual occurrences, attended by incantations and recitations. 
Marriage rites and rules mirror the Bengali construction and significance of the person, 
the cosmogony of persons and who is performing what act at the time of marriage, this is 
crucial especially in terms of who can marry whom. As Fruzzetti (1999: 17-18) 
underlines therefore, “discussing marriage rules is in fact discussing an indigenous 
domain of kinship”.  This idea of kinship being so closely entwined within the notion of 
marriage and dowry is crucial to understanding how sadācāra works. Whether or not 
people label the behaviour overtly as ‘good behaviour’ or ‘right behaviour’ the 
conceptualisation at play is one that centres on the following of dharma or behaviour that 
is considered right and good in terms of clan-rank, and wider societal harmony.  
 The most supreme gift a man may bestow in his lifetime, the one from which he 
acquires maximum merit or punya, is the act of giving his daughter in marriage. The 
                                               
341 See section 5.2.1 above, discussing the model hierogamy contained in the verses of  gveda  .85. 
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observance of marriage rules, and an insistence on the correct ways in which the gift 
should be made are a pre-occupation of the discussions leading up to the actual 
ceremony. If we put this in the context of the Dowry Prohibition rules in the years after 
the Act was passed in 1961 we have a curious situation. On the one hand the father, and 
in effect the parents of the bride feel impelled to give dowry by the sense of sadācāra at 
play which underlines the adherence to custom as good. However, the state has begun to 
mediate and the word filters down into popular consciousness that the “giving and 
receiving of dowry” in now punishable by law.  
Although the Act came into effect in 1961, no complaint was lodged under its 
provisions till 1975, when just one complaint was registered. It was felt that by 
criminalising the potential victims of the crime, the parents of the girl and the bride 
herself, in the wording of the Act, as “the givers” the law makers had in effect woven in a 
problem. It was after much agitation to relieve the parents of the bride from the burden of 
having to be criminalised themselves that several women’s organisations like the Forum 
Against Oppression of Women, Bombay (Shukla, 1985: 6) and others brought this to the 
notice of the judiciary. However, in spite of having a working group to address this issue, 
with specific reference to the working of the Act, the Joint Committee of the Houses of 
Parliament observed on 11 August 1982: 
The Committee feels that the giver of the dowry i.e. the parents should not be 
equated with those who take dowry. The giver of dowry is more a victim than a 
criminal. The parents do not give dowry out of their free will but are compelled to 
do so. Further, when both the giver and the taker are punishable no giver can be 
expected to come forward to make a complaint. 
The members in their argument seem to acknowledge that ‘something compels’ the 
parents to act in contravention of the law. There is an unspoken acceptance that the 
Committee sympathises, even understands this behaviour. And here we have attested 
notes that demonstrate the ‘giving’ of dowry in not bad, that somehow ‘demanding’ it is 
improper, and should be punished. The Committee are therefore of the opinion that only 
those who take dowry or abet the taking of dowry should be punished. The law appears to 
want to influence the extortionate nature of the custom, in terms of attempting to curb the 
greed rather than oppose the custom itself. Interestingly, after several deliberations the 
final notes amending the DPA added in 1984, however, made the taking and giving of 
dowry punishable with a six-month prison term.  
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 Two aspects of the amendment of 1984 were criticised by women’s groups. 
Firstly, that it held both givers and receivers of dowry as equally culpable, and therefore 
deserving of the same punishment. This prevents complaints being registered by those 
giving dowry. Secondly, it gives sanctity to any amount of gifts made to the bride and 
bridegroom which can lead to the blatant re-labelling of any dowry payments and 
prestations as ‘gifts’. The one aspect of the amendments that has been considered 
praiseworthy was the recognition that not just taking dowry, but even “demanding” it was 
to be considered an offence. Section 7 of the Amendment allows the courts to take 
cognizance of dowry offences based on a FIR police report or a complaint made by any 
aggrieved party; a parent or guardian, or even a welfare organisation.    
A number of contemporary studies assess the current scenario with reference to 
dowry as a “problem” in India. These pan-Indian studies seem to have their statistics 
stilted toward presenting solutions rather than getting to the core of the issue. Most often 
the research agenda of these studies is to generate public interest on the “women’s 
question” (Shukla, 1985: 1-3). A host of these papers sit on shelves, uncatalogued and 
unpublished, as the government continues to shift its activist focus to more pertinent 
issues. One of these studies carried out on the academic agenda of the IWM in the early 
1980s evaluated the oppositionality of women attempting to control their own destinies 
when it came to a breakdown in marriage, based on the patriarchally constructed clan 
codes that operate in several regions of modern India, based on the older clan charters we 
discussed in chapter 5. It is evident from the fieldwork carried out during this period that 
women from the same area classified themselves on the basis of whether they were 
bought or sold in marriage, attaching a degree of significance to the means of exchange. 
In the case quoted below, a woman who had been brutally attacked by her husband in the 
presence of her eighteen month old son with an axe, on account of not having brought 
enough dowry, still holds to the prestige of the system of gift giving that potentially 
fractured her family life. She in turn finally walked out of her marriage, and chose a life 
of manual labour, considered demeaning in her community and caste. 
“But aren’t you also a Maratha like Gangubai?” 
We asked Subhadra who has recently joined a friend as domestic maid.  
“No, not like her” clarifies Subhadra regarding the distinction between herself and 
Gangubai, both Marathas but from different regions. Subhadra conceals none of the pride 
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she feels belonging to what she calls a proper K a r ya family. She adds with much 
strength of feeling:  
“We are from Shivaji’s clan. They (Gangubai) come from Konkan. My name is 
Jadhav. My sister married a Bhonsale. During my marriage my father gave a 
hunda (dowry) of 18,000 rupees. My aunts will get 35,000 now when each of 
their sons get married.” 
Subhadra sees nothing wrong in these large sums being given during her marriage or her 
aunt getting it for her son. On the contrary, she expresses scorn for Gangubai whom she 
sees as belonging to a low caste Maratha. She goes on to tell us that Gangubai and her 
people “sell their daughters for three or four hundred rupees.” This clearly indicates that 
there is bride price in Gangubai’s caste and dowry in Subhadra’s (Bhattacharya, 1984: 2).  
Therefore we see that the perceptions of status and rank are complex on the ground. 
Subhadra chose to work as a domestic servant, turning her back on her family to uphold 
the code of honour which she believes she owes to her heritage. Where did she access 
this code from? Who informed her that honour was above all else? And why does she still 
believe in dowry as a custom being the better way? In her words we see a simple, yet 
poignant summary of what many women believe is their lot after a bad dowry marriage. 
At least she lived to recount her story. In her version, as quoted below the idealised form 
of marriage is the one that is accompanied by a dowry. 
Usually the Maharashtrian women who work as domestics belong to more 
backward regions of Konkan unlike her. 
“Our women do not work. They never leave the house or show their faces. Like 
the Muslims we too must cover our heads, only heads, only we do it with our 
saree.” 
Shubhadra demonstrates how she would cover her head obliquely with the pallu if she 
had to live amongst her own people, in her village which is alas a distant reality. 
Subhadra has taken a solemn vow never to turn back towards her birthplace at 
Osmanabad District while her husband is still alive. The true   a r ya that she is her vow 
is to be taken seriously when we consider the rigid codes of this clan about honour and 
dignity. 
 “We have hunda so that our women do not work,” adds Subhadra coming very 
close to the economist’s analysis of the dowry system; that the latter is directly related to 
the value of women’s productive labour (Bhattacharya, 1984: 3-4). 
The rationale for why dowry is important in marriage negotiations encapsulates the 
popular reasoning, which accompanies most contemporary discussions on the subject. 
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Whether in an academic or activist context it is clearly underlined as the form of marriage 
payment, most likely to be upheld as positive in the eyes of the community. Here again 
we see the clear stamp of sadācāra. Dowry is good, even if the husband beats the woman 
for not bringing more of it, as this particular case attests. The practice of the custom itself 
strengthens the status of an entire caste, as the respondent claims. Similar behaviour is 
documented in several studies, and in case after case the reason for giving or taking 
dowry is never questioned, as we will see in the section below.  
Madan (1975: 231) found in his study of the Pandits of Kashmir a similar belief 
system between wife givers and takers. 
“The most striking feature of the ceremony is that the wife-takers appear in the 
role of supplicants and, when the gifts are exchanged, their spokesman spreads the 
hem of his gown wide, bows and stretches his arms, all in the manner of a 
recipient, to accept the gifts. This is the beginning: ever afterwards the gifts flow 
unidirectionally from wife-givers to wife-takers. When the marriage takes place, 
the girl is bedecked with fine clothes and ornaments, and given as a gift to her 
husband. The kanyadān (gift of the virgin) is one of the central rites in the 
marriage ritual. Contrary to what is said at the promise-giving ceremony, many 
gifts of various kinds, accompany the bride to her conjugal household. 
 Those who give gifts also give deference to those who receive them. 
Unlike other receivers of gifts who become demeaned by the act (this is true of, 
for instance, Pandit priests vis-à-vis their patrons), wife-takers assume the higher 
status in relation to wife -givers after the promise-giving ceremony.” 
 Madan’s research, in conjunction with Vatuk’s covering northern Indian communities, 
and Fruzetti and Inden’s work covering the western groups point to a behaviour pattern 
prevalent in a much wider community. From other research studies carried out through 
the TISS and the women’s cell the mindset revealed is one that accepts that dowry should 
accompany a marriage to set a certain stature for the marrying couple in wider society. 
There is evidence that this behaviour follows a clan code, as Inden’s work on medieval 
Bengal found, where the use of the word Kul or clan, “signifies a cross cultural network 
of what came to be known as kulin pratha (customs related to being a kulin) all over 
India” (Bhattacharya, 1984: 3). There seems to be a clear pattern of behaviour signifying 
a pre-occupation with clan prestige, fame and respect tied in with the customary gift 
giving behaviour in a large number of communities in India. That the kulin preoccupation 
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with preserving or trading status for wealth is so widespread goes to the very core of the 
issue. Dowry needs to be given for a clan’s prestige to be maintained and sometimes 
bartered, for better ancestry.  
However, going quite in the reverse of what people believe, the state attempts to 
regulate this area of marriage negotiations and deems that gifts in consideration of 
marriage cannot be considered part of the dowry, which should go with or after a 
marriage has been made; see in particular S Gopal Reddy AIR 1986 SC 2184 for its 
judgement. This confirms that the DPA does apply to demands for dowry made during 
the negotiation period before the actual wedding takes place. The courts already 
recognised that this area must be brought within the scope of the statute law. The legal 
definition of dowry was sought to be expanded from the original in 1961 to 1984 and 
then finally 1986, which is what stands today. The legal definition, as we saw in section 
4.1, however has little impact on what perceived notions of dowry continue to be. How 
often do people reach to a shelf to explain or even refer to the actual text of the law? This 
is seen in the various dowry cases, and in some First Information Reports at police 
stations. 
This brings us to an interesting juncture in the discussion. Women are the objects 
being transferred with dowries. They may have little or no recourse to the current, and 
latest (Shelkar: 2010) definitions of what dowry should constitute. However, the 
understanding of what dowry is does not seem to be sought. It seems to be known quite 
clearly. In terms of links to the past and continuity there is an uncanny resonance with 
phrases spoken millennia ago, with words documented in Sanskrit commentaries and 
regional language clan-charters in the medieval period, with behaviour documented in the 
current century. Let us examine the case of modern day Bengal, as described by Lina 
Fruzzetti in The gift of a virgin after four years of field research in the subdivisional town 
of Vishnupur, district of Bankura, West Bengal in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
According to documented behaviour on the part of women and their families, most often 
their father, there is an unconditional need to secure a good match in marriage. When this 
negotiation is considered, the father bears in mind the fact that the receivers of his 
daughter will ‘expect’ perhaps even demand a second, or supplementary gift if they 
indeed consent to accepting the gift of the daughter in the first place. In Fruzzetti’s (1999: 
30-31) findings the second gift is an acceptable “demand”, as she describes it:  
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“When the offering of a virgin in marriage is considered, the giver bears in mind 
that the receivers will demand a second gift if they consent to the first (the virgin). 
There is a difference in the nature of the two exchanges: the first is a sacred gift, 
the highest possible, and can be neither argued about nor contested, whereas the 
second gift (pon) is a dābi, a demand rightfully made by the groom in return for 
accepting the bride. A girl’s father has both gifts in mind when he starts looking 
for a groom. Both dowry and bride represent wealth but the children to be born 
after marriage are the true wealth of a line and house. This leads to the question: if 
the gift of the virgin is the highest form of giving, then why does the dowry play 
such an important role in accepting or rejecting the girl? The answer is found in 
the attitude toward women in Bengali samāj (society).” 
In clear and linear continuity we see the manner in which the behaviour of society 
mirrors the ideals encapsulated in layers of texts. There is a clear understanding of the 
“bedecking of the bride”, and how important it is to the wider significance of the status of 
the father and his family, in fact his ancestry. There is clear consonance that the children 
of the marriage are crucial to be considered when negotiating a marriage, because they 
will carry the blood-line.342 Further, the importance and value attached to moveable 
wealth is underlined in the social concerns of the father or a bride to be, he must suitably 
“bedeck” her. 
 Women in Hindu culture are curiously demonised and deified in the very same 
breath (Arya, 2004: 35-51; Leslie, 1995: 320; Gatwood, 1985: 10). As Fruzzetti (1999: 
31) finds at ground level women’s dual nature as inauspicious and auspicious, creative 
and destructive are reflective of the goddesses in Bengali cosmogony. The evidence 
therefore suggests that elaborate rituals surround the gift of a virgin and appear to 
unbalance the economics of dowry giving. Bride-givers tend to give unilaterally and 
expect nothing concrete in return, so that “one who gives the daughter should not receive 
anything” (Karve, 1965: 130). The inequality of givers and receivers is established by the 
gift itself (the kanya, or “virgin”) and by the ritual which brings the two groups of people 
together through the marriage alliance. This inequality, however, does not adhere 
permanently to these groups as givers and receivers in relation to other lives. It refers to 
their position in the ritual itself. 
                                               
342 See above discussion in section 5.2 on the importance of the qualities of the bride and groom as 
delineated in the s     literature. 
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6.3  Developments in the case law 
It is difficult to account for the steady rise in national crime statistics relating to dowry, 
both harassment and/or murder, as merely higher rates of crimes being reported. The state 
is forced to recognise that there continues to be a steady increase in the actual death rate 
of young brides. Perhaps each quarter, when it is politically correct, a fresh reform is 
announced to prove that the state does not tolerate cruelty to women, or indeed condone 
it. Whatever the motivation for the reformist stance to implement amendments made in 
1986, of the various governments might be, there is some movement forward it seems in 
a more meaningful direction recognising that the area which requires careful scrutiny is 
the grey area of time during which marriage negations occur. Various attempts have been 
made in this direction by several state governments to curb the practice of dowry.  
Bengal announced its own set of rules, codified as The West Bengal Dowry 
Prohibition Rules 1989. In the light of the discussion in section 5.2, highlighting Inden’s 
research and Fruzzetti’s more recent field work study in section 6.2, it is clear that 
Bengal needed a locally relevant set of rules enjoined in legal terms because dowry 
giving was enshrined in their clan charters in no uncertain terms. But this is by no means 
the preoccupation of only this state. Increasingly reports from the subcontinent display 
continuing reformist zeal: Himachal Pradesh instituted Dowry Probation Officers in early 
2004. In November 2003 the state government of Bihar encouraged affidavits from 
government servants to be signed by both parties entering into a marriage, vowing not to 
take dowry. “The Bihar Government has given strict orders to all state employees not to 
take any dowry when getting married”, proclaimed the article. This a clear example of 
seeking to influence sadācāra, exemplifying attempts by the state to demand appropriate 
behaviour from ‘model’ citizens, which would in turn influence the behaviour of the 
community at large. It appears that formal state law is continually trying to haul custom 
into its jurisdiction and custom remains resilient by staying away.  
Other states in India, notably Bihar and Orissa, have enacted their own Dowry 
Acts and have constituted amendments to them. However, the most significant 
development as a direct result of case law and public pressure was not the Dowry 
(Amendment) Act of 1984 but the Criminal Law (Second Amendment Act of 1983) 
wherein Section 498A has been introduced to tackle violence relating to women, and is 
defined as “cruelty” by the husband or his relatives. Interestingly the definition of cruelty 
in this Act sets a wide scope, by including “driving a woman to commit suicide or to 
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cause grave injury to her mental or physical health because of her failure to meet property 
demands”. This insertion into the Indian Penal Code was hailed as a step in the right 
direction by organisations like the Forum and Women’s Centre, because they felt that 
finally not just wife beating and murder but that recognition of causing a woman to 
commit suicide was perceived as a criminal act as well (Shukla, 1985: 9). The reformist 
zeal of the state is palpable here. It is clearly evident that in the two decades after the 
institution of the original DPA several gruesome cases of dowry related death and murder 
came to light in India’s capital New Delhi, where the Central government is based. It was 
suggested that public outcry, coupled with militant press attention, and protests from 
various women’s groups forced Parliament to look into the ineffectiveness of the DPA in 
bringing culprits to justice. It was seen as necessary to institute a separate provision in the 
criminal code to enable the police and the state to save face almost, to prove that they 
were not turning away.   
The crucial concern, overlooked until recently, is that dowry negotiations occupy 
this grey area outside the immediate control of formal law.343 Discussions about what, 
when and how much take place months, sometimes years, before the actual ceremony and 
since there is a time lapse between the negotiations, the engagement ceremony and finally 
the marriage ceremony, it often causes confusion about the original negotiations that have 
taken place. Rarely is any documentation maintained about the discussions and bartering 
that took place. The only documentation, if any, is usually a list of items sent at the time 
of the marriage, when the girl leaves her parental home. Often even these are not 
maintained. The common belief is that this sort of documentation creates suspicion, much 
like pre-nuptial agreements, which presuppose the demise of the marriage. There is a 
degree of apprehension about pre-empting trouble in a marriage before it is solemnised. 
The call was made for maintaining a comprehensive list of dowry gifts, as an annexure to 
the main statute, as Section 6, called The Dowry Prohibition (Maintenance of List of 
Presents to the Bride and the Bridegroom) Rules, 1985. This amendment to the main 
body of the statute has had considerable trouble of its own. Part of the reason why Dowry 
Probation Officers were instituted was for the overseeing of this aspect of the statute. It 
does seem unwieldy to intend policing an entire nation of marriage makers, considering 
how popular the institution of marriage remains in the Indian public consciousness. A 
                                               
343  S Gopal Reddy AIR 1986 SC 2184.  
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simple scroll through the host of satellite and cable channels in India will show the wide 
section of popular television dramas and soap operas that concern themselves with the 
matters of making and breaking marriages. 
The social importance linked to marriage creates an eagerness for parents to 
marry their children. This often leads to them committing to arrangements that they are 
later unable to honour. The fear of a broken engagement, social stigma against girls who 
remain unmarried beyond a reasonable age, and the overriding emphasis on securing 
good matches lead to situations where some promises may not be kept. This is sometimes 
the reason for arguments and discrepancy about the amount of dowry and how it was 
arranged to be paid. “Demands for dowry have been camouflaged after the passing of the 
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, and its amendments in 1984. In few cases, demands are 
made hours before the wedding and there have been instances when the bride’s family 
have cancelled the wedding” (Muzumdar, 2001: 398). 
Often, as stated by Prof. Muzumdar when dowry arrangements go wrong it leads 
to incomplete marriages, which lead to worse stigma against the bride who must return to 
her parents (Muzumdar, 2001: 398). Menski (2009) reports, however, that in some South 
Indian marriages dowry promises were quite deliberately broken, so that the family could 
take the bride back – she kept her married status, but the dowry remained unpaid.344  
Lesser stigma is attached to the unmarried boy. Dowry has regularly been the 
cause of girls being left before the fire. However, it is also reported that a more dangerous 
situation occurs when the girls are sent with promises that the demanded amount will be 
met with later: this often ends in the tragic death of a young bride. Activists and feminists 
claim that such deaths can be averted by the bride’s parent’s being cannier to these 
extortionist situations. Is that realistic, however? This is an issue that needs to be 
researched from a psychological standpoint. Why do some parents appear to send 
daughters to their death? 
Little can be done to resolve situations when part or the entire dowry has been 
given and no marriage takes place because more is demanded at the time of the 
ceremony. There may be no witnesses to the payment having been made, or discrepancies 
between what the two parties claim was discussed and decided upon. Dowry, however, is 
not a guarantee of either a safe or good marriage. There appears to be a reassertion in 
                                               
344 Oral communication based on unpublished fieldwork results. 
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society that a good dowry (usually meaning beyond one’s means) will secure a good 
marriage. The dutifulness of the father appears to tie-in with his role as the provider and 
negotiator of the dowry. In his absence the responsibility falls on another male member 
of the family or community, the negotiations are always between men. This seems to 
imply that the girl is not the primary concern for the boy’s family. The patterns of the 
negotiations that surround a marriage are influenced by the inputs from elder women, 
who by virtue of their age represent figureheads of the patriarchy. A girl’s dowry rarely 
includes items of personal interest to the girl alone (Hershman, 1981: 244; Agarwal, 
1998: 137). The emphasis on dowry representing status is crucial. All these elements 
require further academic and social analysis. 
The conceptualisation of dowry as an obligatory non-reciprocatory gift allows it 
to become a hazardous patriarchal construct enabling brothers to cheat sisters, and 
husbands to garner wealth at the expense of first wives. How is it that men who have 
killed their wives are re-married within a matter of days?  And women remain widows 
for years without the hope of remarriage? How can the killing of a wife be considered 
acceptable? Why do parents often send the sister of a dead daughter to the same house 
where their first child was murdered?345 What makes the fathers of girls accept servility? 
These questions point us toward an examination of admittedly difficult academic terrain 
in examining the mindset that underlies the practice of bride-burning and dowry murder. 
Mary McGee’s (2000: 1-56) carefully constructed article highlighting the interplay of 
three academically problematic areas: religion, gender and politics is important to the 
discussion here. McGee (2000: 8-9) examines the cultural symbolism scrutinising 
“gender(ed)” constructs in ancient traditions and texts. She cautions, that “…our 
identification of certain texts as ‘religious’ reflects modern, western categories of value 
and analysis that could indeed get in the way of our reading of (and even selection of) 
texts, just as analysing ancient as well as contemporary structures with twentieth-century 
notions of gender could potentially cause us to miss important variables”. Further, 
Goldman (2000: 57-8) observes that Sanskrit is patterned as a “patriarchal idiom” and 
important to our question of female agency here is Goldman’s conclusion that despite 
partaking of this hegemonic idiom, female masters of Sanskrit might gain certain 
                                               
345 In an interview conducted for a short documentary on dowry, Prof. Kalindi Mazumdar cited a case 
where in December 2002 the parents sent the sister of the dead girl to replace the first girl. This is an 
accepted practice in certain communities in Maharashtra, and an area for further research.  
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individual prestige,346 but their “power base” is not substantially altered by this 
acquisition of the ritually superior language.347 Once we recognise this, the patriarchal 
mechanism at play within both textual and customary beliefs of what is superior becomes 
plain. 
Returning to our argument; is it not important to recognise murder as murder and 
not attach a cultural label to it in order for it to become excusable? Shouldn’t dowry 
murder be classified as homicide and not filed away as an unsolved suicide? Why doesn’t 
social rationale prevail? Why does society regurgitate customs that endanger its survival? 
Are we missing something? Is dowry murder acceptable if the girl somehow threatens to 
tip the balance of the home she has just entered? Is she removed because she is in the 
way of stability? Does ritual killing come into focus here as it did with Sati? (see 
Halbfass, 1991: 87-130). Sati was a wonderful way of taking over the property of a 
widow and destroying an inauspicious burden on society. Is this an echo of the same 
sentiment? The sex-ratio in India is completely imbalanced, men outnumber women, is 
this not realised among those that seek girls? Does Indian society still function according 
to the dictates of an innate customary conscience which emphasizes the harmony of the 
whole? In the current global context is India still concerned only with the ritual safety of 
the tiny modules that maintain and uphold the greater whole?  
The link between domestic violence and dowry harassment and death requires 
further research in order to be meaningfully established. This chapter establishes these 
critical links using published reports from social workers from Sakhya,348 the dowry cell 
working in tandem with the Mumbai Police gathered over 15 years. Prof. Muzumdar 
(2001: 397-413) has compiled a comprehensive overview examining the social and 
psychological consequences of dowry violence. It is almost as though the administration 
felt the need to make a special provision to file away the “unexplained deaths” that 
seemed to be rising across the country. Instead of recognising the high incidence of wife-
beaters, and rather be dubbed as a state that encouraged wife murder, a convenient catch 
phrase was coined. This is not to say that dowry is not a problem. Equating a woman 
with wealth is devaluing her as a person. Neither bride-price nor dowry practices are 
                                               
346 As Gargi seems to have gained, as one of the possible female Sanskrit scholars to permeate popular 
memory; few connect her to Yājñavalkya as his learned wife. 
347 There is no room here for a discussion, albeit brief, on the tussle between Sanskrit and its poor cousin 
Prakrit, which is historically considered the language of the masses. 
348 As of August 2010, the Director and founder of Sakhya, Prof. Kalindi Mazumdar has co-opted the social 
work of the state into a religious organisation based out of a suburb of Bombay, called Vasai. 
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satisfactory in terms of women’s empowerment. Women need to be able to exercise 
control over their property. Hindu law recognises the possibility of women owning 
property, but the disposal or maintenance of that property is quite another issue. A recent 
study by Pradeep Kumar Panda, Centre of Development Studies, on the patterns of 
domestic violence in Kerala shows that women who own property are less likely to 
encounter the threat of physical violence from their husband or in-laws.349 The absurd 
continuity of an unwritten belief system is what must be further examined. This provides 
clues to the continued transactions of dowry and the apparent disregard for life. 
It is not possible, nor advisable to isolate the question of dowry death and 
domestic violence in the contemporary context from any discussion on the wider custom 
of dowry. Dowry may be a relatively tame accomplice in most marriages across the 
globe. Few young brides find themselves at the receiving end of undue harassment based 
on the size or content of their dowries. Fewer still face death. The prevalence of dowry 
death has been found in both Indian and ex-patriate Indian communities, among Hindus 
and non-Hindus, is it merely a “cultural crime”? Is there the whiff of something more 
sinister? Is “dowry death” a convenient cover-up for homicide resultant from a violent 
marriage? Why has dowry harassment never been identified with domestic violence? Is it 
so problematic to identify a solution because one has been looking in the wrong place?   
A large percentage of homicide is committed by the male partner in a 
heterosexual relationship in most societies. Women in a domestic situation are more 
vulnerable to violence and abuse; more women end up dead in their homes at night than 
any other time of day. A recent study carried out by a forensic pathologist Dr Achala 
Daga, Department of Preventive and Social Medicine (2003),350 points to the clear 
correlation between domestic violence and dowry. She has analysed 2000 cases of burns 
alone and identified these as extreme cases of domestic violence. Has domestic violence 
found an acceptable misnomer in dowry harassment? Surely there are marriages that 
have worked despite a payment of some sort at the wedding? Recent evidence from 
                                               
349 A recent article in The Times of India examines the notion that women who own property are not as 
vulnerable to violence within the context of bad marriages. (See Katyal, Anita (2003): The Times of India, 
Friday 27th June, 2003 pp 5). 
350Daga, Achala: 2004.  “Burn-cases and revealing statistics” Also relevant evidence was presented by Dr 
Daga in her presentation “Domestic Violence and Dowry Deaths: A Study in a Public Hospital in Mumbai” 
where she has analysed a total of 2000 burn cases registered at the Grant Medical College, Mumbai. At the 
Sixth International Conference on Dowry and Bride-burning and Son Preference in India, held at New 
Delhi, 4th January 2003. 
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Maharashtra points to this. The need “to do something” to register a marriage in the eyes 
of a community (Menski, 1987) is supplemented with a need “to give something” to a 
daughter on her marriage. How can fathers and mothers send daughters into their new 
roles empty-handed? How indeed will brides be comfortable within new families without 
a sense of having a secure sense of status, which is sadly linked to property they bring 
with them into the new marital home, as well as the manner in which they were married? 
 
6.4 Reworking the strategy  
Balgangadhara (1994: 241) surmises: “When you look at religion as tradition, that is, as a 
set of practices transmitted over generations, then the term appears as a minor variation of 
our intuitive notion of culture: to have religion is to have culture”. These views tie in with 
the argument here that tradition as religion is perceived to be perpetuating the practice of 
dowry as a cultural symbol of Sanskritization. It is clear that there is a continuous 
negotiation between text and tradition in forging patterns of ‘right’ behaviour or 
sadācāra, or what is considered in the Hindu context dharmic. However, in terms of 
having instituted a statute which does not necessarily stem from the desire of those being 
subject to the strictures set about within it seems like a poor strategy. Clearly, it was not 
originally conceived as a poor strategy, but one that has succumbed to an inability to be 
applied into positive action. 
It has emerged from the interpretation in the chapters above that the exalted 
position given to “text” may have been exaggerated by Orientalist scholarship (Ingalls, 
1954; Lingat, 1973; Derrett, 1977). In reality it appears that the texts themselves identify 
their position on the working of society as a unit quite independent from their 
prescription, the recurrent emphasis remains on custom. Custom is identified as “queen”, 
not just in dispute-processing but also on questions of daily living. Custom as represented 
by sadācāra seems to take on the responsibility to underpin dharma, rather than the 
opposite. In the modern context this continues to be the case in India, and indeed in 
various other world communities today (Menski, 2010)351. Despite being fluid, unwritten 
and often vastly changeable, even contradictory from community to community, let alone 
state to state, we are faced with a situation where a society governs itself by the tenets of 
an innate customary conscience, in turn almost dictated by the need to conform to what is 
                                               
351 See http://ssrn.com/abstract=1621384 
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considered ‘model’ behaviour. However, in the context of dowry, how is this 
conceptualised by those practising the custom? Why does dowry, or more generally 
‘giving’ represent such a crucial part of the entire ceremonial drama of marriage? Or does 
it? 
Few studies have focussed on the customary element of legality, which is 
certainly not unique to India. The Magna Carta highlights the place of custom in ruling 
lawfully and in fact underpins democratic government today,352 as does the dharmaśās ra 
literature. This aspect of these mediaeval documents has been ignored to a great extent. 
Custom has always played a crucial role in forming the attitudes of people and thereby 
influencing their behaviour. Custom as an important ancillary to law may be recognised 
in legal practice today in terms of practices in place since “time immemorial” in English 
law, or in Hindu law legislation “for a long time”; however the essence of it has remained 
unarticulated. One reason for this is that custom by nature is unwritten. It is not uniform; 
in fact it presupposes legal plurality, something civil courts are uncomfortable with. 
Emerging scholarship deals with these aspects of comparative law and must be utilised to 
analyse the issues further (Chiba, 1986; Menski, 2006; 2010). 
Here again we see the key problem at play. History has seen the influence of more 
than one legal code on the Indian people. Before the apparent unification under the 
British administration, India was a collection of myriad feudatory states and continues to 
function as such. The concept of a nation was remote and invading influences many. The 
concept of the segmentary state has been associated with understanding the development 
of a political system in early India (Inden, 2006). As originally formulated it referred to 
societies in Africa, which followed a segmentary form of social organisation not based on 
a clear state system. Segmentary societies are generally associated with systems where 
lineages determine the identities of descent groups. Although this is in a sense a 
contradiction in terms it corresponds to the working of ancient Indian society (Thapar, 
2002: 25). One sees reflections of such a segmentary state/social organisation at work in 
the panchayat system in modern rural India; this too is in no sense uniform. It appears to 
have made little sense to impose uniformity on such a diverse collection of states. It was 
enforced however; the implication of a ‘uniform’ state and the importance of the 
codification of a pan-Indian legal system governing all Hindus and some non-Hindus 
                                               
352 The plaque at the British Library, Euston Road, London exhibiting the charter highlights the position of 
custom. 
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must be examined.353 Derrett (1978: 121) examines the problems associated with a 
uniform civil code with specific reference to the Special Marriage Act, 1954, pointing out 
that “at no point was it suggested that it should, or could replace the Hindu law itself”. 
Further relevant to the discussion here is his observation that this was a conscious 
“recognition of the viewpoint and the practice” of a majority of Hindus who live in 
accordance of social mores, and the principles of the dharmaśās ra in matters of 
marriage. He points out that for most of these people a “civil marriage” implies a 
negation of everything they live by. Here is a reiteration of following custom, but under 
Hindu law, not the modern secular law; this view against civil marriages continues to be 
widely prevalent in contemporary times. 
All these influences cannot be discounted as agents informing the dynamic of 
dowry working as a custom in contemporary times. A number of processes have been at 
play, and dowry as a custom must be examined within the wider framework of these. 
Two major players that have shaped the current custom are Sanskritisation and 
Westernisation. Dowry as a custom has emerged as a pan-Indian phenomenon with 
regional differences, in no way limited by the boundary of religion, caste or class. And 
yet again we see that the custom of dowry itself is chameleon-like in nature, it changes 
colour depending on which community we examine. It would not be inaccurate to say 
that dowry has as many forms as there are communities in India.  
As we examined, traditionally academic writing has seen dowry primarily in 
terms of property. Several researchers have found that there is no clear terminology in 
Sanskrit for ‘dowry’ in its modern avatar (Hooja, 1969: 15; Derrett, 1984: 185). Ursula 
Sharma’s (1984: 66) unpacking of the kanyadān ideology in Hindu marriages highlights 
her belief like Derrett that dowry grants women social and property status, and those that 
bring little may face ostracism in status terms (Derrett, 1984: 183). Derrett (1984: 188) 
further emphasises that dowry in its traditional and modern form constitutes one part in 
the complex pattern of marital exchange relationships. His argument finds that there was 
a clear link between the dowry given and the perception of the bride’s status; he asserts 
the functionality of dowry as a form of gift to secure and even enhance the girls’ status in 
her new family (Derrett, 1984: 192). To be clear, however, Sharma (1984: 64-66) 
                                               
353 Buddhist and Jain marriages continue to be governed by Hindu personal law, implying that Hindu law 
makes room for the ‘customs and traditions’ of other communities. Indigenous groups falling outside the 
pale of caste are also governed by this law.  
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demonstrates that dowry is not considered individual property, but that the woman acts as 
a mere vehicle. This notion of one that carries, ties in with the ancient terminology 
contained in the old marriage ceremonial verses which stress the presence of wealth, 
which must indeed be carried into the realm of the marriage; therefore the root  āh, to 
carry. In Sharma’s view (1984: 71) because the girl is simply the carrier, she herself in a 
modern context is not seen to be as valuable as the wealth she brings. Menski (1998: 51) 
observes that this view underlines a significant characteristic of modern dowry, where the 
procreative potential, so valued in the past, is no longer cast in inherently valuable terms, 
but remains unspoken because it is so “obvious to the insider”. Here he succinctly 
clinches a crucial point, of extreme value to the present thesis. When a behaviour, a 
custom, a tradition is of such import, and so common, it is rarely underlined in ideal 
terms within textual content: therefore no clear terminology exists for the practice; text or 
terminology has become practice. Instead the opposite behaviour is ostracised and black-
listed, so as to enjoin the preferred behaviour, which within the society everyone is aware 
of and practises.  
Dowry in India is specific to the group that practises it. A pan-Indian legal statute 
demonising and criminalising so widespread and entrenched a practice was a sadly short-
sighted effort on the part of the government. From the discussion here it is evident that a 
fresh debate is required to tackle the several issues so far raised. This thesis has gone 
some way to prove the links between dowry as a relevant practice in ancient India, and 
that historically the practice of dowry in inextricably linked to family prestige, respect 
and fame. This includes the social status of the girl as a new bride within a new and often 
unfamiliar familial set-up.  
Dowry is a custom followed therefore variously; its consequences in the event of 
an alliance gone wrong however tend to be similar. As a custom it may have been 
relatively benign to begin with, although this cannot be proven with certainty. Any 
allusion to an ideal period concurrent with Vedic India or Indian philosophic principles 
appears to have a romantic gloss. It is no longer acceptable to point to “golden 
beginnings”; those beginnings must be researched and meaningfully analysed within the 
context of the present devalued status of women. In fact, the undisputed devaluation of 
women consistent with the ensuing historical periods points to the current status of Indian 
women. Women have been regarded as inferior, except when it concerns their unique 
procreative capacity, throughout the literature. How far should we trust this early 
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literature as a mirror of social practices of the time with regard to academic accuracy? It 
seems difficult because there is little dispute that the vast volumes of literature available 
from the various historical eras are far more representative of notions of the ideal than of 
social reality. Subsequent research and analysis have yielded varying interpretations of 
the past. Women were worshipped, but they did not have autonomy. Women were 
deified, but they had to be controlled, women represented the mother earth, but they 
could not own property, they were pure when controlled through marriage and impure 
when unmarried, whether widowed or maiden. Therefore, the ambiguity so far attached 
to the status of women should now be discarded. Women had, have and will continue to 
hold inferior status in any given patriarchal context.  
An important issue examined was the conceptualisation of women as property, 
and women’s relationship to concepts of property with reference to textual prescriptions. 
It has been argued that women have had definite property rights in the pre-colonial 
period. Simone de Beauvoir has shown that even when women’s rights were largely 
recognised, long standing customs have actively prevented their full expression. This is 
certainly the case with both dowry prestations and stridhana. The suggestion that by 
creating a new economic policy to suit the British Administration land rights took on a 
different character, alien to the indigenous understanding of the ownership of the village, 
and somehow created or even caused the eruption of the dowry system is an 
unsubstantiated argument (Oldenburg, 2002:12). This again stems from a romantic view 
of village India and requires further deconstruction (Oldenburg, 2002:132). Feminist 
concepts of the body and ownership, in the light of Indian ideas of the wife belonging to 
the husband and his family over her individual human rights, particularly when a 
marriage breaks down require further community-specific research and analysis. It is this 
specific dynamic between property, procreative potential and power that need further 
careful scrutiny in the future through adequate research. 
This thesis has established the customary nature of dowry. It further shows that in 
the case of dowry transactions at marriage custom has proved stronger than the 
prescriptions of law. In practice therefore custom overthrows text and takes the place of 
law. Other forms of marriage payments and transactions have been consistently displaced 
by dowry. An element of the ideal appears to be at play here. Dowry is conceptualised as 
the best form of marriage payment, as numerous textual references showed in chapter 5, 
above. There is no specific reference to an actual payment of dowry in the texts; there is 
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only emphasis on the behaviour considered right and appropriate for the bride’s father 
and the groom. Researchers agree that there is no specific Sanskrit term utilised in the 
older material which directly refers to dowry in its modern avatar (Derrett, 1984: 185; 
Hooja, 1969: 15). This had previously led to the claim of “little dowry” in the context of 
Vedic India (Witzel, 1995: 1-5). However there is a preoccupation with wealth and the 
performance of right ritual. This is evidenced today as well. The dangers of failing to 
provide a daughter with a suitable dowry were highlighted also in the epic literature, as 
we saw in chapter 5. And once more, there is a continual reference to dowry as the reason 
why daughters are considered a burden. Many wedding songs and proverbs within the 
disparate communities of India reflect these beliefs about the girl child (Basu, 2001: 117; 
128). There is an eerie similarity to the mindset across the sub-continent, girls are 
burdens because of the large dowries they will require, and in today’s context almost 
expect. A tragic case in West Bengal recently bears out the tremendous hold the fear of 
paying out exbortinate dowries for families of more than one daughter. One poverty-
striken mother sold three of her little girls for Rs 184 each, so as to avoid such future 
burden (India Today onine and BBC News item, 2nd September, 2012). 
In the modern context therefore, dowry can no longer be meaningfully demonised 
in order to define it away. Case law and activism show a clear co-relation between the 
giving of dowry as elemental to marriage in the modern mindset, not so different from the 
traditional one. In order to better understand how exactly to rework this strategy, in terms 
of outlawing a custom, we need to institute a new research project, based through an 
international organisation to study and further research ongoing trends in dowry-related 
behaviour during marriages. There is a need to employ Malinowski’s “participant-
observation” method. This necessitated methodologically using the principle of internal 
observation by an anthropologist or social scientists, by being completely “immersed” in 
the culture they are studying. This further implies participating as wholly as possible in 
all everyday activities while observing the interactions of the informants. 354 
 After a decade worth of dowry-focussed conferences at Harvard, University of 
London and one in India in the early years of this new century, little light seems visible at 
                                               
354 The importance of noting this specific nature of a society has been discussed in some detail by social 
anthropologist Clifford Geertz, in his first chapter in The Interpretation of Cultures (1973), as discussed in 
chapter 2 above. Increasingly, ethnic detail is as crucial to the entire whole as the whole itself, the 
realisation that there might be as many Hinduisms as Hindus themselves. As we must note, the relevance of 
a plurality of pluralities is always at play in understanding both culture and law. 
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the end of the tunnel of questions. A new strategy must recognise the issues that appear to 
have been addressed in these past academic gatherings, where often participants seem 
unwilling to listen to others when faced with differing research or solution agenda 
(Menski, 1998: 222). It is a complex issue. One of the research links that required 
redressing has been attempted in the form of this thesis. Specifically a fresh look at 
several issues from the past: the historical need to gift, not just the girl, but more and the 
crucial link of the various forms of marriage to the notion of gift. All this combined with 
the fact that status as a marker in society was highly prized, and continues to be so in 
modern times.  
In order to assess modern sadācāra it is worth scanning the current matrimonial 
columns of the most popular national daily, the Times of India. This paper highlights a 
trend in the attitudes to marriage making behaviour in Indian communities both at home 
and abroad. Most families seeking ‘decent’ or in our terms here, ‘appropriate’ unions 
seek to be seen in this best of all newspapers. It is considered a serious, well established 
publication, and is expensive to put advertisements in. So already there is a presumption 
that the family must be ‘good’ if they seek to have a matrimonial in the Times. Further, 
families well-settled abroad, seek unions mostly through this publication, for girls of 
Indian origin hoping to find prospective brides for sons who are more amenable to joint-
family life and aspirations than their counterparts born and bred abroad. The need seems 
to be to seek unions which will underline a similar attitude in the up-bringing of children 
born in more disconnected locations like the UK and elsewhere, where having a mother 
accustomed to thinking in terms of societal ideals is aspired to in the traditional Indian 
context. 
 What these advertisements show is that to date dowry need not be overtly 
mentioned. A couple of advertisements highlighted within the Equality Marriage Section 
of the Times of India Matrimonial pages (See appendix 1) declare “NO DOWRY”, which 
seems more representative of the fact that these unions continue to be outside the norm. 
The model of marriage to follow appears to be the one which casts the status of the 
family, gives respect to the pursuance of wealth, and which calls for the bride to respect 
an adherence to joint-family ideals. In modern terms this last assertion tends to be a 
covert way of mentioning the production of lineage, and of course a male heir. Therefore, 
the attitudes of today remain, perhaps not entirely unbroken, however nonetheless in 
continuance with past ideals as set out through customary practice. 
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 A new strategy must therefore utilise the past efforts of the state governments 
where Dowry Probation Officers were instituted and re-assign them new roles to gather 
information on how dowry is perceived. It will be a hard task, riddled with suspicion and 
mistrust of state agencies, who have so far only tried to criminalise and curb dowry 
giving and taking. Further, policy-makers will have to enlist a department to devote itself 
to undertake meaningful research, using both the social activist and legal activist 
networks, which thrive and continue to strengthen India as a democracy. This call for a 
new strategy and a realisation that a very structured and well-focussed legal and social 
agenda requires to be outlined within a meaningful dowry debate is not new.355 
 In August 2010 a legally positioned group Majlis published its findings on a 
linked subject, the Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage section of the HMA. This group 
is vociferously advocating the people to raise their opinions to reach a meaningful pitch, 
so as to be heard and taken cognizance of. This is sadācāra in action. Here we have legal 
opinion seeking by an informed group, advocating and reaching out to other specialist 
and ordinary individuals to involve them in a decision-making process which will 
eventually have a bearing on their social context. It is difficult but not impossible to work 
alongside such grassroots organisations and work within the communities to understand 
the social realities better. Here we need to revert to our model of society and refer to the 
notion that legal notions work upwards from the people, and do not necessarily flow from 
the top, from governing authorities to begin with. We need to understand both sets of 
dowry practices, the ‘good’ where both dowry exists comfortably as an acceptable 
practice and the ‘bad’, where dowry-violence has caused harm to families and the wider 
community. 
 The socio-legal model which causes most confusion is the one where it is 
assumed that law, like water, will continue to flow from positions of authority, along the 
lines of legal positivism (Menski, 2006). To the contrary, law is in living motion when 
things go right. It is when things fall away from the norm, when damage and 
misunderstanding cause rifts in the functioning of a social group that they seek redress 
from those in a position of authority. In fact we may revert to the MDS verses which 
outline the stages by which law is processed, and read it now as transposed, in either the 
                                               
355 See in much detail Menski (1998: 37; 222) for a clear call for a new research agenda, and further setting 
up a six-point plan on the basis of findings from several cohesive international research conferences 
centered on analysing the ‘dowry problem’ (1998: 219). 
 
 
277 
ancient/modern context not from the Vedas/Constitution downwards, but from the model 
behaviour of people upwards. So to press the point, to create an awareness of the living 
law we can move from the socially accepted normative behaviour of respected people, or 
sadācāra. Clearly in the misunderstanding that dowry was itself the problem and not the 
‘bad’ form where women are actively objectified and dismissed as mere carriers of 
wealth the enactment of a law, which did not dare ban a custom the DPA fell prey to its 
own ineffectiveness. While enacting rules therefore we may need to move from the 
position of authority down. 
 Although it is not the intent of this research to suggest solutions, however it would 
be wrong to not summarise possible options for future research, which will further aid an 
understanding of the wider, and more specific, issue of dowry. 
Therefore: 
 A new research agenda must be set highlighting all the angles to be 
studied; 
 A state-funded and academically drawn programme must utilise social 
and legal agencies to study the specificity of dowry; 
 Academic and Non-governmental agencies must collate all the research 
data available to date and begin to synthesize this; 
 Media and press must disseminate the information that dowry and dowry 
murder are two disparate issues. 
Finally, it is important to clarify the role of academia on the route for redressing a 
socially motivated phenomenon like dowry. Research, and even law, can only go so far. 
Self-restraint was advocated in the past, but the entanglement of social status, traditional 
practises and culturally specific behaviour make such suggestion virtually impossible to 
apply (Menski, 1998: 55). In India’s new found confidence as a burgeoning world 
economy, dowry is actually bound to thrive rather than to decline. Besides it has been and 
is still seen after all as a marker of status in communities both at home and abroad, which 
will only add a newer dimension to its practice (Jhutti, 1998: 191-194; Saavala, 2010). A 
specialised research project, enlisting experts should include linguistic learning to access 
the past, sociological analysts, legal professionals, and social activists. Apart from this a 
clear information gathering agenda must be set incorporating an active research principle 
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to understand the functioning of social norms in their culturally specific habitat. The need 
for further research at ground level remains real. 
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Table 3: All India Dowry Death Index (1991-2000) [Mumbai Crime Branch] 
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Table 4: Atrocities against Women (1995-2002) [Mumbai Crime Branch] 
 
 
281 
 
 
Chapter 7 
 
The phantom of dowry 
Without ontology or epistemology dowry functions almost, under the guise of well-
established good behaviour, or sadācāra; Derrett (1984: 185) confirms that there is no 
Sanskrit word for the practice. Hooja’s (1969: 15) research, the first concerted work in 
the area of dowry practice, also reflects that there is no ancient terminology for the 
practice of dowry in its modern sense. M. N. Srinivas’s (1984: 13) characterisation of 
dowry as problematically positioned only in its modern context, as created by the British 
administration has been dismissed by the examination of the old textual material here. 
Specifically examinations of expectations within marriage guidelines, and further within 
the literary clues that point clearly to the accumulation of wealth, this thesis has found 
that dowry did indeed function as a normative marital custom. Importantly, this was 
considered good behaviour, and emulated. 
The analysis in this chapter weaves together the various threads of my thesis 
argument so far, reiterating the customary nature of dowry as an established institution 
carried forward through a customary collective social conscience. The evaluation of the 
evidence from the ancient texts with regard to the expectations of dowry within the 
negotiations for marriage is further clarified. This chapter draws together the various 
threads of discussion from the previous six chapters to reiterate the thesis that dowry has 
existed as part of the Indian Hindu tradition as a major determinant in suitable marriage 
selections and continues to coexist with a law that cannot ban it as a defiant socially 
sanctioned custom. It reiterates that custom is stronger than law in practice, and therefore 
argues that dowry murder be examined as an obvious by-product of brutal domestic 
violence.  
And finally, the status and role of the anti-dowry law as a meaningful strategy is 
reassessed. Derrett (1984: 181) claims in no uncertain terms that “Dowry does figure in 
the sastra, and has done so for a very long time.” Interestingly his observation that the 
practice is dealt with in a “…sly fashion, half-heartedly, shamefacedly” highlights the 
conceptual underpinning of this intensely patriarchal construct. My thesis finds a further 
more tangible link, asserting that dowry has in fact existed from  gvedic times, quite 
clearly. I go further to say therefore that dowry is a conceptual construct of Vedic Indian 
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society, conceptualised to strengthen and enjoin positive marriage unions based on the 
idealised model as represented in the codified traditions of textual authority.  
Therefore, my thesis explored the role of tradition and text as agents in shaping 
the notion of dowry, and its indisputable position in Indian society today as an 
uncomfortable sadācāra or dharma with a very small‘d’. The thesis states therefore that 
dowry has existed as part of the Indian Hindu tradition as a major determinant in suitable 
marriage matches and continues to co-exist with a law that did not dare ban it as a defiant 
socially sanctioned custom because dowry negotiations occur in an area outside the reach 
of official law. 
 
7.1 Summary conclusion and chapter summaries 
That the Brahma form of Hindu marriage is the model for modern dowry 
marriage is the core argument of my thesis. In these roots lie the very murky, but 
discernible workings of dowry as an intricate and fail-safe system using the notion of 
appropriate behaviour as sadācāra to perpetuate itself. I have found and stated the 
evidence from the anthropological work of Lina Fruzetti (1996/1999) based on women in 
rural West Bengal clearly attest this view point. Apart from a myriad relevant references 
in the ‘texts’, the Mahābhāra a is almost a manual of medieval marriage arrangements, 
clearly highlighted by Stephanie Jamison (1996). Furthermore, using the methodological 
tools highlighted by Ronald Inden (2006) in his appraisal of the role anthropology and 
history have played and continue to play in the construction of a South Asian worldview, 
I have claimed that within the garb of tradition lies the conceptualisation of an 
uncomfortable modernity, which continues to use medieval, and even ancient customs to 
strive for a progressive future. All this is outlined by Inden (1976; 2006) and is in support 
of my argument as I stated and developed in chapter two. 
I discussed the conflict between the subaltern view of India, and the need to 
recognise itself as a nation state. Laws and a legal system are the fundamental provision 
of such an entity. This is where my thesis fits with the conceptual leanings of Hindu law, 
within the gamut of Anglo-Hindu law laid down in 1772, by the Declaration of Warren 
Hastings. However, the possibility for the third world to disentangle itself from both, 
constructions of the older European imperial ideologies and its own discourse with its 
past, seems an impossible task to achieve. As Inden (2006: 62) points out in summarising 
the role the social sciences post World War II are meant to play, “The peoples of a newly 
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discovered ‘third world’ are no longer to be appendages of European states, they are to be 
become [sic.] independent, sovereign nation-states. Social scientists are to take up the 
question of how in the absence of direct or even indirect ‘administrative’ subordination to 
European centres these ‘new nations’ are to find their place in the world.”  
My thesis finds itself in the position of clarifying its agenda with reference to my 
own position as an Indologist with anthropological training, using historical tools to 
examine tradition in the field of religious law. To account for the phantom of dowry, 
which neither has definition nor ontology within textual representations, yet is a powerful 
player in the field of marriage laws, is a tough ask. However, by using the excellent 
research that has gone before it has been possible to engage in a discourse of what dowry 
is and how it has formulated itself to become an entrenched partner to most Hindu, even 
Indian marriages. The canvas against which this custom is set is the role tradition 
continues to play in shaping modernity, and thereby becomes a constant in the field of 
marriage. Relying here on several textual and recent anthropological data confirmed that 
other forms of marriage prestations have been displaced in favour of dowry, which is 
currently established as the dominant model of marriage prestations in India. This shift 
adequately documented in various anthropological data, appears to have occurred along 
the lines of Sanskritisation whereby lower castes and classes have emulated and 
appropriated the symbols and practices of the highest caste in order to better their own 
status. Further, an important conclusion we can draw from this discovery is that a custom 
has claimed precedence over the rule of official law.  
In fact dowry appears to function in this grey area, outside the scope of official law, 
which is governed in the main by custom, in an intricate interplay of rites and rituals during 
marriage under the aegis of clan codes. The means of knowing these codes is a complex 
reconstruction of remembered knowledge or Sruti, as contained in the four Vedas, but by 
first and foremost accessing the elements of that remembered knowledge filtered into the 
popular consciousness in terms of doing what the peer group considers right and good for 
its own survival as a superior unit of society. Therefore sadācāra spreads itself in terms of 
local knowledge, as an un-codified set of practises which compel actions even though they 
may be believed to be in contravention of the law. 
Dowry as a practise is believed to be good, and therefore to practise it is considered 
good behaviour or sadācāra. As we discussed, the performance of these practises may not 
be called sadācāra as this is an archaic term contained within the academic domain of 
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analysis. At ground level, this good behaviour may be expressed in terms of following 
procedures prescribed by kul dharma clan-codes to uphold and maintain kul maryada or 
clan prestige. When practises contrary to the western models of behaviour, as expressed 
and expected during a long duration of history in British and post British-India, the clash of 
civilisation caused considerable readjustment on the part of the indigenous population. 
Several practises were not openly discussed, or even publicly acknowledged. A conspiracy 
of sorts seems to have been the order to the day, whereby dowry was still in practise as a 
revered and required custom, but as it was frowned upon, it was not openly discussed. As 
Indian law making, and law makers continue to acknowledge the superiority of western 
model jurisprudence and book centred ideals, the widespread customary behaviour of 
norms like dowry get pushed into the shadowy underground of apparent taboo. The nature 
of Indian society seems to call for a recasting of tradition in order to re-invent modernity, 
and therefore the attitude of fathers-of-brides-to-be tends to feel the pressure of the past and 
responds to the compelling need to gift, and give other valuable property with the 
sampradan of the daughter on her life-defining journey as she becomes wife, and potential 
mother from merely daughter. The peer pressure presents itself in two voices, one that of 
traditionally held beliefs, which enjoin the giving of wealth with the girl, and onwards after 
to secure and establish ties of kinship, and risk imprisonment for this behaviour. The other 
is to not give dowry and be upheld in the eyes of the law as a good father, who values a 
daughter above wealth, and risk the break with tradition as enjoined by generations of peers 
and quash the dearly held clan-codes. Now, as evidenced in the widespread practise of 
dowry in marriages in the past fifty years or so since the DPA (1961) was enacted the need 
to practise dowry has not been addressed. A father continues to feel the weight of negative 
pressure if he does not suitably “bedeck” his daughter and her imaginary “bridal” with the 
choicest of what he can afford. Instead he feels like a bad father if he does not give dowry. 
Girls themselves have been known to undertake jobs in distant places, earning in foreign 
currency to supply and support their fathers who need to ostensibly furnish the dowry 
payment (Saavla, 2010).  
The primary aim of the thesis was to trace the development of dowry as a custom 
from its earliest conceptualisations to its current form. The analysis examined the 
beginnings of the conceptual model by laying out the ancient texts as expectations 
enjoined during marriage. In this manner the underlying practice of dowry was sifted 
from the preserved words and preoccupations of a distant society in the light of their 
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aspirational ideals laid out in the many layers of a contradictory textual tradition. My 
intent was to outline a conceptual model for the functioning of dowry expectations as an 
accepted custom and thereby produce an in-depth study of the conceptual framework that 
underlies the custom of dowry. Was the custom of dowry blameworthy in essence? 
Dowry as a custom may not be as problematic as it has been made out to be by confused 
attempts at law-making. The attempt of this thesis to examine dowry as a complex 
conglomerate of culture set out the following: 
1]  Formulate a meaningful conceptual model to analyse the perpetuation of dowry 
The conceptual model to meaningfully analyse and assess the perpetuation for dowry as a 
custom is the well-defined sacred and superior structure for human marriages set out in 
the  ūr yās k  a verses of     da X.85. Additionally, the enjoinment to give wealth in the 
verses of Book 14 of the Atharvaveda, clearly constitutes the giving of dowry as 
exemplary good behaviour from the earliest notions of human marriages based on the 
divine.   
2] Emphasise the role of custom over the hold of law in terms of application 
Any assessment of the DPA and its amendments clearly shows a lack of applicability, 
when a legal provision is not rooted in the belief system of the people it attempts to serve. 
Therefore, the hold of custom wins out over the influence of law in the Indian context 
with specific reference to dowry practises, by enshrining the sum of initially Rs. 2000, 
updated in the 1980s to Rs. 5000 as an acceptable cash sum to constitute symbolic dowry. 
3] Distinguish the custom of dowry as separate from the act of dowry murder 
That violent death is associated with dowry demands gone wrong is not in dispute, but 
there has been a messy overlap between domestic violence fuelled homicides as versus 
specific cases of dowry related murder. Future research must address this overlap, in 
order to redress it.  
4] Identify the displacement of other marriage transactions in favour of dowry 
Discussions in chapters 4 and 5, and part of chapter 6 demonstrated how the dowry model 
of marriage has displaced all other forms of marriage not just in Hindu communities but 
as an economic transaction to barter for better social standing in pan-Indian communities, 
at home and abroad. 
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7.1.2 Chapter summaries 
The following summaries form the concluding assessment of this thesis and its aims as 
defined briefly above, and demonstrate the core conclusion of the argument here. This 
will lead into the final concluding analysis. 
In chapter 2 my thesis examined the negotiation between custom and text in the 
understanding of legality in the context of ancient India, this chapter principally focuses 
on the traditional cultural texts themselves, since it is crucial to understand the role of the 
Hindu textual tradition in society as encapsulated in the Vedic and later s     tradition. In 
examining the place of texts it was crucial to note the varying agenda of much of the 
research conducted on and around Indian traditional texts. My study focussed on 
Brahmanical Sanskrit texts, regarded as religious texts by early scholars, but classed as 
cultural texts within this thesis. Propelled by a strong literary bias, western scholars 
interpreted ancient Indian data as religious “texts”. To counter this critique of Hindu 
tradition nationalists sought to prove that women, specifically in Vedic India had been 
accorded a high position. The dominant trend among nationalist writers was to glorify the 
past position of Indian women. Before it became an established academic tradition, 
several factors influenced the nationalist discourse on women. It was believed that the 
older the text the greater its authenticity regarding women and, further Indian scholars 
adopted the nationalist rhetoric of a “golden age” as a historical paradigm to study the 
status of women in ancient India. Altekar’s recommendation for the emancipation of 
modern Indian women is not only limited but patronizing. My study has focussed on the 
Brahmanical Sanskrit texts, regarded as religious texts by early scholars.   
‘Texts’ are collections of tradition, we may conclude. Women do not appear to be 
composing teachings or observations during the ancient period or even expressing their 
views on women’s role in society. To examine the role tradition has played in shaping 
texts is most clear when we consider the role expectations of women contained in the 
Brahmanical discourse. In answering this question the influence of tradition over text and 
thereby of text over tradition became clearer. Notably, women are mostly identified by 
their physiological and bodily functions. In feminist terms they are mapped onto. Chapter 
2 highlighted the emphatic influence of social traditions on the way cultural texts were 
shaped.   
So chapter 3 exposed the inherent tensions between legal text and social custom. 
Further it demonstrated the argument of text versus custom and modern law in India, 
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including the role of the state in formulating legal statute. The methodological approach 
here took into account the importance of ‘legal pluralism’: briefly this thesis confirms, as 
Indian legal systems past and present display, classic signs of two or more laws 
interacting.356 Since the primary source materials employed here are ancient Indian texts, 
the application of textual and legal anthropology is important. Chiba’s observation that 
historically law has been studied in exclusion from its social environment was taken up 
and discussed. The working of the dowry system as a legal postulate shows up as a 
resilient social norm in constant conflict with official law. The definition of sastra as law 
book or “works of law” seems reductionist, almost restrictive. Dharma has to date been 
variously explained; as law, custom, righteousness even duty and religion. I demonstrated 
how families negotiate between official laws of the state and custom in the way they 
practice dowry. How indeed do modern Indian families view these texts, are they thought 
of as guidebooks or law?  
Modern Indian legal statutes similar to the ancient texts offer only guidance, it is 
not legal prescription; ought not is. It appears that formal state law is continually trying to 
haul custom into its jurisdiction while custom remains resilient. The current formal 
dowry law attempts to ban dowry as a custom in order to check the occurrence of 
widespread dowry murder. Hindu law has been battling with the social consequences of 
outlawing bigamy, child marriage, sati and dowry for half a century. Tradition, or what 
one considers unwritten custom, is in direct conflict with the dictates of state-law, with 
tradition or custom frequently overriding law. Criminalising dowry has not worked, as 
Derrett, a legal theorist and Dumont, a social scientist warned. The dowry system remains 
stubbornly in place. In 2002 1,512 cases of harassment by in-laws were registered. 
Returning to the thread of my argument within this thesis, when examining the position 
of law and law making as represented by these ancient texts, we find dowry unwritten but 
very present as a customary practise throughout the textual material. 
And, the analysis in chapter 4 holds that this custom of dowry demands, and even 
dowry marriages are an accepted norm in wider Indian society through a wide historical 
period. In terms of defining terminology Srinivas (1984: 11-13) categorically 
distinguishes modern dowry from both dakş na or gift, and s rīdhan. His assertions that 
the modern monstrosity of dowry being linked to the notion of dakş na was fallacious. 
                                               
356 Most legal systems display this intersection of two or more laws; it is therefore a feature not unique to 
Indian legal systems. 
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His view was that modern dowry was bad, and that ancient forms of dowry as related to 
the kanya dan Brahma form of marriage were somehow good. Here we see reflections 
from our discussion in chapter 2, about the deep influence of nationalist thinking on 
academia, and the casting of golden origins (Rabinow, 1984) searching for a golden age 
of good behaviour.  
Further, the tussle between dowry and bride-price was explored, demonstrably 
dowry displaced bride-price. As a customary norm therefore dowry marriages have 
expectations implicit in their very practise. The evidence of dowry present in the literary 
sources available on Hindu marriage negotiations yielded clues to the nature of the 
practice of dowry prestations as a custom considered exemplary by a socially elite group. 
This social elite, then comes to represent those to be emulated by all of society. In a 
modern context, this becomes wider than the Hindu community. Suddenly dowry 
sadācāra applies to others as well, Hindu or not. Therefore in terms of Sanskritisation 
(Staal, 1963) the behaviour of an elite group infects the wider community. 
A detailed examination of the Brahma form of marriage and its subsequent 
codification as the legal form of marriage valid for all Hindus, in the modern Hindu 
Marriage Act (1955) therefore was necessary. This conceptualisation of marriage at a 
pan-Indian level in the explicit terms of kanya dan as the best form of marriage, and the 
best form of gift highlights the emphatic idealisation of dowry marriage in the current 
context (Raheja, 1988: 121).  The theory of gift-giving as discussed examined Marcel 
Mauss’s conceptual examination of marriage prestations. Succinctly: Other forms of 
marriage prestations have been displaced in favour of dowry, which is currently 
established as the dominant model of marriage prestations in India. Hypergamy has had 
an indelible impact on the nature of dowry; whereby the Brahma form of marriage as 
dowry marriage, incorporating and assimilating Āsura form into a new form of modern 
Hindu even Indian marriage. The examination has shown that Muslim, and Christian 
marriages include dowry payments. While considering the position of women as property 
it became clear that women in the ancient context are seen to belong to the husband and 
by extension to his clan, for the precise object of procreation and protection of the male 
line. The tussle between dowry and bride-price demonstrated that dowry displaces bride-
price. My belief is that dowry and dowry-related practices both during and after the 
marriage are governed by these fluid rules operating within the jurisdiction of custom. 
Dowry is contemporary sadācāra. 
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As we saw in chapter 5 the discussion mainly covered what the texts express on 
the nature of Hindu marriage in its various forms and how certain marriage transactions 
emerge as norms. Most pertinent to the present argument is the fact that this form of 
marriage does in fact bear resemblance to the divine marriage of  ū ryā with Soma, as 
described in the  gveda marriage hymn. Later marriages are modelled upon this one, and 
the bride is called  ū ryā in emulation of the model marriage. Further, most contemporary 
studies of Hindu marriage see the kanyadān form of marriage as the form which is free 
from any gift, other than that of the “pure gift of the girl”. Of the eight valid forms of 
marriage few remain prevalent today. The Brahma form of marriage emphasises the 
apparently “free gift of the daughter” to a suitably chosen, qualified groom by her father 
or guardian. To clarify however the influential Gautamadharmasutra I.44, clearly states 
that in the Brahma form of marriage the maiden is gifted away “bedecked with clothes 
and ornaments”. Usage shows how this marriage form is not regarded as been uniquely to 
be used by the highest born but rather the name leads us to the expectations underlying 
the nomenclature. The name Brahma was given to this form of marriage to underline and 
even enjoin and ensure its emulation as the form of most esteemable marriage to be used 
as a model by all sections of society, regardless of their rank or clan. The kanyadān (gift 
of the virgin) is one of the central rites in the marriage ritual. Gifts must exchange hands 
when a bride is taken and given at a marriage ceremony. There is clear evidence that the 
text is enjoining the preference of marriage by gift, Brahma rather than marriage by 
purchase, Asura. In medieval Bengal as highlightd particularly by Inden’s (1976) 
research, however, a new emphasis is placed on marriage, whereby both of these 
marriage forms came to represent the ability to transform rank. I argued that the list of 
acceptable marriages, enjoining certain behaviour above another is in itself a form of 
textualised sadācāra. 
Finally according to the assessment of the DPA in chapter 6, as Derrett said, I too 
do not see an end to the dowry-system. The anti-dowry law appears to have failed. It is 
evident that legislative measures such as the DPA have further confused a seriously 
complex issue. Neither dowry nor dowry murder is conceptualised by the actors as a 
crime at all. The socio-legal significance of dowry prestations and payments appears 
directly linked to the position of women in wider Hindu society. The payment of dowry 
accompanies the gift of a daughter, and this is symbolised within the very marriage ritual 
as we have seen, in ancient and medieval marriage models. In modern Hindu marriage, as 
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we have seen over several millennia the dowry is quite separate from the gift of the girl. 
Women are the objects being transferred with dowries. Demands for dowry have begun 
to be camouflaged after the passing of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, and its 
amendments in 1984 and 1986. Dowry, however, is not a guarantee of either a safe or 
good marriage. The emphasis on dowry representing status is clearly crucial. Neither 
bride-price nor dowry practices are satisfactory in terms of women’s empowerment 
however. It is not possible, nor advisable to isolate the question of dowry death and 
domestic violence in the contemporary context from any discussion on the wider custom 
of dowry. Dowry may be a relatively tame accomplice in most marriages across the 
globe. Many deaths are wrongly registered as dowry killings or dowry-related suicide. 
The continuing greed for dowry, and indeed the persistence of the customary dowry 
system call for a new approach altogether. 
 
7.2 Concluding analysis through the reflexive lens 
So does doing the right and proper thing flow from an understanding of text driven law? 
Or does it flow more naturally from tradition? Maine (1986: 1) highlighted the validity of 
“immemorial unwritten tradition” and his recognition of this phenomenon, is crucial to 
the conclusion here. In a much wider international context the notion of sadācāra may be 
equal to that of “unwritten tradition”. In India more field work is required to expose the 
plural workings of the ancient and medieval Indian legal systems still at play. In spite of 
several attempts at giving (what for lack of better nomenclature continues to be called) 
“Hindu” law, a place on the world’s legal stage little has been acheived. Essentially any 
‘other’ systems of law remain on the outside, sub-servient still to model western 
juriprudence. Whether the persistently excellent shape that the works of Prof. Derrett, 
Masaji Chiba and most particularly Prof. Menski (2010: Forthcoming) have given to non-
western model jurisprudence will yield in the future remains to be seen. But for the 
present concepts and notions like the unwritten community social conscience or 
sadācāra, although not unique to Indian society, will continue to fall outside the precept 
of wider international society because it does not quite fit with the understanding of 
European models of acceptable, legal behaviour. 
 If we illustrate the field of law and society, within their anthropological context in 
modern India, with specific reference to dowry practice we find we are flying kites 
(Menski, 2010). Whether the weather is good or bad, there is always a multiplicity of 
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circumstances and issues working in the anthropological field of law. Developing from 
the notions seen in Fig. 1 above, where we saw the triangular interaction between law and 
religion, and custom to inform the manner in which dowry is practiced in social reality; it 
becomes clear that in any situational context a custom, even law, is subject to several 
forces in the field of practice.  
See the illustrations below for a demonstration of various possibilities of how 
custom and law ant any given point are influenced by the plural effects of a variety of 
factors. This model of course is not uiniquely applicabale only to Indian society, but 
attempts to explain the field in terms of legal applicapbilty in an International context.  
 
Fig 7: THE FOUR PART KITE MODEL: Forces acting on custom 
 
7.1: The original model:  natural law/ethics  
          1  
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7.2 The dashes 
socio-legal approaches 
 
 
 
       
  
 
 
 
 
 
     2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.3: The model with marble affect in the centre indicates messy pluralism 
The outer circle frames within it everything under state law = positivism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
   
        3 
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7.4:  The model with different fields within it: International norms, human 
rights, new natural law 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
        4 
Illustration Key:  
If 1 at the top, 2 on the right side, 3 on the left side and 4 at the bottom. The 
sequence is 1=natural law/ethics etc., 2=socio-legal approaches, 3=state law = 
positivism, and 4 international norms, human rights, new natural law. 
 
Recent studies (Saavla, 2010) show indisputably that the nature of the Indian 
family is changing. Particularly with reference to marriage and women these studies 
suggest that the family is transforming itself from a unit of production to one of 
consumption. Further, that this transformation is being coerced towards nucleation 
instead of extension in order to cement the bond of family. The model in modern society 
of the family has changed, even evolved from the joint to the nuclear structural unit of 
families in most settings, urban or rural. These studies particularly of urban women 
conclude that an emerging secular, nuclear family unit, as opposed to the traditional 
sacred one, today provides the new model for future Indian families (D’Souza, 1970; 
Fonseca 1963, 1964, 1966; Kannan, 1961, 1963; Kapadia 1958; Kapur, 1970; Ross, 
1961). Nonetheless, the social process as evidenced in both the rural and urban context in 
India demonstrates how tradition continues to coexist alongside modernity and its thrust 
of change, without conflict or contradiction. In fact change is itself constantly recast and 
understood in terms of tradition, often through recourse to text, whether through memory 
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or written remembrance. In spite of some evidence that there has been some change at 
certain levels of caste societies there is also evidence of strong resilience in traditional 
societal patterns, specifically in hierarchical layering of clans. Marriage and its related 
rituals and customs preclude drastic changes in the essential structure of society. Notably, 
in terms of idealised behaviour or sadācāra, in modern society the individual still accepts 
assigned role functions in the wider system of hierarchy and plays out his/ her obligations 
in keeping with the greater common good, as it is perceived to be. Individual goals 
remain consonant with the higher goals of the group, or the lineage: the continuity of the 
present with ancestors, and finally the group’s code of conduct or kul dharma.  
  adāc āra therefore becomes almost a cog in the wheel of dharma; it keeps 
kuldharma alive and ever present. The practise of a custom outlawed by the state presents 
no conflict to those who continue to practise it. It has been over five decades since the 
DPA came into being, and so there is little point in arguing a lack of a wider knowledge 
of it. Enough protests in rural and urban settings have demonised dowry to inform 
possibly every section of Indian society. That dowry remains resilient speaks of 
something deeper. In the analysis of the ancient, medieval and modern material presented 
for discussion in this thesis it has been evident that dowry has as a matter of course in 
marriages been enjoined from the very first sketch of an imagined sacred union. Since 
that verse was composed some three thousand years ago, a certain prescribed and 
proscribed behaviour have followed in its lead, in commentaries, in retellings of myths 
that enjoin the importance of the duty of a father not just to his daughter as a prospective 
bride, but also to several (sometimes as many as fourteen) generations of his ancestors. 
All these stories, codes of clan-rank and clan-behaviour enjoin the behaviour that 
underlines the importance of marriage to Indian society past and present. Therefore, the 
appropriate rites and rituals being observed during and in the maintenance of Hindu 
marriages is crucial to consider, and dowry is tacked neatly into these rituals. It is 
demonstrably part of the very giving away of the girl, the worship of the groom by the 
father of the bride, in the gifts of wealth and payment of money as a sulka or tax during 
negotiations, engagement ceremonies, nuptials and in behaviour onwards to uphold the 
marriage.   
That dowry is essentially ‘good’ is uncomfortable to observe, academically or 
otherwise. To add to the discomfort is my own experience as a researcher and an Indian, 
Bengali, Bombayite woman. At my own wedding I felt compelled to furnish my new 
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family with gifts that suitably represented the traditions and past of my natal family. 
Being fatherless I felt the need to fill the gap of my father’s duties by taking them over 
myself, but without overtly admitting to this. My husband and I paid for and arranged our 
wedding, but my natal family took the credit. It had to be so. Why? I even stopped to 
consider the uproar it may cause if it were known that the youngest daughter of a family 
was effectively doing the men in the family out of their duty, and thereby angering 
several generations of ancestors, including my father. My insistence to supply ‘quality’ 
hand made items to adequately represent both our social standing and our cultural 
background to my familyto-be was misconstrued by many, and even joked about as I was 
an accomplished dowry academic. I was pressurised to formulate a list of gifts, to make 
copies and keep one with a responsible person in my natal family, “incase…”!  
From my own experience then the knowledge and purview of the law is not 
absent. People know about the amendments; and “the letter of the law” even. But what 
was it that compelled me, an academic with wide knowledge of the elements of what 
constitutes dowry, to gift and bedeck myself suitably?  
Answers are always hardest when they are about oneself, and particularly one’s 
culture. Dowry is a determinant in Indian marriage. It has been and will continue to be. 
Intervention by the colonising, codifying and controlling efforts of the Raj, and now of 
the state have unsettled the balance of priorities in people’s minds. Most parents pay lip-
service to banning dowry from their lives, but practise it nonetheless. Dowry will not go 
away. We must therefore, turn to it, and set up future projects to analyse the good aspects 
of dowry and re-claim the law making process as an inverted pyramid; working from the 
people up, rather than the other way. Dowry is considered good behaviour in India, even 
today, even after it has been an outlaw for fifty years. It is an uncomfortable modernity; 
we are after all players in the international arena of trade and power. Dowry and its 
existence classifies us as socially perverse, and still backward. Dowry is loved, and 
affectionately protected as a possible protector of daughters. But we don’t admit it. Case-
law is rife with statements from grief-stricken families, especially fathers saying, “We 
thought if we gave more”. Dowry is ensconced in the original model of marriage. Indian 
society needs to re-define marriage in a new mode, as a union between two individuals in 
a new society, but still upholding the very universe we inhabit. Until dowry is seen to 
underpin the upholding of that universe we cannot un-tack it, and should not. Even if we 
won’t as a nation admit to it. 
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 To reroute this discussion to the present let us consider the making of mindsets, 
which is what we are dealing with as the broader theme of this research. A government 
backed study, carried out by UNIFEM,357 UN Habitat, and Jagori, an NGO working in 
the field of education, health and women’s welfare in Delhi,358 based on a survey of a 
sample of 5010 men and women during January-March 2010, found that 2 in every 3 
women in the Indian capital city of New Delhi have faced some form of sexual 
harassment in the last year. This report entitled “Safe city free of violence for women and 
girls” succinctly endorses the conception of women by the male mindset and 
demonstrates the continuing struggle on a daily level for girls. If at ground level there is 
no respect for the physical safety of women to the extent this study suggests, then it goes 
to the very core of the society which breeds such a mindset. And customs, like 
behaviours that infringe on the human rights of women are rooted in and stem from a 
cultural attitude that is both deep and entrenched. There is an urgent need to address this 
mindset with a clarification, posed by research contained in this thesis, which points the 
lens inward, and does not aim to blame-shift to any external agencies. Much, therefore 
remains to be researched, and somehow done. 
 From a triangular tussle between traditional cultural texts, modern legal text and 
custom, custom emerges as most potent in people’s daily lives. To return to our wider 
worldview of the universe as seen through an Indian lens everything is connected. The 
first photo plate that visually led into this thesis, with its emphasis on a circle of solidarity 
has in turn come full circle. We see, overleaf (photo plate 2, pp. 295), where the world 
has widened from ancient times. There is an airplane in the sky, and a motor car/bus on 
the street, alongside what could be Sūryā’s bridal chariot. They all fit in to the 
microcosmic world of dharma, which remains linked to the wider world of rta. From our 
evidence dowry practice forges, and renews so many of these crucial links. It has not 
been legislated away from people’s minds in the ideal marital context. We must therefore 
put modern dowry under the lens once more, contextualising it within the wider 
worldview of the people it matters to, in order to deal with its daily repercussions 
meaningfully.  
 
                                               
357 UNIFEM is the UN development fund for women, and UN Habitat, is the UN human settlements 
programme. 
358 As reported by the BBC on 9th July 2010; www.bbc.co.uk/news/10567761 
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Photo plate 2:  Past and present “Cosmic and chaotic solidarity” 
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Chapter 8 
The Postscript: Dowry exists 
Dowry exists. The persistence of dowry as a problem is borne out by the most 
recent ruling in the well-known Nisha Sharma case in India. The erring in-laws have now 
been acquitted. The judge believes the ruse to call off the wedding by crying ‘dowry 
demand’ was a pre-planned hoax on the part of the bride. After being hailed as a heroine 
of sorts in the dowry debacle, Nisha now finds herself as much at fault as her mother-in-
law who she accused of greed. (Indian Express, 1st March 2012). Similarly as reported on 
the BBC and covered in several dailies, Purnima Halder of West Bengal sold her three 
daughters aged nine, seven and three for less than the equivalent amount of £3(India 
Today, 2nd September 2012). Though it is claimed she did this as she could not afford to 
feed them and was concerned for their wellbeing, it cannot be overlooked that one of the 
social workers handling the case admitted on national television that the mother of three 
daughters did this also with a view of not having to pay their dowry in the future. This is 
reminiscent of the mentality that spews marketing by-lines for female amniocentesis and 
other sex selection clinic advertising, which blatantly advocate “Pay Rs500 now, save Rs 
5000 later” (Dowry Today). 
Dowry remains persistently a problem.  In fact, in spite of a deeply debated 
prohibitive statute, the DPA of 1961, dowry practice in India and across Indian 
communities continues virtually unchecked. This thesis asked why? The answer appears 
in the smoke trail of expectations surrounding the institution of Indian Hindu marriage, 
and even beyond it into Christian and Muslim, and even Buddhist marriages. The intent 
of this final concluding essay is to summarise the main core argument as set out in the 
main body of the thesis, and further to reiterate this with additional explanations 
highlighting the fatal auspiciousness linked to dowry behaviour within locally variant 
cultural contexts.  A further intent of this final chapter is therefore to tie the loosely 
woven threads into a clearer, more tangible, neat research knot.  
Dowry expectations, this thesis demonstrated (Chapter 5) are woven into the very 
fabric of the most highly emulated of all ancient marriage forms, the Brahma form as 
described by the cultural texts. That said, the myriad social practices concerning dowry 
and gift giving remain in existence; and are most prominent in the variation of their 
practise across the Indian subcontinent and now also in the Diaspora. This thesis was not 
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built on anthropological fieldwork and instead focused on the evident strength of the 
largely invisible links between ancient texts and daily practice, which may not on the part 
of participants, have anything to do with those ancient texts. But it appears that the basic 
models and patterns set by such traditions of gift giving and transfers of property on the 
occasion of marriage have deep social roots as well. The thesis thus argued that this 
apparently idealised and pure marriage form has actually been encoded as the official 
Hindu marriage enshrined by the positivist state law into the Hindu Marriage Act (HMA) 
(1955), which it is expected will be followed by all those marrying officially under Hindu 
rites.359 Weaving traditional norms into state legislative principles is not uncommon in 
the Indian context. Further, that those debating the then problematic trend of excessive 
gift giving also instituted a prohibitive statute DPA (1961) only six years after having 
outlined the popular trend for Hindu marriages also allowed the symbolic sum of Rs. 
2000 (extortionate for some, paltry for many) speaks to the clear understanding that the 
statute was intended more as an educative tool, rather than a piece of applicable law-
making. The DPA proves to be symbolic, even myopic legislation.360  
In terms of dowry-related decision making, at ground level the colloquial Hindi 
term rassam or reshum, is critical to note as it is linked to a local belief in tradition. There 
is a clear directive that this comes from local, family based, community influenced 
behaviour patterns, in-scripted into society through repetition for a long period of time. 
Local custom and tradition in fact have much more bearing than becomes apparent from 
even a cursory reading of Hindu culture and society. In this sense, this concluding 
analysis will also note the relevance of sadācāra as dharma with a very small‘d’; as a 
source of ascertaining the ‘right thing to do’ when it concerns dowry-behaviour. 
 
The core argument:  
This thesis linked the ancient model for marriage laid out in RVX.85 to the modern 
vision enshrined in the HMA (1955) and commented on the similar trend that the official 
perception of ‘tradition’ is seen to take. That social practice may be something quite 
different was made clear throughout the thesis. The thesis commented further on the role 
                                               
359 Under the provision of the Special Marriage Act [1954] all persons of Indian descent (almost) need to 
marry under the blessing as it were of this act. In reality much fewer marriages end up being officially 
registered. 
360 See below the discussion on the importance of the four-fold path to dharma for more detail on this 
aspect of the prohibitive law. 
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of importance laid on following positivist notions of book law, but also examined the 
idea that these books have at least partly been created by tradition in themselves. 
Therefore, the crux of the thesis highlighted that dowry as a part of Indian Hindu 
marriage has always existed, and that it grew and evolved, as did society around it. 
Conspicuous consumption and middle class morality today (Saavala, 2010) are not 
enough to explain away the depth to which dowry is embedded within the traditional 
practices of many disparate and similar communities across India and in ex-patriate 
Indian communities. Therefore, dowry according to this thesis and demonstrably from 
social examples cannot be easily extricated, let alone expunged by legislative fiat, from 
Indian marriage or society. Dowry therefore refuses to be made illegitimate. The primary 
reason for this is manifestly the strong link of dowry with auspiciousness and gift giving, 
which is considered highly powerful in relation to clan rank transformation and 
maintenance, in the garb of hypergamy (Chapter 4). So, dowry is veritably written into 
South Asian societies and also into the very fabric of the statute that claims to ban it. It is 
clearly present within ancient norms of marriage and is evident in medieval and finally in 
modern marriage practice. To whatever extent, a girl is rarely married without the 
expectation, and the giving of traditionally acceptable gifts.  
 Highlighting these trends the research here clearly points out, without turning into 
a predominantly law-centred thesis, that banning dowry has in the main been a myopic 
failure on the part of the modern Indian administration. Dowry is a classic 
interdisciplinary Area Studies phenomenon, which cannot be studied in a mono-
dimensional way. The unsatisfactory development of Indian legal studies, however, has 
prevented proper analysis of such issues and has led to propagandistic handling of the 
theme by many participants, some of whom (most evidently Madhu Kishwar in 1989) 
have come to realise that banning dowry outright is not the way forward, anyway. There 
needs to be a fresh approach, both academically and legislatively, which will take into 
account the auspiciousness of the gift of a girl and what should clearly be construed as 
her part in the wealth accompanying her into the new marital home.  
This thesis states what practice at ground level confirms, namely that the 
prohibitive dowry statute of 1961 (amended in the 1980s) is mere symbolic legislation. 
The only academic study (Oldenburg, 2002), linking traditional and modern forms of 
dowry practice, was released over a decade ago. My thesis suggests, not quite for the first 
time and as Derrett (1984) and Dumont (1954) prophesised, dowry is very much part of 
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the cultural textual tradition of India and South Asia and has been so from its earliest 
inception. Prof. Witzel’s (1995) claim of “little dowry and no sati” in the Vedic context 
was taken up and considered through my unpublished Masters work (1999) and it is 
confirmed here that dowry has clear Rgvedic roots. Clearly therefore, dowry as a 
customary marriage practice needs urgent re-examination, both through tradition and in 
the form of text because it will not be made illegitimate. 
The primary analytical aim of this thesis was to examine the historical articulation 
between traditional cultural texts and modern statutory law (also a form of text) 
indicating the crucial relevance of dowry as a customary practice to Indian marriage past 
and present. Concerned with the inscription in society and law of a particularistic notion 
and set of practices comprising dowry deemed ‘right’ and desirable good custom or 
sadācāra (good social norm). The central focus here is that dowry is and has been and 
continues to be a socially sanctioned, and for those who can afford it, necessary part of 
Hindu even Indian marriage. Glenn (2004: 298) characterises the situation aptly when he 
notes that the notion of law which did not appear to be contained in the books or verses of 
the Vedas needed to be gleaned “from somewhere”, he therefore rightly assumes that: 
“Local tradition, of the virtuous,” or sadācāra, is where he suggests one may find this. 
Tradition, I argued, is to some extent text; maybe oral/ non-textual but 
nonetheless a script. Therefore, the notion of an inscription in society of given behaviours 
during the acting out of the give and take of dowry is almost inscribed onto the 
community enacting the dowry based on their collective memory of the behaviour in 
similar circumstances of their family or peers in the past and present. I argue, within the 
main body of this thesis that texts can to some extent be seen as compilat ions of idealised 
traditions. In tackling dowry the initial difficulty is that this custom is never clearly 
named in the traditional cultural texts. I sought therefore, expectations within the 
literature, which give away the socio-cultural reality of dowry at much earlier stages of 
the literature than most academic research so far has suggested and admitted. The intent 
of this thesis and its conceptual pull has been to redress this lacuna by creating a 
convivial conceptual link between modern, medieval and ancient marriage practices that 
formulate and embed dowry behaviour and practice within Indian society past and 
present. Mine is neither a legal nor an economic thesis, but it operates within the area of 
lawmaking to understand an economically charged custom. In the course of this chapter 
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the troublesome-ness of terminologies will be taken up and discussed, as is relevant to the 
charting of the essential core arguments contained here.  
 
8.1 Fatal auspiciousness  
In discussing dowry in text and context (chapter 4), this thesis has already analysed 
literature on Indian kinship and family (Marriot, 1955; Hutton, 1961; Karve, 1965; 
Dumont, 1966; Tambiah, 1973; Inden, 1976: Madan, 1975, 1987, 1989; Raheja, 1988; 
Fruzetti, 1990; Saavala, 2010). Further, this thesis highlighted Rajaram’s (1983) capital 
theory when considering the making of new marital ties in terms of kinship hierarchy, 
thereby attempting to define dowry in sociological terms (Dumont, 1962; Karve, 1965; 
Raheja, 1988). Srinivas (1984:17) believes this theory, however, to be misleading.361 
That dowry is the sum of gifts and prestations, linked to the formulation of a 
marriage between two people, two families, and finally two communities, tends to be 
central to most Indian marriages, whether Hindu or not. That this gifting behaviour 
continues into the wider married life of the couple, beyond the rites associated with and 
surrounding the wedding itself, and this is always plural, has been clearly demonstrated 
within the main text of the thesis (see Chapter 4). In examining the link of hypergamy to 
dowry marriages the auspiciousness and purity associated with the giving of gold was 
carefully outlined, particularly with reference to Gonda’s (1991: 6-8, 88-89) discovery of 
the need to conspicuously spend and lavish gold in relation to marriage, and before and 
after. The crucial impact of the different degrees of hypergamy, following Blunt’s 
(1931:70) analysis among modern sociologists, Tambiah (1973: 64) finds it ideologically 
critical to the conception of marriage. This is particularly so when considering the 
symbolic kanyadān as he believes this status superiority is inherent in the gift of the 
dowry accompanying the gift of the girl. What becomes the fatal aspect of this 
auspiciousness is when the girl is perceived as merely a carrier of the gift of gold, or cash 
etc. in modern contexts, and not as the one who inherently possesses or carries over the 
auspiciousness in the body of her person. For a much more detailed discussion on the 
degrees of difference in the various regions of India, see section 4.3 above. What is 
considered dān or auspicious charity by the father of the bride (or indeed whoever is 
doing the kanyadān), unfortunately proves to be the starting point for more monetary 
                                               
361 For more expansive discussion on Srinivas’ viewpoint see section 4.1 above, dealing with the problem 
of defining dowry accurately. 
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demands, sometimes resulting in what we refer to as ‘dowry death’. What requires further 
comment is the auspiciousness associated with the act of giving the dowry, the auspicious 
nature of the gifts themselves, and the intensely feminine energy powerfully linked to 
both to the transaction itself and the girl who is seen to carry the gifts across the threshold 
into the new household she and her husband are about to set up (see chapter 3 and chapter 
4 above).  
 Much has been made of the auspiciousness linked to connections created through 
marriage (Hutton, 1961: Dumont, 1966: 116-119; Inden, 1976; Raheja, 1988). In this 
thesis the importance and significance attached to gold as a material of exchange and 
power, and its crucial link to the ancient Brahma form of marriage have already been 
pointed out above (chapter 5). In fact Gonda (1977: 606) goes so far as to say that gold 
was seen as integral to this emulated marriage form, and is clearly attested in the ritual 
sutras. Of course, for common people who cannot afford gold, or may not value it as 
such, other forms of metal will have to do. One could write a whole thesis just on that 
theme and the potential implications for social relations of this subject. Uma Gupta 
(1987: 41) also makes the link of materialism to the mythology of the Vedas.362 Dowry, 
as mentioned above,  in section 4.3 goes into much further detail on the nature of 
hypergamy and its relevance to dowry than we can afford here. Therefore the discussion 
here with relation to hypergamy will remain brief. Hypergamy is clearly seen to go 
towards the creation and maintenance of rank beyond the purely natural act of setting up 
a marriage which by definition sets up a network of auspicious relationships. As 
mentioned, the crux of this thesis included at its core the notion, simplistically, of trading 
wealth for status. In terms of auspiciousness this wealth is never considered as a blatantly 
bartering means of material transaction (Inden, 1976; Fruzetti, 1990). It is always 
interlinked with the notion of auspiciousness in terms of izzat or honour, as discussed in 
4.4 above, when dealing with the concept of women as valuable assets exchanging 
position from natal to affinal family units. 
As noted above in chapter 4, Dumont (1966: 282) highlights the importance of the 
“meritoriousness” of the marriage in terms of prestige, primarily achieved in conditions 
where no payment is received for the girl (sampradān) who is considered the complete 
                                               
362 Gupta is not the first to examine and analyse Vedic mythology in terms of a preoccupation with 
materialism and amassing wealth through ritual, clear arguments in this regard were previously presented 
by Edwards (1924) The Philosophy of Religion also noteworthy is Huxley’s (1957) Religion without 
Revelation. But see also Shastri (1957), Lefever (1935).  
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gift. This emphasis on hypergamy as the model for the most auspicious of marriages in 
crucially noted by ethnographers and anthropologists whether they are dealing with 
communities as far north in Kashmir (Madan, 1975) or at the opposite end of the country 
in Kerala (Vishwanathan, 1993), Bengal (Inden, 1976; Fruzetti, 1993) or  rural north 
India (Raheja, 1994) or Punjab (Oldenburg, 2003). Interestingly the case of this 
preoccupation with hypergamy seems relevant to studies in early nineteenth century 
Indian communities (Risley, 1891; Rivers, 1921) as it is today (Saavala, 2010). Which is 
why, throughout the cultural and even modern literature the writers will balk at the notion 
of marriage as a form of buying and selling children. Rather, what is conceived to be at 
play within the auspicious context of marriage negotiations, the marriage itself, and then 
at rites seen to further uphold and strengthen the initial ties established through marriage, 
the gift of dowry is its direct link to prestige. Inden (1976) makes much of the peculiarity 
of hypergamy in terms of prestige with reference to Bengali marriage negotiations and 
transactions linked to the give and take seen to effect and thereby affect the nature of the 
marriage itself. Rivers, (1921: 12) before Inden also pointed out the link of rank and 
ritual directly linked to gifts being given during this auspicious time. 
 In terms of auspiciousness the muhurat, or auspicious hour in the ancient period 
and still in use, lunar calendars continue to have an important part to play. As is discussed 
elsewhere (Vishwanathan, 1993: 103-105) auspiciousness is courted by the couple and 
their families in the initial setting of not only the date but also the precise time at which 
the knot should literally be tied. Although discussing the marriage arrangements of 
Keralite Christians Vishwanathan (1993) recognises the underlying influences of the 
more ancient traditional perhaps Hindu practices which modern day Christian converts 
act out oddly consonant with traditional rites. These bear resemblance to the behaviour 
during negotiations of ancient, medieval and even modern couples across India. However 
plural and locally variant these norms continue to be, it is hard to ignore the similarity of 
the presence and importance of rules governed by a hypergamous dominant culture. 
Raheja’s (1988: 120) observation during her rigorous study of marriage prestations 
among the Pahansu people in rural north India is worth discussing here.363 Her study 
demonstrably proves, while also unpicking Tambiah’s preoccupation with dowry as pre-
                                               
363 See in detail chapter 4, particularly section 4.3 and the discussion on trading wealth for prestige and 
status. The plural nature of these practices is also overtly noted in the latter, and must be respected within 
the context of these discussions at all times. 
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mortem inheritance, that the ethos of hypergamy appears distinct from the emblematic 
kanyadān principle in wider India, but that crucially the evidence in terms of ritual and 
linguistic data gathered in relation to these prestations clearly represents dowry as a total 
phenomenon. As a matter of fact there is evidence to suggest that acts of giving and 
receiving carry clear messages, coded within the very act of the custom they denote. 
Moreover, power equations are set and controlled between kin-groups and this is what 
foretells the future for the survival of dowry as a practice. The theory of gift-giving 
particularly relevant here considers Mauss’s (1990) conceptual examination of marriage 
prestations.364 
 In terms of a medieval model marriage the Mahābhāra a is replete with 
references as discussed in chapter 2. What is necessary to note here is the importance in 
terms of religious and spiritual leverage accorded to this text. Sullivan (1994: 377-401) 
comments that in the Hindu tradition religious authority is often personal, embodied in 
the figure of the guru. Vyasa in fact is believed to stand at the head of the guru 
parampara or teacher tradition as the originator and authenticator of all important 
teaching. And therefore Vyasa’s authorship serves to validate the Mahābhāra a and its 
claim as the fifth Veda, which in turn reinforces this epic text with supreme religious 
leverage. Further, Lipner (1994: 74-85) argues the nature of the epic verses made them 
easier to remember and therefore simpler to disseminate at a later period through memory 
and recitation. Therefore, the epic has also social leverage, for an elite whose intent is to 
incorporate, even infect a wider society with their own ideals.365 Sanskrtization (Srinivas, 
1984) once more (discussed in further detail below).  
My own marriage had to be conducted at precisely 8.59 pm on 14th August 2002. 
My father’s eldest cousin, who still lives in our ancestral home where the verses of the 
Rgveda are held for protection, dictated both time and date. In the absence of my father it 
                                               
364 Marcel Mauss’s study although released in French between 1923-4, became more widely translated and 
available to academics and others in 1950. Therefore, in reference to the conceptual idea this date is used in 
the thesis. In the discussion of gift theory in this thesis two versions, or translations of Mauss are used. The 
more widely accepted of these two for social scientists is by Ian Cunnison (1970). However a more recent 
reading is relevant for a much changed world. Interestingly the very title is translated variously. Halls’ 
(1990) version uses the phrase “form and reason for exchange” as opposed to the previous translation 
“form and function”. This represents the shift in focus of our society from a more functional to one that 
attempts explanations, perhaps?  
365 See Lipner (1994: 25-165) for an explanation of how “the Veda” functions as “scripture”  and notably 
for the present purpose for the relevance of caste and narrative (108-145), also a discussion on the part 
folklore plays in the wider social network in India in the context of the growth of intellectual power of an 
entire group (146-164).  
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fell to him to ordain these details. I needed to travel by the end of September to begin this 
PhD thesis and we thought it appropriate to marry (after a courtship of thirteen odd years) 
before I committed myself to this arduous project. The timing was all wrong, we were 
told. August for instance is not a month appropriate for making marriages. December and 
January tend to be more auspicious. But after deep consultation with the planetary 
configuration, our individual and collective birth and life charts astrologically, an 
appropriate date and time were found. So many other factors dictate this sort of 
arrangement, and clearly cannot be detailed here. For reasons of brevity, however, the 
fact that ours was a love366 match and not arranged primarily by our elders or peers made 
the negotiation much simpler. Even so, the underlying influence of the power struggle 
between groom-givers and bride-bearers floated to the surface. In spite of the technical 
anomaly that my partner and I were organising every last detail, and spending our own 
savings to make our marriage a reality, the overbearing burden of appropriate behaviour 
had to be maintained in order to achieve a harmonic linking of two families. 
The difference in auspiciousness featuring in love matches, or arranged marriages 
has been examined by Osella (1998; 2000) and Vishwanathan (2001) and Saavala (2010). 
It cannot be gone into at any length in this concluding exposition; however it is crucial to 
note that the presence of love in the mix of marriage is not always a staying hand on 
those that have the intent to demand a dowry. Saavala (2010: 52-57) discusses how the 
intervention of love in the marriage model can play havoc with the more serenely 
perceived Sanskritic ideal model of kanyadān as discussed above. In hierarchical terms, 
the prestigious ideal of the ancient Brahma form of marriage where the bride-bearers are 
meant to be the sole givers, “giving the gift of the virgin and dowry as well as being an 
eternal source of gifts later on while denying any reciprocal flow” (Saavala, 2010: 54) of 
wealth has to be followed in order to achieve the correct status for a family. Love 
marriages veritably transform the gift-giving model by putting it on its head, making it 
appear instead like the opposite model of gift exchange, namely bridewealth. Saavala 
(2010: 54) makes the further observation that; 
                                               
366 Although the proportion of love marriages and free-choice marriages in India is growing, the trend leans 
in favour of arranged-cum-love marriages. An interesting study highlighting the ‘doomed’ nature of young 
romances outside the purview of parental control worth mention here is Osella and Osella (1998), who 
found that often young couples who had established or entered into romantic affairs commonly expressed 
the “hopelessness” of their situation. 
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…in some cases of love marriage, the boy’s side might give to the girls’ side thereby 
inverting the hierarchical model in which the girl’s side is eternally “below” the receivers 
of the gifts. For example, a young man received a car as a gift from his sister’s fiancé 
before the wedding. Evidently he felt embarrassed by the fact and when I asked about the 
origins of the vehicle, he explained that the gift was from his sister. This kind of more 
reciprocal exchange in marriage transactions leads to a new constellation that could 
possibly shake the established hierarchical and hypergamous model of dowry and 
arranged marriage. 
However, as much as one would weigh in favour of the reverence of reciprocity in 
marriage making and related transactions the embedded behaviour which accompanies 
such marriages highlights the long and narrow road that must yet be traversed in order for 
some change for the better to be meaningfully achieved. In the meantime, the social fact 
remains that arranged marriage is the high-status norm (Saavala, 2010: 46) and this is 
emulated by wider society. In the absence of reliable statistics to account for the 
proportion of free-choice or love marriages, it is probably safe to state that the majority of 
marriages in India continue to be matches made by parents, or their peers. The most 
prevalent model for romance in marriage of course is provided by the 1000 films a year 
market of Bollywood, which cannot be underestimated. Here, too, the dowry model is 
subtly, and at times not so subtly, replicated.367 
Most of the behaviour here documented is underwritten by a conscious perception 
of dowry marriage as the ideal model, both in the mindsets of groom givers and bride 
bearers. For instance, the gift of dowry willingly given is often seen as showering 
affection on one’s daughter. Saavala (2010: 54) notes the case of a mother of three girls, 
where this mindset of having to give something to secure a good future of the girl 
becomes apparent. This rationale is by no means limited to the few, as Saavala (2010: 
54) notes “Some people want to take [dowry], some people don’t take dowry. We give as 
much as we possibly can. Whatever we have we give, beyond our means we can’t give. 
We want our daughter to be in a nice family background, so we have to give something.” 
And as Saavala (2010: 54) goes on to note, this peculiar rationale common among 
upwardly mobile middle-class families in any Indian Hindu family “if they can afford to 
pay dowry, they think it will secure a desirable match for their daughter and reduce the 
possibility of her suffering in the affinal home. In most middle-class peoples’ thinking, 
                                               
367 See Ye Aag kab Bujhegi (1991) as one example of dowry related troubles being reflected in popular 
Hindu cinema. More recent references in popular culture are abundant of course. 
 
 
308 
sending your daughter to her husband’s family without money gold and gifts would be 
asking for trouble” [emphasis added]. “‘Giving’ confers power on the giver; ‘receiving’ 
is a sometimes shameful act that can put the receiver in the power of the giver”. This 
aspect of a complex power equation linked to the giving and receiving of dowry has been 
clearly tackled in Chapter 4 and is briefly addressed below. 
 I have, among friends and people I know, come across cases where love 
marriages have turned into difficult divorce settlements somehow toppled by demonised 
versions of undercurrent dowry harassment. An unsatisfied set of in-laws may harangue a 
young bride saying “If he had married someone we chose she would have brought so 
much wealth. But you married for love like in Hindi films, it is very modern, but not 
always the best for everyone”. Similarly Saavala (2010) finds in Andhra Pradesh cross-
cousin marriages where love may be a factor in choosing a certain bride, but then coming 
in for surreptitious slandering. Although cross-cousin marriages were traditionally the 
acceptable even desirable norm in Hindu South India, this is somewhat altered today. 
One case noted by Saavala is worth repeating here, a young bride domiciled in her 
husband’s joint family home with two little children sharing the space with her husband’s 
siblings and their nuclear families, and therefore dependent on the parents-in-law had to 
suffer for not having brought any dowry. “She explained…her parents-in-law kept 
reminding her that other brides would have brought with them Rs. 4 lakhs while she 
brought none.” This was used as a bargaining tool to force housework and cooking on her 
although other daughters-in-law could just as easily have pitched in. She was 
contemplating returning to her natal home. But separation and divorce, though in 
contemporary times offer an option, are certainly not the preferred choice of lifestyle, 
either for the woman or to impose on children of a difficult, dowry drained marriage. 
What this case clearly confirms is that dowry adds to a woman’s status and bargaining 
power in the family. Clearly, a woman who brings a lot of property, in whatever form, 
into her new marital home, will have a different status than one who came with less. The 
situation persists in overseas communities within the diaspora as well. For instance the 
specific case of suffering caused within a single family, between two sisters and their 
father in the British Sikh community (Jhutti, 1998: 192).368 
                                               
368 Such scenarios are not unique to the British Sikh community but are more widespread, and as yet 
unresearched.  
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Further, though, love marriage offers parents with limited means an escape 
however discreditable from at least initial dowry demands. But, as Saavala notes there are 
cases where even in love matches demands may surface after a marriage has taken place 
(2010: 53). Then there are the cases of highly educated women who will save up and pay 
either the entirety or contribute to the paying of the dowry or marriage expenses. All in 
all, this most recent discussion on middle-class India demonstrates that the ideal of 
marriage arranged by the wider kin group persists (Saavala, 2010: 48-49). In the case of 
Lalita who saved up from her own earnings, the parents were looked down upon by the 
wider group. In Lalita’s own words the older relatives disapprove of parents who were 
“making their daughters work for themselves” because it is clearly seen as the parents’ 
duty to provide the accompanying gift of a dowry to make the ‘gift of a virgin’ more 
acceptable to the affinal family (Saavala, 2010: 41-42). This notion clearly attests the 
findings within the thesis here that these pressures of peer perception indicate what 
appropriate behaviour is in making marriage matches, negotiations and choices. Clearly 
then, sadācāra is at play here. The cognitive value linked to this sort of collective 
conscience shared by an entire community cannot be underplayed. When, as these days, 
education takes longer, demands for dowries may be exorbitant and a suitable match 
becomes harder to find. This may of course be linked to assumptions that such older girls 
are difficult to live with and dowry may here be seen as additional costs imposed because 
of certain perceived or actual negative characteristics of the bride, age being only one of 
them. Such more recent trends point to a new model of behaviour at play in the modern 
Indian middle classes, which is worth discussing here in brief. 
Now, Varma (1994) observes that the relatively new and clearly upwardly mobile 
middle class are not depicted in a favourable light, as a socially responsible class aware 
of the needs of a developing society around them.369 Instead they seem to constitute a 
social strata selfishly motivated by their own preoccupations in terms of displays of 
conspicuous consumption and status-driven consumerism. Those identified as belonging 
to the modern Indian middle class do not necessarily form a ‘class for itself’, as a socially 
cohesive stratum aware of its shared economic and societal interests.  Gupta (2000) finds, 
                                               
369 The part played by the daily praxis of middle class groups in various other parts of Asia was scrutinised 
with due attention paid to the transformative role of social behaviour (See, Osella and Osella (2000), 
Liechty (2003) among others. What Saavala’s (2010) study does is synthesises the socio-cultural processes 
at play in Indian and Asian middle class groups by exploring how these are inter-related, and how they 
reflect cultural specificity. 
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clearly from his moral high ground, that regrettably though this relatively new social 
class is westernised, it is a skin-deep plastic mentality with no added conceptions of equal 
rights or a true understanding of liberal democracy. However uncomfortable this 
viewpoint is, it is crucial to consider that it is against this backdrop that much of the 
problem relating to dowry behaviour is acted out. And, by middle class people who 
believe themselves to have achieved the cornerstones of western society in every sense, 
but still remain akin to a cultural specificity much entrenched in a deep traditionality. It is 
this complex hypocrisy that adds to and largely constitutes the depth of the dowry 
problem. 
 Bourdieu’s (1984) classification of French society may be seen as derivative to 
the nature of the modern middle class in India today, and is in contrast to Liechty’s 
(2003) production-related classification.370 In terms of a significantly more relevant 
casting of class overtly as a culturally influenced social process, this thesis understood the 
importance of relating the morality of a small group to suit the majority of those who 
practise dowry behaviour. In this sense the study here re-invents the position of a class or 
even a caste struggle based on Bourdieu’s more or less symbolic and somewhat status-
guided formations. Class-struggle in a Marxist sense may appear an out-moded strategy 
for a community to busy itself with, in an attempt to gain and barter for better rank, but in 
Indian terms it is relevant here. As discussed at length in chapter 4 above, this sort of tug-
of-war between classes continues at ground level, and the status-guided position seeking 
negotiated constantly during marriage match-making fits here. Of particular concern here 
is the central feature of belonging to the middle-class in the ongoing classification 
struggle (Bourdieu, 1984): specifically how to restrict entry to others from the lower 
strata into the higher one, and crucially how to gain acceptance by one’s status equals and 
superiors (Saavala, 2010: 12).371 This is relevant in terms of dowry behaviour in 
particular. Another typical feature of middle class morality noteworthy here is the high 
moral value attached to monetary means, to practise morally higher standards, which 
links in also with modern day dowry-related behaviour.  
                                               
370 Liechty (2003) has conducted a similar study in relation to social classes in Kathmandu, Nepal, who also 
follow similarly hierarchised status game play in the Hindu sense.  
371 South Asian middle class behaviour and classification has gained growing scholarly interest, Liechty 
(2003). On Indian middle classes noteworthy among others are the work Osella and Osella (2000), and of 
Saavala (2001; 2003; 2010)  
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Increasingly the new middle-class in India express their role in society as ‘being 
modern’ not as a reflection of being westernised but being indigenous. Margit van Wessel 
(2001) shows in her ethnography that this new group in discussing modernity and its 
morality consider it very much indigenous to their lives.372 Osella and Osella (2000) in 
their observation of an upwardly mobile lower caste in Kerala found a similar pattern of 
behaviour and thought. 
This brings us to the following discussion on how one can overlay ancient and 
medieval thought processes onto a modern marriage market without creating great 
discomfort among modern-day lawmakers, feminists and interpreters of anthropological 
pasts. In search of a more comfortable and proud modernity, modern dowry, and related 
death rates clearly represent a threat to the pre-occupation with the golden age ideologue 
of the Hindu Right. There has been an insistence on recasting the past, to make modernity 
more acceptable than the westernised models left behind by colonial lawmaking 
administrators. 
 
8.2 Dowry as dharma with a very small ‘d’or sadācāra 
One of the primary purposes of this final chapter is to clarify, explain and further analyse 
the concept of sadācāra, which is central to the main body of my thesis. By further 
assessing the role and nature of the terminology and usage associated with dowry-related 
behaviour, it will become clearer how and why the very term sadācāra may be crucial to 
a better understanding of the background within which dowry as a social custom 
operates. That there are other possible terms for ‘custom’ in various parts of India is 
readily accepted, but the thesis did not venture to explore all the different typologies and 
their connotations. Focusing on sadācāra did not mean to suggest that it is the only such 
term in the field, nor to assert that it alone links to textual tradition. But because the term 
itself is mentioned in the ancient sastric texts, it somewhat stands out as a linking agent 
between textual tradition and societal practices and patterns of various kinds (Glenn, 
2000: Menski, 2003). Searching for meanings involves sifting interpretations from both 
legal and cultural texts, and will be kept brief. All of this will further highlight the 
undeniable position of the current Indian law relating to dowry as sadācāra, in opposition 
to the DPA as a symbolic legislation. 
                                               
372 As cited in Saavala (2010: 202). 
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The multi-disciplinary nature of this thesis calls for a brief preamble, and 
hopefully will guard against a backlash from purists in a pluralist contemporary context.  
Derrett (1976) called for collaboration between anthropologists and lawyers because 
anthropologists are concerned with what actually goes on in people’s minds and not with 
lawyer’s idealised versions of law.  apanese jurist Masaji Chiba (1986) insists that as a 
result of new approaches concerning the study of law it becomes clear that law is so 
“inseparably” rooted in society so as to be unpicked using sociological tools and 
methodology. Neil Whitehead (1995) highlights that “limited historiographical 
scholarship tends to underpin the literary analysis of ethnographic texts leading to an 
inadequate anthropological appreciation”. While Sally Falk Moore (1979) discusses the 
need for comparative classification: “The ‘culturalists’ highlight the specific nature of a 
society’s value system; the structuralists try to sift an underlying order within cultural 
variability” (see chapter 2 for an extended discussion). Then, Koch (1969) emphasises the 
need to ascertain categories by which the people being studied structure their ideas of 
wrongs. So it is with the essential understanding of dowry as practised at ground level as 
sadācāra or dharma with a very small ‘d’. In light of all of the above assertions therefore 
we arrive at the succinct conclusion that law must be recognised as an aspect of the total 
culture of a people, and is therefore subject to anthropological techniques of analysis.  
The challenge is to represent ancient and however vague perceptions of the need 
for giving some kind of ‘dowry’ in the language of today’s scholarship without running 
into the firing line of human rights activism that sees all forms of dowry as evidence of 
the systematic suppression of women’s rights. Hence I argued that there is ‘bad’ (the 
extortionate version) dowry and ‘good’ dowry, but that under the notion of a collective 
social consciousness at local level all dowry-behaviour is essentially considered ‘right’ 
therefore ‘good’. Therefore in textual terms, as reflected in the notion of sadācāra, giving 
dowry is good. It is even considered dharma with a very small‘d’. It begets, or should 
beget a good marriage, and secure a good daughter’s good future in a good household. 
The emphatic belief is of course on the ‘goodness’ of all the behaviour linked to dowry 
giving and taking at the auspicious time of negotiating and then completing the 
transaction of a Hindu marriage. That these are ideals and not merely normative 
statements should be obvious. However, then the state goes and outlaws it, reconstructing 
modern dowry as ‘bad’ and therefore we have a sociological and an ideological dilemma.  
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The intervention of normative positioning creates a conflict where none existed 
before. The DPA of 1961 does not in fact decree that no dowry whatsoever should be 
given or taken, but it seeks to curtail exploitative practices. Sadācāra as a term that recurs 
throughout the early and later dharmic literature appears to reference a much more 
specific set of cultural norms, dependent usually on the community in question when a 
traditional practice is called into question. For instance, my cousin would like to marry a 
certain boy. Her parents have not yet met him. They ask about his family, first of all, then 
his earning capacity, lastly his character. What governs this list of queries in the minds of 
parents? Who has the final say on what is ‘right’, ‘good’ or ‘valid’ behaviour in all the 
surrounding negotiations that interplay in order for a couple to be betrothed, and then to 
form that extraordinarily important unit of human society, the householders?  If one turns 
to the ancient, medieval or even modern texts then it seems one must take cue from the 
superior most, for instance the Indian Constitution or cases of the Supreme Court of 
India, or the old handbooks of the pundits, depending on which the particular pundit, or 
the community or family give preference to. In actual practices, however, none of this 
happens. Most people do not own a copy of the Constitution, nor would they refer to it in 
negotiating a marriage. While most people are aware of the existence of a powerful 
Supreme Court, they do no read its decisions in the form of reported judgments unless in 
some rare cases newspapers pick up this material and publicise it. As elsewhere in the 
practical application of the law, the time for recourse to law is usually when something 
goes wrong. But what when most things go right? 
 So, my cousin first consults me, do I think her mother would approve of this boy? 
She is a Bengali Brahmin, he is half German. We’re talking on the phone, at different 
corners of the UK, but being governed by the guiding principles of good behaviour for 
well-brought up Bengali Brahmin girls. First, I think, has any girl in our vast family 
married outside the Bengali fold? I have. I married a Muslim. But this now is a white 
boy, half English and half German. Does he even know about dowry? Suddenly I feel my 
sole knowledge of my family’s marital alliance making is far too limited to offer my 
cousin sound and suitable advice. So, what should my next port of call be? 
 It is this precise negotiation between oneself (ā  ana        ) and the world at 
large, traversed carefully by first accessing information and advice through one’s 
immediate peer group, whether that be family or familiars that gives us the first glimpse 
of how decision making at ground level is arrived at. Now, whether this could be used by 
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academically minded researchers as an example of how negotiations and gathering know-
how is carried out in real world scenarios relating to marriage and dowry discussions is a 
belief we must suspend ourselves to accept. If dowry as mentioned does not overtly 
appear to be mentioned in textual material, but has acceptably become a social irritant, 
enough to be legislated against, then how and in what circumstances does that dowry 
discussion take place? There is ample evidence to gather an understanding of how dowry 
links in with other marriage discussions. We are aware in the Hindu jurisprudence sense 
that decision making is carried out through a four stage method. This four fold path is 
elaborated on further in the following section below.  But whether the highest form of 
text, namely the ancient Sanskrit verses contained in the Vedas is ever accessed directly 
or not, there is a clear understanding that in most human interaction we arrive at an 
acceptance of what is the right thing to do, in the right context, by negotiating it first with 
oneself, and then with the relevant peer group. Individuals weigh pros and cons in the 
light of their own experience and other people’s guidance. However, the floating notions 
of sadācāra, as dharma with a very small ‘d’ are not entirely irrelevant, just as the grand 
words and guarantees of the Indian Constitution and the judicial statements from the top 
court of the country are not entirely disconnected from the social field.  
 In terms of dowry-related decision making, however, we have a clear directive 
that this comes from local, family based, community influenced behaviour patterns, in-
scripted into society through repetition for a long period of time. Local custom and 
tradition in fact have much more bearing than becomes apparent from a cursory reading 
of Hindu culture and society. The term pluralism sits perfectly with an understanding of 
how custom in fact operates in the dictating of dowry behaviour. Quite clearly, in spite of 
local colour and the homogenising emphasis of modern Hindu law, in its state avatar the 
importance of local influence in terms of customary traditional behaviour and practice are 
crucial and necessary to the acting out of community led weddings. 
 As elsewhere in the world, (Rheubottom, 1980) the nitty-gritty as it were of how a 
marriage party must be organised, who will receive the groom as the main reception 
party, what this implies in terms of status for the other side all remain open to situation-
specific negotiations. All these issues rest solely in the realm of customary notions of 
what is right and proper, however. But, importantly, what has an impact on that which is 
deemed right and proper behaviour for the wider group to follow, because it has possibly 
been in practice for a long period of time, which earlier used to be time immemorial for 
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legal purposes. These ideas are in an Indian Hindu context believed to be held in codified 
form within the older literature. This is why the collection of Vedic texts as academics 
might call them, may sometimes be consulted in Indian homes, by those who hold these 
ideas to be important and crucial. However, this is rare. The ‘texts’ are collectively called 
sanskriti, or samskara, or riti-riwaj, or resham-riwaj. These terms may be 
interchangeably used at ground level. As will be discussed below, the trouble with 
terminologies when dealing with Indian communities is that they are severally defined by 
the specific community in question. This therefore has a direct bearing on what is 
considered right and proper by a group, and evidently another separate thesis could be 
written on those distinctions in their specific cultural contexts. 
 But in an academic dissertation, like the present work, how does one qualify a 
term to fit varying, often disparate yet similar behaviour, which seen through a research 
lens shows evidence of a pattern emergent over a vast period of time if one wants to 
focus on the link, however intangible, of older and newer forms of text? That dowry 
exists there is no dispute. That all across India it has been problematic enough to occupy 
the judiciary and the social justice network and intelligentsia is not in question, either. 
There has however, precisely in the cultural texts themselves, been no one term for dowry 
in history, neither is there one Sanskrit term for it as an echo in all those languages that 
have sprung from Sanskrit as the parent. In search for the “len-den”, or taking and 
giving,373my research has turned up a smoke trail of expectations layered across the 
literature and various regional manifestations of dowry practices. So there is a 
consonance, no real term for dowry in the texts, no really uniform and simple identifiable 
term for dowry in local usage. It is called severally, (chapter 4 for more detail on regional 
terminology) hunda in Maharastra, and daaj (from the Rajasthani root) also heard in 
Punjabi culture, dahej in some northern communities, tattva or totto in Bengal, jahej 
elsewhere. And yet the behaviour or as in the Bengali community the niyom or niyam or 
norm that accompanies dowry linked behaviour is curiously similar if not the same. And 
in particular, the wretched outcome of a burned bride is uncomfortably uniform in dowry 
demands gone badly wrong. (For a fuller discussion on these terms, see 4.1 above) 
                                               
373 Notably here in the Hindi term lena or ‘taking’ appears before ‘dena’ which is to give. Whether this is 
merely a linguistic characterization because it sounds better, or whether it emphasizes the role of the one 
who takes as being more somehow better, or more superior in respect of the one who gives. As this thesis 
has outlined, the gift giver is usually at the lower end of the social status scale.   
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In wider, perhaps even Western terms, the term ‘right and proper’ has come to 
gain a legal tonality to it. In a similar vein, in an Indian context a similar term would 
perhaps be dharma, or in usage dharmic. However, in daily usage dharma even in an 
Indian context is linked much more to legality or spiritually linked action/ behaviour and 
in this context the more general term ācāra has been used and identified as an important 
concept in the work by Donald Davis Jr. (2010). In order to encapsulate the several, 
variant, pluralistic layered community local behaviour the term sadācāra, with the added 
element that this ācāra is ‘good’ and somewhat in accordance with ‘truth’, stands as an 
academic equivalent. In a country that has never had a single language to share, before 
British historical intervention, no single term means one single thing ever. It is always a 
shade of something, or as Menski (2011) now calls it, a ‘plurality of pluralities’. 
Similarly, as a researcher attempting to garner a code of practised behaviour under an 
explanatory label like sadācāra, for purposes of academic discussion and comprehension 
using an older Indian legally recognised term seems less objectionable than creating or 
inventing a newer modern term which will be loaded with unnecessary baggage, Western 
or otherwise. 
 Noteworthy here is Saavala’s (2010: 164-167) observation on the religious zeal 
and the ritual peculiarities of the new middle class in India with specific reference to the 
“Sanskritized emulation of those above them on the social ladder” [sic.]. This bears 
testament to the much discussed Sanskritisation of the outer-reaches of non-Hindus or 
even those considered outside caste. For instance “ex-untouchables”. Saavala speaks of a 
particular case, where the need to emulate the proper ritual of a Satya Narayana puja had 
some bearing on the social mobility of a family particularly with their ability to prove 
they could pay better dowries for three grown daughters. This has been discussed in 
chapter 3 above, specifically how the force of ‘doing the right thing’, another phrase for 
the Sanskrit term sadācāra, seems to have an influence greater than that of legal 
provisions for society at ground level. According to Saavala’s interview with Urmila, 
whose parents were ex-untouchable, the family could neither have arranged this 
Sanskritic ritual nor tried to do so due to severe discrimination in their village of origin. 
However, since migrating to another part of the country, they attempted to alleviate their 
social standing, by elevating it with an arrangement of ritual worship not within their own 
tradition because,  
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Everybody’s eyes are on us. The puuja helps us to get rid of that influence, helps good 
things to happen.    
This confirms that there are standards for sadācāra which are manipulatable by 
individuals and families, rather than simply dictating to people what they should be doing 
or not doing, as the case may be. Saavala finds (2003: 166), that one of the fundamental 
features of the lives of this family unit was that the father was suffering the burden of 
having three daughters of marriageable age, and no sons. The “root cause” for their 
suffering, she says, was this perceived inability to pay large dowries, and to “marry them 
off to educated grooms from high-status families”. Two elements become clear in the 
above situation. One that a family traditionally un-used to Sanskritic ritual in and of 
itself, are emulating these in order to gain approval-seeking (“eyes are on us”). Secondly, 
and more importantly, the causation of this approval-seeking is notably rooted in the need 
to reflect better status in order to gain access into the social strata of one’s betters (high-
status grooms). In its entirety the situation is reflective of the collective conscience of a 
social family unit adjusting its traditional behaviour, based on the current acceptable 
social behaviour of the particular group where they are. What throughout this thesis has 
been called ‘bartering for better ancestry’. This is sadācāra in action, as it were. It seeks 
to manipulate a scenario where a family that does not have enough means to generate 
huge dowries is seeking to gain a better status in society and thus make their daughters 
more attractive as potential marriage partners, by simply doing ‘what is right’, or at least 
deemed to be right. The importance of the group was referred to as superior to the 
individual, as individualism in Indian thinking was considered a “bad” motive (Inden, 
2006: 15). 
Osella and Osella (2000) in their examination of an upwardly mobile ex-
untouchable caste, the Izhavas in Kerala, observed how religious consumption has 
become a means by which to transform material capital into symbolic capital. For 
instance, their ethnographic study suggests that better-off Izhavas try hard to shrug off 
their perceived negative characteristics by placing investments in spiritually superior 
temple donations, among other things. There is also an effort to seek a personalised 
connection to the divinity through expensive vows and arrangements of temple ritual. In 
Hindu terms, as pointed out earlier, there is rarely discomfort in relating wealth to status. 
Hindu practices give ample space for interpreting the sacred in close connection to 
economic success. Seeking such blessing by recourse to wealth awaiting its 
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transformation into wealth in terms of prestige and finally upward social mobility is 
being noted across middle-class groups (Osella, 2000: 168-169).   
Therefore, sadācāra shows itself within this thesis to be appropriately applied to 
much dowry linked behaviour; governed by the fluid logic and wider perceptions of 
custom. Importantly it does not alienate any local influences, in fact it makes room for 
them precisely because the primary focus of the term is the inherent ‘goodness’ or ‘sad’ 
prefix to the notion of a legally understood term ācāra or behaviour.  
 
8.3  Troublesome terminologies 
‘Hindu law’ as a term in itself is a cumbersome construct, but a placative in usage widely 
which brings its own problems (Menski, 2003: 73). As a collective term as such, it has 
been variously codified for the purposes of uniformity and easier application across a 
very diverse land, where pluralistic solutions are not seen as a mark of modernity. There 
has been general agreement, which in this area as any is rare, that the pedigree of Hindu 
law is possibly one of the more ancient systems of jurisprudence. That the texts which 
form the basis for this pedigree are numerous and varied, and deeply plural in nature is 
most often glossed over. Hindu law whether among practitioners, academics or 
specialists is now considered an acceptable term to denote the vast textual and oral 
tradition which encapsulates the very amorphous concept of dharma. The reason to 
reiterate the relevance of nomenclature here is to highlight how, as Hindu law has come 
to be accepted as a term encapsulating a wider most plural set of systems of lawmaking, 
then similarly dowry as a term has come to be used for plural locally charged behaviours 
under one heading. For academic purposes and to help identify and define the causation 
of the socially rooted norms of behaviour linked to dowry prestations and demands this 
thesis has used the term sadācāra.  
 Relevant to note here is the fact that Orientalist constructions have obscured the 
plural nature of this system of jurisprudence far beyond the scope of one doctoral study, 
or a single essay to meaningfully redress. However, to begin by making note of the nature 
of the research conducted to date is to lay bare the framework, and expose the mechanics 
of how sadācāra comes to light as a crucial determinant in the cultural creation of dowry 
practice. Methodologically the historical school of jurisprudence (Cotterrell, 1989; 
Menski 2000: 99-110), which takes into account the organic progression of legal systems 
viewing them more as legal philosophy of a sort is crucial here. This comes close the 
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purist definition of the Latin term juris-prudence as meaning quite literally the morality 
of the law. That notion is not so removed from the historically rooted analysis of the 
ancient Sanskrit literature. However, alongside distilling a rational argument for an 
evolving legal philosophy of sorts one must consider the probability that normative 
orders and legal rule systems transpired through a process of logical elaboration; but have 
not been systematically documented in written form. Menski (2003: 73) asserts that most 
of the Hindu legal system, then as in the present, was negotiated at local level and 
remained largely un-documented. This fact again re-asserts the importance of social 
behaviour that is acted out at local level, but may not always find its way into codes of 
legally sanctioned behaviour. Dowry-behaviour as we saw in chapters 4, 5 and 6 clearly 
exists in expectations surrounding what is believed by the father of the bride and his 
peers, and superiors to be the correct ‘bedeckment’ for his daughter, in keeping with his 
social stature and aspirations, as well as bartering for better ancestry as noted by Inden, 
(1976) in medieval Bengal; specifically enjoined in the clan charters or kulaji texts of the 
period (see chapter 5, specifically 5.2). 
 As has been pointed out, the dowry ontology itself is shaky, but the practice is 
not. Whether locally referred to as ‘niyam’ (norm in Hindi/ Bengali) or reshum-riwaj or 
riti-riwaj, all of this behaviour surrounding giving and taking of gifts at a wedding seem 
to be governed by a fluidity that is disconcertingly constant. As we saw in chapter 4, the 
trouble with defining dowry has been manifold (see in detail Menski, 1998). In a 
peculiarly Indian context worse still perhaps, given all the variant local and regional 
colours and shades that need to be filled in as well. For the purposes of further future 
research, a state by state community by community search will need to be undertaken to 
compile a comprehensive list of names given to the act of dowry across India, and Indian 
communities abroad. Precisely because of the fact that the DPA has had considerable 
public dissemination; its infiltration into popular belief leads to the newer ideology that 
all dowry is bad, these behaviours have therefore been further demonised and sent 
underground. Thus, in terms of any future attempts at gathering newer fieldwork data the 
identity of the researcher will be crucial to gaining true accounts from the participants in 
any such research.374 
                                               
374 Saavala (2010) and Vishwanathan (2001) have highlighted this problem in a peculiarly Indian context 
when dealing with domestically reliable data. Sharma (2001) also points to this hurdle in gaining true 
accounts when relating to any research conducted on women. Further, as mentioned in the main part of the 
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 An inherent problem with defining transactions at marriage is that they tend to be 
ambiguous in nature. The current legal definition of dowry does not take cognisance of 
the on-going payments incumbent on the wife-givers for the duration of their daughters’ 
life, though “in consideration of marriage” was finally altered to “in connection with” 
(Bhatnagar, 1996: 4). In the current thesis the terms stridhanam, same as stridhana; dan, 
pon, dabi, tattva, hunda, dahej, daaj among other colloquial regional language terms 
have been variously discussed in terms of their phantasmal connection with the phantom 
of dowry. As highlighted right at the start of this thesis, dowry is described as a phantom 
because in the Indian context it appears to have no ontological existence. And yet, as we 
saw above, dowry exists. Therefore, a brief revisiting of the main terminology that 
signifies dowry gifts, dowry behaviour and related ideology is worthwhile.  
 Most of the terms mentioned here have already been dealt with in some detail in 
the text of the main thesis, chapter 4; section 4.1 in particular, highlights and 
problematises the arena of definition and dowry as a conundrum with ongoing 
ontological and sociological repercussion with little clarity. What bears repetition 
however is the plural nature of the practices that these terms symbolise. Further, in most 
cases, as locally variant as the behaviours may be, what appears to be difficult for most 
western academia to ascertain, and even grasp is how each specific term has a similarly 
tangible element of social pressure attached to it. The word dabi, for instance as Fruzzetti 
(1999: 30-31) explains it and discovers lays emphasis on the burden of the act of gifting.  
Her considerable fieldwork in Vishnupur, West Bengal revealed to her an arena rife with 
unspoken rules, but all the players, particularly the women were conversant with these 
rules or norms. Fruzetti finds that the negotiation for a suitable match in marriage is never 
made without the father of the prospective bride or ‘virgin’ being aware of the 
expectations linked to gift giving behaviour. There is a clear awareness among the actors 
that when there is an expectation of the offering of a “virgin in marriage” the bride bearer 
will consider that the receivers will demand a second supplementary gift if they indeed 
accede to the first gift of the girl herself. 
The word dab in Bengali refers to pressure, or force, even demand. What cannot 
be overemphasised once more is how contextual the linguistic data is to the specific 
situation in which it is being used. Plurality remains key to understanding Indian cultural 
                                                                                                                                            
thesis, Srinivas (1952) had clearly pointed to the mechanics of involving a female social scientist, with the 
appropriate background to unearth clearer pictures of what is at play in the field.   
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contexts when unpicking custom. If the families involved in the marriage negotiation, are 
neighbours or have had promissory discussions laid in the couple’s childhood to create an 
affinal link in later life, the pressure will be different to that of two families only recently 
acquainted. Or, for instance if the couple have made an initial love match, building on an 
arrangement set up by the wider family or group of familiars. As much as we have noted 
above, the detail depends on the local context. If they are family friends, and have shared 
a relationship for some time other factors may come into play. The practical implications 
of sharing food, and even friendship transform the nature of a relationship between 
individuals making the possibility of practical kinship as opposed to official kinship, and 
these are negotiable relationships as well (Bourdieu, 1977: 34)375. Another relevant 
aspect of these relationships is the possibility of faking one’s antecedents. Particularly in 
current urban set-ups it may be possible to present one’s caste background, as veritably 
higher than it is. One can “pass” oneself off as something one is not. The risk of losing 
face if this is detected may discourage groups from such an option (Osella, 2000). Caste 
behaviour is linked to all kinds of sensitive issues in India even today. Friendships can be 
threatened even by small infractions of behaviour not deemed acceptable in areas of life 
other than the highly auspicious ones set out through marriage. For instance friendships 
between young people of differing backgrounds can be fragile (Osella, 2000: 230), see in 
particular the case of the low and high caste youths in Kerala and their relationship. In 
spite of close ties of friendship they were not in the habit of visiting each other’s homes. 
They were forced into a situation where the higher caste boy had to accept a drink from 
his low caste friend’s home (considered polluting due to the low caste status).  
Even if the ritual purity of caste related behaviour does not govern public practice, 
it continues to have a strong influence on intimate relationships, particularly in the realm 
of the home. By extension, of course marriage and negotiations are within this realm, and 
therefore likewise affected. Osella and Osella (1998) also point out that within the realm 
of the home and familial relationships conventional hierarchies tend to govern friendships 
and are rather strictly maintained. Someone who does not adhere to these rules is felt to 
be showing a lack of feeling for the game (Osella, 2000: 228-229). It is better to behave 
                                               
375 Worth noting however, is that such divisions into official and practical kin can be criticised for granting 
the practical position of kin relations the hint of contestation, even if the context be absent. Besides, these 
two sides of kinship are interdependent (Peletz, 1996: 81). 
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within these game rules therefore. This also underlines our sense of sadācāra, as being 
fluid and ever changing in local scenarios, in a situation specific sense.     
But what remains stubbornly almost fixed, in the way expectations are heaped on 
the father of the bride, or the other bride bearers and the natal family of the girl to 
“suitably bedeck the bride” (Chatterjee, 1974: 258).  The behaviour in the attendant 
society, whether that be the Bengali samaj or the Punjabi household governed by the 
reshum-riwaj that governs the giving of daaj (Oldenburg, 2002: 87-90), the ideals 
encapsulated in the texts are mirrored in the respective social acting out of the marriage. 
The clear consonance that the products of the marriage, as in the children, would carry 
the blood-line and ancestry of the couple linking their respective affines, is also crucial. 
And, further as seen in the section above, gold and in modern terms moveable wealth is 
underpinned in a social sense incumbent on the father and his peers to “bedeck” the bride 
in keeping with his betters so as to prove and move his own rank, and keep up to fourteen 
generations of his own ancestors satisfied. Several dhar as ū ra verses are explained by 
commentators as expressing the duty of the bride’s family to adorn her suitably 
(Chatterjee, 1974: 464). This clear enjoinment to the parents, specifically the father of the 
bride, to “bedeck” the daughter suitably enough to then become acceptable as a gift is of 
repeated primary concern this thesis has proved, (See discussion in section 5.3 for more 
literary detail). This reiteration through the sū ra and śās ra literature is a very telling 
clue toward the idealisation of dowry, or any goods that go with the girl. It clearly was a 
custom to do so, but maybe people needed to be told to take it seriously in the ancient and 
medieval period. In its earliest sense the notion of moveable property, in terms of brilliant 
attire, jewellery and adornments all point clearly to the conceptual importance of 
bedecking the girl. This must be read as an enjoinment to the father of the girl to make 
her ritually acceptable in the eyes of the groom, and the family who will receive her. This 
also ties in with ideas of status of the giver and receiver, as seen in sections 4.2 and 4.4 
above. 
The role of the father in the act of gifting, both the girl and the goods that go with 
the girl, is emphasised in all accepted forms of marriage. However, it is evident from the 
verses that though offspring were considered to belong to their father and his family, they 
were not possessions in the manner of cattle etc. or other items that could be given away 
when in debt for instance. The married couple were ideally considered joint owners of 
property, a fact borne out by the term dampati used for the couple. Essentially the pair 
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was looked upon as joint upholders of the world of rta through an adherence to dharma 
(dharmena). Sternbach (1965: 370) in his analysis of the Brahma, Daiva and Prâgâpatya 
forms notes: 
[i]n the case of these three forms, contrary to the Arsa-   āha, the obligation to give a 
dowry was clearly expressed. So we may say that the bestowal of the dowry was the 
essential point in these... and they were the highest most esteemed forms... 
These, and similar findings by ethnographic investigators ring loud and clear of a 
clear and present expectation to accompany the gift of the girl, with an extraordinary 
supplementary gift, which has come to occupy central importance for the groom-givers. 
The fact that it adds to the financial standing of the family is of course a factor that must 
not be ignored. In fact we saw in the main thesis, and as further discussed here in this 
concluding chapter, that the material gift has come to occupy a status and importance 
greater than that derived off the girl as a person and a new family member. Therefore, 
once more one is reminded of the fatal consequences of the auspiciousness loaded onto 
the carrier of the gift if the material gift is valued more than the carrier herself. Too often 
she is sacrificed, and the gift consumed, never returned. In Chaturanga Tagore (1916) 
points out, “The scriptures forbid the sacrifice of female animals, but in the case of 
human beings sacrificing females gives great satisfaction.” 
Consider this testimony from an insightful synthesis of Hindu laws and usage 
relating to the position of the Hindu woman in late eighteenth century Indian society;  
“…a woman is not regarded in Hindu law as an active party in marriage. In fact, 
she is hardly regarded a party at all. Marriage is viewed as a gift of the bride by 
her father or other guardian to the bridegroom: the bride therefore, is regarded 
more as the subject of the gift than as a party to the transaction.” (Banerjee, 1879: 
45-46). 
What is insightful is that the discussion continues to talk of why there is a need 
for guardianship of the girl about to be given as a bride. We have not made enough in this 
thesis of the fact that brides being bartered for marriage were often underage, and not in a 
position to negotiate on their own behalf. Child marriage has not featured in the 
discussion above at all (See Menski, 2003: 322-373). But it must be considered that until 
recently girls as young as ten were considered not only appropriately aged, but as Gooroo 
Dass Banerjee (1879) surmised and echoed the sentiment of a majority of the populace 
that “minors are not only eligible for marriage, but are the fittest to be taken in marriage”. 
 
 
324 
This sheds great insight into the heavy burden on fathers to negotiate ably on behalf of 
underage daughters. It also lends further light to the conceptual underpinning of the 
processes by which girls continue to be seen as without legal position, and therefore in 
need of guardians to be bestowed as gifts to an affinal family unit. These sentiments 
albeit of an older, past generation, co-exist with modern belief in the empowered woman 
in Indian society today. And, yet we see the discussion in Saavala’s (2010) thesis on 
middle class morality returning time and again to the inability of even highly educated 
girls, or women, being given or having true autonomy over their own destiny. 
As regards the continuing confusion over terminology when dealing with modern 
manifestations of dowry the case of stridhan in Kerala is interesting to highlight in brief. 
Vishwanathan (1993: 103) in her exploration of Christian marriage making rituals and 
rites in the southern parts of India notes the significant time and energy spent on the ritual 
receiving of the stridhanam. Briefly, as explained earlier in this work there has been 
serious confusion about defining dowry and stridhan (see 4.1) as distinct from each other. 
In linguistic terms they bear little relation. That the notion of  stridhanam as exclusively 
women’s wealth seems a more modern explanation where it has become crucial to define 
areas of ownership in relation to marital property in legal terms with the ever-increasing 
divorce and settlement arguments preoccupying family courts across India. However, 
from Vishwanathan’s description the practice of ritual stridhanam, the manner in which it 
is seen to change hands and the phraseology employed when the amounts are not 
acceptable are all curiously reflective of dowry behaviour in other communities across 
India. The fact there is feasting involved, that the affinal relationship is marked in a 
significant and separate ceremony from that of the marriage, where the previous 
negotiation is openly discussed in terms of what has been agreed by whom and when and 
where. There is a keenness to adhere to practices which exemplify the superiority of the 
wife-takers. This is also marked in the power of the groom-givers to walk away from a 
public reception, thereby breaking with the agreements simply by saying “Our son is not 
yet ready for marriage” or even appallingly acceptably “We have received another 
proposal which we are considering”. Pleas may follow to allay their expectations and 
thereby save face. In modern terms such negotiations often occur in a setting described 
by the social actors as “engagement” parties. As Kerala is seen to constitute a mainly 
matriarchal culture with a strong history of educating their women, the cases where such 
transactions go awry may reportedly be rare.  
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In a horrific case of dowry deferred (See Dowry Today, Documentary) a young 
Syrian Christian girl, Gracie (2003), had to flee Kerala to seek refuge with her brother 
and his wife in Mumbai due to continuing harassment and dowry demands. In fact when 
interviewed, the natal family spoke of their continuing burden to repay loans taken to 
furnish a fine wedding, and ongoing demands. The church in this case (Gracie) took a 
20% cut of the dowry, but when the groom went missing with the majority of the bride’s 
jewellery and cash, the Church has not mediated to recover the wealth. However, what 
must be referenced here is the fact that in the conception of peoples minds, most often 
dowry has in contemporary times come to signify such a demonised transaction that the 
milder, more apparently empowering term stridhan may be used for what is overtly a 
dowry transaction. As in Vishwanathan’s (1993: 103) observations, this is symbolic of 
“the prospective incorporation into the family” of the daughter-in-law. In a curious 
development the church intervenes in most of these negotiations, as an official mediator, 
and even accepts a cut for their effort. Often discussions may take place with the blessing 
of a Bishop and may even be carried on in the premises of a Syrian Christian church. 
That this process indicates forms and the active presence of community courts and 
tribunals could, in the current climate of much concern about such informal mechanisms, 
give rise to yet another very pertinent study about dowry practices in India. 
  
8.4 The four-fold path to ascertain the ‘right thing to do’ 
Not enough attention has been paid to the manner in which human society ascertains 
what in a specific context ‘the right thing to do’ is, or how indeed it is arrived at. Enough 
academic attention has been lavished on dharma idealising the spiritual and legal merits 
of a cosmologically underpinned entity that presupposes the ‘rightness’ of good 
behaviour. The accession to the throne of a good king, his understanding of being a good 
ruler through rajadharma, all these have been carefully constructed for students of legal 
philosophy. The question which has occupied this thesis in the main is how do people 
decide what is the right thing to do when it comes to arranging for dowry in relation to 
marriage?  
 Again, as much as a plurally constructed response to this is appropriate, the 
cultural texts themselves have clearly demarcated clues of how the world works. The 
work of Japanese jurist Chiba (1986) and Menski (1999- 2011) have been offering crucial 
building blocks through which to understand the notion of lawmaking at ground level. 
 
 
326 
Menski (2003: 124-125) summarises the case dextrously in highlighting the constant 
battle in legal circles with ascertaining textual authority. With specific reference to 
marriage, and as noted in chapter 5 above the As a ayana r hyasū ra 1.7.1-2 makes note 
of the “very diverse” practices of the variant communities across the then un-unified sub-
continent when it expresses:  
Very diverse, indeed, are the customary practices of different countries and villages; one 
should follow those in marriages. What, however, is common to all or most shall be 
declared here. 
 
In Menski’s translation he introduces the word “all or most” being careful to recognise 
the plural leaning of the ancient and medieval cultural texts. They are notably never 
sweeping in the generalisations made, and if they do so, they refer to an ideal vision, not 
social reality. Menski gathers from perusing these texts contradictions and important 
queries regarding the hierarchical appropriateness of one’s family or community customs 
as versus the other smriti textual prescriptions, which would have occupied the minds of 
those needing to negotiate marriages. There has been no detailed jurisprudential debate 
concerning the older source material and its hierarchy, as stated above in chapter 2, 
section 2.4; however, in Manusmriti 2.6 and 2.12, respectively, the guidance or rule is 
stated as below: 
“The root of religion {dharma} is the entire Veda {śr   } (then) the tradition and 
customs  s    }  of those who know (the Veda), the conduct of virtuous people 
{sadācāra}, and what is satisfactory to oneself” MS 2.6 
  
“The Veda [śr   ], tradition [sm ti ], the conduct of good people {sadācāra}  
and what is pleasing to oneself {ā  ana        } they say that this is the  
four-fold mark of religion (dharma), right before one's eyes” MS 2.12 (Doniger, 
1990.17)376 
Menski’s observation that for all practical purposes common Hindus would most 
certainly not have first gone to the highest of sources as the smriti represented, is 
reasonable, as in the case of my confused cousin. The cultural texts purport to indicate 
guidance on hierarchy not an actual suggestion of how to ascertain authority.  Therefore, 
                                               
376This translation of dharma continues to be problematic, like other core concepts in Hinduism: according 
to Menski (2002: 112) it is neither ‘law’ nor ‘religion’ and yet he believes it “encompasses parts of both”. 
In fact this shows how internal categorisations in Hindu culture don’t quite match with those of other 
religious traditions 
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error certainly lies in assuming that at ground level everyone had access to śruti or s     
texts. Ordinary individual Hindus would have accessed instead, as today, a fluid 
customary tradition or even perhaps morality as described in the epics, and disseminated 
by their peers or perhaps elders. As Menski mentions, commonsense suggests that it is far 
more useful to “gauge the dharmic needs of a particular situation” by turning to social 
reality. These textual statements must therefore be read in reverse as it were. As Menski 
has suggested, and I concur, the sequencing for the sources of dharma needs to be 
examined in the order beginning with the first, with foremost importance being given to 
individual satisfaction as ā  ana         and  therefrom upwards.  adāc āra thus plays a 
crucial role in how society manages itself, through the individual. To be clear this 
conclusion does not imply however, that ā  ana         or the Hindu individual’s self 
satisfaction somehow automatically relates to becoming a valid source of dharma in 
Hindu social reality. It is practically pre-eminent, but more in terms of how social reality 
works, than how legality functions. In fact in modern interpretations of law we see how 
Mahmood (1981: xli) almost ignores the individual aspect relevant to law making or law 
seeking, and instead interprets the individual dimension more in keeping with the notions 
of “equity, justice and good conscience”. This once more creates then another layer of 
secular, legalistic interpretation. Till these aspects of ancient Hindu law can be 
meaningfully translated as being valid to read law making at societal level, we will 
continue to see the current confusion at thinking that top-down models of law making can 
in the long term work within society.377 
  As concerns the legal roots of sadācāra in the notion of ācāra,378 or 
behaviour, a brief explanation will not be out of place here. Derrett (1968: 149) translates 
from  ā yayana that “whatever a person practises, whether it be in accord with dharma 
or not, is declared to be caritra because it is the invariable usage of the country.” Now in 
Menski’s (2003: 119) opinion this at first glance implies that “appropriate behaviour in 
itself serves as a source of dharma, requiring no further intervention from anywhere” 
“When the first element is replaced, as it regularly is, with other contextual markers, the 
theological connection to Veda is also weakened or lost. Texts speak freely of the ācāra 
of groups, of particular places, families, castes, and various corporate groups. When 
                                               
377 When in so many ways one is seeing even a fine philosophy like democracy disintegrating surely the 
time is here to seek systems of law outside the western model for clues to how societal harmony can be 
accessed.  
378 See also May (1985: 58-59) for a variety of meanings and forms of ācāra. 
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pushed beyond boundaries of its archetype, therefore, ācāra appears to be nothing but the 
norms accepted and imposed by the leaders of various social institutions. This slippage is 
very important for understanding how the famous recognition of customary laws of 
various social groups in Hindu jurisprudence came to be incorporated into the texts.” 
Davis (2010: 146-147) 
Julius Jolly (1975: 95-96) observed that the mystical authors of the Smriti texts 
were already aware and “recognised the necessity of the existence of other laws and 
regulations. It is a significant remark that the science of law ( ya aharasās ra) like 
grammar…is based on usage (ācāra).” Therefore the two concepts are clearly linked. 
Society seeks harmony in rituals and their repetition, particularly when it does not 
seem reflected elsewhere. In times of war, in terms of strife ritual is reassuring, even 
grounding for communities and cultures across the world. In terms of marriage making 
the harmony being sought is that of the couple as a single, individual householder unit in 
itself, but connected to the macrocosmic sphere. But further, as we have seen above, in an 
ancient and even modern society where the nuclear unit is important for the links and 
connections of a network it creates and is not always important for the couple by itself. 
As seen, in chapter 1 while discussing the theories at play in the wider thesis, and in 
particular the nature of the primary sources there is no established iconography for the 
most ancient period under scrutiny here. However, as demonstrated in the same chapter, 
when explaining the circle of solidarity represented in photo plate 1, there are in Indian 
specifically in Maharashtrian society remnants of an ancient art form in the shape of the 
Warli painting tradition. As discussed, these paintings, and etchings have their roots in a 
much older cave drawing tradition which record in a manner of evidence the aspirations 
of that older society. These modern depictions of clan and community aspirations clearly 
display the strength of solidarity, and of how the emphasis seems always on the 
functioning of society as a wider unit, based on the proper functioning of the smaller 
units within it. There are depictions of how society comes together at different times; for 
market day, for a celebration of the harvest and centrally for this thesis of course, 
gathering to celebrate a wedding. Examining the manner in which the couple are 
depicted, completely as the central focus of proceedings is important to discuss briefly 
here. The picture depicts the final taking of leave of the girl, seeking the blessing of her 
father. The bride is being carried in a palanquin, with a trumpeter leading the way, to 
banish bad spirits on the way. The groom is arriving on horseback, while the wider 
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community may be dancing with much gusto. The marriage hall is splendidly decorated, 
and all of this is witnessed by both the moon and the sun in the sky. All is at harmony 
with the other. This is I believe the closest one can come to a pictographic depiction of 
right and appropriate behaviour at play, sadācāra.  
 
8.5 Tying up the theory that dowry is good dharma  
From the chapters above and the final knotting of the threads in this last chapter it has 
become clearer than before that dowry functions in Indian communities as a 
conglomerate of culture, a complex and intricately interwoven custom, inherently 
integral to what is considered a good marriage. Custom was put forward in terms of text, 
as a loose system of ideals. Text is not always required to attest reality, but the early texts 
in question do attest the ideal condition society was intent to attain. In this regard the 
theories discussed in terms of methodology in chapter 1, see Fig. 2, it is worth reiterating 
the underlying gift-theory once more crystallised into this current applicable form by 
Marcel Mauss’s post First World War theory.379 Unlike the British social anthropologists 
who focussed on studying social relationships and their development, Mauss evolved an 
approach to examine collective representations, or in other words, cosmological 
concepts. This is why his work has been central to the discussion on dowry in tradition 
and text here, taking into account the emphasis of the plural collective social conscience 
under scrutiny here.  
For clarity, like Durkheim, Mauss attempted to establish abstract categories and 
conceptual notions to articulate essential properties inherent in phenomena under the 
social microscope, rather than to emphasise the empirical dimensions of specific cases. 
This then presupposes the social actor’s own definitions of social life being somehow 
inadequate. Further, in the same vein, the first and foremost most evident theorisation of 
data is consequently likely to be most superficial. This was an attempt to gain access to 
the laypersons’, even the social actor’s own categories of social and cultural description 
to discovering the underlying components of culture. How Mauss differed from 
                                               
379 In sharp contrast to Durkheim’s emphasis on the principles of ‘mechanical solidarity’ which integrated 
the broad class of segmentary societies based on clan division and territory offered a model for British 
scholars like Radcliffe-Brown and Evans-Pritchard who developed their perceptions of these societies 
based on this. Among the French intelligentsia, and particularly parallel to the development of British 
social anthropology in France was the work of a collective of scholars enthused by Durkheim and focused 
to work around  the journal Annee Sociologique. Among this group only his nephew Mauss, survived 
World War I to strengthen and carry forward the tradition.  
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Durkheim, and why that is structurally crucial to the discussion at hand with regard to the 
observation and functioning of dowry is that Mauss laid much emphasis on the synthetic 
aspect of sociological analysis. Mauss considered a study complete not merely when the 
phenomenon under question had been analysed down to its bare and basic form and 
subsequently recast into an evolutionary series, but when the phenomenon was re-
synthesised into a totality; so as to account for its plural nature by explaining all its 
correlations and differences, casting it thereby into a valid sociological explanation. 
Crucially, this aspect of Mauss’ method draws the discussion here back into the nature of 
plurality inherent in the social reality of ācāra-sadācāra, whether or not the social actors 
themselves explicitly refer to it as such. This is important in sociological terms when 
considering the principles of operation of the observed phenomenon, in this case dowry 
behaviour, rather than the abstract form of observed social relations. 
 When Mauss’s study The Gift (1925) was related in chapter 5, particularly 5.4, the 
critical aspect of his theory was examined, by which it was demonstrated that the manner 
in which a gift passes between persons also highlights their relationship to each other. 
That means the individuals then articulate their relationship by maintaining a hierarchy of 
reciprocal giving. It was discussed that since the recipient has to reciprocate as well as 
receive, there is a multi-dimensional aspect to the act of giving, and thereby to the acting 
out of dowry practice at ground level. Mauss further reveals that the gift has significance 
on a multi-dimensional scale of social relationship building; symbolic, individual and 
social. Further that these dimensions influence many other spheres of social life, namely 
religious, economic, legal and even moral. This is in harmony with Mauss’s notion that 
what must be analysed are ‘total social facts’, not just relations between two or more 
elements arbitrarily isolated from culture, but to examine what is between all the 
component parts. Instead of attempting what Durkehim did, at establishing universal 
laws, Mauss aims to make several factors intelligible by demonstrating that their meaning 
lies in their inter-relation rather than taking each one individually. Individual social facts 
are therefore to be explained as parts of an integral cultural complex.    
Similarly, dowry it appears is a phenomenon which can easily be identified as an 
example of Mauss’s total social-cultural phenomenon; it encompasses economic, 
religious, social, jural and political aspects of culture. Further, dowry is seen to function 
as a system of affinal gifting and transaction not for material wealth and status 
implications alone, but to seek, to harbour and maintain a relationship through an 
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intricate and long-term progression of symbolic and actual gift-giving. Therefore, dowry 
fits into the explanation of the gift-giving system identified as ‘pot latch’ (see Mauss, 
1990; White, 1987: 552). Once more the notion emerges of bartering for better ancestry 
and a more solid social standing, not uncommon in most human society. 
Reiterating ideas already expressed in chapter 2, above, but vital to the summation 
here; through an “unholy alliance” as Halbfass called it, (1992: 9) colonialism “elevated 
 rah a  c  formulations to the level of hegemonic text” (Raheja, 1988: 497-523), while 
Indological discourse continued to project “the essence of Indian civilization” as opposite 
to that of the West; that is as “the caste system and the religion that accompanies it, 
Hinduism” (Inden, 1986: 401-446). In the hands of the colonialists, caste became an 
administrative tool to “arrange and register” Indian society into a cohesive sum of parts. 
This further helped to transform  rah a  c a  hypocrisy into social fact. Essentially, as 
discussed at length in chapter 2 above,  rah a  s   represented an integrated socio-
politico-religious ideology which developed during a specific historical period. This was 
a result of certain social and political transformations as discussed before. Contained 
within this ideology was the worldview of the elite Brahma s , which found expression in 
their vast literature. These texts reflected the changing circumstances of the times as 
perceived by the Brahma s . This works neatly along with Saavala’s (2010) modern day 
assertion of observable Sanskritisation of the middle classes in India today. The need to 
emulate the elite in order to gain a superior standing both in society and daily life, is thus 
noted by Inden (1986) and Fruzzetti (1996) in their study of Bengali society over a period 
of decades.  
Worth noting here once more, is Clifford Geertz’s idea of culture as a semiotic 
concept. He equated ethnography with interpretation, or the reading of text. His 
explanation that the purpose of cultural analysis should “not be an experimental science 
in search of law but an interpretative one in search of meaning” (1973: 5) is relevant in 
tying up the notion of dowry as dharma with a very small ‘d’. Further, in recalling the 
researcher-ethnographers position as discussed in chapter 2, he gave greater importance 
to interpretative insights, thickly described, than to ‘thin’ scientific conclusions, as the 
product of ethnographic endeavour. I stressed this emphasis on being aware of the critical 
elements of cultural specificity in attempting to draw generalisations about how dowry as 
a custom functions. It is most plural in its practice. This became relevant in examining 
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my own position as a researcher involved in the study of my own culture. In particular, 
noting my stance as a woman, researching an issue that affects Indian women. 
Practically speaking this means that a written text is deemed to be more 
authoritative as it cannot be directly questioned or contested. However, texts in Sanskrit 
would still be open to interpretation, and thus would not simply be ‘fixed’. Writing 
however did restrict the access to the corpus of literature limiting its perusal to literate 
Brahma as  and k a r yas, thereby reinforcing their privileged status. But it could not be 
held that a text is simply ‘the law’. 
Dowry, as I have emphasised throughout this thesis, is clearly representative of 
sadācāra, and since this concept is interlinked with custom, we must examine here 
further how custom itself functions in the Indian context. In fact, seeing dowry as 
sadācāra it becomes important that it should continue as a practise, since it is perceived 
to somehow maintain the wider harmony in society. So the thesis attempted to understand 
how custom works in Indian society. Chapter 6 in particular examined the customary 
practices in Indian society in terms of dowry and the related dowry problem(s). Dowry is 
not important for itself alone but for the harmony it is seen to uphold in its very practice, 
as most traditions are.380 With particular reference to custom we have seen how custom is 
encapsulated within the textual tradition and then replicates itself in the behaviour 
considered appropriate by that particular community. As discussed, in chapter 2, the 
composition and compilation of the texts comprised primarily of enumerating the 
ideology of the dominant group, the Brahma as , who upheld themselves as models to all 
society. In so doing they created a tradition of upward mobility characterised in various 
ways throughout the texts, and today evidenced by modern sociologists studying modern 
middle classes and their preoccupation with monetary upward mobility (Saavala, 2010). 
To conclude, Kulin polygamy is one such by-product, dowry another (chapter 4). 
Dowry is sadācāra, even if it is not spoken of as such. Not all sad or good ācāra 
behaviour is necessarily ‘good’ in terms of modern expectations and norms. We must not 
lose sight of the range and change of expectations of positive and negative aspirations 
and related behaviour within the field of marriage considering the period under review is 
admittedly vast. Dowry as a cog of culture works. It has a proven life of its own; it has 
                                               
380 Haraway’s (1988: 575-599) idea “practice is persuasion”; following that somehow the continued 
practice of an given act carries the coercive force of persuasion to continue that practice. And the emphasis 
in the present thesis is quite squarely on practice. See also Campbell, (2004: 162-182) for an able critique 
of Haraway’s feminist reflexivity for use in social science studies, and its wider applicability. 
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successfully operated for a minimum of three thousand years, give or take a century. It 
refuses to go away. Then perhaps, it is fair to stake an assumption that dowry is necessary 
to Hindu/Indian marriage in some way. 381 
To reiterate the concluding analysis, from the above therefore: 
 “Dowry is in many ways an archetypal institution” (Srinivas, 1984:7) 
 Dowry will not be made illegitimate, in spite of many decades worth of effort, 
and confused law making. This discussion has laid bare the problem at the very core of 
this thesis: one cannot outlaw what is considered ‘the right thing to do’. Whether it is 
called as in Hindu classical terms sadācāra, or in modern analytical terms as dharma 
with the tiny ‘d’. Dowry not only exists, it persists as a problem, which will not be 
defined away. That the kulin preoccupation, as seen above, with preserving or trading 
status for wealth is so widespread goes to the very core of the issue.  
It appears from the discussion above that dowry needs to be given for a clan’s 
prestige to be maintained and sometimes bartered, as expressed in the modern middle 
class for a better ancestry. Dowry, therefore as a total social phenomenon, has an inbuilt 
sanction to its adherence by the wider social group. As we have seen, neither the legal 
sanction of prison or punishment is strong enough to delimit its influence in the field of 
marriage. Perhaps not even to curb it. It demands, therefore to be placed under the social 
microscope again, by a range of theorists, to recast it as a positive part of marriage 
arrangements.  
India’s Dowry Prohibition Act (1961) appeared to outlaw dowry, but didn’t. It has 
proved a misleading educative tool, causing more confusion than proving curative to a 
deeply entrenched customary scenario. This thesis considered how and why dowry has 
long defied legal prohibition. The analysis here clearly demonstrated that dowry was, is 
and remains a major determinant in ‘ideal’ marriage alliances. Thereby this thesis has 
aimed to fill a research gap in the current understanding of dowry as a normative marital 
custom. To deconstruct the demonised form of dowry will be difficult. However, the 
existence of the lengthy and comprehensive research in this thesis will go some way 
toward addressing this issue again. 
 
                                               
381 See the case of Gracie and the acceptance of dowry in a Catholic scenario, where the Church accepts a 
‘cut’ or percentage of the dowry in a Keralan Syrian Christian marriage ceremony. (Dowry Today, 2002 
documentary) 
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